McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[OpnCoronet]

I don't think you've really read Barnard's AAR of 6th May in which he deemed an assault "too hazardous," but rather his later works in which he, as Hunt put it, "cut up his own words." Barnard, at the time, was quite forward in his belief that no assault was possible, staing that even if a "murderous assault" was actually successful, it would not have achieved much. On 11th May he wrote that the idea of "an assault was mere hare-brained folly."

Later, Barnard fell in with an anti-McClellan crowd in Washington, after McClellan got rid of him. Then he changed his tune a bit, but always talked around the issue.

Barnard didn't need thousands of corpses to see the obvious - the Yorktown position could not be assaulted with any reasonable chance of success.

That may be well and good, but does not answer my point, McClellan's mistakes in generalship enumerated by Barnard is pretty good proof of the accuracy of Longstreet's thoughts on McClellan's generalship.

As I have stated before the decision to lose time in a siege without first ascertaining if it was necessary at all, was objectively wrong in the light of its part in events that led to McClellan's ignominious repulse in the 'Seven Days' .

 

[Saphroneth]

As I have stated before the decision to lose time in a siege without first ascertaining if it was necessary at all, was objectively wrong in the light of its part in events that led to McClellan's ignominious repulse in the 'Seven Days' .

So how exactly do you propose to "ascertain... if it was necessary at all"? Yorktown is a bastion fort with a continuous enciente and McClellan cannot simply assume his enemy will go contrary to all military logic and abandon it when it can be held.

 

[Saphroneth]

That may be well and good, but does not answer my point, McClellan's mistakes in generalship enumerated by Barnard is pretty good proof of the accuracy of Longstreet's thoughts on McClellan's generalship.

It completely answers your point. Barnard claims mistakes later which contradict what he wrote at the time - Barnard said AT THE TIME that an assault would have been "pure folly", and LATER he changed his tune.

What this means is that, for example, Barnard agreed with McClellan at Yorktown (to be more precise, McClellan agreed with Barnard).

 

[OpnCoronet]

He explored them, and in some cases rejected them as unproductive or impractical. What option do you think he failed to explore?


Okay, so where is that?

I am not aware that McClellan explored any options except a formal siege. He might have been aware of other options but did he explore them?

Your are not aware of Johnston's and AoP Engineers general agreement on where there might be a weakness in the Warwick Line?

 

[DanSBHawk]

I don't think you've really read Barnard's AAR of 6th May in which he deemed an assault "too hazardous,"

Timid commanders infect their subordinates with their timidity. Barnard had the integrity to be able to look back and see the mistakes.

 

[Belfoured]

It completely answers your point. Barnard claims mistakes later which contradict what he wrote at the time - Barnard said AT THE TIME that an assault would have been "pure folly", and LATER he changed his tune.

What this means is that, for example, Barnard agreed with McClellan at Yorktown (to be more precise, McClellan agreed with Barnard).

Which, for objective folks, raises credibility issues regarding Barnard on both assertions - not just one.

 

[OpnCoronet]

So how exactly do you propose to "ascertain... if it was necessary at all"? Yorktown is a bastion fort with a continuous enciente and McClellan cannot simply assume his enemy will go contrary to all military logic and abandon it when it can be held.

Have McClellan, or his staff if little mac were not up to it, organize a strong and coordinated attack on the weak points chosen by AoP Engineers.

 

[Saphroneth]

I am not aware that McClellan explored any options except a formal siege. He might have been aware of other options but did he explore them?

Define "explore" in this sense, please?

Your are not aware of Johnston's and AoP Engineers general agreement on where there might be a weakness in the Warwick Line?

I'd be interested to hear where that weakness was considered to be, and the way in which they agree - at least, if that weakness is to assault.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'd be interested to hear where that weakness was considered to be, and the way in which they agree - at least, if that weakness is to assault.

It was the bluff that overlooked the Red and White Redoubts. It was agreed by both Barnard and Johnston that when the siege battery 13 was complete it would be able to fire into the interior of the redoubts because it had a higher elevation (about 10-15 ft by the contemporary map). The works would be untenable. However, battery 13 is reported (by Barnard) to be 2,590 yds from the Red Redoubt and 2,100 yds to the White Redoubt. When completed, the battery would have 3x 30 pdr Parrott's that could fire on the redoubts (the others aimed towards Gloucester Pt). As of 3rd May, it was still unarmed.

The redoubts were, of course, considered proof against assault.

 

[Saphroneth]

It was the bluff that overlooked the Red and White Redoubts.

That would certainly fit the bill of a weakness in the defences in terms of it being vulnerable, but of course not in terms of it being vulnerable to an assault. @OpnCoronet is there an example you have of a specific position along the line that both McClellan's engineers and Johnston agree is vulnerable to an assault?

 

[rbasin]

Does he have Sherman and Grant, who were the ones who did the lions share of the entrenching?

Shh...

 

[Belfoured]

Shh...

Probably a good idea to read up on the First Corinth Campaign, the Union command structure, etc. Tim Smith has published the definitive book.

 

[OpnCoronet]

That would certainly fit the bill of a weakness in the defences in terms of it being vulnerable, but of course not in terms of it being vulnerable to an assault. @OpnCoronet is there an example you have of a specific position along the line that both McClellan's engineers and Johnston agree is vulnerable to an assault?

 

[OpnCoronet]

That would certainly fit the bill of a weakness in the defences in terms of it being vulnerable, but of course not in terms of it being vulnerable to an assault. @OpnCoronet is there an example you have of a specific position along the line that both McClellan's engineers and Johnston agree is vulnerable to an assault?

I think the Engineers thought around Dams 1 and 2, also by Johnston.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think the Engineers thought around Dams 1 and 2, also by Johnston.

Would you be able to cite Johnston to that explicit effect?

In addition, would you be able to give the engineer's statement to the effect that there was a vulnerability to an assault there? So far as I am aware there was a possible plan to damage the sluice gates downriver of Dam #1, meaning that the impounded water there would fall at low tide and render the area wadeable, but that's a multi-stage operation with prep work - potentially viable, with enough prep, but not a simple assault.

 

[67th Tigers]

I believe he's referring to Comstock's plan submitted 12th April, which is what McClellan was starting to put into action.

Comstock's plan was:

1. Build up a base of fire at the Garrow Ridge, then,
2. Cut the dam at Dam No. 2 and allow the Warwick to drain, and then
3. Smash the defences with a massed artillery barrage before,
4. At low tide, the attackers wade over and seize the works allowing for,
5. Artillery etc. crosses the dam and mobile warfare can be resumed

When a false report came in that the Warwick was wadable, someone decided to go off half-cocked. As I've discussed, this appears to be a "charge of the light brigade" scenario, wherein the AdC carrying the order changed it from "advance to the Warwick" to "advance over the Warwick."

Note that this isn't a plan for a simple assault, but rather an involved plan that involves multiple phases, which are quite involved. As soon as it was presented to McClellan he approved it, but it misfired in phase 1. There were other schemes, including one at Wynn's Mill but all came to naught due to the independent will of the enemy.

PS: Johnston never commented on the dams. On his visit it isn't clear he got as far as Wynn's Mill. He looked at the position of the future Battery 13 and declared the position untenable against McClellan's siege artillery.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Would you be able to cite Johnston to that explicit effect?

In addition, would you be able to give the engineer's statement to the effect that there was a vulnerability to an assault there? So far as I am aware there was a possible plan to damage the sluice gates downriver of Dam #1, meaning that the impounded water there would fall at low tide and render the area wadeable, but that's a multi-stage operation with prep work - potentially viable, with enough prep, but not a simple assault.

They were doubtful. But the position chosen was in their considered opinion the weakest part of the line susceptible to success.

The Engineers were not in command, they did their job and it was up to little mac to do his and he did. Deep in enemy territory, with Time as precious as Gold to Lee and Davis, the bold, imaginative author of a Peninsular Campaign in the comfort of his Washington apt , seems to have wilted under the strains of the responsibilities of actually having to see his plan to a successful conclusion .... with the whole world watching.

 

[Saphroneth]

They were doubtful. But the position chosen was in their considered opinion the weakest part of the line susceptible to success.

The Engineers were not in command, they did their job and it was up to little mac to do his and he did. Deep in enemy territory, with Time as precious as Gold to Lee and Davis, the bold, imaginative author of a Peninsular Campaign in the comfort of his Washington apt , seems to have wilted under the strains of the responsibilities of actually having to see his plan to a successful conclusion .... with the whole world watching.

That's not what I asked. I asked for your citation of the weak point in the line which (your claim) Johnston and the AoP engineers agreed was weak to a "strong and coordinated attack". Would you be able to cite both Johnston and the AoP engineers to this effect?