Why General Hood

[diane]

You're discussing battle tactics and leftyhunter is discussing overall strategy of the conflict. Tactics and strategy are not the same thing. However, it's still probably not sound history to quote what someone said in a novel.

True.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I think Johnston's retreating has been largely misunderstood. Think he used it very effectively to keep his army intact, viable and before Sherman. As long as he remained an obstacle to Sherman, that general could not engage his larger scheme. He could not combine with Grant, either, until Johnston was disposed of. This was of benefit to Lee. However, from Davis' perspective, Johnston's secretiveness gave the distinct and quite logical impression that he had no plan but retreat.
There was also another handicap that Hood was saddled with, and some of it was his own fault as well, and that was the state of the AoT. They were not a happy bunch of soldiers! As one of them observed, "Well, we're in a hell of a fix, ain't we. A one eyed president, a one legged general and a one horse Confederacy!"

Very true. But, Sherman, was coming to the conclusion that he would have to change strategies . That, in fact, it would be almost impossible to force the AoT to a stand up battle of attrition, if they(whoever its commander was)did not want to.
Sherman's plan was to move East to the Sea, leaving behind a sufficient force to keep the AoT out of Tn. and make the decision to either follow and attack Sherman or attack the Army he was leaving behind. In either case he would be forcing the AoT to chose an offensive against a superior sized Union armies, whichever choice was made.
The real problem for Sherman was not the AoT or whoever its commander was, but, his superiors, Grant and Lincoln, neither of whom really approved the change in strategies, i.e., they favored the idea of moving East to reinforce Grant's plans, but they wanted the AoT, decisively defeated First.
It took some doing but in the end, Sherman had his way and his plan worked , almost to perfection and IMO, with any commander chosen by Davis, except, perhaps, Joe Johnston..


P.S. just as an aside, I think the plan would not have worked with Johnston, he would have had what, I think, he always wanted by the end of 1864(even if he probably would not have admitted it, even to himself), to save as many confederate lives of his Army as he could, from the effects of a war already lost, i.e., to remain in the backwaters of the war, until it was over.

 

[leftyhunter]

The thing is, Pete was wrong in this case. They didn't have to win an offensive war; they didn't even have to force the Yankees out of Georgia. All they had to do was make the war costly and unpopular enough that the Union government was willing to call it a day for the sake of getting reelected.

Maybe old Pete was right.Because the CSA did not have enough men and the Union had only so many bad generals no matter who many victories Lee won the Union could win just enough in the west to maintain enough morale to keep the Union war effort going. Perhaps if Lincoln had to face election just after Chanslorville (sp?) or if the US had a parliamentry system then yes Lincoln would of been in trouble. By the time the election rolled around in early Nov 1864 the CSA is on a death spiral and its to late for a negotiated settlement.
A major problem for the South was that the war was very unpopular in the South and that made it impossible for the South to field enough men to fight the Union . In fact has I pointed out the unpopularity of the Confederate cause in the South very much helped the Union to win.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

You're discussing battle tactics and leftyhunter is discussing overall strategy of the conflict. Tactics and strategy are not the same thing. However, it's still probably not sound history to quote what someone said in a novel.

I never said that it was written in stone that Longstreet said "The logical outcome of defensive warfare is defeat" on the other hand history has shown that very well is the case.In the case of the CW that seems to be quite true.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Very true. But, Sherman, was coming to the conclusion that he would have to change strategies . That, in fact, it would be almost impossible to force the AoT to a stand up battle of attrition, if they(whoever its commander was)did not want to.
Sherman's plan was to move East to the Sea, leaving behind a sufficient force to keep the AoT out of Tn. and make the decision to either follow and attack Sherman or attack the Army he was leaving behind. In either case he would be forcing the AoT to chose an offensive against a superior sized Union armies, whichever choice was made.
The real problem for Sherman was not the AoT or whoever its commander was, but, his superiors, Grant and Lincoln, neither of whom really approved the change in strategies, i.e., they favored the idea of moving East to reinforce Grant's plans, but they wanted the AoT, decisively defeated First.
It took some doing but in the end, Sherman had his way and his plan worked , almost to perfection and IMO, with any commander chosen by Davis, except, perhaps, Joe Johnston..


P.S. just as an aside, I think the plan would not have worked with Johnston, he would have had what, I think, he always wanted by the end of 1864(even if he probably would not have admitted it, even to himself), to save as many confederate lives of his Army as he could, from the effects of a war already lost, i.e., to remain in the backwaters of the war, until it was over.

I suspect you are right that Johnston wanted to save has many of his men has possible. Of course we will never know unless someone find his writing that state that he did. It was obvious that if Sherman conquers Atlanta with 60k men he will go on the offensive . Johnston and latter Hood can not stop Sherman because they lack the manpower. One can only retreat so much. Something has to be done. perhaps poor old Hood knew he had to make a hail Mary pass not a gret option but what choices did he have?
Leftyhunter

 

[peteanddelmar]

Hood's wounds alone should heve been enough to keep him out of a command position. The Confederacy had several competent generals who could have commanded those forces. .... S.D. Lee, Polk, Hardee, even Forrest.

Grant got a lot of grief for using up his men. What Hood did at Franklin was totally unnecessary and much worse than anything Grant ever did.

Politics killed any chance of the Confederacy putting the right men at the top of the right armies. Study how many Confederate generals were not professionally trained soldiers, but WERE big plantation owners, or friends of Jeff Davis.

 

[Allie]

Politics killed any chance of the Confederacy putting the right men at the top of the right armies. Study how many Confederate generals were not professionally trained soldiers, but WERE big plantation owners, or friends of Jeff Davis.

Nice avvy! I can't stand Sherman but if I've got to look at him, that's much spiffier in color.

I agree about the politics. Although it didn't always work that way - some of the political colonels served a short time before being bounced back into politics. John Overton was a political colonel who actually served as a captain.

 

[peteanddelmar]

Nice avvy! I can't stand Sherman but if I've got to look at him, that's much spiffier in color.

I agree about the politics. Although it didn't always work that way - some of the political colonels served a short time before being bounced back into politics. John Overton was a political colonel who actually served as a captain.

Have you ever read, "Fighting Prophet" about Sherman? You don't seem the unreasonable type. General Jo Shelby burned my hometown twice and I don't get disgusted at him. IDK what your reasons are, though either....BTW thanks.

 

[Allie]

Have you ever read, "Fighting Prophet" about Sherman? You don't seem the unreasonable type. General Jo Shelby burned my hometown twice and I don't get disgusted at him. IDK what your reasons are, though either....BTW thanks.

Basically I'm annoyed at him for burning Randolph, including my family's home. But it's not so much personal as that I dislike all vandals. I can't stand Cromwell for the same sort of reasons. And Sherman's belief that if you make war ugly people will want less of it is simply invalid.

 

[Elennsar]

Politics killed any chance of the Confederacy putting the right men at the top of the right armies. Study how many Confederate generals were not professionally trained soldiers, but WERE big plantation owners, or friends of Jeff Davis.

Not very many, in my reading. Davis preferred professionals to planters.

All the Confederacy's full generals were West Pointers.
Most of the lieutenant generals were (Richard Taylor, Wade Hampton, Nathan Bedford Forrest are the only exceptions I can think of).

Major Generals and Brigadiers might reveal many more not from West Point (after all, only 146 graduates out of 425 total), but while talking the top grades, there's a predominance of professionals - whether men like Bragg merited their ranks or not, he's not of the "not professionally trained but" camp.

So who do you have in mind as getting their rank from being friends with Davis or a big planter?

 

[peteanddelmar]

Not very many, in my reading. Davis preferred professionals to planters.

All the Confederacy's full generals were West Pointers.
Most of the lieutenant generals were (Richard Taylor, Wade Hampton, Nathan Bedford Forrest are the only exceptions I can think of).

Major Generals and Brigadiers might reveal many more not from West Point (after all, only 146 graduates out of 425 total), but while talking the top grades, there's a predominance of professionals - whether men like Bragg merited their ranks or not, he's not of the "not professionally trained but" camp.

So who do you have in mind as getting their rank from being friends with Davis or a big planter?

Have to look again. Maybe I am thinking "AND a big planter"! I just kept reading short bio's of confederate generals online and they were all big planters if they were of much rank. I expected to find more long term army guys in there instead of big plantation owners, I guess.

 

[M E Wolf]

I often marvel as to why the likes of Hardee, author of the US Army's "Hardee's Manual 0f Infantry Tactics, Polk, etc., were sent westward into that battle theater along with Bragg.

General Joe Johnston was in the Eastern Theater, who was most important bringing the likes of Longstreet, "Stonewall" Jackson and others from Harpers Ferry, West Virginia into the fray at the First Battle of Manassas/First Bull Run having done a brilliant military movement that shoved a Union General aside and using the railroad to get the troops there in support of Beauregard, to whom was loosing the battle there at First Bull Run/First Manassas. Another well established fact was that General Johnston was the highest ranking officer to defect to the Confederacy at the rank of Brigadier-General. In addition, under General Johnston, both Longstreet and Jackson were promoted and were being mentored by him. These officers in the "Old Army" hadn't the time to learn the rank and responsibilities when they defected to the Confederacy. I am of the opinion the Confederacy, especially in the eastern theater were best served by having such an experienced general to quick teach these two generals. It was Longstreet who recommended J.E.B. Stuart's promotion to Brigadier-General soon after the attacks on Bailey's Crossroads, Virginia, so close to the future site of the "Grand Review" of McClellan and Lincoln as well as the winter home of the Bailey Circus before merger with Barnum. During the time of the battle of First Manassas/Bull Run; Hood was freshly out of the United States Military Academy/West Point as a Cavalry Officer and assigned not far from Norfolk and Hampton Roads. This gap of military experience must be considered, to include the circumstances for which Hood was 'trained' per se, as far as fighting style and tactics. East verses West topography, state's culture/heritage/social structures vary as do the importance of the use of troops. Mentored by Longstreet's overall command style, Hood florished and was promoted rapidly. He was not laid back.

When General Johnston was wounded severely enough to which caused him to be replaced on the spot by General R. E. Lee, Johnston's technical junior in rank, Davis preferred to keep Lee close. I would suspect had it been any other general other than Lee, General Johnston would have resumed his command of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee returned to adviser or General of the Armies or something where Lee was near. As it happened, Lee remained with the Army of Northern Virginia and General Johnston was shipped west. It must also be mentioned that General Johnston didn't trust Davis and vice versa. Personally, I don't think Davis really trusted anybody and was too much hands on and telling what generals should/shouldn't do from Richmond, rather than trusting the generals in the actual battlefield.

With an overwhelming distrust of Bragg by generals, officers and commanders 'in the field' in his sector of the Western theater, which to me was in 'halves'--Bragg and Johnston having a half each in their particular battle theaters, the shakeup of command was inevitable. In addition, the Confederacy, et.al., seemingly did not put in the same energy and supplies to the western battle theater, so the troops overall dissatisfaction had to play a part in the effectiveness of the troops 'spirit' and physical maintenance. With more territory to cover with less troops, it had to wear on the troops, in my opinion.

With Davis' personal problems with Johnston, as well as Johnston's distrust of Davis, as it was evident that news of what the armies of the various Confederate battle theater's where abouts and intents were published in the various newspapers. It was something Lee complained about often. No doubt Johnston had the same problem. Further west the ability to replace troops was also an issue, whereas the Eastern Theater did have problems but, not to the extend as Johnston had, so I am of the opinion that Johnston was sparing his men, supplies for more important fights that needed all of them, not just some of them. Being passed over rank seniority as Johnston was, had to forever mark his judgment of why Davis did what he did as far as he was concerned.

Johnston's style to me was like chess. Patience and seeing the overall 'board' or, in this case the battle and tactics--move, counter-move, move, etc. His style wasn't 'flash' and 'dash.' Now comes Hood. Wounded in the arm at Gettysburg, again wounded loosing a leg, still was 'able.' This had to bring my admiration for the physical fortitude of the man--J. B. Hood. I am of the opinion that once bitten by Cavalry, it really doesn't leave the man and Cavalry tactics and Infantry tactics are different in some areas, same in other areas. But, it is my opinion that Richmond was as impatient as Hood and both Davis' frustrations and Hood's frustration of a lack of 'doing something' to hurt the enemy (Union armies), the mutual impatience played into one another's favor. Hood was willing to take a temporary rank of full General as to do what Davis had wanted--make movements in a positive direction towards the enemy. Like a 4x4 stuck in snow, Johnston's army had a plan to get free but, Hood brought energy--perhaps best described as bravado, and instead of Johnston's rock back and forth to get out of the rut, Hood would be the sort to rev the engine and slam and mash the accelorator down to the floorboard and 'bully' out of the rut, of course this push of energy would exhaust the troops and deplete their numbers. This of course happened when numbers of men were so critical and Hood's orders that all clerks would be re-assigned to their units for duty, to me--this demonstrated that men were of short supply as to strip his own headquarters of supporting staff and why so few documents appear for 1864 when just officers were at headquarters in a skeleton scale and doing their own clerk work on top of their other responsibilities. When Hood couldn't produce the desired results as Hood had hoped and promised Davis, Hood was man enough to resign his position. But, to Hood's credit--he did try though his way failed. It is then, when I believe Davis realized that Johnston, though his appearance of doing 'nothing' was making progress of holding a position as to 'draw to him'--the enemy.

It is my opinion, that Davis' use of Hood at that time and place in history, was a poor choice yet again and frustration got the better of him, as it did Hood. Hood would be the 'scape goat' for the losses in the western theater and his career was pretty much done. Only after Lee's death did his place change with Longstreet as being the scape goat. Davis needed Hood's action, no matter how little progress or results, in my opinion, to sooth the citizens and politicians more than any military gain. Without civilian and political support Davis would be in trouble, as there were already 'cracks' and 'crumblings' showing within the Confederacy, et.al. Confederate Congress considering the use of "Black/Negro Confederate Armed Troops" was only manifested after Hood's failure to make progress in Davis' and CSA Congressional goals.

I ponder though, why General R. E. Lee would recommend Hood to a position beyond his abilities. Certainly, he would have had better overall knowledge of Hood. I must only 'assume' as not all was collected papers wise, so many never filed out of Hood's troubled headquarters, very little is mentioned elsewhere. Hood's untimely passing leaving so many children behind, the Hood house broke up and it must again be assumed that many of his papers were scattered along with his children. Why Lee recalled Longstreet and Hood left behind is curious yet, it might be Lee saw the frustration in Hood, in addition to Hood's direct connection with Davis and CSA Congress to gain the promotion and giving him overall command as a future threat to under-mine Lee's command--there are too many 'what ifs' that don't belong to the actual facts of history.

General Hood took the chance, lobbying Congress and Davis for the position of authority. Hood gambled and lost but, in doing so and dispite all of the faults one can find in General Hood or, for that matter--any general of any army, is extremely easy in hind-sight. The old wive's tale of the turtle and the hare, proved out in regard to Johnston and Hood. Johnston's reputation remained intact and perhaps gained favorably as Johnston didn't have to say; "I told you so" or "It isn't easy as it looks--huh...." I am also of the opinion, that lessons were learned by other Confederate Generals in the western battle theater, as to how Richmond really felt about them. Looking in the luxury of modern eyes and hind-sight, I am of the opinion that the western battle theater for the Confederacy was the earliest casualty of the overall Civil War once it was split. In my personal opinion Davis offered false hope to the Confederate States in the western and far southern states composing the Confederacy, et.al. Davis couldn't withdraw troops to concentrate around Richmond, without risking states withdraw and with those withdraw, shrink ever smaller the Confederacy, et.al., the men/troops and monies needed for their Treasury Hood gave an opportunity to Davis to keep this false hope up and perhaps prolonged the war because of it.

As a career soldier, I am glad once retired, Hood was able to create a family and though it was a short civilian life, am glad for him to have found love and had children. It was heart wrenching to know that Hood on his death bed willed and entrusted his children to the Confederate veterans, et.al., as their survival and their production of offspring will keep the memory of General Hood alive.

Just some personal observations, comments and opinions.
M. E. Wolf

 

[Elennsar]

Have to look again. Maybe I am thinking "AND a big planter"! I just kept reading short bio's of confederate generals online and they were all big planters if they were of much rank. I expected to find more long term army guys in there instead of big plantation owners, I guess.

There do seem to be a lot who were planters.

But "only nine had uninterruptedly engaged in civilian pursuits prior to 1861" for major generals out of seventy-two. And while we might have plenty of West Point training - well, Polk "almost immediately resigned" after graduation, for example. And I don't think he was the only one who hadn't exactly made a career of the army of those who were technically West Point graduates and thus "professionals" to some extent.

 

[Rebforever]

Politics killed any chance of the Confederacy putting the right men at the top of the right armies. Study how many Confederate generals were not professionally trained soldiers, but WERE big plantation owners, or friends of Jeff Davis.

Wonder if you would put a summery up of your statement? Maybe on another thread?

 

[spurs716]

I hold the opinion that what you're seeing was his inability to function well at middle levels of command. He was terrible at taking orders when he had something else in mind. It's hard to say how he would have done in absolute command of a large force, because we didn't see it.

You are right. It was a middle level of command. IMO, that wouldn't have changed much at the Army level of command either. He probably would have been even less agreeable there. That higher level of command heavily involved politics. Forrest doesn't strike me as one who would put up with too much political B.S. Tactically speaking, he may well have been brilliant at the Army Command level, but without the right type of pucker to keep the politicians happy, he wouldn't have lasted long at that top level.

 

[Allie]

You are right. It was a middle level of command. IMO, that wouldn't have changed much at the Army level of command either. He probably would have been even less agreeable there. That higher level of command heavily involved politics. Forrest doesn't strike me as one who would put up with too much political B.S. Tactically speaking, he may well have been brilliant at the Army Command level, but without the right type of pucker to keep the politicians happy, he wouldn't have lasted long at that top level.

Well, we know what he looked like as a politician, since he did it off and on again during his lifetime. With... interesting... but not always ineffective results. I figure he would have lasted about a week before threatening Jeff Davis with a horsewhip.

 

[Nathanb1]

Yep you and my GG grandfather( the grave and Texas Ranger Cross in the Avatar)he despised him as he was a close friend of old Sam Houston who had no use for Wiggie.. When GG grandpa was a Judge in Atascosa County Wigfall used some influence to get a cronie a job as a court clerk. GG gransdpa caught the guy stealing and stabbed him with a Bowie knife(not fatal)then the threats started flying.

And who is your great-grandfather? Very cool to have a Ranger in the family!

 

[Nathanb1]

I hold the opinion that what you're seeing was his inability to function well at middle levels of command. He was terrible at taking orders when he had something else in mind. It's hard to say how he would have done in absolute command of a large force, because we didn't see it.

You're absolutely right....and quite often, he turned out to be right in throwing his hissy, considering the outcome; but it's not exactly military etiquette.

 

[Elennsar]

Forrest's problems commanding a corps of cavalry are not the sort that would be less serious for an army commander to be prone to. It being "middle level" doesn't seem to be an issue there as much as it being - well, put simply:

Square pegs belong in square holes. Saying that Forrest was so awesome that he could be square or round just is not supported by his record when he was squeezed into a round hole.

 

[spurs716]

You're absolutely right....and quite often, he turned out to be right in throwing his hissy, considering the outcome; but it's not exactly military etiquette.

I agree 100%. I am a "middle manager" in a paramilitary organization, and a veteran myself. I have been in very similar situations in which I knew I was right, the higher command, not so much. After a hissy that would have made the good General proud, I achieved the desired result. But it came at a cost to my image from those higher up. I very much associate with Forrest in some of these situations. I know from my personal experience that at this stage in my career, with the politics involved at a higher level, I wouldn't last much more than a month at that half tactical, half political position. Just give me the tools to do my job and get the hell out of my way. That's how I see General Forrest as well. I may be way off base but that's my impression of the General.