Why General Hood

[Nytram01]

Afraid that Johnson's plan was the same as in Virginia and Mississippi., retreat until the perfect opportunity presents it'self. As we know that rarely happens for the smaller army. Lee kept the A.O.P. off guard because they feared him when he was doing nothing and when he was moving forwards or backwards. That fear did not exist when it came to Johnson so they were able to divide forces and out maneuver him time after time.

1 - its Johnston not Johnson. The "t" make a it a different name. It is a pet peive that annoys me to no end. Please try and get it right in the future.

2 - "retreat until the perfect opportunity presents itself" was never Johnston's plan in either Virginia or Mississippi, nor was it his plan in Georgia.

In Virginia he had wanted to advance on Washington after 1st Manassas but the troops could not be found to facilitate this. In the Peninsula Campaign the plan - as agreed upon in the April high command conferance - was to delay McClellan's advance on the Peninsula to buy time for more troops to be trained and material to be amassed while conducting a stage-by-stage withdrawl towards Richmond where the Confederate Army would be reinforced and could launch its own offensive - and that is exactly what happened. Additionally, Johnston supported Jackson remaining in the Valley, and even advancing on Baltimore if he wanted too, provided it would keep superior numbers of Federal soldiers busy and away from Richmond or McClellan's Army.

In Mississippi his plan was to unite with Pemberton to achieve local superiority over Grant so that the Confederate could engage and defeat him in open battle. This was scarpered by the Federals moving on Jackson and drive Johnston from it followed by Grant's swift and decisive action following the discovery of what Johnston's intentions were. Having not the manpower required to lift the seige of Vickburg, and with Pemberton adament that he would not attempt to break out the Confederate efforts thereafter were totally ineffective.

In Georgia his plan initially was to engage the Federals in a defensive battle around Dalton then counter-attack into Tennessee. After being driven below the Oostanula he set out looking for opportunity where the Federals would be forced to split their forces so he could fall upon one isolated - and he tried to do this at Cassville and, after Kennessaw Mountain, stated this to Wigfall as his intention of what he planned to do when he crossed the Chattahoochie. When Bragg arived to review the Army and its situation he described his plan for the defence of Atlanta of using the militia as a city guard while using it as a pivot to manuever his army around it to strike at the Federals. Additionally he also called for Forrest to be released upon Sherman's line of supply and communction to aid him in his defence - which is something Lee also suggested might be helpful to the situation.

Now, whether you think Johnston operationally conducted himself in the manner you described is another matter entirely, but saying Johnston planned to retreat until the perfect opportunity presented itself in Virginia, Mississippi and Georgia is simply not true.

 

[Nytram01]

General Joe Johnston was in the Eastern Theater, who was most important bringing the likes of Longstreet, "Stonewall" Jackson and others from Harpers Ferry, West Virginia

Longstreet was not at Harpers Ferry and, in fact, spent most of the Battle of 1st Manassas at Blackburn's Ford on the Confederate right flank unengaged save for artillery until the Federal's were in flight when he recieved orders to advance and cut off their retreat only to be called back by Chase Whiting.

When General Johnston was wounded severely enough to which caused him to be replaced on the spot by General R. E. Lee, Johnston's technical junior in rank, Davis preferred to keep Lee close.

By seniority in the Confederacy Lee was technically Johnston's senior. As the Confederacy decided seniority by the rank held in the Union army translated to the arm in which they currently served in the Confederacy, Lee's full Colonelcy in the Line put him above Johnston's brevet Colonelcy while Johnston's full Generals rank as Staff officer didn't count.

 

[ErnieMac]

Not very many, in my reading. Davis preferred professionals to planters.

All the Confederacy's full generals were West Pointers.
Most of the lieutenant generals were (Richard Taylor, Wade Hampton, Nathan Bedford Forrest are the only exceptions I can think of).

Major Generals and Brigadiers might reveal many more not from West Point (after all, only 146 graduates out of 425 total), but while talking the top grades, there's a predominance of professionals - whether men like Bragg merited their ranks or not, he's not of the "not professionally trained but" camp.

So who do you have in mind as getting their rank from being friends with Davis or a big planter?

My reading indicates there were 296 West Point graduates who served the Confederacy. Of that number over 100 failed to reach a general rank for various reasons; some were killed or died before obtaining the rank, others served in staff positions or not healthy enough for field duty and still others not competent for higher command. More typically in the south than the north you will also find a fair number of graduates of military academies such as VMI or The Citadel (Robert Rodes, William Mahone, Evander Law and Micah Jenkins immediately come to mind) or who had served in a military capacity in the Mexican War (William Barksdale, James Kemper, G. T. Anderson, Harry T. Hays) who would have at least had a knowledge of military training and discipline.
http://www.civilwarhome.com/themen.html

 

[OpnCoronet]

I tend to agree with those who believe that Hood's wounds probably did affect his generalship, i.e., if he had been physically fit, I would think his record as AoT commander would have been significantly better. But, I do not think it would have changed his decision to move against Thomas, rather than pursue Sherman, nor have ended in any kind of strategic success that would have extended the war in the West, to any appreciable degree.
Certainly success at Spring Hill would have had devastating effect on Thomas' plans for his defense of Tn, as Schofields Veterans, was the rock around which he was planning to build the rest of his army from the flotsome and jetsome of the various dept's of The Western Theatre.
As already noted, I think time had run out for the confederacy in the West, no amount of military genius (or toughness) could be expected to negate the overwhelming force that could be brought against them by late 1864.

 

[kepi]

I tend to agree with those who believe that Hood's wounds probably did affect his generalship, i.e., if he had been physically fit, I would think his record as AoT commander would have been significantly better. But, I do not think it would have changed his decision to move against Thomas, rather than pursue Sherman, nor have ended in any kind of strategic success that would have extended the war in the West, to any appreciable degree.
Certainly success at Spring Hill would have had devastating effect on Thomas' plans for his defense of Tn, as Schofields Veterans, was the rock around which he was planning to build the rest of his army from the flotsome and jetsome of the various dept's of The Western Theatre.
As already noted, I think time had run out for the confederacy in the West, no amount of military genius (or toughness) could be expected to negate the overwhelming force that could be brought against them by late 1864.

As I understand it, he was taking medications at that time too. I am no historian, as I have mentioned before, but I am no medical expert either. Could these medications have caused problems?

In addition, could his infatuation with Sally Buchanan Preston have caused him to "take chances" on the battlefield as a way to impress her?

 

[Jamieva]

No he wasn't that has been debunked and discussed on this forum several times.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I doubt it. I do not think those items played much in his deciding to invade Tn. and not pursue Sherman, and I do not think they had much to do with his planning to defeat Schofield before he could join with Thomas, i.e., pretty basic military decisions taking into account the limitations on the AoT of time and distance or the failing of even the slender resources still available for active campaigning of any kind.
To me, his afflictions probably did keep him from riding close herd on his corps commanders, as he probably needed to. But, that would have run counter to AoT experience and certainly was not a part of csa military command precedents and might not have done so, in any case.

 

[cash]

I tend to agree with those who believe that Hood's wounds probably did affect his generalship, i.e., if he had been physically fit, I would think his record as AoT commander would have been significantly better. But, I do not think it would have changed his decision to move against Thomas, rather than pursue Sherman, nor have ended in any kind of strategic success that would have extended the war in the West, to any appreciable degree.
Certainly success at Spring Hill would have had devastating effect on Thomas' plans for his defense of Tn, as Schofields Veterans, was the rock around which he was planning to build the rest of his army from the flotsome and jetsome of the various dept's of The Western Theatre.
As already noted, I think time had run out for the confederacy in the West, no amount of military genius (or toughness) could be expected to negate the overwhelming force that could be brought against them by late 1864.

I don't see how Hood's loss of a leg and injury to his arm, which was actually less injured than we have been led to believe, affected his battle planning or how they affected the way others executed his plans.

I think we are in agreement regarding the last part of your post.

 

[cash]

As I understand it, he was taking medications at that time too.

No, he wasn't.

In addition, could his infatuation with Sally Buchanan Preston have caused him to "take chances" on the battlefield as a way to impress her?

Probably not.

 

[nitrofd]

After the fall of Atlanta Hood moved to the northwest away from Sherman.Sherman had a mock pursuit of him and was glad not to be bothered by him.Sherman was then thinking of marching to the sea and when Hood realized Sherman wasn't after him he was too far gone to do an thing about and more then likely this was his main idea to go to Tennesssee.just my two cents worth.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I don't see how Hood's loss of a leg and injury to his arm, which was actually less injured than we have been led to believe, affected his battle planning or how they affected the way others executed his plans.
.

I meant it as a general statement of his condition, that could have impeded him keeping a much closer tactical eye on his corps commanders, if he chose. A remedy much needed by the AoT by that time.

 

[Jamieva]

No he went NW of Atlanta to strike at Sherman's supply lines from TN and hope to draw him into battle at a place of his choosing.

Sherman was not interested in a continuous pursuit when it became evident early on that he couldn't catch Hood and get him in a toe to toe battle.

 

[Tin cup]

Why Hood? Hood got things moving.

He was successful in getting Sherman to move a big portion of his Army out of Atlanta, to chase after him, though he held the initiative for a while, he lost it in Georgia when Sherman said: "**** him. If he will go to the Ohio River I will give him rations ... my business is down south." and went on his March to the Sea.

Then going into Tennessee, Hood shifted the focus for the Union side by having to force them to rush troops into Tennessee to counter his thrust there. Eric Jacobson has really brought to light how much of an effect on the situation Hood was causing on the North's war department. It was a close call at Springhill for Schofield's army, Hoods subordinates were not willing to have a major night fight, and mis-communications staved off a disaster there for Schofield.

Franklin...Hood's plans actually (for a short while) worked, his troops broke the Federal line, but that line (further back) held, and was shored up by both seasoned and raw troops, fighting heroically. It was the subsequent charges that bashed Hood's army, incurring losses that would cause controversy even to this day!

Well, then came Nashville...While the AoT wasn't destroyed, it was battered. After the retreat to Corinth, and beyond, that army did get back into action at Bentonville, N.C. Hood still looked elsewhere to get things moving, looking to the Trans Mississippi.

Hood had a habit of blaming others, and at times his orders were not followed as should have been. But he was a mover/shaker where others would wait and watch instead.

Sherman said it pretty good of Hood:
"About 10 A.M. of that day (July 18th), when the armies were all in motion, one of General Thomas's staff-officers brought me a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of Atlanta, and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before, containing Johnston's order relinquishing the command of the Confederate forces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assuming the command. I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was his classmate at West Point, about Hood, as to his general character, etc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant "fight." Notice of this important change was at once sent to all parts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to be always prepared for battle in any shape. This was just what we wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on any thing like equal terms, instead of being forced to run up against prepared intrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy having Atlanta behind him, could choose the time and place of attack, and could at pleasure mass a superior force on our weakest points. Therefore, we had to be constantly ready for sallies.


We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.

anyway...MY take on it!

Kevin Dally

 

[EricAJacobson]

As I understand it, he was taking medications at that time too. I am no historian, as I have mentioned before, but I am no medical expert either. Could these medications have caused problems?

In addition, could his infatuation with Sally Buchanan Preston have caused him to "take chances" on the battlefield as a way to impress her?

1. He was not on any medications, regardless of what Wiley Sword and others have alleged. The medical journals detailing Hood's recoveries from both his arm and leg wounds finally prove that, and thank goodness since I've been railing for about 15 years that there never was any evidence that he ever took anything. Now we have the evidence that proves he wasn't taking anything beyond small does of morphine (very typical) in the immediate following his leg amputation.

2. The Sally Preston angle is another Wiley Sword elaboration.

 

[EricAJacobson]

No doubt Hood was initially trying to draw Sherman away from Atlanta. When that didn't work, he looked for a crossing of the Tennessee and made the end run into Middle Tennessee. Conveniently forgotten by most, or perhaps unaware, are three important points:

1. Hood was held up at the Tennessee for nearly three weeks. No excuse, just facts. Had he gotten across the river when he intended who knows what might have unfolded. The fact is, during the early days of November he had 33,000 troops and the only troops standing between him and Nashville was David Stanley's IV Corps, which numbered about 14,000.

2. George Henry Thomas had only 8,000 troops with which to defend Nashville until the IV and XXIII Corps arrived there.

3. John Schofield's XXIII Corps wasn't in place to directly defend against Hood until November 15.

These three points aside, the roughly 48 hour period of Nov 29-30 teetered on the edge of a collapse by the Federal forces.

 

[EricAJacobson]

Sorry I can't help myself:

Johnston is McClellan in a gray uniform.

Yep, their men loved them both. And they were both really smart. And they both argued with their commander-in-chief. Both lied thru their teeth in their memoirs. And together they accomplished nothing.

 

[Elennsar]

My reading indicates there were 296 West Point graduates who served the Confederacy. Of that number over 100 failed to reach a general rank for various reasons; some were killed or died before obtaining the rank, others served in staff positions or not healthy enough for field duty and still others not competent for higher command. More typically in the south than the north you will also find a fair number of graduates of military academies such as VMI or The Citadel (Robert Rodes, William Mahone, Evander Law and Micah Jenkins immediately come to mind) or who had served in a military capacity in the Mexican War (William Barksdale, James Kemper, G. T. Anderson, Harry T. Hays) who would have at least had a knowledge of military training and discipline.

"Some form of military training" for generals is 272/425 Confederate generals, 395/583 Union generals. (per Generals in Gray and Generals in Blue respectively).

I have hardly any data to compare Union field officers and lower to Confederates also below the rank of brigadier general, but as far as the high command went, the figures don't favor the Confederates.

Not sure why we should expect more at lower ranks.

 

[Elennsar]

No doubt Hood was initially trying to draw Sherman away from Atlanta. When that didn't work, he looked for a crossing of the Tennessee and made the end run into Middle Tennessee. Conveniently forgotten by most, or perhaps unaware, are three important points:

1. Hood was held up at the Tennessee for nearly three weeks. No excuse, just facts. Had he gotten across the river when he intended who knows what might have unfolded. The fact is, during the early days of November he had 33,000 troops and the only troops standing between him and Nashville was David Stanley's IV Corps, which numbered about 14,000.

2. George Henry Thomas had only 8,000 troops with which to defend Nashville until the IV and XXIII Corps arrived there.

3. John Schofield's XXIII Corps wasn't in place to directly defend against Hood until November 15.

These three points aside, the roughly 48 hour period of Nov 29-30 teetered on the edge of a collapse by the Federal forces.

The obvious questions:

1a) Why didn't he get across when he intended? Was it realistic for him to base his campaign on the idea that he could get across earlier, given the weather and supplies available etc.?

1b) Why are we only counting a portion of the troops under Thomas's command and making no allowance for Thomas's dispositions changing in this hypothetical/what if/alternate scenario?

2) See 1b.

3) What Federal forces? 4th and 23rd Corps are not the same as "all Thomas's organized and equipped soldiers".

I'm not saying that they wouldn't be missed, but even if Hood achieves a victory such as almost no general ever achieved in the ACW over them, he still has other soldiers to fight in order to take Nashville.

 

[EricAJacobson]

1a) answered this previously in other threads.
1b) nonsensical question. Thomas forces were scattered. That's the point.
2) see above.
3) again this makes no sense. Thomas had 8,000 troops in Nashville plus the IV (about 14,000 and XXIII corps (about 10,000) available until Dec 1. That is the point yet again.

 

[Elennsar]

1a) answered this previously in other threads.
1b) nonsensical question. Thomas forces were scattered. That's the point.
2) see above.
3) again this makes no sense. Thomas had 8,000 troops in Nashville plus the IV (about 14,000 and XXIII corps (about 10,000) available until Dec 1. That is the point yet again.

1a) But if you're going to talk about how getting across three weeks earlier might have mattered, what responsibility Hood has for that not happening - or for attempting something that wasn't feasible to attempt - is relevant in this one as much as the others.

1b & 2) No, dead serious question.

Those troops you're not counting are under Thomas's command, those troops are equipped and are able to be moved.

If you want to suggest that they don't matter in a can't-be-rewritten-too-soon version of this: http://www.gamersarchive.net/theGamers/archive/eaaw.htm
then yes, I agree. If you want to suggest that they're irrelevant to the campaign because if you list "the soldiers at Nashville" they're not at Nashville, then I cannot agree unless some evidence is presented for how their orders cannot be changed so that they're not as scattered.

3) "Thomas's troops" are not the same as the troops at Nashville and 4th & 23rd Corps. The other troops in his department are not on the moon.