Why General Hood

Speaking as someone who is twenty-nine, though, the first thing that comes to mind is "So why doesn't Stuart (two years Hood's junior after all) come off like this so badly?"

I guess part of it is that Stuart knew his limits better. Hood's self-confidence seems less checked by his self-awareness.
 
Speaking as someone who is twenty-nine, though, the first thing that comes to mind is "So why doesn't Stuart (two years Hood's junior after all) come off like this so badly?"

I guess part of it is that Stuart knew his limits better. Hood's self-confidence seems less checked by his self-awareness.
He wasn't a brainy sort of fellow. He was the sort of guy who ends up accidentally saying something with a double meaning at a party and blushing all night as people make jokes about it.

In a charge, you need self-confidence, not self-awareness. But the guy who decides whether the charge should be made at all needs to be a different sort of guy.
 
He wasn't a brainy sort of fellow. He was the sort of guy who ends up accidentally saying something with a double meaning at a party and blushing all night as people make jokes about it.

In a charge, you need self-confidence, not self-awareness. But the guy who decides whether the charge should be made at all needs to be a different sort of guy.

A thing that strikes me about Hood's personality is that he seems to have been an engaging fellow. Put even more strongly, Hood was seems to have been attractive - both in the sense of "to the ladies", and being a man other men followed.

I'm not saying Johnston wasn't inspiring as a leader, but from Davis's POV, I do think "Hood will raise their spirits." was part of why Hood and not Hardee. No one seemed interested in wrapping Hardee in a mantle of romance and glory, not even Hardee.

Not in the way the Gallant Hood of Texas radiates it.
 
Quite possibly, yes. We know from observing Asian cultures that average height is strongly affected by dairy consumption within a culture, and Texas has always been cattle country, with dairy in abundance. Plus an abundance of strong sunlight, very important in an era when people wore long sleeves and tried hard to avoid sunlight.

Naw. Riding horses makes you short. And dairy? I snort.
 
The same can be said about Grant and Meade at Cold Harbor. They thought their men could achieve success. When they didn't at that time, they learned from their mistakes and later adapted to the conditions. That cannot be said about Nashville in the aftermath of Franklin.

I agree with you there. I can't figure out why, after the crash n burn at Franklin Hood thought it was a good idea to go kick the Rock of Chickamauga in the shins. It was exactly the same fatal mistake - frontal assault on heavily fortified works. One historian said there was something of the fatal Greek about Hood and maybe there was, but he sure took his army with him.
 
A thing that strikes me about Hood's personality is that he seems to have been an engaging fellow. Put even more strongly, Hood was seems to have been attractive - both in the sense of "to the ladies", and being a man other men followed.

I'm not saying Johnston wasn't inspiring as a leader, but from Davis's POV, I do think "Hood will raise their spirits." was part of why Hood and not Hardee. No one seemed interested in wrapping Hardee in a mantle of romance and glory, not even Hardee.

Not in the way the Gallant Hood of Texas radiates it.

The people of that day very much respected a leader who got shot up, showed by example they wouldn't have the troops do what they themselves wouldn't do. This seemed particularly so for Southerners. If a leader was willing to be front and center and keep coming back, even in pieces, they would respect him more and more. Hood certainly had that in his favor, like the Black Knight of Monty Python fame. Johnston was actually shot up way more than Hood - he just hadn't lost any limbs - Ol Joe was a bullet magnet! He was popular with the men because he was economical with their lives.
 
The same can be said about Grant and Meade at Cold Harbor. They thought their men could achieve success. When they didn't at that time, they learned from their mistakes and later adapted to the conditions. That cannot be said about Nashville in the aftermath of Franklin.

I agree with you there. I can't figure out why, after the crash n burn at Franklin Hood thought it was a good idea to go kick the Rock of Chickamauga in the shins. It was exactly the same fatal mistake - frontal assault on heavily fortified works. One historian said there was something of the fatal Greek about Hood and maybe there was, but he sure took his army with him.

Am I missing something here. Hood did not attack at Nashville, he took up position south of the city and awaited attack. IIRC the idea was that after repulsing Thomas the Confederates would be in position to counter and take the city. Unfortunately for Hood things did not work that way, Thomas' two day attack was overwhelmingly successful.
 
Am I missing something here. Hood did not attack at Nashville, he took up position south of the city and awaited attack. IIRC the idea was that after repulsing Thomas the Confederates would be in position to counter and take the city. Unfortunately for Hood things did not work that way, Thomas' two day attack was overwhelmingly successful.
Yes, Hood took up a position South of the city with his bloodied 20,000 men. He was hoping to draw out Thomas' 50,000 men to attack him, which they did in grand scale for two days, leading to a disastrous defeat.
 
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I have heard a lot of names thrown around about "who if not Hood". One name that I don't see mentioned much that I think maybe should have been considered is Edmund Kirby Smith. The more I read about Smith, the more impressed I am by him. I am not so sure that things would have ended differently but I don't think Georgia would have been abandoned, not without a fight.
 
I have heard a lot of names thrown around about "who if not Hood". One name that I don't see mentioned much that I think maybe should have been considered is Edmund Kirby Smith. The more I read about Smith, the more impressed I am by him. I am not so sure that things would have ended differently but I don't think Georgia would have been abandoned, not without a fight.
One issue with Kirby Smith was the time factor. Sherman had crossed the Chattahoochee and Davis wanted an immediate change. To get word to Kirby Smith in the Trans-Mississippi, have him cross the Mississippi River and get to Atlanta in a timely manner was virtually impossible.
 
I guess Hardee was the smart one in turning the command down.

The Army of Tennessee command has been, accurately I believe, described as "a pit of vipers." I also think Hardee might have been smart to turn command down. But Hardee also made his share of mistakes in the Atlanta campaign.

I still think Hood "worked hard for that job" with his tattling.

He complied with the request of his commander in chief to keep him informed. Johnston wasn't keeping Davis informed, so someone had to do it.

I still think holding Atlanta behind fortifications and quick, stabbing counter-strokes with the whole army would have been better. IDK maybe he ended the war quicker HIS way.

Richard McMurry believes that Johnston lost Atlanta the moment he retreated from North Georgia. Once they were out of the mountains it was only a matter of time.
Maybe PR wouldn't let anyone fight it that way.
I know he was well intended...I just think he was rash.
And I just don't like Davis' friend undercutting another officer, then getting the command...then destroying it.

But, I am only a non-general trying to think what would have been best.
I am not very concerned about the battle BUT WOULD LOVE to get my hands on unbiased biographies of Hood and Johnston.

I have Richard McMurry's biography of Hood in line to be read. I have high hopes for it. McMurry has really impressed me with his understanding of the war in the west, though he's a bit too much of an apostle for it.
 
A lot of people excoriate Hood for writing to Davis and bypassing Johnston, but that was fairly common at the time. When Dick Ewell got orders to leave the Valley as Jackson was preparing to attack the Federals, Jackson, who was under Joe Johnston at the time, wrote directly to R. E. Lee and sought permission from Lee to keep Ewell with him, bypassing his own commander completely. Yet Jackson doesn't come in for any criticism for that. Neither does Lee, who also bypassed Johnston entirely in his correspondence with Jackson in the Valley.
 
We have been having a very interesting thread here, but I should like to add several sites worth reading directly related to this issue.these sites are done by Sam Hood.
johnbellhood.org/indefense.htm
He is a quote from this site: "Uncle Joe" Johnston in an effort that he admitted was hopeless, ordered over 3,000 soldiers to death, would in or capture at Bentonville simply to obtain fairer surrender term; yet he is historically portrayed as a compassionate commander who loved his troops, while John Bell Hood, who at Franklin and Nashville was attempting to win a war not yet decided, is commonly portrayed as a reckless butcher who ordered men to senseless deaths.
Another part of the site of interest is:The 1864 Tennessee Campaign.
Johnbellhood.org/aot.htm

SAM HOODS MAIN SITE IS : Johnbellhood.org/menu.htm
 
One issue with Kirby Smith was the time factor. Sherman had crossed the Chattahoochee and Davis wanted an immediate change. To get word to Kirby Smith in the Trans-Mississippi, have him cross the Mississippi River and get to Atlanta in a timely manner was virtually impossible.
Hmm, true... but Johnston already had his plan in place to attack Thomas's Army of the Cumberland as they tried to cross Peachtree Creek a plan which Hood tried himself to implement. Why not call for Kirby Smith, leave Johnston in place, let him go through with is plan at Peachtree Creek...couldn't have failed worse. I know that just wouldn't have happened but I will always wonder about E Kirby Smith at the head of the Army of Tennessee.

Don't get me wrong, as I stated in another thread, I don't blame Hood for Peachtree Creek or even Atlanta....I blame Hardee for both. The entire Tennessee Campaign was all on Hood though. It was a bad plan in my opinion. Of course I have the benefit of knowing what ended up happening and Hood didn't.
 
He "kept sending confidential letters to Davis, the Secretary of War, and Bragg" according to Bruce Catton's "Never Call Retreat". Catton said these letters steadily undercut Johnston's own reports.

Use whatever word you want: spy, insubordinate backstabber, two-face, overly ambitious, spy....

Who say's my quote of Lee is a myth? You?

And what was Catton's source? Moreover, as I already stated, others were doing the same. That doesn't give Hood a pass, but others were in fact conducting themselves in the same fashion. Dare I say that say more about Johnston (and Davis) than it does those who were concerned about how the campaign was being managed.
 
Hmm, true... but Johnston already had his plan in place to attack Thomas's Army of the Cumberland as they tried to cross Peachtree Creek a plan which Hood tried himself to implement.

Well, that's what Johnston claimed, anyway. Do we really have any evidence other than Johnston's claim?
 
If I'm not mistaken, that comment was related quite second hand by Dr R L Dabney, who said he had heard it from Governor Stockdale, who was the only person to whom Lee said it. It was after the conference at White Sulphur Springs, and Lee closed the door after seeing everyone else out - to say thus to Stockdale. It's quite dubious, seeing as Stockdale was an ardent Southern nationalist and didn't accept the South's defeat...and assuming Dr Dabney got it straight as he wasn't particularly reliable on a number of things.

Why Lee would say this to anybody at any time after the war is fairly strange and not in accordance with his undisputed actions and sayings post-war.
 
What I want is to know how- in Richard M. McMurry's wording - "Hood had forgotten to take up the pontoon bridge the Confederates had put across the Coosa River at Gadsden - a bridge that Hood planned to have with the army in case he met with defeat and had to recross the Tennessee at a point where it could not be forded." - indicates good preparations.

This looks more like "careless off (the battlefield)".

Well this one is interesting. McMurry's source for this is Beauregard's memoir, which was written by Alfred Roman (largely via Beauregard's words and papers). Anyway, I have no reason to think that Beauregard would lie about this, but it does seem odd. OR 39, pt. 3, had plenty of correspondence about the bridge over the Coosa:

p. 834 - bridge is about to be laid
p. 841 - AoT leaves Gadsden; Beauregard says nothing Sam Cooper about the bridge being forgotten
p. 843 - Mason tells cavalry to swim and ferry across the Coosa which indicates the bridge is already gone
p. 866 - Mason is already referring to the bridge being potentially laid at Bainbridge

Also, a correspondent with the Montgomery mail wrote (and which was published in a Richmond newspaper barely two weeks later):

"The Southern papers bring us very little of the movements and operations of Hood's army. This may be accounted for from the fact that his army is constantly on the move, and there is very little opportunity for this reason of communicating with the press. From the accounts we get it seems to be a settled fact that General Hood broke up his camp at Gadsden (Alabama) on the 22d of October, moved northward in the direction of Gunter's Landing, on the Tennessee, and is now in all probability in Middle Tennessee. The events of the next few days will be looked for with interest. It is reported that Forrest has been ordered forward to attack Bridgeport. A corresponded of the Montgomery Mail, writing from Gadsden (Alabama), says: The army has moved. The troops are gone. The last train has disappeared, and the last soldier has taken his farewell peep of the south side of the Coosa. On Friday, October 21st, Stewart's corps marched out in the van. It was followed by Lee, or rather Dick Taylor, who occupies the center ; and to-day, at dawn, the delighted Tennesseans, under Cheatham, crossed the river Jordan, or Coosa. The transportation quickly followed, and at noon the pontoon was taken up end also hurried forward after the troops."

So if the bridge was "forgotten" it was remembered pretty quickly. My speculative answer is that 20 years after the war Beauregard may not quite have remembered it as it actually happened. The newspaper is pretty clear that the pontoon bridge was pulled up as soon as Cheatham's men crossed.

Long story short, Beauregard is the only source I am aware of that makes this claim. Had the bridge indeed been forgotten I suspect someone else might have had something to say about at the time it actually happened. But perhaps the "hurried forward" portion of the article is what Beauregard was referring to.

In closing, I find it implausible that ANY army commander would just forget his pontoon bridge. But hey, I've seen snow in mid-May so who knows. :)
 
This (from the newspaper piece referenced above) doesn't really apply to the discussion going on, but it does put on display the old adage that perception is 9/10 of reality:

"The troops were in fine spirits and full of joyful anticipations as to the prospects before them. They had been addressed by Generals Hood, Beauregard and Cheatham, the first of whom informed them that they were about starting on a fifteen days march, but whither they were not informed."

I also have letters written by Confederate soldiers just before they entered Tennessee who expressed the same feelings. We may look back and say Hood didn't have a chance, or he did this and this and this wrong, but the army certainly believed they had a chance. And sometimes, like in late 1864, a chance is about all you have to hang onto.
 

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