Wilderness casualties

MikeyB

Sergeant
Joined
Sep 13, 2018
Why were the casualties in the Wilderness so lopsided against the Union? I thought the Wilderness was basically two armed infantry mobs with little room to maneuver just slugging it out with both sides attacking and counterattacking. Was there some big flank attack or was it predominantly the Union attacking Confederate prepared works?
 
Why were the casualties in the Wilderness so lopsided against the Union? I thought the Wilderness was basically two armed infantry mobs with little room to maneuver just slugging it out with both sides attacking and counterattacking. Was there some big flank attack or was it predominantly the Union attacking Confederate prepared works?
The Confederates executed several flank attacks that caused disproportionate Union losses. Basically, Grant underestimated his opponent.
 
The Union command definitely did not show to advantage in the Wilderness. Grant and Meade wanted to get to grips with Lee's army, but their intent was to move through the Wilderness as quickly as possible and fight in terrain which would allow scope for maneuver and to bring the full combat power of the Federal army to bear. Unfortunately they abandoned this strategy upon making contact with the Confederates. Meade launched a series of frontal attacks, though only after giving the rebs a few hours to prepare field fortifications. When they discovered Hill's corps thrusting itself between Hancock and the main Union force, they hastened to throw troops across his path, followed by another series of frontal assaults through the woods. On the second day, Longstreet launched a devastating flank attack, using an unfinished railroad bed that Hancock had marched over the previous day without taking note or making use of it.

@Robin Lesjovitch makes a valid point. As a proportion of troops engaged, the losses were not so disparate and actually slightly favored the Federals with about 14% to ~17% for the Confederates.
 
I thought the Wilderness was basically two armed infantry mobs with little room to maneuver just slugging it out with both sides attacking and counterattacking.

I would actually give a lot of credit to the ANV; rather than simply acting liked a "mob" Lee threw Ewell's and AP Hill's Corps along 2 parallel routes (Orange Turnpike and Plank Road) to attack Union positions while they were still stuck in the Wilderness and were unable to use their artillery and maneuver effectively. Concurrently, Lee directed Longstreet's Corps, located at Gordonsville much further west, to make haste to reinforce Hill's Corps. Longstreet got to the field on the second day of conflict, in time to aid Hill and set the stage for his later flank attack against Hancock's II Corps.
 
I would actually give a lot of credit to the ANV; rather than simply acting liked a "mob" Lee threw Ewell's and AP Hill's Corps along 2 parallel routes (Orange Turnpike and Plank Road) to attack Union positions while they were still stuck in the Wilderness and were unable to use their artillery and maneuver effectively. Concurrently, Lee directed Longstreet's Corps, located at Gordonsville much further west, to make haste to reinforce Hill's Corps. Longstreet got to the field on the second day of conflict, in time to aid Hill and set the stage for his later flank attack against Hancock's II Corps.

That's a valid point, but Lee's strategy exposed his corps to defeat in detail. Ewell and Hill were essentially out of touch with each other. Ewell was stopped when he ran into Warren's corps, but Hill continued advancing several miles further - under observation from Union troops at the Chewning farm and the 5th NY Cavalry falling back ahead of him. Had Grant or Meade recognized it, there was an opportunity to cut Hill off and surround his two divisions with significantly superior forces.
 
That's a valid point, but Lee's strategy exposed his corps to defeat in detail. Ewell and Hill were essentially out of touch with each other. Ewell was stopped when he ran into Warren's corps, but Hill continued advancing several miles further - under observation from Union troops at the Chewning farm and the 5th NY Cavalry falling back ahead of him. Had Grant or Meade recognized it, there was an opportunity to cut Hill off and surround his two divisions with significantly superior forces.

No doubt about the risk to the ANV. But on the other hand, that type of move, in which Lee divided his army rather than keeping it intact, was pretty much Lee's "signature" tactic, from 2nd Manassas to Maryland and the Gettysburg campaign. He was generally successful in the past with that technique, although he certainly came close to losing it on more than one occasion.
 
Had Grant or Meade recognized it, there was an opportunity to cut Hill off and surround his two divisions with significantly superior forces.

Lee was making the bet that they wouldn't recognize or at least be able to effectively coordinate their forces and bring them to bear on one and then the other ANV corps. It got Lee that far in the war, and he wasn't all together wrong about the reaction of his opponents, even as good a one as Grant in this case.
 
I would liken the Wilderness Campaign as a fight over stale-mated ground, and not lost ground. Lee was right, IMO, to move early at the beginning. Grant would not retreat. It became a masterful set of maneuvers on both sides by both Generals'. Willful determination and relentless pursuit makes casualties multiply.
Lubliner.
And it gets worse from there. And Grant hasn't recognize what those piecemeal attacks are doing to him.
 
And it gets worse from there. And Grant hasn't recognize what those piecemeal attacks are doing to him.
Grant had his mind set to never turn back, and had already counted attrition as an end to his means. By cutting off the exchange of prisoners, he understood his own ranks could be heavily reinforced, and Lee's would dwindle. It was problematic, and the results showed just how correct he was, while he whittled his sticks back at field headquarters with Meade, listening to dispatches that should normally sink the heart of morale into utter despair.
Lubliner.
 
Frontal attack was Grant's modus operandi if the assault failed, leave your dead to fester in the sun to stink the enemy out. Grant and Hood would have made a great team working together.

Grant resorted to frontal attack at Cold Harbor because he was running out of flanking room and he hoped a successful assault would prove decisive. It didn't and I agree with you that his refusal to signal a flag of truce to collect the wounded and dead was a dark stain on his reputation.
 
I don't like Grant one bit. Brute force and stubborness with an overwhelming and larger army against his opponent. And if I am fighting with him and wearing a blue uni, I hate him even more because he doesn't care about MY life. Wouldn't exchange prisoners either? Come on! He outnumbered Lee 3 - 1 and he shows such a reckless abandon for his own people and their welfare? Like a prisoner exchange is really going to help Lee and prolong the war? Yeah he won but look at the cost. Grant was the right guy at the right time - meaning he was lucky - but an American military leader who will never make my list of most admired.
 
Yes, we all know that Grant ended the war. But didn't Jeff Davis REALLY end the war with his stupid command decisions in GA? I'm hardly a Joseph Johnston fan but his style of fighting (defensively) would have been a lot better for the South than Hood's. Back to Grant, could he have beaten Lee without killing so many of his own men?
 
I don't like Grant one bit. Brute force and stubborness with an overwhelming and larger army against his opponent. And if I am fighting with him and wearing a blue uni, I hate him even more because he doesn't care about MY life. Wouldn't exchange prisoners either? Come on! He outnumbered Lee 3 - 1 and he shows such a reckless abandon for his own people and their welfare? Like a prisoner exchange is really going to help Lee and prolong the war? Yeah he won but look at the cost. Grant was the right guy at the right time - meaning he was lucky - but an American military leader who will never make my list of most admired.

The Federal desertion rate jumped from an average of 4,647 a month in 1863 to an average of 7,333 a month in 1864. I wouldn't be at all surprised if much if not most of the sharp desertion increase didn't come from a reaction in the ranks to the carnage Grant's tactics inflicted on his own army during the Overland Campaign of 1864.
 
Back
Top