Wilderness casualties

[Dead Parrott]

Any capable commander would try to maximize the odds in their favor, wouldn't they? The fact that Lee took on Grant in the Wilderness means nothing as to the potential outcome of a fight in the open. It's just as likely Grant may have destroyed his own army in a battle of maneuver with Lee.

Lee didn't want it. I trust Lee on that point.

Grant wanted it. I trust Grant on that point.

You are of course free to differ!

 

[Rebforever]

The Wilderness was Grant's first battle against Robert E. Lee and although he knew of Lee's reputation for aggressiveness, he may have underestimated his opponent a little bit and he was fighting on what was to him unfamiliar ground that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia knew well. Lee knew that if he could keep the Army of the Potomac tangled up in the woods and brush of the Wilderness that he could negate the numerical advantage Grant possessed. Grant did come out swinging but Lee frustrated his assaults and threw a powerful counter punch with Longstreet's flank attack which may have been even more devastating if Longstreet had not been wounded by his own men. The fighting in the Wilderness did not go Grant's way but it did not deter him and once he got out he kept pressing Lee and eventually besieged him in Petersburg after several bloody and hard months of fighting that ground down the Army of Northern Virginia.

Grant in unfamiliar land? He had Meade there that probably new as much as anyone else about the territory he was fighting in. 2 things must have happened. Meade didn't tell him about the Wilderness or he just didn't listen when he was told.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Grant in unfamiliar land? He had Meade there that probably new as much as anyone else about the territory he was fighting in. 2 things must have happened. Meade didn't tell him about the Wilderness or he just didn't listen when he was told.

From what I've read, I get the impression that Grant was overly optimistic about getting through the Wilderness before Lee could react. Lee was late reacting, but much faster than Grant's AOP, which became held up with its long lines through the road network. Lee got the jump on Grant, and made him pay. But just as Grant would have expected Johnston to have retreated after such a fight, Lee hoped Grant would turn north again after the battle. Both learned something about each other after that battle.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Considering that he was on the offensive in 1864-65, probably not. While the armies attacks could have been more efficient on several occasions, casualties were going to be inescapable while Grant tried to end the war as quickly as possible.

Ryan

In the word of 'What Ifs?" the answer is yes, if any number of certain stars aligned just right. If Grant had been able to use his original thought of coming in through NC, or If the flank attack generals had done better, or If there had been no time pressure from an upcoming election, if the original commands for the Crater had been followed, if only general X had moved faster\better, if if etc etc

Not being cynical here, hopefully it doesn't come across that way. Just saying that yes, if several factors had gone otherwise, or certain political issues different, or one unit\commander moved faster/better, then yes the casualties could have been much lighter.

But as you rightly point out, given the facts, blood would have to be shed. Given the determination of the opposing commanders, and their mutual understanding of the importance of the campaign, it was never going to be easy or pretty. Se la guerre.

 

[jackt62]

Interesting that you say it was not successful in and of itself. It was certainly much tougher and bloodier than Grant wanted (Lee ability to use his available assets saw to that), but think about the definition of success here. Grant wanted one of three outcomes: 1.) Lee fighting in the open and pretty much getting the ANV destroyed; 2.) Lee being cut off from Richmond & supply, leading to the fall of the city and isolation; or 3.) the ANV trapped in a siege at Richmond, inevitably bagging both.

You correctly state the possible outcomes, and because Grant did not achieve any of them, it is why I say that the campaign was not successful "in and of itself." In a larger sense, it set the stage for the final victorious campaign, even though it took longer and was not the one that Grant conceived of when he began the Overland offensive. By the time Grant was thwarted at Cold Harbor, the Overland Campaign had run its course. So Grant had to attempt a new and different strategy, which of course was a bold crossing of the James to capture Petersburg and cut off the rail links to Richmond. Had the ANV and the Army of the James succeeded in taking Petersburg in June 1864, the war might have ended that much sooner. But with the failure of those assaults, Grant's strategy changed to a "war of posts" as Lee described it. And it was that slow tightening and extending the lines around Petersburg that finally decided the outcome.

 

[Dead Parrott]

You correctly state the possible outcomes, and because Grant did not achieve any of them, it is why I say that the campaign was not successful "in and of itself." In a larger sense, it set the stage for the final victorious campaign, even though it took longer and was not the one that Grant conceived of when he began the Overland offensive. By the time Grant was thwarted at Cold Harbor, the Overland Campaign had run its course. So Grant had to attempt a new and different strategy, which of course was a bold crossing of the James to capture Petersburg and cut off the rail links to Richmond. Had the ANV and the Army of the James succeeded in taking Petersburg in June 1864, the war might have ended that much sooner. But with the failure of those assaults, Grant's strategy changed to a "war of posts" as Lee described it. And it was that slow tightening and extending the lines around Petersburg that finally decided the outcome.

But Grant did achieve #3. Am I missing something you said?

If you are making the point that Grant thought #3 would occur purely by Lee retreating into the city, and not by Grant getting blocked and subsequently outmaneuvering him across the James, I agree it was not how Grant thought it might happen. But with Grant it was always the strategic end result that mattered.

Several parts of both side's plans did not occur as they should have, and both Grant and Lee are appreciated today for their adjustment against setbacks and adaptability to opportunities.

In eight weeks Grant achieved #3. Apologies if I'm misunderstanding your point (I do that sometimes).

 

[Carronade]

Grant in unfamiliar land? He had Meade there that probably new as much as anyone else about the territory he was fighting in. 2 things must have happened. Meade didn't tell him about the Wilderness or he just didn't listen when he was told.

From what I've read, I get the impression that Grant was overly optimistic about getting through the Wilderness before Lee could react. Lee was late reacting, but much faster than Grant's AOP, which became held up with its long lines through the road network. Lee got the jump on Grant, and made him pay. But just as Grant would have expected Johnston to have retreated after such a fight, Lee hoped Grant would turn north again after the battle. Both learned something about each other after that battle.

All good points. As I've bored everyone with before, what mystifies me is that Grant and Meade abandoned their strategy upon first contact with Confederates. Grant in particular was usually of the "keep going and let the other fellow react to us" school.

 

[jackt62]

But Grant did achieve #3. Am I missing something you said?

If you are making the point that Grant thought #3 would occur purely by Lee retreating into the city, and not by Grant getting blocked and subsequently outmaneuvering him across the James, I agree it was not how Grant thought it might happen. But with Grant it was always the strategic end result that mattered.

Several parts of both side's plans did not occur as they should have, and both Grant and Lee are appreciated today for their adjustment against setbacks and adaptability to opportunities.

In eight weeks Grant achieved #3. Apologies if I'm misunderstanding your point (I do that sometimes).

Sounds like a matter of interpretation. I took #3 (trapped in a siege at Richmond) to understand Grant surrounding the ANV at Richmond and bringing the war to a quicker conclusion than what actually occurred by moving south of the James River to Petersburg.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Sounds like a matter of interpretation. I took #3 (trapped in a siege at Richmond) to understand Grant surrounding the ANV at Richmond and bringing the war to a quicker conclusion than what actually occurred by moving south of the James River to Petersburg.

Got it, agreed.

 

[Rhea Cole]

One thing to keep in mind is the modern demographic finding that the Confederate losses during the Civil War were grossly underreported in the past. At a certain point Lee was aware that his telegraphic communications with Richmond were routinely intercepted. They were literally being printed in the New York Times. It became Lee's policy to communicate with Richmond via courier. The numbers available to the public were deliberately low. As a result, the actual casualty returns from his army were significantly higher than what is published pre 1990 publications. The traditional loss during the Civil War was pegged at 620,000. Using modern demographic tools, an additional 130,000 have been added to reach a total of 750,000. The vast majority of these additional casualties were Confederates.
Historians will tell you that Union record keeping was more accurate than Confederate. There are a lot of very easy to understand reasons for that. Simple loss of records is one factor. Commanders, not just Lee, on the Confederate side, e.g. Hood, habitually underreported their losses.
This is not meant as a critique of the casualty reporting on the Southern side at this battle, rather a statement of a general skepticism of Confederate casualty reporting.

 

[FburgRob]

That's a valid point, but Lee's strategy exposed his corps to defeat in detail. Ewell and Hill were essentially out of touch with each other. Ewell was stopped when he ran into Warren's corps, but Hill continued advancing several miles further - under observation from Union troops at the Chewning farm and the 5th NY Cavalry falling back ahead of him. Had Grant or Meade recognized it, there was an opportunity to cut Hill off and surround his two divisions with significantly superior forces.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I think it is important to remember that it was the failure of some of the deadwood in the Army of the Potomac command structure that thwarted Grant's initial plan. The force that was bottle up in Bermuda Hundred was supposed to capture Richmond & Franz Siegal was supposed to clean out the Shenandoah. It was only when both of those parts of his plan were thwarted that the campaign proceeded as it did. As far as Grant was concerned, Richmond was nothing but a point on the map that pinned Lee in place. It was Lee's army that Grant was after. The profound strategic blunder of placing the Confederate capitol on the far northeast corner of the Confederate territory was what led to Lee's defeat.

The Confederate high command clung to the Napoleonic doctrine of capturing the opponent's capitol & negotiating terms of surrender. That is why the delusion that taking Washington would force the Federals out of the war drove so many of Lee's actions. Lincoln, Grant & Sherman had learned the lesson of the American Revolution. The British captured the capitol at Philadelphia, New York & Charleston. In each case, the British expected that to win the war. Of course, nothing of the kind occurred while Washington's army was still in the field. Huge assets that the Confederacy could not stand to loose were expended attacking Washington & defending Richmond. The Confederates were operating under a false premise & they paid dearly for it.

 

[RobertP]

I think it is important to remember that it was the failure of some of the deadwood in the Army of the Potomac command structure that thwarted Grant's initial plan. The force that was bottle up in Bermuda Hundred was supposed to capture Richmond & Franz Siegal was supposed to clean out the Shenandoah. It was only when both of those parts of his plan were thwarted that the campaign proceeded as it did. As far as Grant was concerned, Richmond was nothing but a point on the map that pinned Lee in place. It was Lee's army that Grant was after. The profound strategic blunder of placing the Confederate capitol on the far northeast corner of the Confederate territory was what led to Lee's defeat.

The Confederate high command clung to the Napoleonic doctrine of capturing the opponent's capitol & negotiating terms of surrender. That is why the delusion that taking Washington would force the Federals out of the war drove so many of Lee's actions. Lincoln, Grant & Sherman had learned the lesson of the American Revolution. The British captured the capitol at Philadelphia, New York & Charleston. In each case, the British expected that to win the war. Of course, nothing of the kind occurred while Washington's army was still in the field. Huge assets that the Confederacy could not stand to loose were expended attacking Washington & defending Richmond. The Confederates were operating under a false premise & they paid dearly for it.

Wasn't Lincoln famously obsessed about the protection of Washington City? I think so, and that is exactly what hamstrung Union troop movements throughout most of the war in the East.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Wasn't Lincoln famously obsessed about the protection of Washington City? I think so, and that is exactly what hamstrung Union troop movements throughout most of the war in the East.

Defending your capitol is rational, especially when the other side has capturing Washington as a major war aim. I have never read anything that indicated an obsession that sacrificed other objectives for defense of the capitol.

 

[RobertP]

Defending your capitol is rational, especially when the other side has capturing Washington as a major war aim. I have never read anything that indicated an obsession that sacrificed other objectives for defense of the capitol.

Don't you think McClellan had capturing Richmond on his mind during the Peninsula Campaign? It seems to me that every Union commander made sure, under orders, that there was an army between the ANV and Washington. None of them would have taken the risks that Lee did in in the Maryland and Gettysburg campaigns, much less than 2nd Bull Run when maneuvered half his army around the rear of Pope and essentially leaving the path open to Richmond open. Had the AOP been allowed to operate as audaciously they may have been able to accomplish more considering the enormous advantages in men and materiel.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Don't you think McClellan had capturing Richmond on his mind during the Peninsula Campaign? It seems to me that every Union commander made sure, under orders, that there was an army between the ANV and Washington. None of them would have taken the risks that Lee did in in the Maryland and Gettysburg campaigns, much less than 2nd Bull Run when maneuvered half his army around the rear of Pope and essentially leaving the path open to open. Had the AOP been allowed to operate as audaciously they may have been able to accomplish more considering the enormous advantages in men and materiel.

Of course, McClellan was on to Richmond. It is apparent that Mcclellan's gifts lay in organization & training. Had there been such a thing as training command, he could have been an unprecedented asset to the Union. During WWII, that is exactly what happened. The general Patton replaced in North Africa did an excellent job in training command. No such thing existed, so McClellan spent the war as a boo-bird sitting on the fence calling out what should have been done.

 

[RobertP]

Of course, McClellan was on to Richmond. It is apparent that Mcclellan's gifts lay in organization & training. Had there been such a thing as training command, he could have been an unprecedented asset to the Union. During WWII, that is exactly what happened. The general Patton replaced in North Africa did an excellent job in training command. No such thing existed, so McClellan spent the war as a boo-bird sitting on the fence calling out what should have been done.

Well, weren't McDowell, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker all on the road to Richmond too? I don't get your original premise that the South clung to the outdated Napoleonic notion of capturing the enemy's capital and negotiating war's end. IMO, that describes the Union MO, including Grant's 3 pronged plan to take Richmond. As for the Confederates it was all about keeping the Yanks away from Richmond, not capturing Washington.

 

[rpkennedy]

One thing to keep in mind is the modern demographic finding that the Confederate losses during the Civil War were grossly underreported in the past. At a certain point Lee was aware that his telegraphic communications with Richmond were routinely intercepted. They were literally being printed in the New York Times. It became Lee's policy to communicate with Richmond via courier. The numbers available to the public were deliberately low. As a result, the actual casualty returns from his army were significantly higher than what is published pre 1990 publications. The traditional loss during the Civil War was pegged at 620,000. Using modern demographic tools, an additional 130,000 have been added to reach a total of 750,000. The vast majority of these additional casualties were Confederates.
Historians will tell you that Union record keeping was more accurate than Confederate. There are a lot of very easy to understand reasons for that. Simple loss of records is one factor. Commanders, not just Lee, on the Confederate side, e.g. Hood, habitually underreported their losses.
This is not meant as a critique of the casualty reporting on the Southern side at this battle, rather a statement of a general skepticism of Confederate casualty reporting.

I'm not convinced about the higher estimate of dead, at least based on the few Confederate state studies that have been and are continuing to be conducted. Virginia completed an extremely thorough examination of those who served and actually had to lower the official count of those that died during the war. North Carolina, who I believe is still working on their numbers (although I could be wrong since it's been several years since I've checked on their progress), was also on the road to slightly lowering their count as well. Based on these studies, I tend to think that the 620,000 estimate is probably pretty close to the actual count.

That said, Confederate casualties are without question too low since they didn't count the walking wounded but rather counted only those who stayed in hospitals. Not only that, there are battles in which Union casualties were also reportedly too low. Gordon Rhea makes a very compelling argument that Warren underreported his losses at the Wilderness in order to cast himself in a better light.

Ryan

 

[Rhea Cole]

I'm not convinced about the higher estimate of dead, at least based on the few Confederate state studies that have been and are continuing to be conducted. Virginia completed an extremely thorough examination of those who served and actually had to lower the official count of those that died during the war. North Carolina, who I believe is still working on their numbers (although I could be wrong since it's been several years since I've checked on their progress), was also on the road to slightly lowering their count as well. Based on these studies, I tend to think that the 620,000 estimate is probably pretty close to the actual count.

That said, Confederate casualties are without question too low since they didn't count the walking wounded but rather counted only those who stayed in hospitals. Not only that, there are battles in which Union casualties were also reportedly too low. Gordon Rhea makes a very compelling argument that Warren underreported his losses at the Wilderness in order to cast himself in a better light.

Ryan

The demographic studies compared adult males in the 1860 census who were not enumerated in the 1870 census. It is a very compelling piece of statistical analysis. If anything, the number is likely to increase as more sophisticated tools are applied to the data.

 

[rpkennedy]

The demographic studies compared adult males in the 1860 census who were not enumerated in the 1870 census. It is a very compelling piece of statistical analysis. If anything, the number is likely to increase as more sophisticated tools are applied to the data.

I understand the mathematical theory behind the census study and I thought that the data was compelling. In fact, the people who did the studies in Virginia and North Carolina expected that their numbers would increase as they proceeded but instead found that they were actually reducing the count of the dead. Unfortunately, we are left to wonder where the methodology of either study seems to be falling short.

Ryan