Why General Hood

[Elennsar]

In closing, I find it implausible that ANY army commander would just forget his pontoon bridge. But hey, I've seen snow in mid-May so who knows.

The history of war is full of bone headed mistakes, though. Generals have done various follies in regards to the parts of making sure they can get out of a sticky situation.

That's not proof Hood is an example, but I am less inclined to believe anything asking me to put faith in the prospect that no one would do such a thing than if we simply had the quote by an unnamed correspondent.

And out of curiosity, where exactly are you quoting from?

 

[cash]

The history of war is full of bone headed mistakes, though. Generals have done various follies in regards to the parts of making sure they can get out of a sticky situation.

That's not proof Hood is an example, but I am less inclined to believe anything asking me to put faith in the prospect that no one would do such a thing than if we simply had the quote by an unnamed correspondent.

And out of curiosity, where exactly are you quoting from?

Eric posts from Franklin, Tennessee.

http://www.civilwar.org/books/interviews/eric-jacobson---baptism-of-fire/baptism-of-fire.html

 

[Nytram01]

Really spies need to be on the other side. If someone discussing the activities of the General with the President counts as a spy, then something is fundamentally wrong.

The issue, as I have said several times on this website regarding this matter, is this; Hood was conducting this correspondence in secrecy behind his commanders back and was ignoring the correct procedure and proper channels that he should have been observing.

There was nothing wrong with answering the questions Davis asked him to answer - indeed, it would have been wrong not to - but when those questions concerned the conduct of his commanding officer, and when the questions and answers were exchanged outside of the correct official channels, it became a case of Hood undermining his commander's authority and position.

And regardless of whether it was Hood doing this to Johnston or Polk doing it to Bragg or even Forrest doing it to Hood himself, this was morally wrong and indefenisible.

 

[Elennsar]

Eric posts from Franklin, Tennessee.

http://www.civilwar.org/books/interviews/eric-jacobson---baptism-of-fire/baptism-of-fire.html

I do like the sound of that book. Not sure if more inspiring or horrifying, though, given the grimness of that fighting.

 

[Nytram01]

A lot of people excoriate Hood for writing to Davis and bypassing Johnston, but that was fairly common at the time. When Dick Ewell got orders to leave the Valley as Jackson was preparing to attack the Federals, Jackson, who was under Joe Johnston at the time, wrote directly to R. E. Lee and sought permission from Lee to keep Ewell with him, bypassing his own commander completely. Yet Jackson doesn't come in for any criticism for that. Neither does Lee, who also bypassed Johnston entirely in his correspondence with Jackson in the Valley.

When Johnston was compelled to leave Northern Virginia to take up command at Yorktown he left Jackson, Ewell and Field behind and told them he was relying on their intiative and judgment in his absence, but said if they wanted to contact him they should sent their communications to Cooper in Richmond who would forward them on to him, as Johnston had requested.

Cooper did no such thing and instead forwarded these messages to Lee who inserted himself into the vacuum created by Johnston's absence to become the de-facto commander of Northern Virginia. From that moment on Ewell, Jackson and Field ceased to be Johnston's subordinates, he had no effective control over them and he was not even kept informed of what they were doing. Northern Virginia had been rendered a nominal command to Johnston and Lee had been long established as the true authority before Johnston regained contact with them.

A commander of an independent but nominally connected force making direct requests to a central authority that had been running affairs in that region for a month a or more is an entirely different situation from a Corps Commander in an Army bypassing his Army Commander to correspond with a central authority that was miles away from events and unconnected to the day-to-day affairs of the Army.

 

[cash]

When Johnston was compelled to leave Northern Virginia to take up command at Yorktown he left Jackson, Ewell and Field behind and told them he was relying on their intiative and judgment in his absence, but said if they wanted to contact him they should sent their communications to Cooper in Richmond who would forward them on to him, as Johnston had requested.

Cooper did no such thing and instead forwarded these messages to Lee who inserted himself into the vacuum created by Johnston's absence to become the de-facto commander of Northern Virginia. From that moment on Ewell, Jackson and Field ceased to be Johnston's subordinates, he had no effective control over them and he was not even kept informed of what they were doing. Northern Virginia had been rendered a nominal command to Johnston and Lee had been long established as the true authority before Johnston regained contact with them.

A commander of an independent but nominally connected force making direct requests to a central authority that had been running affairs in that region for a month a or more is an entirely different situation from a Corps Commander in an Army bypassing his Army Commander to correspond with a central authority that was miles away from events and unconnected to the day-to-day affairs of the Army.

No, that's not the situation. Johnston was still in place and Jackson wrote directly to Lee.

 

[Allie]

The history of war is full of bone headed mistakes, though. Generals have done various follies in regards to the parts of making sure they can get out of a sticky situation.

That's not proof Hood is an example, but I am less inclined to believe anything asking me to put faith in the prospect that no one would do such a thing than if we simply had the quote by an unnamed correspondent.

And out of curiosity, where exactly are you quoting from?

I'm just not so sure that the commanding general is the sole person in charge of whether a bridge is taken up. It's like blaming him for his men not remembering their tent pegs. Surely it was handled at multiple levels.

 

[Nytram01]

No, that's not the situation. Johnston was still in place and Jackson wrote directly to Lee.

I am not aware of Ewell coming under Jackson's command in the Valley until after Johnston left for Yorktown. As far as I am aware, prior to that Ewell was independent of Jackson and stationed around the middle of the Rappahannock prior to Lee directing him into the Valley in support of Jackson following Jackson's request to that effect on April 17th.

 

[Elennsar]

I'm just not so sure that the commanding general is the sole person in charge of whether a bridge is taken up. It's like blaming him for his men not remembering their tent pegs. Surely it was handled at multiple levels.

The commanding general is responsible for communicating to the people responsible for the bridge whether or not he does want them to take it up, though. Unless he does so, how are they to know what he intends them to do with it?

Maybe he intends to leave it across the Coosa because that's where he's concerned about needing a bridge in place in case the army can't ford. Maybe he intends to leave it there to imply that's what he intends.

It's not their job to make those decisions.

 

[Allie]

The commanding general is responsible for communicating to the people responsible for the bridge whether or not he does want them to take it up, though. Unless he does so, how are they to know what he intends them to do with it?

Maybe he intends to leave it across the Coosa because that's where he's concerned about needing a bridge in place in case the army can't ford. Maybe he intends to leave it there to imply that's what he intends.

It's not their job to make those decisions.

And he "forgot" this, and nobody said, "Uh, Sir, about that bridge..." And the sole report just happens to come from a notorious gossip who hated him, many years later. Sorry, not buying it.

 

[bschulte]

He worked hard to get that command! Truth of it was, he wasn't the general he and others thought he'd be - he was best where he had been. Sherman was happy with Hood's promotion, though - Ol' Joe wasn't getting out of his way.

Nope, Ol' Joe would've just kept retreating to the Gulf of Mexico...in all seriousness, Johnston is the most overrated army commander of the entire war. He would've given up Richmond had he not been wounded, and Atlanta would've fallen much sooner had Davis not made the switch.

 

[Elennsar]

And he "forgot" this, and nobody said, "Uh, Sir, about that bridge..." And the sole report just happens to come from a notorious gossip who hated him, many years later. Sorry, not buying it.

Hood can have all the intent in the world to do X, but unless his subordinates know that they 're intended to do X, X not happening is entirely his responsibility.

So I am not even remotely surprised at the idea of no one saying 'Uh, Sir, about that bridge" if Hood has failed to communicate that it is supposed to be taken up and brought with the army.

That's the area I can very much see him "forgetting". Hood wasn't absent minded, but an effective manager? Not so convinced.

If you have information saying it was taken up, great. But I don't have any faith in either Hood or in Beauregard (who is probably my least favorite Confederate full general - at least Hood is sympathetic).

Having the two together was definitely not a good thing for the Confederacy.

 

[Allie]

Hood can have all the intent in the world to do X, but unless his subordinates know that they 're intended to do X, X not happening is entirely his responsibility.

So I am not even remotely surprised at the idea of no one saying 'Uh, Sir, about that bridge" if Hood has failed to communicate that it is supposed to be taken up and brought with the army.

If you have information saying it was taken up, great. But I don't have any faith in either Hood being immune to "aren't you suppose to know what I want, when I want, without me having to say so?" (it's an obnoxiously common failing) or Beauregard (who is probably my least favorite Confederate full general - at least Hood is sympathetic).

The contemporary newspaper account posted by Eric A Jacobon is information that it was taken up. Which, given the absurdity of the account of it being "forgotten" and the source, would seem like more than sufficient evidence.

 

[Nytram01]

...in all seriousness, Johnston is the most overrated army commander of the entire war...

You've chosen the wrong Johnston to make that comment about.

 

[bschulte]

You've chosen the wrong Johnston to make that comment about.

He's second!

 

[Elennsar]

The contemporary newspaper account posted by Eric A Jacobon is information that it was taken up. Which, given the absurdity of the account of it being "forgotten" and the source, would seem like more than sufficient evidence.

We have generals failing to give specific orders to do X and X not happening accordingly all over the place. What is absurd about Hood's subordinates failing to take up the bridge because Hood has not made it clear they needed to do so and thought that he had?

This is where I see the text Eric quoted, so this is what I have to say on the source:
http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=SDU18641205.2.14&e=-------en--20--1--txt-txIN-------

It may be true - but "'more than sufficient evidence" considering the nonsense in the following article? (And "It was followed by Lee, or rather Dick Taylor, who occupies the center" - when was Richard Taylor in the Army of Tennessee?) I am distinctly underwhelmed by the Daily Union's coverage of the war.

I'm trying not to nitpick here because I have a tendency to do that when feeling stubborn, but "some newspaper article claimed this" when the newspaper is reporting what some other paper refers to is a slim basis for concluding X is "certainly" (my word) true.

So if you're going to argue its impeachable, my natural reaction as a skeptic is going to look at it more closely - and that gets into things I make a point of because I'm a detail obsessive person more than a big picture person.

 

[Specster]

I am not trying to be redundant and diseregard similar positions stated priot to mine in this tread but by position, independent to what has been prior stated - Johnston had given up significant territory and assets w/o much of a fight. Richmond wanted someone who would fight regardless of the odds, and Hood fit that bill - to the dterminent of the Confederacy.

He fought, and continued to fight, when it made little sense to do so. I know others, on this thread have said he had no legit. options. I do not buy that. Johnston's strategy was still available. When Johnston was returned to commander, he still saved him army...it was not slaughtered in weeks.

I think Hood was a knee jerk reaction, in a time of desperation. I can understand the reasoning. As good a commander as he was in past campaigns, in positions of lesser authority, in retrospect, it was a mistake to give him the command. They Confederacy would have been better off leaving Johnston in, or perhaps elevating PT Bourigard (yet I think he was having his own problems at that time, health not being the least) - he had a hell of a track record.

 

[Elennsar]

How would Johnston's strategy have been better for the Confederacy than Hood's, and at least as importantly, what suggested that it would do the Confederacy more good than Hood's at the time Davis decided against Joe?

 

[cash]

I am not aware of Ewell coming under Jackson's command in the Valley until after Johnston left for Yorktown. As far as I am aware, prior to that Ewell was independent of Jackson and stationed around the middle of the Rappahannock prior to Lee directing him into the Valley in support of Jackson following Jackson's request to that effect on April 17th.

You're right that Johnston had left the Valley; however, there were no messages sent through Cooper in this series.

Here's Lee directly to Jackson:

Here's Lee direct to Ewell:

And after Johnston ordered Ewell out of the Valley, here's Jackson directly to Lee:

Robertson describes it thus:

"Jackson retained an outward calm in the hours that followed. Apprehension doubtless triggered acute dyspepsia. All he could do was wait, and pray. The course of events that transpired when Jackson's telegram reached Richmond is unknown. Lee was the only high-ranking military official there who appreciated the situation in the valley. He apparently did not consult with Johnston but went straight to the president. Davis may still have harbored some misgivings about Jackson's potential as a field commander, but Lee made a convincing case. The telegram that Jackson received was approval to move forward with his and Ewell's brigades." [James I. Robertson Jr., Stonewall Jackson: The Man, the Soldier, the Legend, pp. 388-389]

The salient point is that this was direct communication between Lee and Jackson, and in one case between Lee and Ewell, without consultation with Johnston.

 

[rhettbutler1865]

Hood's wounds alone should heve been enough to keep him out of a command position. The Confederacy had several competent generals who could have commanded those forces. .... S.D. Lee, Polk, Hardee, even Forrest.

Grant got a lot of grief for using up his men. What Hood did at Franklin was totally unnecessary and much worse than anything Grant ever did.

Forrest should have gotten that command. He was extremely gifted in warfare, and underrated at the time. Lee even admitted that.