Wilderness casualties

[rupert822]

This may sound overly simplistic, but of course Grant was going to take more casualties throughout the Overland Campaign because he was consistently on the offensive, this alone usually generates more losses, even when successful.

Also, I do think that for the Wilderness specifically, it must have made some difference that Lee had fought there before. Grant had not, Burnside had not, and while Meade was at Chancellorsville, I'm not sure he ever got more than a mile or two from U.S. Ford. In short, Lee knew exactly what he was getting into in the Wilderness, Grant did not.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Everybody can win the war better than the guy who actually did it.

Lather, Rinse, Repeat.

 

[nc native]

The Wilderness was Grant's first battle against Robert E. Lee and although he knew of Lee's reputation for aggressiveness, he may have underestimated his opponent a little bit and he was fighting on what was to him unfamiliar ground that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia knew well. Lee knew that if he could keep the Army of the Potomac tangled up in the woods and brush of the Wilderness that he could negate the numerical advantage Grant possessed. Grant did come out swinging but Lee frustrated his assaults and threw a powerful counter punch with Longstreet's flank attack which may have been even more devastating if Longstreet had not been wounded by his own men. The fighting in the Wilderness did not go Grant's way but it did not deter him and once he got out he kept pressing Lee and eventually besieged him in Petersburg after several bloody and hard months of fighting that ground down the Army of Northern Virginia.

 

[jackt62]

The Federal desertion rate jumped from an average of 4,647 a month in 1863 to an average of 7,333 a month in 1864. I wouldn't be at all surprised if much if not most of the sharp desertion increase didn't come from a reaction in the ranks to the carnage Grant's tactics inflicted on his own army during the Overland Campaign of 1864.

I don't necessarily disagree with that assertion. But I would point out that another factor that might have influenced greater federal desertions in 1864 was the fact that in contrast to 1861 or 1862, the pool of candidates that entered the Union ranks contained a larger degree of conscripts and bounty jumpers who were more likely to desert at the first opportunity they had.

 

[CSA Today]

I don't necessarily disagree with that assertion. But I would point out that another factor that might have influenced greater federal desertions in 1864 was the fact that in contrast to 1861 or 1862, the pool of candidates that entered the Union ranks contained a larger degree of conscripts and bounty jumpers who were more likely to desert at the first opportunity they had.

I wouldn't be surprised.

 

[jackt62]

The Wilderness was Grant's first battle against Robert E. Lee and although he knew of Lee's reputation for aggressiveness, he may have underestimated his opponent a little bit and he was fighting on what was to him unfamiliar ground that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia knew well. Lee knew that if he could keep the Army of the Potomac tangled up in the woods and brush of the Wilderness that he could negate the

This was the fear of many of the Union commanders in the AOTP. That Grant in the west, had not faced an opponent as skillful and audacious as Lee. Grant's lack of familiarity with the Wilderness, despite the prior experience of the AOTP in campaigning in that location, may have also played a big part in his getting bogged down there.

 

[Florida Rebel]

Great point by Mr. CSA Today. I'm really at a loss to say "good things" about ional Grant; both as a military leader and a President. Yes, he did treat Lee and his soldiers generously when they finally surrendered. But I think that was more due to Lincoln and the way he wanted the southern soldiers and states treated once the war was done. What else was positive about Grant? He made Yellowstone a National Park in 1872! If any readers have ever been there, THAT was a huge deal to accomplish! But to me, that was all I could see "good" about Grant. During the war, it wasn't enough to defeat the southern armies, Grant (with help from Lincoln, Sherman and Sheridan) made war on the southern civilians. And how about Sherman and Sheridan! Where is all the national outrage towards those TWO Union leaders? If it wasn't bad enough how badly they treated the southern civilians in GA, SC and VA, look at what they did to the American Indians after the war! Why aren't ALL American people demanding the names of Grant, Sherman and Sheridan be expunged and street names and school names changed and all statues with their likeness removed? Some people say it was OK to do what they did in the war, that it was a means to an end. I don't agree. But besides all the corruption that happened during Grant's two terms as president, to me, one of the worst things he ever did was make war on the Indians and break treaties. And Sherman and Sheridan were right there with him. The debacle with Custer at the Little Bighorn, in 1876? That had Grant's fingerprints all over it. So no, I don't like the man one bit.

 

[rpkennedy]

And if I am fighting with him and wearing a blue uni, I hate him even more because he doesn't care about MY life.

One could make the same argument about Lee. He lost a greater percentage of his men than Grant did over the course of the war. While I agree with Lee's strategy of aggressiveness to push the USA to war-weariness, it essentially bled the Confederacy white and by 1864, there were an awful lot of dead and crippled soldiers (and especially officers) in the Army of Northern Virginia's wake.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

Back to Grant, could he have beaten Lee without killing so many of his own men?

Considering that he was on the offensive in 1864-65, probably not. While the armies attacks could have been more efficient on several occasions, casualties were going to be inescapable while Grant tried to end the war as quickly as possible.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

Great point by Mr. CSA Today. I'm really at a loss to say "good things" about ional Grant; both as a military leader and a President. Yes, he did treat Lee and his soldiers generously when they finally surrendered. But I think that was more due to Lincoln and the way he wanted the southern soldiers and states treated once the war was done. What else was positive about Grant? He made Yellowstone a National Park in 1872! If any readers have ever been there, THAT was a huge deal to accomplish! But to me, that was all I could see "good" about Grant. During the war, it wasn't enough to defeat the southern armies, Grant (with help from Lincoln, Sherman and Sheridan) made war on the southern civilians. And how about Sherman and Sheridan! Where is all the national outrage towards those TWO Union leaders? If it wasn't bad enough how badly they treated the southern civilians in GA, SC and VA, look at what they did to the American Indians after the war! Why aren't ALL American people demanding the names of Grant, Sherman and Sheridan be expunged and street names and school names changed and all statues with their likeness removed? Some people say it was OK to do what they did in the war, that it was a means to an end. I don't agree. But besides all the corruption that happened during Grant's two terms as president, to me, one of the worst things he ever did was make war on the Indians and break treaties. And Sherman and Sheridan were right there with him. The debacle with Custer at the Little Bighorn, in 1876? That had Grant's fingerprints all over it. So no, I don't like the man one bit.

Of course, Grant was also the most successful general that the war produced so that has to be taken into consideration.

Ryan

 

[Krieger]

Considering that he was on the offensive in 1864-65, probably not. While the armies attacks could have been more efficient on several occasions, casualties were going to be inescapable while Grant tried to end the war as quickly as possible.

Ryan

There's also the fact that fighting Lee's army head-to-head on its home turf was always the poorest route to take but also the unfortunate reality that the predicament of 1864 called for, despite the fact that Lincoln had finally found a general who understood not just how to beat an opponent on the battlefield, but to squeeze that opponent into surrendering, which is how wars are won and not with some "glorious charge". I can't help but find it amazing that the Confederates committed the strategic mistake of choosing a capital as vulnerable as Richmond and fortifying it so heavily, investing so many resources into its physical defenses, yet the Union didn't take it by simply isolating it with their much larger forces. It was by far the safest and wisest military approach, but it seems to me like the Union didn't want to give the appearance that they were "too scared" to face Lee in Virginia. Had Grant been able to go with either his earlier suggested plan of sending a powerful Union force behind Lee to cut off his supply lines and force Lee out of his entrenchments, or had the two outer wings been commanded by more competent officers than Sigel and Butler, Lee simply would have been outmanuevered and overpowered at the strategic level regardless of whatever tactical deployments he could come up with. That's what modern war is all about. It's simply incorrect to say that Grant's whole line of thinking was "Keep sending our own men forward until the enemy runs out of men first". (Not that I'm accusing you of saying that, just that it's a rather common and most often deliberate misrepresentation of Grant's strategic vision)

 

[Dead Parrott]

Of course, Grant was also the most successful general that the war produced so that has to be taken into consideration.

Ryan

It is that very fact that makes him a choice target.

 

[rupert822]

It is that very fact that makes him a choice target.

I agree with this 100%. I just think it is not a zero zum/binary game. Grant was deservedly the country's only lieutenant general and I actually think his willingness to fight, and lose huge percentages of his army brings him closer to Lee. I get that Shiloh was a bloodbath, but the first army commander who was willing to risk losing huge percentages of his army, repeatedly, to gain some strategic advantage was Lee in 1862. It worked the same for him in 1862 as it worked for Grant in 1864.

 

[Florida Rebel]

Those were some very good comments! I will say this about Grant; and you know I am NO fan of his for all the reasons I mentioned earlier..... He was one stubborn SOB. He was also ONE lucky guy to always have more men than his opponent and be able to fight the way he did. But it's still hard for me to give him a lot of accolades and credit. We all know he was told by Lincoln to end the war as soon as he could so naturally, he had a very high body count for the way he fought in '64. Either way, did Did Lee make it easy for him? Heavens NO.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Those were some very good comments! I will say this about Grant; and you know I am NO fan of his for all the reasons I mentioned earlier..... He was one stubborn SOB. He was also ONE lucky guy to always have more men than his opponent and be able to fight the way he did. But it's still hard for me to give him a lot of accolades and credit. We all know he was told by Lincoln to end the war as soon as he could so naturally, he had a very high body count for the way he fought in '64. Either way, did Did Lee make it easy for him? Heavens NO.

For this reason I find the Overland Campaign so fascinating a study. Everyone knew it was the Heavyweight title match of the war, and it wouldn't be pretty. If you study the actual movements, you see a contest between two hard-fighting, determined commanders, shifting, maneuvering, adapting to and overcoming failures\obstacles that broke\stopped their lesser compatriots, never giving up until one or the other reached their end game. It is an amazing campaign of brilliance, error, near-misses, constant tension and relentless combat, between the two best in the war.

In the end, despite what I consider one of Lee's most brilliant efforts, the ANV is reduced to a non-threat, trapped in an inevitable besieged defeat. All in eight weeks. Brutal. Ugly. But an end game that wins the war.

It is an amazing campaign to study.

 

[jackt62]

Another factor that distinguishes Grant from his predecessors is his willingness to soldier on and his ability to improvise, despite setbacks and changing conditions. We all know the famous story of how Grant, after being battled to a draw in the Wilderness, stood at the crossroads leading either north towards the Rappahanock, or south towards Spotsylvania Courthouse. The troops under his command were expecting to be ordered north, but to their surprise and amazement, Grant ordered them south. Unlike Hooker, Burnside, or McClellan before him, Grant chose to continue the campaign without letup. Although the Overland Campaign took costly turns and was not successful in and of itself, it ultimately led to the final defeat of the ANV.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Another factor that distinguishes Grant from his predecessors is his willingness to soldier on and his ability to improvise, despite setbacks and changing conditions. We all know the famous story of how Grant, after being battled to a draw in the Wilderness, stood at the crossroads leading either north towards the Rappahanock, or south towards Spotsylvania Courthouse. The troops under his command were expecting to be ordered north, but to their surprise and amazement, Grant ordered them south. Unlike Hooker, Burnside, or McClellan before him, Grant chose to continue the campaign without letup. Although the Overland Campaign took costly turns and was not successful in and of itself, it ultimately led to the final defeat of the ANV.

Interesting that you say it was not successful in and of itself. It was certainly much tougher and bloodier than Grant wanted (Lee ability to use his available assets saw to that), but think about the definition of success here. Grant wanted one of three outcomes: 1.) Lee fighting in the open and pretty much getting the ANV destroyed; 2.) Lee being cut off from Richmond & supply, leading to the fall of the city and isolation; or 3.) the ANV trapped in a siege at Richmond, inevitably bagging both.

I believe Grant infinitely preferred option 1, but Lee was far too good a general to ever oblige (he was no Hood). Option 2 would help the Lincoln campaign, but leave the ANV as an effective field force - perhaps if supplies or political pressure forced Lee to attack, it might serve the same purpose as option 1, but again I think Lee too competent for that. Option 3 removed the ANV as an effective field force and ensured success over both targets, but would take the longest, be bloodiest, and might be too late to significantly help the Lincoln election. But those were all flexible End Game results for Grant to win the campaign.

For Lee to win the campaign, he would need Grant to fail at all three of the above options, and remain a threat in the field. If he could keep Grant north of the James, or cause Grant to retreat (or even pause in inactivity for a significant time), or (best case) smash a good part of the AOP in a climactic Napoleonic style victory (ala Chancellorsville), its highly likely Lincoln might lose the election.

A true 'draw' would have seen both armies staring out across each other, exhausted but free to move. Lee being trapped in Petersburg was no draw, and Lee knew it and angrily acknowledged it. But it MIGHT be enough, with good press, to fatally hurt Lincoln's reelection bid. In prizefighting terms, Lee was beaten and immobilized into his corner but staying on his feet, crumbling bit by bit, hoping for the bell and a favorable judges' card (the northern voters). Once it went extra rounds, the fight was over ... except for the needless extra punishment both took.

In eight weeks, Grant succeeded at one of his End Game options. Lee did not. I give full props to both men for their skills, uses of advantage and adaptability during the campaign - an incredible tense slugfest by both.

 

[RobertP]

Interesting that you say it was not successful in and of itself. It was certainly much tougher and bloodier than Grant wanted (Lee ability to use his available assets saw to that), but think about the definition of success here. Grant wanted one of three outcomes: 1.) Lee fighting in the open and pretty much getting the ANV destroyed; 2.) Lee being cut off from Richmond & supply, leading to the fall of the city and isolation; or 3.) the ANV trapped in a siege at Richmond, inevitably bagging both.

I believe Grant infinitely preferred option 1, but Lee was far too good a general to ever oblige (he was no Hood). Option 2 would help the Lincoln campaign, but leave the ANV as an effective field force - perhaps if supplies or political pressure forced Lee to attack, it might serve the same purpose as option 1, but again I think Lee too competent for that. Option 3 removed the ANV as an effective field force and ensured success over both targets, but would take the longest, be bloodiest, and might be too late to significantly help the Lincoln election. But those were all flexible End Game results for Grant to win the campaign.

For Lee to win the campaign, he would need Grant to fail at all three of the above options, and remain a threat in the field. If he could keep Grant north of the James, or cause Grant to retreat (or even pause in inactivity for a significant time), or (best case) smash a good part of the AOP in a climactic Napoleonic style victory (ala Chancellorsville), its highly likely Lincoln might lose the election.

A true 'draw' would have seen both armies staring out across each other, exhausted but free to move. Lee being trapped in Petersburg was no draw, and Lee knew it and angrily acknowledged it. But it MIGHT be enough, with good press, to fatally hurt Lincoln's reelection bid. In prizefighting terms, Lee was beaten and immobilized into his corner but staying on his feet, crumbling bit by bit, hoping for the bell and a favorable judges' card (the northern voters). Once it went extra rounds, the fight was over ... except for the needless extra punishment both took.

In eight weeks, Grant succeeded at one of his End Game options. Lee did not. I give full props to both men for their skills, uses of advantage and adaptability during the campaign - an incredible tense slugfest by both.

Why is assumed that Grant could have destroyed the ANV in the open? I don't think that's a given at all.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Why is assumed that Grant could have destroyed the ANV in the open? I don't think that's a given at all.

While I agree very few things are a given, what odds would you give the 1864 ANV led by Lee in the open against the 1864 AOP in the open led by Grant?

Lee wouldn't take those odds, and I don't blame him. I think Lee's actions tell us what the odds would be. Not good.

 

[RobertP]

While I agree very few things are a given, what odds would you give the 1864 ANV led by Lee in the open against the 1864 AOP in the open led by Grant?

Lee wouldn't take those odds, and I don't blame him. I think Lee's actions tell us what the odds would be. Not good.

Any capable commander would try to maximize the odds in their favor, wouldn't they? The fact that Lee took on Grant in the Wilderness means nothing as to the potential outcome of a fight in the open. It's just as likely Grant may have destroyed his own army in a battle of maneuver with Lee.