Why General Hood

[ErnieMac]

"Some form of military training" for generals is 272/425 Confederate generals, 395/583 Union generals. (per Generals in Gray and Generals in Blue respectively).

I have hardly any data to compare Union field officers and lower to Confederates also below the rank of brigadier general, but as far as the high command went, the figures don't favor the Confederates.

Not sure why we should expect more at lower ranks.

272/425=64%; 395/583=68% - some advantage to the Union, but not really too much. I agree that trying to work the numbers for field and company grade officers would be a daunting task. Both the Union and Confederate governments controlled the commissioning of general officer while the lower ranks were handled by state officials and elections. When the Confederate regiments were reorganized following the Conscription Act of 1862 more than a few officer were voted out because they were perceived as too demanding by the men. IMO percentages of trained officers ranking below brigadier general would be nowhere close to the percentages for general officers.

 

[EricAJacobson]

1a) But if you're going to talk about how getting across three weeks earlier might have mattered, what responsibility Hood has for that not happening - or for attempting something that wasn't feasible to attempt - is relevant in this one as much as the others.

1b & 2) No, dead serious question.

Those troops you're not counting are under Thomas's command, those troops are equipped and are able to be moved.

If you want to suggest that they don't matter in a can't-be-rewritten-too-soon version of this: http://www.gamersarchive.net/theGamers/archive/eaaw.htm
then yes, I agree. If you want to suggest that they're irrelevant to the campaign because if you list "the soldiers at Nashville" they're not at Nashville, then I cannot agree unless some evidence is presented for how their orders cannot be changed so that they're not as scattered.

3) "Thomas's troops" are not the same as the troops at Nashville and 4th & 23rd Corps. The other troops in his department are not on the moon.

a. Are you actually suggesting that getting across the Tennessee three weeks earlier would NOT have mattered? I'm beginning to think you are.

b. No one, including myself, has ever denied that Thomas didn't have other troops in his area of jurisdiction. That being said, Steedman is the ONLY sizable force. Let's be honest, they couldn't just evacuate every post (Decatur for example, or Murfreesboro) so your argument that those troops were some sort of factor is largely mute. The other troops Thomas has coming to him are A. J. Smith's men, but they weren't even in his department. I always find your kind of approach regarding troop strength so interesting, because Thomas certainly didn't make the argument you are.

c. I'm not interested in playing online games.

 

[Elennsar]

a. Are you actually suggesting that getting across the Tennessee three weeks earlier would NOT have mattered? I'm beginning to think you are.

b. No one, including myself, has ever denied that Thomas didn't have other troops in his area of jurisdiction. That being said, Steedman is the ONLY sizable force. Let's be honest, they couldn't just evacuate every post (Decatur for example, or Murfreesboro) so your argument that those troops were some sort of factor is largely mute. The other troops Thomas has coming to him are A. J. Smith's men, but they weren't even in his department. I always find your kind of approach regarding troop strength so interesting, because Thomas certainly didn't make the argument you are.

c. I'm not interested in playing online games.

a) No. I'm suggesting that Hood failed to do so (get across three weeks earlier) for reasons that relate to whether or not not this campaign's chances of success were anything more than a Hail Mary attempt to begin with.

b)

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0093&q1=Thomas, George H.&view=image&seq=994&size=100
And in fact, we do see this in regards to Granger:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0093;q1=Thomas, George H.;view=image;seq=1019;size=100;page=root

Sure sounds like Thomas felt they were some sort of factor in facing Hood. Certainly he can't evacuate "every" post, but evacuating some posts to strengthen his forces elsewhere wasn't even only hypothetically possible.

c) I'm not suggesting you would be interested in that game. I'm using it as how focused on tactical level alone we have to be to define the fate of "federal forces" as identical to "4th and 23rd Corps".

 

[Elennsar]

I think this (bolded) is why I regard Hood's Tennessee campaign as senseless.

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/hoods-plan-hoods-failure.9525/page-6#post-113348

For some very short period, it looked like the Rebels might burst through to the bridges. If they had, the Confederacy might very quickly and at comparatively little cost, have killed or captured almost every Union soldier on the Franklin side of the Harpeth River, along with all their equipment.

You might figure that as something like 1,500 Confederate casualties; 10-12,000 Union ones. (I'm not sure how many men were actually in Franklin.) That is devastating to Schofield's command and very damaging to Thomas' command.

But by December 2, Thomas will still have 20-25,000 or more troops in Nashville. Schofield's remnants will arrive, and Smith is already there (10,000) and Steadman and the RR garrisons are arriving (5,000) to reinforce the existing garrison. The city is highly fortified. George Thomas is in command. They won't be coming out anytime soon, but they won't be surrendering, either.

Note that this is after a hypothetical situation that would be the single greatest tactical victory of the Civil War.

This is not a reward worth the risks. And - this related to the entire saga of Hood as the commander of the Army of Tennessee - the situation is at least in part a consequence of his decisions. He's not been dropped into command after there's no chance of anything but a surrender.

I'm not saying he had a good position with which to defend Atlanta, but a general with an army of approximately 59,000 (not counting the 5,000 odd militia with the army) vs. a general with 100,000 odd (106,070 on June 30) is not down to the point of relying on Volkssturm (edit, mixed up late war formations) with hand grenades either.

So simply saying that "it was a bad situation" isn't doing justice to why this is the situation the Army of Tennessee is facing in November.

 

[EricAJacobson]

a) No. I'm suggesting that Hood failed to do so (get across three weeks earlier) for reasons that relate to whether or not not this campaign's chances of success were anything more than a Hail Mary attempt to begin with.

b)

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0093&q1=Thomas, George H.&view=image&seq=994&size=100
And in fact, we do see this in regards to Granger:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0093;q1=Thomas, George H.;view=image;seq=1019;size=100;page=root

Sure sounds like Thomas felt they were some sort of factor in facing Hood. Certainly he can't evacuate "every" post, but evacuating some posts to strengthen his forces elsewhere wasn't even only hypothetically possible.

c) I'm not suggesting you would be interested in that game. I'm using it as how focused on tactical level alone we have to be to define the fate of "federal forces" as identical to "4th and 23rd Corps".

1. I think it patently obvious that in late 1864, any chance the Confederacy had to hang on was very slim at best. So Hood did what he thought best. The delay in NW Alabama certainly wasn't anticipated. No one could have predicted the horrendous weather, and the change of supply base only added to the delay. Federal troops also cutting the first pontoon bridge was another factor certainly not anticipated. But my gosh, the Civil War is replete with cases of a campaign not playing out as a particular commander hoped. I prefer to evaluate what DID happen, rather than sit back 150 years later and pass judgment with the benefit of hindsight.

2. I don't see how either OR reference changes anything I previously posted. Thomas' forces with which to contest Hood's movement remained the IV and XXIII Corps (plus Wilson's cobbled together cavalry) and the Nashville garrison until Smith and Steedman got there, both of which occurred after the events of Nov 29-30. We can debate all night about whether Thomas could have used the Decatur and/or Murfreesboro troops. He didn't. Everything as it turned out hinged on Schofield's force, at least until post-Franklin.

 

[EricAJacobson]

This is not a reward worth the risks.

That is your opinion. It wasn't so easy have that opinion in late 1864 as the commander of the only effective Confederate army which remained mobile.

 

[EricAJacobson]

I think this (bolded) is why I regard Hood's Tennessee campaign as senseless.

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/hoods-plan-hoods-failure.9525/page-6#post-113348



This is not a reward worth the risks.

Looking at in that manner is a static approach, and ignoring a key factor. On Dec 2 with a Confederate victory at either Spring Hill or Franklin as a reality, the entire situation is different. Hood's army got smoked at Franklin and yet U. S. Grant was ready to sack Thomas a week and a half later. I wonder what might have been firing across the telegraph lines had Hood won at Franklin and then placed his army right outside Nashville?? To suggest that Thomas wasn't going to come out might be true, but I doubt it. He would have had to (as he did in reality), or be relieved. Then somebody else would have had to.

No way where the Federal authorities - Lincoln, Grant, Stanton, et al., going to let a Confederate army which had just pummeled one Federal army sit outside Nashville unmolested. But I've been wrong before....

 

[ole]

The railroad from Corinth was broken, requiring wagons to bring supplies from the rail end to Florence. And these supplies were coming up from Mobile and points north, so I would guess that Hood was waiting for supplies.

 

[Elennsar]

1. I think it patently obvious that in late 1864, any chance the Confederacy had to hang on was very slim at best. So Hood did what he thought best. The delay in NW Alabama certainly wasn't anticipated. No one could have predicted the horrendous weather, and the change of supply base only added to the delay. Federal troops also cutting the first pontoon bridge was another factor certainly not anticipated. But my gosh, the Civil War is replete with cases of a campaign not playing out as a particular commander hoped. I prefer to evaluate what DID happen, rather than sit back 150 years later and pass judgment with the benefit of hindsight.

2. I don't see how either OR reference changes anything I previously posted. Thomas' forces with which to contest Hood's movement remained the IV and XXIII Corps (plus Wilson's cobbled together cavalry) and the Nashville garrison until Smith and Steedman got there, both of which occurred after the events of Nov 29-30. We can debate all night about whether Thomas could have used the Decatur and/or Murfreesboro troops. He didn't. Everything as it turned out hinged on Schofield's force, at least until post-Franklin.

1) Hood's own decisions play a role in what impact things like the weather or the actions of Federal troops have on his ability to "move into Tennessee three weeks earlier".

He's attempting a campaign late in the year. A well prepared commander would have measures in place in case the weather does turn lousy unless he's truly ignorant of what the weather could be expected to be like "in a normal November", and if Hood is that uninformed, it is his responsibility to become informed so that he can make the most reasonable decisions possible.

Something similar can be said in regards to protecting pontoon bridges.

A fair evaluation of Hood does not mean absolving him of any responsibility for preparing properly.

2) Thomas could have and did use troops other than those to respond to Hood's movements. That's the point of the OR references - to illustrate Thomas using troops other than those to "respond to Hood", and that there was no restriction interfering with using them to reinforce Nashville if Thomas chose that in response to Hood.

That is your opinion. It wasn't so easy have that opinion in late 1864 as the commander of the only effective Confederate army which remained mobile.

What made Hood having the opinion that West and Middle Tennessee did not offer a very good chance of that army being used to best effect "not so easy"?

Looking at in that manner is a static approach, and ignoring a key factor. On Dec 2 with a Confederate victory at either Spring Hill or Franklin as a reality, the entire situation is different. Hood's army got smoked at Franklin and yet U. S. Grant was ready to sack Thomas a week and a half later. I wonder what might have been firing across the telegraph lines had Hood won at Franklin and then placed his army right outside Nashville?? To suggest that Thomas wasn't going to come out might be true, but I doubt it. He would have had to (as he did in reality), or be relieved. Then somebody else would have had to.

No way where the Federal authorities - Lincoln, Grant, Stanton, et al., going to let a Confederate army which had just pummeled one Federal army sit outside Nashville unmolested. But I've been wrong before....

I'm sure that Thomas would be expected to do something. But if Hood does significant damage to Schofield's corps, I think that is going to impact how Lincoln, Grant, Stanton, et. al. see whether or not Thomas can attack immediately.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/grantthomas.html

Post edited to communicate more clearly.

 

[GELongstreet]

... Johnston is McClellan in a gray uniform...And together they accomplished nothing.

No need to insult Johnston. And I wouldn´t call e.g. the victory at Manassas nothing.

 

[ole]

Hood was the only immediately available choice. He was there. Hardee had already declined the appointment. (Wasn't the only time on either side that a reluctance to accept an appointment, on either side, that got one passed over for the second consideration.)

Taylor has been mentioned, but he was barely in the theater and would have been in the same position as Meade at Gettysburg. He didn't know the troops, subordinate generals, or the territory.

Surely there must have been better choices, but who? Only Hood was a logical, unfortunate choice for Davis.

 

[Nytram01]

Hood was the only immediately available choice. He was there. Hardee had already declined the appointment. (Wasn't the only time on either side that a reluctance to accept an appointment, on either side, that got one passed over for the second consideration.)

Taylor has been mentioned, but he was barely in the theater and would have been in the same position as Meade at Gettysburg. He didn't know the troops, subordinate generals, or the territory.

Surely there must have been better choices, but who? Only Hood was a logical, unfortunate choice for Davis.

Surely that was at least partly by design. Davis had, afterall, promoted Hood to Corps command and sent him to Johnston, and Davis had relied on Hood's reports of the campaign to keep him better informed of events, therefore Davis facilitated Hood's rise to high command and placed Hood in the ideal position to promote himself for bigger things.

It was in no way a secret that Davis and Johnston didn't get along and didn't trust each other, nor was it a secret that Davis didn't think highly of Johnston's ability. He hadn't really wanted to give Johnston the Army of Tennessee job in the first place - he had wanted to drum him out of service after Vicksburg - but he didn't really have an alternative and Johnston had too much political support for Davis to justify giving someone else the job over his head. Placing a man he trusted and thought highly of in a high command position under Johnston would give him an ideal, to his point of view, and idealy placed alternative when Johnston inevitably, in Davis's opinion, had to be replaced.

That Hood was the only logical replacement for Johnston - if Hardee was ruled out based on his previous refusal of the job - then that, I would suggest, was the intended result anyway when Davis promoted him to command a Corps.

 

[ole]

Surely that was at least partly by design. Davis had, afterall, promoted Hood to Corps command and sent him to Johnston, and Davis had relied on Hood's reports of the campaign to keep him better informed of events, therefore Davis facilitated Hood's rise to high command and placed Hood in the ideal position to promote himself for bigger things.

It was in no way a secret that Davis and Johnston didn't get along and didn't trust each other, nor was it a secret that Davis didn't think highly of Johnston's ability. He hadn't really wanted to give Johnston the Army of Tennessee job in the first place - he had wanted to drum him out of service after Vicksburg - but he didn't really have an alternative and Johnston had too much political support for Davis to justify giving someone else the job over his head. Placing a man he trusted and thought highly of in a high command position under Johnston would give him an ideal, to his point of view, and idealy placed alternative when Johnston inevitably, in Davis's opinion, had to be replaced.

That Hood was the only logical replacement for Johnston - if Hardee was ruled out based on his previous refusal of the job - then that, I would suggest, was the intended result anyway when Davis promoted him to command a Corps.

Interesting, nytram. Now we have to factor in Hood's communications with Davis about Johnston's lame retreats. Hood torpedoed Johnston and ingratiated himself with Davis.

And Davis, no fan of Johnston, bought into it.

 

[Elennsar]

Johnston's own communications - or lack of - are kinda relevant there.

Whether you think the strategy he had when asked for specific information just before his relief is a bad one, it isn't the sort of message to win over someone reluctant to trust your judgment.

Johnston being no fan of Davis, as opposed to a merely passive victim of Davis's unfriendship, is definitely a complication.

 

[Allie]

Johnston's own communications - or lack of - are kinda relevant there.

Whether you think the strategy he had when asked for specific information just before his relief is a bad one, it isn't the sort of message to win over someone reluctant to trust your judgment.

Johnston being no fan of Davis, as opposed to a merely passive victim of Davis's unfriendship, is definitely a complication.

I don't know how much you're aware of the interactions between the two women involved, but Mary Chesnut's accounts of the sparring between Varina Davis and Lydia Johnston make interesting reading. In case anyone thinks "women's matters" don't have a real effect on actual man stuff like battles and government, well... in this case a whole country's fortunes may have been altered by two women not getting along.

 

[Elennsar]

I don't know how much you're aware of the interactions between the two women involved, but Mary Chesnut's accounts of the sparring between Varina Davis and Lydia Johnston make interesting reading. In case anyone thinks "women's matters" don't have a real effect on actual man stuff like battles and government, well... in this case a whole country's fortunes may have been altered by two women not getting along.

Very little, to the point of "nothing", to be honest. So I'd be grateful for help fixing that.

 

[Allie]

Very little, to the point of "nothing", to be honest. So I'd be grateful for help fixing that.

This is an abridged version which seems to leave out a bunch of what I remember - but still a lot of interesting stuff about Hood.

http://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/chesnut/maryches.html#mches102

 

[Elennsar]

This is an abridged version which seems to leave out a bunch of what I remember - but still a lot of interesting stuff about Hood.

http://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/chesnut/maryches.html#mches102

Thanks for the link.

 

[EricAJacobson]

1) Hood's own decisions play a role in what impact things like the weather or the actions of Federal troops have on his ability to "move into Tennessee three weeks earlier".

He's attempting a campaign late in the year. A well prepared commander would have measures in place in case the weather does turn lousy unless he's truly ignorant of what the weather could be expected to be like "in a normal November", and if Hood is that uninformed, it is his responsibility to become informed so that he can make the most reasonable decisions possible.

.

As Trice and I once discussed, the weather in late Oct and thru mid Nov 1864 was not even close to the norm. That is normally among the driest times of the year in north Alabama and Middle Tennessee. The rains which came, day after day, created a situation which no one could have anticipated. Some rain is one thing. Rain for nearly THREE straight weeks is another.

So you claim Hood was ill-prepared. I take the position that some situations obliterate any and all appropriate preparations.

Frankly, the weather impacted not only the army's ability to cross the river, but more importantly delayed the transfer of adequate supplies.

 

[EricAJacobson]

2) Thomas could have and did use troops other than those to respond to Hood's movements. That's the point of the OR references - to illustrate Thomas using troops other than those to "respond to Hood", and that there was no restriction interfering with using them to reinforce Nashville if Thomas chose that in response to Hood.

I disagree. No one disputes there were other troops "available" at Decatur and Murfreesboro. Available and being avilable for practical use are two entirely different things. Just because you have one player left on the bench doesn't mean you use him just because he is "available." Moreover, there was a virtual restriction, as noted in the OR. If there wasn't Thomas would have simply evacuated both Decatur and Murfreesboro.

This argument has never made sense to me. It's like saying that Meade had more troops "available" with which to oppose Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania because there were additional troops in Washington, DC.