Why General Hood

He "kept sending confidential letters to Davis, the Secretary of War, and Bragg" according to Bruce Catton's "Never Call Retreat". Catton said these letters steadily undercut Johnston's own reports.

Use whatever word you want: spy, insubordinate backstabber, two-face, overly ambitious, spy....

Jefferson Davis asked Hood what was going on, since he wasn't getting any information from Johnston. Was Hood supposed to ignore a request from the commander in chief?

Who say's my quote of Lee is a myth? You?

Any responsible historian who's looked at it.

Tell you what. Why don't you provide the primary source where Lee said it?
 
Jefferson Davis asked Hood what was going on, since he wasn't getting any information from Johnston. Was Hood supposed to ignore a request from the commander in chief?



Any responsible historian who's looked at it.

Tell you what. Why don't you provide the primary source where Lee said it?
I quess he has never read the thread about Lee's supposed quote that it did come Benet'.s poem I believe circle 1927.
 
Jefferson Davis asked Hood what was going on, since he wasn't getting any information from Johnston. Was Hood supposed to ignore a request from the commander in chief?



Any responsible historian who's looked at it.

Tell you what. Why don't you provide the primary source where Lee said it?

Here you go. I don't have an original source.
So just attribute it to me.

First off, where do I get brownie points for admitting to the fact instead of starting some stupid diversionary conversation?

John Bell Hood was reckless. He wasted men's lives. As did Davis for making the change.
They were deluded at this point of the war thinking in these offensive terms.
But they were all in "The Club" and Joe Johnston wasn't.
Like kids getting false strength to exclude another kid by all agreeing.
That's an analogy.

What would have happened if the Confederacy had spent the entire(even early) war fighting a serious defensive strategy?
Only getting aggressive in very, very, very limited circumstances?
Wouldn't that have upped the chance of "winning by not losing"?
 
Here you go. I don't have an original source.
So just attribute it to me.

The source is Stephen Vincent Benet. He wrote the line in the 1928 poem, "John Brown's Body." Lee never said it.

The cannon roll past,
The endless lines of the infantry begin.
A. P. Hill leads the van. He is small and spare,
His short, clipped beard is red as his battleshirt,
Jackson and Lee are to call him in their death-hours.
Dutch Longstreet follows, slow, pugnacious and stubborn,
Hard to beat and just as hard to convince,
Fine corps commander, good bulldog for holding on,
But dangerous when he tries to think for himself,
He thinks for himself too much at Gettysburg,
But before and after he grips with tenacious jaws.
There is D. H. Hill--there is Early and Fitzhugh Lee--
Yellow-haired Hood with his wounds and his empty sleeve,
Leading his Texans, a Viking shape of a man,
With the thrust and lack of craft of a berserk sword,
All lion, none of the fox.
When he supersedes
Joe Johnston, he is lost, and his army with him,
But he could lead forlorn hopes with the ghost of Ney.
His bigboned Texans follow him into the mist.
Who follows them?

First off, where do I get brownie points for admitting to the fact instead of starting some stupid diversionary conversation?

Go to Window #3 and take a number. :smile:


John Bell Hood was reckless. He wasted men's lives. As did Davis for making the change.
They were deluded at this point of the war thinking in these offensive terms.

In what way was Hood reckless?

But they were all in "The Club" and Joe Johnston wasn't.
Like kids getting false strength to exclude another kid by all agreeing.
That's an analogy.

What would have happened if the Confederacy had spent the entire(even early) war fighting a serious defensive strategy?
Only getting aggressive in very, very, very limited circumstances?
Wouldn't that have upped the chance of "winning by not losing"?

So then you consider R. E. Lee to be reckless as well?

Well, I suppose when all the confederate armies combined on the island of Key West after retreating there, they would have been unassailable.
 
The source is Stephen Vincent Benet. He wrote the line in the 1928 poem, "John Brown's Body." Lee never said it.

The cannon roll past,
The endless lines of the infantry begin.
A. P. Hill leads the van. He is small and spare,
His short, clipped beard is red as his battleshirt,
Jackson and Lee are to call him in their death-hours.
Dutch Longstreet follows, slow, pugnacious and stubborn,
Hard to beat and just as hard to convince,
Fine corps commander, good bulldog for holding on,
But dangerous when he tries to think for himself,
He thinks for himself too much at Gettysburg,
But before and after he grips with tenacious jaws.
There is D. H. Hill--there is Early and Fitzhugh Lee--
Yellow-haired Hood with his wounds and his empty sleeve,
Leading his Texans, a Viking shape of a man,
With the thrust and lack of craft of a berserk sword,
All lion, none of the fox.
When he supersedes
Joe Johnston, he is lost, and his army with him,
But he could lead forlorn hopes with the ghost of Ney.
His bigboned Texans follow him into the mist.
Who follows them?



Go to Window #3 and take a number. :smile:




In what way was Hood reckless?



So then you consider R. E. Lee to be reckless as well?

Well, I suppose when all the confederate armies combined on the island of Key West after retreating there, they would have been unassailable.


The poem says he had "the lack of craft of a berserk sword".
He threw his men away in Tennessee in 1864 when he couldn't gain enough to justify their loss. Reckless.
Atlanta was lost darn quickly. What if Hood had that whole army entrenched in Atlanta?

No, Lee wasn't reckless but did take some risks. He had a good balance. Only left Virginia for forage.:D

Lee also wasn't crazy about replacing Johnston with Hood. He said "Hood was a bold fighter" but Lee " doubted some other qualities necessary". That's a close paraphrase of a telegram to Davis.

So you like Key West, too? They had a dream of Caribbean Empire in the Confederacy! They'd a been closer!:cool:

Are Texans big boned?
 
I don't think Hood threw his men away - he thought they could do it. Unfortunately, his temper was up and he was not in the mood to listen to anyone. Forrest told him he'd checked out the Union fortifications and there was no way a frontal assault would work. He wanted a division - preferably Cleburne's - and his cavalry, and said he could flank them out of their positions in a few hours. That was a movement he had become a master of, and if he said he could do it he likely could. But Hood was not in a listening mood. And, after everybody had let Schofield out of the bag, one can hardly blame him for still being angry. It was one of those things that so often happened. Lee was not in a listening mood, either, when he ordered Pickett's Charge.
 
I think "not in a listening mood" is a good phrasing of it. Hood strikes me as - well, if he was angry, it was angry because Hood was an emotional guy (this isn't meant as a criticism - a lot of ACW generals were "emotional guys", and Hood was only a few years older than I am) and was dealing with a frustrating situation.

Sam Hood and others writing recently have settled that there wasn't anything more to it than that, but I have trouble imagining it being anything less.
 
If I had a time machine, I would go back and give both him and Preston Brooks marksmanship lessons. Two birds with one stone, so to speak.

I don't understand this remark. Didn't Preston Brooks beat somebody with a cane? Like a hardcore abolitionist Senator?:help:
 
I don't understand this remark. Didn't Preston Brooks beat somebody with a cane? Like a hardcore abolitionist Senator?:help:
Expired Image Removed

Preston Brooks and Louis T. Wigfall were hot-tempered young men with political ambitions back in South Carolina in 1840. They fought a duel, and each shot the other. Both survived, but Brooks used a cane ever after that time. If they'd both been better shots, there would've been 17.4% less fire-eating in 1860.
 
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Are Texans big boned?
Quite possibly, yes. We know from observing Asian cultures that average height is strongly affected by dairy consumption within a culture, and Texas has always been cattle country, with dairy in abundance. Plus an abundance of strong sunlight, very important in an era when people wore long sleeves and tried hard to avoid sunlight.
 
I don't understand this remark. Didn't Preston Brooks beat somebody with a cane? Like a hardcore abolitionist Senator?:help:
What Andy said. You're right too - later, with the help of Keitt, he attacked Charles Sumner on the floor of the senate with his cane. Sumner was trapped by his desk and unable to fight back. He was nearly killed and never did recover fully. That made Brooks a hero in the South.

All three, Keitt, Brooks, and Wigfall, are pretty good examples of the sort of rabid dogs that the South thought it was appropriate to allow out in society and even send to Congress to represent them in that era.
 
The poem says he had "the lack of craft of a berserk sword".
He threw his men away in Tennessee in 1864 when he couldn't gain enough to justify their loss. Reckless.
Atlanta was lost darn quickly. What if Hood had that whole army entrenched in Atlanta?

No, Lee wasn't reckless but did take some risks. He had a good balance. Only left Virginia for forage.:D

Lee also wasn't crazy about replacing Johnston with Hood. He said "Hood was a bold fighter" but Lee " doubted some other qualities necessary". That's a close paraphrase of a telegram to Davis.

So you like Key West, too? They had a dream of Caribbean Empire in the Confederacy! They'd a been closer!:cool:

Are Texans big boned?

I wouldn't count on a poet writing in 1928 for historical accuracy.

How did Hood "throw his men away" in Tennessee? We've already determined that he came very close to an overwhelming victory at Franklin. How is what Hood did at Franklin any different from what Lee did at Gettysburg, yet Hood is reckless and Lee isn't?

Lee wasn't against replacing Johnston with Hood. He wasn't crazy about replacing Johnston with anyone in the midst of a campaign. Later the same night he sent the telegram you quoted from, he wrote to Davis saying, "I am distressed at the intelligence conveyed in your telegram of today. It is a grievous thing to change commander of an army situated as is that of the Tennessee. Still if necessary it ought to be done. I know nothing of the necessity. I had hoped that Johnston was strong enough to deliver battle. We must risk much to save Alabama, Mobile and communication with the Trans Mississippi. It would be better to concentrate all the cavalry in Mississippi and Tennessee on Sherman's communications. If Johnston abandons Atlanta I suppose he will fall back on Augusta. This loses us Mississippi and communications with Trans Mississippi. We had better therefore hazard that communication to retain the country. Hood is a good fighter, very industrious on the battle field, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his action, when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a high opinion of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General Hardee has more experience in managing an army. May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter."

Lee didn't really have a problem with Hood except that he was careless in his paperwork and he didn't have previous experience as an independent commander.
 
All three, Keitt, Brooks, and Wigfall, are pretty good examples of the sort of rabid dogs that the South thought it was appropriate to allow out in society and even send to Congress to represent them in that era.

Harper's Magazine, August 1868:

The anecdotes of Ex-President Houston in the March Number of the Drawer remind a correspondent of a scene that occurred in the city of Houston in the summer of 1861. "I was wending my way," says he, "from the Old Capitol down Main Street, when I learned that' Old Sam' had just come up from his plantation at the month of Cedar Bayou, and stopped at the Fannin House. Never having seen him I went there. He was seated on the veranda, surrounded by a crowd, who were listening eagerly to all he said. As I came up some one asked, 'Well, Governor, what do you think of [Louis T.] Wigfall?' (then a Senator in the Confederate Congress, and Brigadier-General commanding the First Texas Brigade in Virginia, and very popular with Texans, notwithstanding the enmity between him and Houston.) 'Wigfall,' said Old Sam, 'why, Wigfall has always been a good deal of a puppy, and if he continues on in his present course he will eventually become a good deal of a dog!'"
 
I don't think Hood threw his men away - he thought they could do it. Unfortunately, his temper was up and he was not in the mood to listen to anyone. Forrest told him he'd checked out the Union fortifications and there was no way a frontal assault would work. He wanted a division - preferably Cleburne's - and his cavalry, and said he could flank them out of their positions in a few hours. That was a movement he had become a master of, and if he said he could do it he likely could. But Hood was not in a listening mood. And, after everybody had let Schofield out of the bag, one can hardly blame him for still being angry. It was one of those things that so often happened. Lee was not in a listening mood, either, when he ordered Pickett's Charge.
The same can be said about Grant and Meade at Cold Harbor. They thought their men could achieve success. When they didn't at that time, they learned from their mistakes and later adapted to the conditions. That cannot be said about Nashville in the aftermath of Franklin.
 
I wouldn't count on a poet writing in 1928 for historical accuracy.

How did Hood "throw his men away" in Tennessee? We've already determined that he came very close to an overwhelming victory at Franklin. How is what Hood did at Franklin any different from what Lee did at Gettysburg, yet Hood is reckless and Lee isn't?

Lee wasn't against replacing Johnston with Hood. He wasn't crazy about replacing Johnston with anyone in the midst of a campaign. Later the same night he sent the telegram you quoted from, he wrote to Davis saying, "I am distressed at the intelligence conveyed in your telegram of today. It is a grievous thing to change commander of an army situated as is that of the Tennessee. Still if necessary it ought to be done. I know nothing of the necessity. I had hoped that Johnston was strong enough to deliver battle. We must risk much to save Alabama, Mobile and communication with the Trans Mississippi. It would be better to concentrate all the cavalry in Mississippi and Tennessee on Sherman's communications. If Johnston abandons Atlanta I suppose he will fall back on Augusta. This loses us Mississippi and communications with Trans Mississippi. We had better therefore hazard that communication to retain the country. Hood is a good fighter, very industrious on the battle field, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his action, when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a high opinion of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General Hardee has more experience in managing an army. May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter."

Lee didn't really have a problem with Hood except that he was careless in his paperwork and he didn't have previous experience as an independent commander.

I guess Hardee was the smart one in turning the command down.

I still think Hood "worked hard for that job" with his tattling.
I still think holding Atlanta behind fortifications and quick, stabbing counter-strokes with the whole army would have been better. IDK maybe he ended the war quicker HIS way.
Maybe PR wouldn't let anyone fight it that way.
I know he was well intended...I just think he was rash.
And I just don't like Davis' friend undercutting another officer, then getting the command...then destroying it.

But, I am only a non-general trying to think what would have been best.
I am not very concerned about the battle BUT WOULD LOVE to get my hands on unbiased biographies of Hood and Johnston.
 
IDK maybe he ended the war quicker HIS way.
There is certainly truth to that, and it was indeed bittersweet. There has been criticism on this board against Lee and whose strategies are sometimes viewed as prolonging the war and increasing the casualty lists.
 
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I guess Hardee was the smart one in turning the command down.

I still think Hood "worked hard for that job" with his tattling.
I still think holding Atlanta behind fortifications and quick, stabbing counter-strokes with the whole army would have been better. IDK maybe he ended the war quicker HIS way.
Maybe PR wouldn't let anyone fight it that way.
I know he was well intended...I just think he was rash.
And I just don't like Davis' friend undercutting another officer, then getting the command...then destroying it.

But, I am only a non-general trying to think what would have been best.
I am not very concerned about the battle BUT WOULD LOVE to get my hands on unbiased biographies of Hood and Johnston.
Is it possible to get a truly unbiased biography of anyone?

Reading Mary Chesnut, I get a picture of Hood as a good sort of guy, basically a jock, not stupid but no one's idea of a quick thinker, and very ambitious. He got in over his head and no one was more devastated than he was by what happened next. Later he had time to think about it, started to resent being left holding the bag on a situation which was nearly impossible to begin with, and said some things which made him look less attractive than if he had just taken all the blame and let others apologize for him.
 
The main thing I hold against Hood is this:

Hood does not strike me as a mature, seasoned adult. I'm not saying he was a terrible person - but his ambitions exceeding his ability to handle those responsibilities comes off as very adolescent, in the sense adolescents want to be treated as adults even though they're not ready.

It's perfectly understandable, and there are worse failings in both a man and a general - but it is the downside of his leonine (bold and strong and proud) character, in my opinion.
 
The main thing I hold against Hood is this:

Hood does not strike me as a mature, seasoned adult. I'm not saying he was a terrible person - but his ambitions exceeding his ability to handle those responsibilities comes off as very adolescent, in the sense adolescents want to be treated as adults even though they're not ready.

It's perfectly understandable, and there are worse failings in both a man and a general - but it is the downside of his leonine (bold and strong and proud) character, in my opinion.
Well, he was thirty-three. That's pretty young.

The problem is, he was picked for being bold and young and rash. And it's proven that the less competent someone is in a given field, the less self-aware they are of their own failings.
 

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