Why General Hood

[Nathanb1]

I'm not really sure of Forrest in command of anything over a division, but he had a lot of the good qualities that you can't just teach.

That's something few men had, West Pointers or not.

He was fairly good at staffing. Other than that one--er--serious error.

 

[Elennsar]

No man kills me and lives? Or was that some other element of his problems with people?

 

[Drew]

But a trip to West Point would have taught him the one thing he really needed to learn, and that was how to work with fools, idiots and assorted incompetents as well as those he respected.

I dunno, Diane. I didn't go to West Point but I got to go to school. I learnt a lot but not how to suffer fools. I'm sure it's cost me as it did Forrest, but what can you do? They're insufferable.

 

[diane]

I dunno, Diane. I didn't go to West Point but I got to go to school. I learnt a lot but not how to suffer fools. I'm sure it's cost me as it did Forrest, but what can you do? They're insufferable.

Forrest had a lot of management experience but not in the military context - which is another world! School might not teach you how to deal with numbskulls but the military teaches you to salute them and say, "Yessir!" And, to be fair to Forrest, the ones he wanted to knock some sense into were usually the ones who desperately needed that...

 

[Elennsar]

I have mixed feelings on that. Forrest sometimes seems to have had his temper speaking as much as his judgment in regards to wanting to knock sense into people.

 

[Saruman]

I have mixed feelings on that. Forrest sometimes seems to have had his temper speaking as much as his judgment in regards to wanting to knock sense into people.

Even his own men...

"One evening Forrest was observed pacing deep in thought around a small railroad station. His hands were clasped behind his back and his head was down as he walked round and round the station. As Forrest made his rounds an unfortunate trooper located his commanding general and proceeded to air his grievances. The man attempted to get Forrest to listen to his problems as the general walked by. He was ignored as though he did not exist. On Forrest's next pass, the soldier once again demanded to be heard. Suddenly, with no advanced warning, nor indication of his agitated state, Forrest threw an explosive, short punch that knocked the man out cold. Then, as though nothing had happened, Forrest continued his rounds calmly and unconsciously stepping over the prostrate body each time he came around again."

 

[Nytram01]

Robertson describes it thus:

"Jackson retained an outward calm in the hours that followed. Apprehension doubtless triggered acute dyspepsia. All he could do was wait, and pray. The course of events that transpired when Jackson's telegram reached Richmond is unknown. Lee was the only high-ranking military official there who appreciated the situation in the valley. He apparently did not consult with Johnston but went straight to the president. Davis may still have harbored some misgivings about Jackson's potential as a field commander, but Lee made a convincing case. The telegram that Jackson received was approval to move forward with his and Ewell's brigades." [James I. Robertson Jr., Stonewall Jackson: The Man, the Soldier, the Legend, pp. 388-389]

The salient point is that this was direct communication between Lee and Jackson, and in one case between Lee and Ewell, without consultation with Johnston.

Jumping from late-April to mid-May I notice, a big leap to say there were no messages whatsoever sent to Cooper meant for Johnston from Jackson or Ewell in that time. That aside, the failure of Richmond to pass on information about events in Northern Virginia to Johnston was highlighted by his specific request on April 22nd to Lee to keep him informed because he was recieving no direct communiction with Jackson or Ewell - a request Lee denied having memory of recieving when he and Johnston's exchanged letters on May 7th and 8th.

In mid-May Lee was telling Jackson to attack Banks as quickly as possible and drive him out Valley while Johnston cautioned him that if Banks was heavilly invested it would be too hazardous to attack him, and on May 17 Johnston wrote to Ewell telling him that if Banks's position was too strongly fortified they should leave him where he was and strike out at Sheilds as he was marching to Fredericksburg instead, this message was forwarded to Jackson.

On May 18th Johnston sent two letter to the Valley. In one to Jackson he reiterated that the goal was to keep Banks from linking up with McDowell and if he was too late to achieve success by attacking Banks directly he should look to east outside of the Valley for a better opportunity, he also stated his full confidence in Jackson and Ewell's judgement and left the final decision of what to do up to them. In the second to Ewell he wrote :

"The whole question is, whether or not General Jackson and yourself are too late to attack Banks. If so the march eastward should be made. If not (supposing your strenght sufficent) then attack."
Page 164 - Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond - Steven Newton​

Jackson's communication to Lee on May 20th in light of that, therefore, seems less like a plea to keep Ewell in the Valley and countermand an order from Johnston for him leave it than it does as merely a request for confirmation of what freedom he has and whether he is allowed to attack Banks or not.

 

[EricAJacobson]

We have your take on the reliability of a statement twenty years later and of a second hand, second rate newspaper account against McMurry's. Both you and McMurry are to all I know are well regarded, studious authors - I have nothing to choose from between the two of you in that regard.

So what I am saying is that I am not persuaded that multiple authors (I checked what McMurry said because he's not known as a Hood basher or just plain lousy researcher, whereas - say - http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hood-at-guntersville-alabama is not something I'm as confident in unsupported by any independent source, and thus it is simply "one of multiple descriptions stating" this) stating that Hood forgot the bridge are wrong.

McMurry has nothing to do with it really. We know what his source was for writing the bridge was forgotten. I found a source that contradicts that. One is contemporary - one is not. One is a pretty straightforward newspaper account - the other comes from a man who was involved with this campaign (and who bore responsibility).

This is a classic example of how evidence can drive a writer/author nuts because YOU have to make the choice about what to include or not include and weigh a piece of evidence's veracity. If I were writing today I wouldn't even cover this bridge issue, expect maybe in a footnote. The evidence isn't there to make a point one way or the other. Ultimately it gins up a controversy that perhaps doesn't even exist and then someone brings it up because they think they've found something and then people debate it online post after post after post.

What a waste of time. It reminds me of the time wasted on laudanum 10-15-20 years ago when posts would just drag on and it seemed some posters just had to have the last word. I guess it was worth it, but some people (I am convinced) just like to go round and round and round and round.

 

[EricAJacobson]

If I sound tired....I am in a way. I do history for a living. I take it seriously, and hopefully have made some positive changes in Spring Hill and Franklin. I don't have the luxury of this as a hobby that is simply fun to debate. I'm fighting developers, attorneys, etc as we reclaim battlefield, and processing almost 100,000 visitors per year. It is a great job, and I'm not sure I would change anything. But this kind of nickel and dime interpretive stuff that really achieves nothing - not so much.

Talk to everyone later.

 

[nitrofd]

The work of preserving franklin is going well thanks to Eric and the Civil War Trust.keep up the good work.

 

[Jamieva]

I think, all things considered, Forrest was considered at the top of the heap in terms of his command, in the context in which he ran. To jump to the next level, takes largely different set of skills. I dont doubt for a second that Forrest was extraordinary. Yet, how many generals, are so far in the thick of things to get severely wounded, and just keep on coming (not always that day but soon thereafter).

Just because Forrest was so successful in his command, does not mean he would have been equally as successful in the next stage (Please excuse my inexperience w/ army COC. I was instructed as a Navy man.) of his command. I dont think a typicall General has that many severe injuries, horse shot out from under him, or kills as many combatants as he did (of the later two I think it was 38/39).

There was this thing called the "Peter Principle", strong in the 1970s, which basically stated that a person rises (in management) to the level of his incompetance. As ugly as that sounds it may be true (try looking at it objectively, he was a great leader but not superman), as to Forrest.

Bottom line, as great as Forrest was in the field, Im not sure he would have done as well in command of the AOT. Just my opinion.

Go read David Powell's book on Chickagmauga that came out last year. Forrest was terrible as the head of a cavalry corps in an organized army. It didn't fit what he was good at. He was a raider, not a true cavalry leader in intelligence gathering and screening of an army. he did way more wrong than right in that campaign.

 

[cash]

Jumping from late-April to mid-May I notice, a big leap to say there were no messages whatsoever sent to Cooper meant for Johnston from Jackson or Ewell in that time.

I didn't say that. I simply showed instances where Lee communicated directly with Johnston's subordinates, and in one case it was in order for those subordinates to get out of following a directive issued by Johnston. There were most certainly no messages at all sent to Cooper regarding the issue of Ewell staying with Jackson after being ordered to leave by Johnston.

That aside, the failure of Richmond to pass on information about events in Northern Virginia to Johnston was highlighted by his specific request on April 22nd to Lee to keep him informed because he was recieving no direct communiction with Jackson or Ewell - a request Lee denied having memory of recieving when he and Johnston's exchanged letters on May 7th and 8th.

I don't see how that really matters. The salient point is that both Lee and Jackson felt comfortable communicating directly with each other without involving Jackson's superior, Johnston, in the conversation much as Hood was communicating directly with Jefferson Davis.

In mid-May Lee was telling Jackson to attack Banks as quickly as possible and drive him out Valley while Johnston cautioned him that if Banks was heavilly invested it would be too hazardous to attack him, and on May 17 Johnston wrote to Ewell telling him that if Banks's position was too strongly fortified they should leave him where he was and strike out at Sheilds as he was marching to Fredericksburg instead, this message was forwarded to Jackson.

On May 18th Johnston sent two letter to the Valley. In one to Jackson he reiterated that the goal was to keep Banks from linking up with McDowell and if he was too late to achieve success by attacking Banks directly he should look to east outside of the Valley for a better opportunity, he also stated his full confidence in Jackson and Ewell's judgement and left the final decision of what to do up to them. In the second to Ewell he wrote :

"The whole question is, whether or not General Jackson and yourself are too late to attack Banks. If so the march eastward should be made. If not (supposing your strenght sufficent) then attack."
Page 164 - Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond - Steven Newton​

Jackson's communication to Lee on May 20th in light of that, therefore, seems less like a plea to keep Ewell in the Valley and countermand an order from Johnston for him leave it than it does as merely a request for confirmation of what freedom he has and whether he is allowed to attack Banks or not.

Johnston laid out a clear requirement and Jackson sought to overturn that requirement.

Here are additional messages in that incident:

Johnston's instructions to Ewell clearly told him that in the situation that existed in the Valley he was to come east. Jackson (and Ewell) wanted to attack Banks, and so Jackson went to Lee to get Johnston's order overturned.

Here it is again:

He wants to keep Ewell in the Valley so that he can make the attack. He can't make the attack without Ewell, so he needs to have Johnston's orders overturned. That's why Lee went directly to see Davis about the situation in the Valley. If it's merely a request for confirmation of what he can do, there's no need for Lee to see Davis about it.

 

[diane]

Go read David Powell's book on Chickagmauga that came out last year. Forrest was terrible as the head of a cavalry corps in an organized army. It didn't fit what he was good at. He was a raider, not a true cavalry leader in intelligence gathering and screening of an army. he did way more wrong than right in that campaign.

I think Powell's book is quite good but I don't agree with his conclusions that Forrest performed poorly as a corps commander. A lot of what went wrong in his section wasn't his fault and I'd put more blame on Wheeler. Cozzens, for example, comes to just the opposite conclusion - that Forrest was almost the only commander who performed well there!

 

[Bowen]

There are a lot of myths about John Bell Hood. He had his faults as a commander (no doubt) but his plans around Atlanta actually were not bad and in fact were audacious but subordinates did not exactly carry them out (the Battle of Atlanta being one of them, Spring Hill was another). Hood was not a drug addict and he was not obsessed day and night with Sally Preston.

 

[cash]

There are a lot of myths about John Bell Hood. He had his faults as a commander (no doubt) but his plans around Atlanta actually were not bad and in fact were audacious but subordinates did not exactly carry them out (the Battle of Atlanta being one of them, Spring Hill was another). Hood was not a drug addict and he was not obsessed day and night with Sally Preston.

I agree with this, along with the caveat that his men were also too exhausted to carry out what he wanted to do around Atlanta, so while some key subordinates made some crucial errors [I'm looking right at S. D. Lee right now], Hood also misjudged the physical ability of what his men could do. Even R. E. Lee could do that.

 

[gunny]

There are a lot of myths about John Bell Hood. He had his faults as a commander (no doubt) but his plans around Atlanta actually were not bad and in fact were audacious but subordinates did not exactly carry them out (the Battle of Atlanta being one of them, Spring Hill was another). Hood was not a drug addict and he was not obsessed day and night with Sally Preston.

I agree with your statements regarding Hood, excepting those regarding Atlanta and Spring Hill. I always laugh when historians or authors write about someone making a "Jacksonian Maneuver." One would think that Stonewall Jackson invented the flank movement. The oldest rules of war combine a number of principles that decrease the defender's effectiveness and multiply the attacker's capabilities when utilized correctly. Both in front of Atlanta and at Spring Hill, Hood utilized many of these principles and came near success.

It appears to me that it was not a failure on the part of his subordinates so much however, as it was the actual planning and execution of the movements themselves. At Atlanta, after Hardee basically getting an butt-chewing for not attacking soon enough at Peachtree Creek - he attacks without sufficient reconnaissance. As late in the day as it was, Hardee could either conduct a sufficient recon to determine the best approach that may result in the absence of a battle altogether - or he could attack as Hood wanted (already behind schedule). Either way he would have been looked at as incompetent. If he didn't attack - or as happened - he blindly attacked and got lucky finding a seam that he exploited to some degree - but which accomplished nothing other than a bloody nose for the Feds.

In both of those cases - Spring Hill and Atlanta - Hood conducted long distance movements that left very little time before an engagement would commence (leaving a short period of daylight) and pushing his troops to near exhaustion. The march from Columbia to Spring Hill was no less than 17 miles and up to 24 miles for some of the troops.

Understanding your troops capabilities is one of the most important leadership concepts. The Army of Tennessee were in fact "Supermen" in my eyes, but even superman has cryptonite - i.e. - poor prior planning, poor reconnaissance, over estimating unit abilities, etc.

So, is it Hood's subordinates responsible on these occasions or is it Hood's failure to communicate or translate what he wants done - and how - effectively. Or - was Hood just asking too much of his subordinates in the situations at hand?

 

[Lost Cause]

So, is it Hood's subordinates responsible on these occasions or is it Hood's failure to communicate or translate what he wants done - and how - effectively. Or - was Hood just asking too much of his subordinates in the situations at hand?

Both, overall Hood was in command of the army regardless of whether or not he was actually in command of the situations. Relinquishing blame to his subordinates was not becoming of Hood.

 

[Specster]

Go read David Powell's book on Chickagmauga that came out last year. Forrest was terrible as the head of a cavalry corps in an organized army. It didn't fit what he was good at. He was a raider, not a true cavalry leader in intelligence gathering and screening of an army. he did way more wrong than right in that campaign.

Shelbe Foote said that Forrest was one of two geniuses of the ACW. Do you agree with this or do you just consider him a great horseman/outdoorsman who could modivate men?

Initially I thought, with Forrest it was more about resolve and inner strength that allowed him to succeed. The more I read the more I can see what Foote was talking about. Even his own superiors took a great deal of time to realize just how able he was.

No person, especally in war, can fit every bill. But I am starting to come around that Forrest was very able and intelligent. If he took the S/B IQ test 30 years ago I dont think he would score very high. Yet, what we now know about the diversity of intelligence, I dont have much trouble accepting Footes assessment.

 

[Jamieva]

I'm not ready to say genius. I would have to read a lot more about him before i say that. However, he had a specific skill that he was very good at. That specific skill was not in a traditional cavalry role as attached to a large land army.

 

[gunny]

In a discussion about Forrest's abilities with Joe Johnston in the days following the war's end, Major Campbell Brown related the following regarding the Battle of Bentonville and cavalry.

"I told Gen. Johnston of the surprise Gen. Barney had expressed at Wade Hampton's not doing more with his Cavalry. He [Johnston] said he did not think there had been any genius shown in the handling of our Cavalry--that on several roads confronting Sherman's advance guard they never seemed to think when they would make a fight on one road of bringing reinforcements from another--but rather seemed to regard each body of troops as fixed to its own road. Jeb Stuart had been greatly abused, but he had never seen any one he considered him [Stuart's] equal in our Cavalry service. I asked if Forrest were not superior to him. He said Forrest could do more with bad material than any one else, but he did not make soldiers--he had fought without them better than could have been expected."