William S. Rosecrans

[Irishtom29]

No other army on the planet could have advanced to Chattanooga & stayed there.

The Army of the Cumberland stayed there with considerable help from the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Tennessee.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The Army of the Cumberland stayed there with considerable help from the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Tennessee.

And they were sustained there by the brilliant logistical system Rosecrans put in place. The Atlanta Campaign would have been impossible without A of the C logistics. I don't know why people forget the 240,000 strong Department of the Cumberland that made everything possible.

As commander of the Department, Thomas was able to Marshall the forces necessary to destroy Hood's army.

I do not mean this to be rude, but popular histories barely scratch the surface of what it took to successfully fight the war in the West.

 

[LematLemat]

The Army of the Cumberland stayed there with considerable help from the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Tennessee.

In fairness, the material contributions of Hooker's Easterners and Sherman's Army of the Tennessee were far less than those of Thomas' men when it came to relieving the supply situation at Chattanooga.

From September to October, the Army of the Cumberland sustained itself for over a month upon a supply line which consisted of a single road stretching from Bridgeport into the Sequatchie Valley, and from there over the difficult Walden's Ridge into the town. The concept of forging a new supply line via Brown's Ferry, the famous "Cracker Line," originated with Baldy Smith, then Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. Additionally, it was troops from the Army of the Cumberland who would ultimately make the crossing at Brown's Ferry and secure the bridgehead across the river. While Orland Smith's 11th Corps brigade and John Geary's 12th Corps division would fight and fight well during the night of the following day at Wauhatchie, Sherman's troops would not arrive until another three weeks. When it came to surviving upon their existing line of supply, and creating and seizing a bold, more efficient line of supply, it originated from Army of the Cumberland officers and was carried out by Army of the Cumberland enlisted men.

 

[tony_gunter]

Actually it was June 23rd. Nine days before that a completely worked up Beardslee Repeating Telegraph unit arrived from the East. Along with it came an officer who became the signal officer on Rosecrans' staff.

As the Army of the Cumberland was forming up for the long anticipated advance, it began to rain.

This was not one of the lines of thunderstorms that march through Middle Tennessee on regular intervals, it was a 500 year rain event.

There is no way to exaggerate what the following 30 days were like. Rosecrans himself dismounted & helped drag a gun sunk up to the axil box in mud.

The plan was for a corps to sweep around Bragg's right flank. It was bogged down, barely able to move. Improbably, Wilder's Brigade broke through Hoover's Gap.

Because the Beardslee Repeaters connected Thomas with Rosecrans HQ, overnight, the main thrust of a 50 mile wide advance shifted from the left to the center. Before Bragg knew what was happening, Thomas' corps flanked the elaborate Tullahoma earthworks. Only the rain swollen rivers & bottomless mud saved the Army of Tennessee.

Cumberlanders entered the vast Tullahoma works & feasted on mounts of abandoned rations. Row after row of sparkling white tents still stood staked down & slashed.

View attachment 481648
Without the Beardslees, Wilder's unprecedented mounted infantry armed with repeating rifles would possibly made no difference.

I realize that it is the conventional trope that Rosecrans diddled away the six months between Janie & June 1864. In fact, Rosecrans & the entrepreneurial officers like Wilder were rewriting the book. No other army on the planet could have advanced to Chattanooga & stayed there. Waiting for the Beardslees was just the final piece of the puzzle that completed the picture.

The downside of those units is that they were slow (5 words per minute) and short range (10 miles maximum).

If an average dispatch contains 30 words, that's 6 minutes per dispatch. A horse could carry that same dispatch 10 miles in an hour. That's until you got traditional telegraph run. Sounds like a "nice-to-have" not a "must-have."

Again, if the ultimate goal is to occupy Chattanooga, wouldn't it have been smarter to achieve that while Lee was occupied in Pennsylvania and Johnston in Mississippi? As it was, by the time Rosecrans met the enemy Bragg had been reinforced by a division from Lee and a Corps from Mississippi.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The downside of those units is that they were slow (5 words per minute) and short range (10 miles maximum).

If an average dispatch contains 30 words, that's 6 minutes per dispatch. A horse could carry that same dispatch 10 miles in an hour. That's until you got traditional telegraph run. Sounds like a "nice-to-have" not a "must-have."

Again, if the ultimate goal is to occupy Chattanooga, wouldn't it have been smarter to achieve that while Lee was occupied in Pennsylvania and Johnston in Mississippi? As it was, by the time Rosecrans met the enemy Bragg had been reinforced by a division from Lee and a Corps from Mississippi.

Have you ever operated a Beardslee? We do it regularly at Stones River. Using the US Signal Corps standard dictionary of abbreviations & word shortening principles, messages were cryptic. Routine phrases were reduced to a few letters.

The Dictionary of Abbreviations is the red jacketed book camera right of signalist Izabell teaching telegraphic key technique.

Range of the magneto powered signal was 5-8 miles. Just like the telegraph, messages were received & repeated for greater range. The Beardslee signal was not interceptable, a unique feature.

Visitors, especially young ones, find the slaved indicator on the receiving unit magical.

The opening phase of the Tullahoma Campaign was the Beardslee's finest hour. Specially constructed wagons carried miles of the single gutta percha insulated wire on man portable spools. Poles with a pointy foot & hook on top could be set up & wire run with remarkable speed. STRI has that equipment & does demo programs.

In one of histories great ironies, July 4th conjunctions, also marked the end of the Tullahoma Campaign. The terrain past the formidable barrier of Monteagle & its 2000' tunnel was a forage desert. All freight carried from the Nashville & Murfreesboro depots on the rebuilt N&CRR was equine feed. Rations & ammunition was transported by wagon. Fortunately, as commander of the Department of the Cumberland, Rosecrans could establish a 70 mile wide front along the Tennessee River & the (+/-) 100 miles back to his base without the territorial squabbles that plagued Bragg.

A visual signal from the Sequatchie Valley in the east to Muscle Shoals in the west only took 45 minutes. Hazen's Brigade, in front of Chattanooga, had its own signal system using black & white flags. The A of the C was fully connected, a necessity in such country.

Telegraphic coms were established with the 80 miles of wire that was loaded on wagons, ready for the advance.

Unlike Wheeler's videttes who could only gape in amazement at the enormously long pontoon bridge over the Tennessee before hiding in a cane break, The A of the C's signalists could establish contact across the river & onto the army & department HQ's in Murfreesboro. Lenette Taylor's 'The Supply For Tomorrow Must Not Fail.' is an eye opening account of what it took for the Murfreesboro Depot to support Rosecrans' advance on Chattanooga. Still in print from LSU Press, everybody ought to have this book.

Lookout Mountain from the logistically vital Missionary Ridge veranda of Sugars BBQ.

In all candor, my Virginia-centric friends have a very hard time grasping the continental logistical support of the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. Today, the driving distance between the logistics base in Cincinnati & Chattanooga is 365 miles / 587 kilometers.

 

[jackt62]

popular histories barely scratch the surface of what it took to successfully fight the war in the West

On point! Rosecrans' logistical system and its key influence on the western war, is not treated as a stand alone component in histories of the war by authors including Castel, Connelly, and Cozzens to name a few. Your keen insights on this subject are a valuable contribution to my understanding!

 

[VeronicaLake12]

I'd like to recommend Rosecrans and the Union Victory by David Moore (who posts here). I don't think it answers your question (I'm not sure how you'd even determine who was the "best strategist" of the war, tbh) but it does a great job of placing Rosecrans in historical context. Of the Union commanders, Rosecrans is among those I like the most, along with Custer, Gibbon, Buford, and one or two others.

Thank you so much for the book recommendation. I have a copy on the way from AbeBooks!

 

[gjpratt]

I fully concur with @Rhea Cole 's recommendation of Lenette Taylor's The Supply For Tomorrow Must Not Fail. It is one of the most informative and insightful books I have ever read about the Civil War. It changed my entire way of thinking about campaigns and planning. And in particular, it gave me deep new appreciation for Rosecrans' logistical challenges

 

[Rhea Cole]

On point! Rosecrans' logistical system and its key influence on the western war, is not treated as a stand alone component in histories of the war by authors including Castel, Connelly, and Cozzens to name a few. Your keen insights on this subject are a valuable contribution to my understanding!

Thanks. One of the advantages of doing living history at Stones River is that Murfreesboro had a four year war. Fortress Rosecrans was a major supply depot. There were "…almost twenty hospitals…" in Murfreesboro. We can shoot cannon one program, Signal Corps, Pioneer Corps, logistics & the Sanitary Commission the next.

 

[tony_gunter]

Have you ever operated a Beardslee? We do it regularly at Stones River. Using the US Signal Corps standard dictionary of abbreviations & word shortening principles, messages were cryptic. Routine phrases were reduced to a few letters.

View attachment 481687
The Dictionary of Abbreviations is the red jacketed book camera right of signalist Izabell teaching telegraphic key technique.

Range of the magneto powered signal was 5-8 miles. Just like the telegraph, messages were received & repeated for greater range. The Beardslee signal was not interceptable, a unique feature.

Visitors, especially young ones, find the slaved indicator on the receiving unit magical.

The opening phase of the Tullahoma Campaign was the Beardslee's finest hour. Specially constructed wagons carried miles of the single gutta percha insulated wire on man portable spools. Poles with a pointy foot & hook on top could be set up & wire run with remarkable speed. STRI has that equipment & does demo programs.

In one of histories great ironies, July 4th conjunctions, also marked the end of the Tullahoma Campaign. The terrain past the formidable barrier of Monteagle & its 2000' tunnel was a forage desert. All freight carried from the Nashville & Murfreesboro depots on the rebuilt N&CRR was equine feed. Rations & ammunition was transported by wagon. Fortunately, as commander of the Department of the Cumberland, Rosecrans could establish a 70 mile wide front along the Tennessee River & the (+/-) 100 miles back to his base without the territorial squabbles that plagued Bragg.

View attachment 481658
A visual signal from the Sequatchie Valley in the east to Muscle Shoals in the west only took 45 minutes. Hazen's Brigade, in front of Chattanooga, had its own signal system using black & white flags. The A of the C was fully connected, a necessity in such country.

View attachment 481659
Telegraphic coms were established with the 80 miles of wire that was loaded on wagons, ready for the advance.

Unlike Wheeler's videttes who could only gape in amazement at the enormously long pontoon bridge over the Tennessee before hiding in a cane break, The A of the C's signalists could establish contact across the river & onto the army & department HQ's in Murfreesboro. Lenette Taylor's 'The Supply For Tomorrow Must Not Fail.' is an eye opening account of what it took for the Murfreesboro Depot to support Rosecrans' advance on Chattanooga. Still in print from LSU Press, everybody ought to have this book.

View attachment 481674
Lookout Mountain from the logistically vital Missionary Ridge veranda of Sugars BBQ.

In all candor, my Virginia-centric friends have a very hard time grasping the continental logistical support of the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. Today, the driving distance between the logistics base in Cincinnati & Chattanooga is 365 miles / 587 kilometers.

Never played with one! Wikipedia claims that the AotP pretty much ditched theirs, keeping only the insulated wires

But we are talking strategy. Wouldn't timing play as much of a role as communication? If Rosecrans occupies the Chattanooga area prior to August, doesn't that eliminate the threat of Bragg turning and attacking?

 

[Irishtom29]

And they were sustained there by the brilliant logistical system Rosecrans put in place. The Atlanta Campaign would have been impossible without A of the C logistics. I don't know why people forget the 240,000 strong Department of the Cumberland that made everything possible.

As commander of the Department, Thomas was able to Marshall the forces necessary to destroy Hood's army.

I do not mean this to be rude, but popular histories barely scratch the surface of what it took to successfully fight the war in the West.

Indeed. And yet Rosecrans screwed the pooch after he captured Chattanooga.

 

[Irishtom29]

In fairness, the material contributions of Hooker's Easterners and Sherman's Army of the Tennessee were far less than those of Thomas' men when it came to relieving the supply situation at Chattanooga.

The Cracker Line wouldn't work without the presence of the 11th and 12th Corps in Lookout Valley. The campaign was a combined effort of forces from three armies, one can't separate the efforts of each from the whole.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The Cracker Line wouldn't work without the presence of the 11th and 12th Corps in Lookout Valley. The campaign was a combined effort of forces from three armies, one can't separate the efforts of each from the whole.

Sherman's HQ flag.

I agree, the meeting of the three major US armies at Chattanooga was a disaster for the CSA. Each army had fought over profoundly different terrain. Grant, Thomas & a committee had shaped each army & its distinctive collection of commanders.

The he sum of the parts of what became Sherman's army group was, indeed far greater than the whole.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Never played with one! Wikipedia claims that the AotP pretty much ditched theirs, keeping only the insulated wires

But we are talking strategy. Wouldn't timing play as much of a role as communication? If Rosecrans occupies the Chattanooga area prior to August, doesn't that eliminate the threat of Bragg turning and attacking?

The Beardslee worked well in a static application. The various HQ's & courthouse signal nexus were connected by Beardslees. At the Mule Shoe, a Beardslee team went forward. As with similar attempts in WWI, the wire was soon irreparably broken. Sherman left the Beardslees in Chattanooga.

There was a Beardslee training camp in Brentwood. The Signal Corps training center was at Fort Negley.

The Achelliez's heel of the Beardslee was the crude nature of 1860's metal manufacturing processes. However, the Acme Products Company purchased the magneto patent. Every time Wiley Coyote pushed the plunger to dynamite the Roadrunner, it was the heart of a Beardslee that set it off… sorta.

 

[LematLemat]

The Cracker Line wouldn't work without the presence of the 11th and 12th Corps in Lookout Valley. The campaign was a combined effort of forces from three armies, one can't separate the efforts of each from the whole.

Well, for the most part, their presence wasn't necessary beyond the repulsing of Longstreet's flawed and ultimately failed effort to attack Geary's division on the night of October 28th-29th. The biggest contribution of Geary's division, and von Steinwehr's and Schurz' divisions is that they dissuade another attack in Lookout Valley, which while significant, I fail to see as an equal contribution to actually conceptualizing and creating the Cracker Line.

 

[David Moore]

Indeed. I was thinking about Tullahoma last night and while well done what was the result? The Federal army moved a short distance and Bragg's army was still intact and in fine fettle. Not so big a deal I'm thinking.

Some perspective on Rosecrans is in order. There was no operation in the Civil War that rises to the complexity, execution & strategic success of the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. All of Middle Tennessee & the gate to the Deep South, Chattanooga came under Union control without a large loss of life. The Army of the Cumberland was supported by a logistical complex stretching up river to Cincinnati OH. The Department of the Cumberland, that Rosecrans also commanded, had (+/-) 240,000 men. The massive logistical operation that Rosecrans created made everything that followed possible. That in & of itself was a stroke of strategic genius.

Contemporaneously, Lee had no logistical support a mere 41 miles north of the of the Potomac.

Once established in Chattanooga, Rosecrans faced a daunting tactical & strategic challenge. If you have never been there, wadding up a piece of stiff paper & loosely flattening out will give you an idea of what the area looks like. Complicating things, there were no accurate maps.

The A of the C's topographers were arguably the best at that time. Using a solar powered copy machine (+/-) 20,000 multicolored fully updated maps had been copied & distributed during the Tullahoma / Chattanooga Campaign. The area between Chattanooga & Atlanta was not properly mapped. Sherman said that without accurate maps, he would not have attempted the Atlanta Campaign. Unlike him, Rosecrans could not wait for, "…Sgt. Finegan & his motley crew to finish their work."

The challenge Rosecrans faced can be imagined via the currier line between Thomas' HQ & Rosecrans in Chattanooga. By mounted courier, it took 14 hours each way to transmit a message & receive an answer. The "should-done-this or Should-a-done that" experts never take that into account. One unfortunate courier stumbled upon an HQ after 36 hours in the wilderness & handed his dispatch bag regardless of which HQ it was. Logically, the only thing an army commander wanted to do was to get south of there where topological sanity returned. Logical engineer that he was, it probably did not cross Rosecrans' well ordered mind that Bragg would come north & fight a battle there. What Rosecrans' strategic vision for an Atlanta campaign are unknowable.

To my mind there was no best strategist. Grant fought a river war in the Mississippi valley. Rosecrans fought a rail road war. There was a littoral war. The march back & forth a dozen times war in Virginia was a singular strategic challenge. The only General who commanded armies & created a strategy across all of the distinct operating areas was Grant. He adopted Lincoln's insightful phrase, " If you can't skin, you can hold a leg." to describe his strategy for ending the war. Every Union army was ordered to maintain maximum pressure so as to leave no space for CSA forces to maneuver & support each other. As each was defeated, It freed forces up to contribute to the next operation. E.g., an entire corps was escorted to New Orleans from Muscle Shoals by 40 tin clads after Hood's defeat.

Nobody exercised a command like Grant did.

Note: Wittenberg's Tullahoma Campaign book is one everyone should have on their book shelf.

I don't think Grant fought in mountainous terrain. Rosecrans did in two different campaigns ( WV and TN)
Both campaigns resulted in important results.
Chattanooga was never fully occupied by the Union until after the battle of Chickamauga.

There's also the controversial question whether Grant or Rosecrans would have been around in 1863 if the Confederates had won at Corinth in October 1862.

 

[VeronicaLake12]

I don't think Grant fought in mountainous terrain. Rosecrans did in two different campaigns ( WV and TN)
Both campaigns resulted in important results.
Chattanooga was never fully occupied by the Union until after the battle of Chickamauga.

There's also the controversial question whether Grant or Rosecrans would have been around in 1863 if the Confederates had won at Corinth in October 1862.

I have not thought about what Grant or Rosecrans would be doing or where they would be if the Confederates did win at Corinth! This has opened up new questions to ponder for sure. Thank you very much!

 

[VeronicaLake12]

Thank you all for your replies to my question. You all are the best!

 

[Generic Username]

Was William S Rosecrans arguably the most talented strategist of all Union generals?

Tullahoma was great, but he really came within a hair of getting his Army destroyed immediately after taking Chattanooga. September 11th through the 13th in particular stand out as moments when he nearly came undone, and this was followed up with several close calls during Chickamauga itself.

 

[David Moore]

Tullahoma was great, but he really came within a hair of getting his Army destroyed immediately after taking Chattanooga. September 11th through the 13th in particular stand out as moments when he nearly came undone, and this was followed up with several close calls during Chickamauga itself.

Rosecrans' army didn't "take" Chattanooga until after Chickamauga. The case can be- and was- made that Chickamauga was the battle for permanent possession of Chattanooga. Longstreet was not sent south to participate in a siege. There was at some point going to be a battle for Chattanooga. Bragg was reenforced; Rosecrans wasn't. I cover all this in detail in my book. I recommend reading it (naturally)