Thoughts on Old Rosy.

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Brev. Brig. Gen'l
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Aug 25, 2012
I received my spring issue of The Civil War Monitor today. William B. Kurtz has an article, Old Rosy, (Reconstructed), about Rosecrans. So if I read it, can Kurtz "reconstruct" Rosecrans? I am not sure what new information Kurtz came up with.
 
Having nearly completed a book manuscript on the Tullahoma Campaign--we have only the conclusion left to go--I find myself terribly impressed by the strategic brilliance of that campaign. Maneuvering Bragg all the way of all of Tennessee but Chattanooga without a general engagement and with less than 1500 casualties for the entire campaign is quite spectacular. I dare anyone to show me a more strategically brilliant campaign in the Civil War than Tullahoma. Rosecrans was eccentric, high strung, but he was a brilliant man and a brilliant soldier, and he deserves better. His personality clashes with Grant notwithstanding, the man had one bad day in the entire war--the third day at Chickamauga--and he was unceremoniously dumped into the scrap heap of history.
 
He had one bad day. Also was a micro manager which contributed to it. Was a Ohio Democrat in the Union Army. He had some enemies.

However, he was innovative. Wilder’s Lightning Brigade and Eli Lilly’s Light Artillery Unit. He tried to procure all the repeating rifles he could find. He was a great Tactician.

I don’t think his style suited Lincoln and Stanton. They wanted Army’s defeated and removed from the field, vs a tactician who could gain territory with tactical moves.
 
I've always been fond of Rosecrans. He was one of the most brilliant of the western generals - Tullahoma has already been referenced. He leveraged Bragg out of Chatanooga the same way. He was personally brave, and, just speaking personally, I find his obvious Christian Roman Catholic faith witness interesting. He could freeze up, or go blank under pressure, though, which is disturbing. He did it at Stones River, and certainly did it at Chickamauga. Almost like his bravery and his brain were fighting with each other. What was Lincoln's phrase "like a duck hit on the head?" If he'd had the option, or good sense, to get a little more distance from the front and conducted actions more like a von Moltke, he would have been fine.
 
William Kurtz -a Univirsity of Virginia PhD- is working on a biography of Rosecrans.
Here -to me -are some irrefutable facts:
Rosecrans was highly regarded in the 19th century.Indeed when he was relieved after Chickamauga the N.Y. Times -edited by the chairman of the Republican Party - said Rosecrans a Democrat was second only to Grant in accomplishments.
Rosecrans and Grant had a falling out in Mississippi in 1862. The standard line is that Grant couldn’t get Rosecrans to do what he wanted but Grant actually gave few instructions to Rosecrans during the battles of Iuka and Corinth. This has been a subject of much debate on this site (mostly resulting in rancor) but recent historians including Evan Jones, Albert Castel and even Grant archivist Michael Ballard have largely sided with Rosecrans in his 1862 disputes with Grant.
Much of the Rosecrans story comes from his opponents Grant - via his Memoirs- and especially Charles A Dana. Dana -a politically motivated man- later turned on President Grant. Rosecrans’ story really is unknown to CW students much less the general public.
Finally politics is a key factor in discussing Rosecrans’ -and other generals’ - fate. James Garfield - a soldier and a politician- wrote that the leaders in Washington were not unwilling to see evil befall Rosecrans. To try and understand the war without understanding the role of politics in impossible.
The usual criticisms of Rosecrans : nervousness, micromanaging, poor relations with his superiors, bad decision in a battle could be applied to almost any general in command of an army. They do not explain the reasons for Rosecrans’ fall. His story- and accomplishments- is possibly the great unknown story in Civil War history and by extension American history.
I have researched Rosecrans for over 25 years. I have written a book about his role in the Union victory. I am very happy that more historians are looking into his career and writing about it. His current obscurity is a great injustice that needs to be undone.
 
I've always been fond of Rosecrans. He was one of the most brilliant of the western generals - Tullahoma has already been referenced. He leveraged Bragg out of Chatanooga the same way. He was personally brave, and, just speaking personally, I find his obvious Christian Roman Catholic faith witness interesting. He could freeze up, or go blank under pressure, though, which is disturbing. He did it at Stones River, and certainly did it at Chickamauga. Almost like his bravery and his brain were fighting with each other. What was Lincoln's phrase "like a duck hit on the head?" If he'd had the option, or good sense, to get a little more distance from the front and conducted actions more like a von Moltke, he would have been fine.
Do you have a source for Rosecrans’ “freezing up” at Stones River and Chickamauga? Lincoln of course had no personal knowledge of Roseceans post Chickamauga but was relying on info sent him by Charles Dana among others. Montgomery Meigs’ reports from Chattanooga were laudatory towards Rosecrans. Rosecrans’ religion was particularly important in his anti slavery views which in turn influenced his soldiers views on the subject.
 
No - that's just my read on his decision making process. Maybe freezing up isn't the phrase I need, but maybe failure to prioritize might be better? Admittedly, it must be hard to think with one of your best friend's brains all over your coat, but army commanders should be in a better position to control the battle, not get sucked into it.
 
He could freeze up, or go blank under pressure, though, which is disturbing. He did it at Stones River, and certainly did it at Chickamauga.
Is there any real evidence for that? Or is that simply the way his detractors painted him?
 
No - that's just my read on his decision making process. Maybe freezing up isn't the phrase I need, but maybe failure to prioritize might be better? Admittedly, it must be hard to think with one of your best friend's brains all over your coat, but army commanders should be in a better position to control the battle, not get sucked into it.
Eyewitness accounts of both battles including surprisingly Dana in his first dispatch from Chattanooga attest to Rosecrans’ bravery and efforts to rally his troops. This is especially true about Stones River.
 
Dave Powell, Jim Ogden, both talk about Rosecrans going through periods during Battles where nervous energy keeps him from Sleeping. Happened at Stones River. That sequence lasted for a few Days. This period during Chickamauga lasted for nearly a Week. He slept little during that period. Most commanders, like Thomas didn’t sleep much, for a few days. At some point, not sleeping, leads to issues of decision making. So that has been noted, and was a Issue on the Last day of battle at Chickamauga. So there was good reason he was expended when he got back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans didn’t have the same Respect for McCook or Crittenden that he had for Thomas. So he did micro manage them. Which both of them, get cashiered.

However, leaving the field, was his biggest Crime. Optically, it was terrible. Garfield was with him, when he left the Field. They stopped at Roseville Gap, which is a couple of miles from Chattanooga. He has Telegraph communications at Rossville Gap, so he could of stayed there.He makes the decision to go on to Chattanooga, Garfield, being the Politician and knowing the optics, makes the decision to go Back. Powell says Stanton wanted to replace Rosecrans before Chickamauga, Powell’s opinion. Rosecrans leaving the field, gives him the opportunity he was looking for. Stanton sent Dana to Chattanooga earlier. We can Guess Why. But when Dana gets to Chattanooga after the battle, he wires Washington and tells what a disaster the Battle was. Called it worse than Bill Run. So, there is no Rosecrans can get all that back.
 
Perhaps some of Rosecrans adverse historical reputation may be based on the fact that Rosecrans was not a favorite of Grant, who was critical of him for not vigorously pursuing the defeated confederates after the battle of Corinth. Grant of course, relieved Rosecrans later on at Chattanooga. There seems to be a pattern of competent commanders (Rosecrans, Thomas, Warren), who for one reason or another were not favored by Grant, and whose historical reputation has suffered accordingly.
 
Rosecrans was a Chase man, and by the summer of 1863 Seward and Stanton had observed enough of Chase to be sure they wanted to get rid of him. Wade and Sherman were gaining power in Ohio, and Chase was being pushed away from the cabinet.
If Stanton had been more supportive of Rosecrans, the general probably would have paused at Chattanooga and fortified. Instead Rosecrans decided to push on, while the Army of the Potomac was inactive, and there was no attempt to take Mobile from the land side.
Without simultaneous pressure on all fronts, the Confederates were able to support and reinforce Bragg in Georgia, and that set the stage for Rosecrans' downfall.
Stanton then put himself in the position of solving a problem and that he and Halleck had allowed to happen.
 
Compare what happened in 1864 to what happened in 1863. In 1864 Grant never let up the pressure. Banks' failed operation in Louisiana was re-committed to other purposes and support troops for the Mobile Bay operation were obtained. Grant's intelligence service lost track of Early for awhile, but Lincoln allowed Grant to form a new command for the Shenandoah valley, and after a six week shakedown, they whipped Early.
McClellan and Lincoln went back and forth about simultaneous pressure, which was the way to neutralize the Confederate advantage of interior lines of communication, but it did not happen until 1864 when Lincoln slowly got rid of Halleck and stopped Stanton from trying to run the war.
Sherman and Thomas used the same tactics as Rosecrans and Thomas, but Sherman's campaign had better political support and better logistical support. And when Sherman swung around Atlanta to the west southeast, the direct route from Richmond to Atlanta had been severed and the US could threaten the City of Mobile.
 
I conclude that Rosecrans' problems were much more political than military.
I think Rosecrans was an overt Catholic and that did not endear him to either Grant or Sherman.
 
Dave Powell, Jim Ogden, both talk about Rosecrans going through periods during Battles where nervous energy keeps him from Sleeping. Happened at Stones River. That sequence lasted for a few Days. This period during Chickamauga lasted for nearly a Week. He slept little during that period. Most commanders, like Thomas didn’t sleep much, for a few days. At some point, not sleeping, leads to issues of decision making. So that has been noted, and was a Issue on the Last day of battle at Chickamauga. So there was good reason he was expended when he got back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans didn’t have the same Respect for McCook or Crittenden that he had for Thomas. So he did micro manage them. Which both of them, get cashiered.

However, leaving the field, was his biggest Crime. Optically, it was terrible. Garfield was with him, when he left the Field. They stopped at Roseville Gap, which is a couple of miles from Chattanooga. He has Telegraph communications at Rossville Gap, so he could of stayed there.He makes the decision to go on to Chattanooga, Garfield, being the Politician and knowing the optics, makes the decision to go Back. Powell says Stanton wanted to replace Rosecrans before Chickamauga, Powell’s opinion. Rosecrans leaving the field, gives him the opportunity he was looking for. Stanton sent Dana to Chattanooga earlier. We can Guess Why. But when Dana gets to Chattanooga after the battle, he wires Washington and tells what a disaster the Battle was. Called it worse than Bill Run. So, there is no Rosecrans can get all that back.
 
I received my spring issue of The Civil War Monitor today. William B. Kurtz has an article, Old Rosy, (Reconstructed), about Rosecrans. So if I read it, can Kurtz "reconstruct" Rosecrans? I am not sure what new information Kurtz came up with.
We always seem to forget about how Rosecrans in his last combat command defeated Major General Price's invasion of Missouri alongside Major General Samuel Curtis. Rosecrans had advance knowledge of Price's invasion and acted accordingly.
Leftyhunter
 
Why is everything written about this man at CWT only vilification? After all, he rose to the rank of general and held prominent commands, so he must have had some military virtues.

Really? Oh, I love him and admire him from what I've read. My husband knew a great deal more about the civil war and he always had the opinion that he was an excellent commander, one of the best of the war (held the opinion that he got on Grant's bad side somehow). He loved that book "Grant and the Rewriting of History" (which I plan to eventually get to).

Since the post says "thoughts" I'll add in that I think he was one of the really eccentric characters of the war (which I love). I'm just scratching the surface of a screen-play I'm hoping to write (one day, if I live to be 200) about Chattanooga and I'm really looking forward to reading all I can about Rosecrans; hopefully I'll have a good idea of how to write his character like I have with D.H. Hill and some others (well, I think I do--everyone's going to have a different idea since all we can do now is interpretations from what's written).

Having nearly completed a book manuscript on the Tullahoma Campaign--we have only the conclusion left to go--I find myself terribly impressed by the strategic brilliance of that campaign. Maneuvering Bragg all the way of all of Tennessee but Chattanooga without a general engagement and with less than 1500 casualties for the entire campaign is quite spectacular. I dare anyone to show me a more strategically brilliant campaign in the Civil War than Tullahoma. Rosecrans was eccentric, high strung, but he was a brilliant man and a brilliant soldier, and he deserves better. His personality clashes with Grant notwithstanding, the man had one bad day in the entire war--the third day at Chickamauga--and he was unceremoniously dumped into the scrap heap of history.

Awesome! I can't wait to read it! Definitely will be included as part of my research.
 
Enjoyed reading this thread. I'm just starting to do more reading about Chickamauga and had a question I was hoping the learned Rosecrans experts can answer.
It seems that Bragg was very well fortified in Tullahoma. Rosecrans gave the order and was ready to attack but the Confederates were gone. My read was that Rosecrans was a generally conservative general, moved when everything was ready and preparations complete. But I was surprised to see he was willing to launch a full frontal, and (my take) suicidal assault. Thoughts on this? Was this decision to attack uncharacteristic of him? Or is my take on him wrong?
 
Having nearly completed a book manuscript on the Tullahoma Campaign--we have only the conclusion left to go--I find myself terribly impressed by the strategic brilliance of that campaign. Maneuvering Bragg all the way of all of Tennessee but Chattanooga without a general engagement and with less than 1500 casualties for the entire campaign is quite spectacular. I dare anyone to show me a more strategically brilliant campaign in the Civil War than Tullahoma. Rosecrans was eccentric, high strung, but he was a brilliant man and a brilliant soldier, and he deserves better. His personality clashes with Grant notwithstanding, the man had one bad day in the entire war--the third day at Chickamauga--and he was unceremoniously dumped into the scrap heap of history.
Grant admired the Tullahoma campaign. He wondered why Rosecrans did not pause and fortify at Chattanooga. Which leads into why Rosecrans did not protect Lookout Mountain and the road back to Bridgeport. Which is probably Grant writing that he suspicious about the political pressure. Grant also though the plans to re-establish a shorter logistics line were good, but needed to be implemented. Later he learned that a good deal of Rosecrans' problems were caused by Smith's big mouth and Thomas' abiding caution.
 
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