Perryville Understanding Perryville.

I have studied the 16th Tennessee - for all practical purposes - my whole life. One battle that they were heavily involved in was Perryville.

For anyone that doesn't know the story there - Polk extended his lines to the north to gain the flank of the Federal army and sent Cheatham's division into the fray first. The plan was supposed to be to crush the Federal left flank and roll up the enemy corps from right to left. As a kid, I read account after account of their actions there in various early post-war history books, and gained what I thought to be an ample understanding of events at that battle regarding the 16th TN. However, as I grew older and discovered modern books by more recent historians that regurgitated their comprehension of the story, I couldn't help but notice that none of their conclusions about what the 16th did there were in concert with the accounts of the men in the ranks and/or friendly units adjacent to them as well as Federal accounts.

Comprehending a battlefield is hard enough for the men on it or leading the men on it - and just as tough is writing about something when you weren't there. I have long believed that historians often rely too strongly on corps and division reports and rarely search deep into the regimental level - but I believe if we did so, it is far easier to gain a better understanding of the battlefield. What unit was where - who was to their right or left - what units they engaged.

However, this search can't stop at the unit in question. It has to extend to the units that were on their right and left. After an exhaustive search within the histories of those units at the same battle, we might gather pertinent information relative to the regiment in question. This is what has happened in my case with the Sixteenth Tennessee.

Like I said, while early post-war books related the regiment's experiences in one way, modern 21st century revisions actually have managed to change history! Not the outcome of a battle of course - but the unfolding of events.

In the Sixteenth Tennessee's case for instance, the regiment was ORIGINALLY interpreted as attacking the extreme right flank of the Federal army and being caught in a horrific cross-fire for nearly thirty minutes until Maney's brigade came to their relief. With this additional support, the regiment and Maney's brigade were able to seize the guns of Parsons' battery on Open Knob. It was a blood bath and related as such by the men who fought on the extreme right.

The NEWER versions of the 16th's experiences - apparently incorrectly - relate (based off modern scholarship that differs dramatically from written word by the men who were there...) that the 16th was ordered to attack a position that was thought to be the Union flank but was in fact (according to modern scholarship) the Union CENTER!

I could accept this version of events - if I wasn't absolutely convinced of otherwise by eyewitness testimony. Undeniable evidence from Colonel Savage of the 16th, numerous men in his ranks, General George Maney, Marcus Toney of the 1st TN in Maney's brigade and at least two men in Stewart's brigade correctly (and I say correctly because they were there) relate the true experiences of the men of the 16th Tennessee that day.

They all relate that the Sixteenth initially went into action as the extreme right most unit that day. They were the first Confederate unit to be heavily engaged, and although their original axis of advance was off spot - they received a correction to their direction in the protection of a defilade position. They then advance on the TRUE left flank of Jackson's Union division and were heavily engaged with the 123rd Illinois and Parsons' battery for no less than thirty minutes before the arrival of Maney's brigade on their immediate right that had been instructed that Donelson (the 16th's brigade commander) was in immediate need of support.

I will post some of the evidence - if not all of it in a following post. But this is one example of modern scholarship perhaps cutting corners. Battles are big. They are not easy to comprehend - however, it will be shown that some of the most crucial information can be found at the regimental level and pieced together that can clarify nearly incomprehensible actions.

Stay tuned.
I have Frederick Noe's Perryville: This Grand Havoc Of A Battle. I thought it was pretty good. But, I have to confess to being just as confused about the battle after reading it as I was before. I think the battle must have been a cluster-bleep.
 
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A small divergence. In The Naked And The Dead author Norman Mailer went through fiery hoops to avoid using the 'f' word, using things like 'frig' and 'fugg'. When he was introduced to the gang at the Algonquin Round Table, Dorothy Parker said, "Oh hi. You're the guy who can't spell f***!" My favorite Parkerism.
 
I will be at Perryville on June 17 (Saturday) and June 18 (Sunday) with a friend on mine. We are staying overnight in Danville at Comfort Suites. If anyone wants to join - feel free! We will be doing a lot of hiking and driving on the field so be prepared!

What time will you be at the visitor center, Marine? I am off and I would love to tag along....

Bill
 
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I will be at Perryville on June 17 (Saturday) and June 18 (Sunday) with a friend on mine. We are staying overnight in Danville at Comfort Suites. If anyone wants to join - feel free! We will be doing a lot of hiking and driving on the field so be prepared!

Just returned, and understanding a LOT more about the battle! one caveat though - beware of TICKS! In the course of the day I pulled off no fewer than FOUR of the **** things, 3 large deer ticks (I think) and a tiny black seed tick. Fortunately none of them attached and were on either my bare leg or sock. (It was HOT and both Mike and I were wearing our shorts.) The man at the park visitor center desk said it was a very active year for them.

Our itinerary was changed somewhat when we found out - early on, thank goodness - that the Patton Museum at Ft. Knox no longer has the army's collection of armored vehicles; it seems they got moved to Ft. Benning in 2010. That essentially gave us another day which we put to good use going to the museum and small Mill Springs battlefield at Nancy. We also followed the route of the Union rout at Richmond in addition to the entire day at Perryville. There's also a private Civil War Museum in Bardstown that has a great deal of interesting and unusual artifacts, mixed in with a lot of generic photos, illustrations, and text; plus a few items I thought rather dubious. Unfortunately the Eli Lilly Civil War Museum in Indianapolis was closed, but we made up for that by going to the HUGE Indiana War Memorial and Museum instead before our respective return flights.

Personally, the best thing I was able to do was trace the action of the brigade of S. A. M. Wood's Confederate brigade which included the 33d Alabama as it crossed the field from east to west. According to the marker below, at the end of it's trek it assaulted Harris' Battery capturing a couple of its guns. This would've been the very first action of the regiment in the war since it had only been raised in the summer of 1862.

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I also found a couple of their dead in the Confederate Cemetery section at nearby Danville:

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I should be there about noon on Saturday the 17th of June. Would love to see you there!

Sorry I can not make the trip tomorrow, Gunny.

My Mom's sump pump broke today and I have to replace it tomorrow morning with a brand spankin' new one.

Gotta take care of Mom!

Semper Fi,
Bill

P.S. Have fun and post photos!!!
 
I have Frederick Noe's Perryville: This Grand Havoc Of A Battle. I thought it was pretty good. But, I have to confess to being just as confused about the battle after reading it as I was before. I think the battle must have been a cluster-bleep.
Actually, I think it wasn't quite the cluster **** that modern historians have made it out to be. It was a well devised but toughly contested fight. The Confederates had a good offensive plan that was only thwarted by Bragg's misunderstanding of the situation.
 
Perryville was my Great Grandfather's first battle. He was a member of the 94th Ohio. Shortly after the battle he was captured and spent a long time on Belle Island in Richmond, Va. ,before being exchanged. he was wounded during his capture, and survived the war. He lived to be a very old man. Maybe he was the last survivor of his regiment. He died in 1935.
 
Continuation of information regarding Colonel Thomas M. Jones.

Kenneth Noe devoted two pages to Jones' attack that day. His scenario suggested that Jones moved forward on his own without orders, and since he is not found in command of his brigade later on, that he must have failed in some manner that day. Jones was not mentioned in any of the reports of the commanding officers that day. This was probably due to the likelihood that no particular commander was aware who would be directly in charge of Jones' brigade. Whether Jones failed in some way that day is debatable—as his brigade sustained the highest casualty percentage of any brigade in the army; however, Patton Anderson's division had been splintered into four separate (practically) independent commands.

Anderson's four brigades were commanded by Colonel Samuel Powell, Brigadier General D. W. Adams, Brigadier General John C. Brown and Colonel Thomas Jones. Powell's brigade covered the Springfield Pike nearly three-fourths of a mile southwest of Brigadier General D. W. Adams' brigade that supported the left flank of Buckner's division. The other two brigades of Brown and Jones had at first maintained some level of cohesion with their division, but by about one p.m., these two brigades had been sent northeast to fill a gap that had been created by General Sam Wood's brigade forcing back the skirmishers of Harris' brigade. The gap was created when Buckner allowed Wood to force the enemy skirmishers back to the north side of Doctor's Creek. This gap had to have been at least three to four hundred yards and created a void between Buckner's brigades commanded by Wood and Johnson. Buckner wrote in his official report that "Wood's skirmishers became engaged with the enemy and drove them to the wood to the right of my line, which covers the heights in the rear of the valley of Doctor's Fork of Chaplin's Fork. By direction of General Bragg this brigade remained in occupancy of that wood, making a gap in my line which was afterwards filled by the brigade of Brigadier-General John Brown, of Anderson's Division."[1]

Interestingly, Buckner nor Anderson made any mention of Jones' brigade, and it's probable that Anderson spent the majority of his time conducting the movements and actions of Powell's and Adams' brigades. The only mention of Jones' brigade is made by the left wing commander—Major General William J. Hardee. He stated that Jones and Brown were both sent to plug the gap between Buckner's and Cheatham's divisions.[2] Acting as right wing commander during the battle, Cheatham also failed to mention Jones' brigade, but the fact that he mentioned casualties from two Mississippi regiments at his field hospital point to the probability that Jones in fact advanced to Donelson's immediate left. Those troops would have been put in the hellish scenario that historians maintain Donelson's brigade to have experienced. That is—that they advanced up the 'run' that separates Doctor's Fork from Chaplin Hills and Open Knob. The 'run' is currently referred to as "Donelson's Run," but would more appropriately be called "Jones' Run" or even "Wood's Run." This 'run' was called "Crazy Creek" at the time M. Quad wrote his story in the autumn of 1882.[3]

No report of Colonel Jones is known to exist, and it appears that details of his brigade's actions are not reported by any commanding officers. Being aware of the scheme of maneuver, Jones was apparently placed on the right of Brown's brigade and to the left of Donelson. Wood's brigade was initially placed in reserve—as they had conducted skirmishing in the hours preceding the fight. Jones' direction took him up the length of "Crazy Creek"—just north of Doctor's Creek—where he engaged the Thirty-third Ohio and portions of the Second Ohio. His men also faced the direct frontal fire of Captain Harris' Nineteenth Indiana battery of Webster's brigade. In this initial action, he was probably engaged up to an hour. Taking high casualties and running low on ammunition, he was probably withdrawn—and likely taken charge of by the division commander, Patton Anderson. This may explain why his last charge was apparently made on the west side of Mackville Pike against the section of howitzers of the Second Minnesota battery near the Russell House.

Two things are certain in regards to Jones' brigade at the Battle of Perryville. They conducted no less than two separate attacks at the battle. The first was in the opening minutes of the fight upon the movement of Donelson's brigade to their immediate right.[4] The second attack took place shortly before nightfall that aided in the rout of Federal troops from the grounds of the Russell House. There is no doubt that between the two attacks the brigade had fallen back some distance to replenish cartridges and reform. At least an hour—or perhaps two—had passed between the time they first moved into action and the time that they charged a section of the 2nd Minnesota Light Artillery near sunset.[5]


[1] Report of Major-General Simon Bolivar Buckner, C.S. Army, on the Battle of Perryville, Kentucky, October 8, 1862. Simon Bolivar Buckner Collection, The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

[2] Report of Major General William J. Hardee, C.S. Army, commanding Left Wing. OR, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, p. 1119 – 1122.

[3] The Spirit of Democracy (Woodsfield, OH) June 13, 1882, Page 1.

[4] 'From General Bragg's Army." Memphis Daily Appeal (Memphis, Tennessee) November 4, 1862, Page 2.

[5] "Letter from the Second Battery." St. Cloud Democrat (Saint Cloud, Minnesota) November 27, 1862, Page 2.
 
If Polk hadn't screwed everything up as usual,how much different would the results have been?.
Post # 178 discusses this to an extent. In this particular case, the plan of attack was sound, but the understanding of the strategic scenario was grossly misunderstood by Bragg.

I would even suggest that if Polk had not delayed the attack in this case, the result may have been much worse for the Confederates.
 

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