Thoughts on Old Rosy.

[Carronade]

However, he was innovative. Wilder's Lightning Brigade and Eli Lilly's Light Artillery Unit. He tried to procure all the repeating rifles he could find. He was a great Tactician.

He also took the progressive step of consolidating his army's cavalry into a division, later expanded to a corps.

 

[Cavalier]

@wausaubob. In your post#15 above stating that Rosecrans Catholicism did not sit well with Grant and Sherman. A kind of irony then, as I believe that Sherman's son became a Catholic priest.

 

[wausaubob]

@wausaubob. In your post#15 above stating that Rosecrans Catholicism did not sit well with Grant and Sherman. A kind of irony then, as I believe that Sherman's son became a Catholic priest.

And Sherman regarded that as one of the tragedies of his life. He never completely forgave his wife for that.

 

[David Moore]

Enjoyed reading this thread. I'm just starting to do more reading about Chickamauga and had a question I was hoping the learned Rosecrans experts can answer.
It seems that Bragg was very well fortified in Tullahoma. Rosecrans gave the order and was ready to attack but the Confederates were gone. My read was that Rosecrans was a generally conservative general, moved when everything was ready and preparations complete. But I was surprised to see he was willing to launch a full frontal, and (my take) suicidal assault. Thoughts on this? Was this decision to attack uncharacteristic of him? Or is my take on him wrong?

Difficult to respond to this without specific citations in regard to Rosecrans' plans. Tullahoma was largely a campaign of deception with feints in different directions from the main attack. Rosecrans' objective was to get into the rear of Bragg's army. He may have been able to
achieve that if not for torrential rain. The subsequent Chickamauga campaign was similar but conducted in much more difficult terrain.

 

[David Moore]

Dave Powell, Jim Ogden, both talk about Rosecrans going through periods during Battles where nervous energy keeps him from Sleeping. Happened at Stones River. That sequence lasted for a few Days. This period during Chickamauga lasted for nearly a Week. He slept little during that period. Most commanders, like Thomas didn't sleep much, for a few days. At some point, not sleeping, leads to issues of decision making. So that has been noted, and was a Issue on the Last day of battle at Chickamauga. So there was good reason he was expended when he got back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans didn't have the same Respect for McCook or Crittenden that he had for Thomas. So he did micro manage them. Which both of them, get cashiered.

However, leaving the field, was his biggest Crime. Optically, it was terrible. Garfield was with him, when he left the Field. They stopped at Roseville Gap, which is a couple of miles from Chattanooga. He has Telegraph communications at Rossville Gap, so he could of stayed there.He makes the decision to go on to Chattanooga, Garfield, being the Politician and knowing the optics, makes the decision to go Back. Powell says Stanton wanted to replace Rosecrans before Chickamauga, Powell's opinion. Rosecrans leaving the field, gives him the opportunity he was looking for. Stanton sent Dana to Chattanooga earlier. We can Guess Why. But when Dana gets to Chattanooga after the battle, he wires Washington and tells what a disaster the Battle was. Called it worse than Bill Run. So, there is no Rosecrans can get all that back.

Reread Dana's second telegram to Washington from Chattanooga. In it he says he overstated the extent of the "disaster" and testifies to the "conspicuous " gallantry of Rosecrans during the battle. Dana himself probably fled the battlefield in panic.

 

[David Moore]

We always seem to forget about how Rosecrans in his last combat command defeated Major General Price's invasion of Missouri alongside Major General Samuel Curtis. Rosecrans had advance knowledge of Price's invasion and acted accordingly.
Leftyhunter

One 19th century observer ( John Russell Young) summed up Rosecrans' career: Four theaters of war, four times successful, four times removed. One must read 19t century sources to really get the whole story.

We always seem to forget about how Rosecrans in his last combat command defeated Major General Price's invasion of Missouri alongside Major General Samuel Curtis. Rosecrans had advance knowledge of Price's invasion and acted accordingly.
Leftyhunter

Compare what happened in 1864 to what happened in 1863. In 1864 Grant never let up the pressure. Banks' failed operation in Louisiana was re-committed to other purposes and support troops for the Mobile Bay operation were obtained. Grant's intelligence service lost track of Early for awhile, but Lincoln allowed Grant to form a new command for the Shenandoah valley, and after a six week shakedown, they whipped Early.
McClellan and Lincoln went back and forth about simultaneous pressure, which was the way to neutralize the Confederate advantage of interior lines of communication, but it did not happen until 1864 when Lincoln slowly got rid of Halleck and stopped Stanton from trying to run the war.
Sherman and Thomas used the same tactics as Rosecrans and Thomas, but Sherman's campaign had better political support and better logistical support. And when Sherman swung around Atlanta to the west southeast, the direct route from Richmond to Atlanta had been severed and the US could threaten the City of Mobile.

Sherman also had more troops than Rosecrans ever had and a considerable numerical advantage over his opponent. That's always helpful. Political support helpful too.

 

[David Moore]

And Sherman regarded that as one of the tragedies of his life. He never completely forgave his wife for that.

Any citable evidence of Rosecrans' religion being a factor in Grant or Sherman's dislike of Rosecrans?

 

[David Moore]

We always seem to forget about how Rosecrans in his last combat command defeated Major General Price's invasion of Missouri alongside Major General Samuel Curtis. Rosecrans had advance knowledge of Price's invasion and acted accordingly.
Leftyhunter

One 19th century observer ( John Russell Young) summed up Rosecrans' career: Four theaters of war, four times successful, four times removed. One must read 19t century sources to really get the whole story.

We always seem to forget about how Rosecrans in his last combat command defeated Major General Price's invasion of Missouri alongside Major General Samuel Curtis. Rosecrans had advance knowledge of Price's invasion and acted accordingly.
Leftyhunter

Compare what happened in 1864 to what happened in 1863. In 1864 Grant never let up the pressure. Banks' failed operation in Louisiana was re-committed to other purposes and support troops for the Mobile Bay operation were obtained. Grant's intelligence service lost track of Early for awhile, but Lincoln allowed Grant to form a new command for the Shenandoah valley, and after a six week shakedown, they whipped Early.
McClellan and Lincoln went back and forth about simultaneous pressure, which was the way to neutralize the Confederate advantage of interior lines of communication, but it did not happen until 1864 when Lincoln slowly got rid of Halleck and stopped Stanton from trying to run the war.
Sherman and Thomas used the same tactics as Rosecrans and Thomas, but Sherman's campaign had better political support and better logistical support. And when Sherman swung around Atlanta to the west southeast, the direct route from Richmond to Atlanta had been severed and the US could threaten the City of Mobile.

Sherman also had more troops than Rosecrans ever had. That's always helpful.

Grant admired the Tullahoma campaign. He wondered why Rosecrans did not pause and fortify at Chattanooga. Which leads into why Rosecrans did not protect Lookout Mountain and the road back to Bridgeport. Which is probably Grant writing that he suspicious about the political pressure. Grant also though the plans to re-establish a shorter logistics line were good, but needed to be implemented. Later he learned that a good deal of Rosecrans' problems were caused by Smith's big mouth and Thomas' abiding caution.

After Tullahoma Bragg retreated to Chattanooga. Rosecrans could hardly have gone into and fortify Chattanooga without Bragg evacuating it first. That was the purpose of the Chickamauga campaign. That required crossing Lookout Mt and threatening Bragg from the rear. Lookout was a barrier to be crossed. Fortification could only come after Chattanooga was fully secured. Citations for your statements always helpful.

 

[David Moore]

I conclude that Rosecrans' problems were much more political than military.
I think Rosecrans was an overt Catholic and that did not endear him to either Grant or Sherman.

According to Garfield (and others) Rosecrans' problems were mostly political.

 

[David Moore]

I apologize for the duplicated comments. It's been a while since I've posted.

 

[uaskme]

Reread Dana's second telegram to Washington from Chattanooga. In it he says he overstated the extent of the "disaster" and testifies to the "conspicuous " gallantry of Rosecrans during the battle. Dana himself probably fled the battlefield in panic.

Dana commanded, or tried to, actually didn't have the authority to give him an order, to Wilder. Wanted Wilder to escort him to Chattanooga. Wilder did provide one for him. Yes Dana, being a newspaper guy and not Military, was alarmed.

Dana's second telegram didn't repair the damage the first one did.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Here is Jacob Cox, in his Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, on a discussion with Garfield of Rosecrans at Chickamauga:

Yet I found he had reached the same judgment of his mental qualities and his capacity as a commander which I had formed at an earlier day. Rosecrans's perceptions were acute and often intuitively clear. His fertility was great. He lacked poise, however, and the steadiness of will necessary to handle great affairs successfully. Then there was the fatal defect of the liability to be swept away by excitement and to lose all efficient control of himself and of others in the very crisis when complete self-possession is the essential quality of a great general.

We sat alone in my room, face to face, at midnight, as Garfield described to me the scene on the 20th of September on the battlefield, when through the gap in the line made by the withdrawal of Wood's division the Confederates poured. He pictured the astonishment of all who witnessed it, the doubt as to the evidence of their own senses ; the effort of Sheridan further to the right to change front and strike the enemy in flank; the hesitation of the men; the wavering and then the breaking of the right wing into a panic-stricken rout, each man running for life to the Dry Valley road, thinking only how he might reach Chattanooga before the enemy should over take him, officers and men swept along in that most hope less of mobs, a disorganized army. He described the effort of Rosecrans and the staff to rally the fugitives and to bring a battery into action, under a shower of flying bullets and crashing shells. It failed, for men were as deaf to reason in their mad panic as would be a drove of stampeded cattle. What was needed was a fresh and well-organized division to cover the rout, to hold back the enemy, and to give time for rallying the fugitives. But no such division was at hand, and the rush to the rear could not be stayed. The enemy was already between the headquarters group and Brannan's division which Wood had joined, and these, throwing back the right flank, were presenting a new front toward the west, where Longstreet, preventing his men from pursuing too far, turned his energies to the effort to break the curved line of which Thomas at the Snodgrass house was the centre. The staff and orderlies gathered about Rosecrans and tried to make their way out of the press. With the conviction that nothing more could be done, mental and physical weakness seemed to overcome the general. He rode silently along, abstracted, as if he neither saw nor heard. Garfield went to him and suggested that he be allowed to try to make his way by Rossville to Thomas, the sound of whose battle seemed to indicate that he was not yet broken. Rosecrans assented listlessly and mechanically. As Garfield told it to me, he leaned forward, bringing his excited face close to mine, and his hand came heavily down upon my knee as in whispered tones he described the collapse of nerve and of will that had befallen his chief. The words burned themselves into my memory.

 

[uaskme]

It wasn't only the Gap, left by Wood's faithful Order. Davis's two beat up Brigades of about 1400 was the Federal Right at this point. Sheridan's Division was moving to Thomas. Latrobe was ordered to form by McCook. He was ordered forward to meet the Confederates and plug a hole that, wasn't a hole. But to confront 10k Confederates assembled with nearly a Mile long Line. This line is going to wrap around Davis. Sending these 2 Divisions fleeing thru Latrobe. Latrobe Buckles, and join the escape. Sheridan's other 2 Brigades form up, but are outnumbered probably 3 to 1. The story is usually told by the Gap created with the Wood's Order. If you look at what happen in relation to the other movements that morning. You get a more complete picture.

 

[David Moore]

Dana commanded, or tried to, actually didn't have the authority to give him an order, to Wilder. Wanted Wilder to escort him to Chattanooga. Wilder did provide one for him. Yes Dana, being a newspaper guy and not Military, was alarmed.

Dana's second telegram didn't repair the damage the first one did.

Actually the telegrams didn't turn really negative until the situation at Chattanooga had stabilized. No historian today believes Rosecrans was about to evacuate Chattanooga once it was decided to send troops from the Army of the Potomac there. Dana sent a telegram in October suggesting otherwise. This is all covered in depth in various books for those really wanting to know. Dana was technically Asst Secy of War. The blending of politics and the military is perhaps the most important overlooked aspect of the war. But there was going to be a political revolution of sorts after the war. Politics would naturally have a big impact on military commands. Few would dispute this in the 19th century. In fact many would have said it was a good thing.

 

[uaskme]

Actually the telegrams didn't turn really negative until the situation at Chattanooga had stabilized. No historian today believes Rosecrans was about to evacuate Chattanooga once it was decided to send troops from the Army of the Potomac there. Dana sent a telegram in October suggesting otherwise. This is all covered in depth in various books for those really wanting to know. Dana was technically Asst Secy of War. The blending of politics and the military is perhaps the most important overlooked aspect of the war. But there was going to be a political revolution of sorts after the war. Politics would naturally have a big impact on military commands. Few would dispute this in the 19th century. In fact many would have said it was a good thing.

Dana Quote:

"My report to-day is of deplorable importance," began Dana's, missive. "Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run, "Dana then went on for several hundred more words, painting a picture of unmitigated disaster. In describing the Rebel breakthrough, Dana wrote that the Confederates "came through with resistless impulse. . . Before them, our troop turned and fled. It was wholesale panic. Vain were all attempts to rally them. . .the road is full of a disordered throng of fugitives. Davis and Sheridan, "Dana continued, "are said to be of at the head of a couple of regiments in order. Wilder's brigade marches out unbroken. Thomas, too is coming down the Rossville road with an organized command, but all the rest is in confusion." Dana estimated Union losses at "20,000. and may be much more," with 6,000 wounded abandoned to the Rebels. "Enemy not yet arrived before Chattanooga," he concluded. "Preparations making to resist his entrance for a time." pp705 The Chickamauga Campaign by Powell

Think the Bull Run analogy, did the most damage! This was the first impression of the Battle to be reported to Washington. First Impressions are hard to overcome. Dana was a tool of Stanton. He just gave Stanton the ammo he needed to Cashier Rosy. Something he had been trying to do.

So, 1/3 of the Federals Army is Routed. Flee in Panic. Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden and Negley, Cashiered. They lose all of their Hospitals. 2.5K wounded with 52 surgeons captured. Lose 20 artillery pieces. Should of been much worse. However, yes, it was pretty bad. Don't think you can turn this into a Federal Victory.

 

[David Moore]

Dana Quote:

"My report to-day is of deplorable importance," began Dana's, missive. "Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run, "Dana then went on for several hundred more words, painting a picture of unmitigated disaster. In describing the Rebel breakthrough, Dana wrote that the Confederates "came through with resistless impulse. . . Before them, our troop turned and fled. It was wholesale panic. Vain were all attempts to rally them. . .the road is full of a disordered throng of fugitives. Davis and Sheridan, "Dana continued, "are said to be of at the head of a couple of regiments in order. Wilder's brigade marches out unbroken. Thomas, too is coming down the Rossville road with an organized command, but all the rest is in confusion." Dana estimated Union losses at "20,000. and may be much more," with 6,000 wounded abandoned to the Rebels. "Enemy not yet arrived before Chattanooga," he concluded. "Preparations making to resist his entrance for a time." pp705 The Chickamauga Campaign by Powell

Think the Bull Run analogy, did the most damage! This was the first impression of the Battle to be reported to Washington. First Impressions are hard to overcome. Dana was a tool of Stanton. He just gave Stanton the ammo he needed to Cashier Rosy. Something he had been trying to do.

So, 1/3 of the Federals Army is Routed. Flee in Panic. Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden and Negley, Cashiered. They lose all of their Hospitals. 2.5K wounded with 52 surgeons captured. Lose 20 artillery pieces. Should of been much worse. However, yes, it was pretty bad. Don't think you can turn this into a Federal Victory.

Why don't you quote the next message sent to Washington by Dana?

 

[David Moore]

Hopefully you read Dana's second dispatch from the attached photo. If not it's in the OR Series I Vol XXX Pt I pg 193-194

 

[David Moore]

JD Cox's Reminiscences was published in 1900. Rosecrans and almost every other prominent figure in the CW was dead by then. Cox himself would die that year. Any point about Rosecrans based on that book alone is pretty weak. Cox was not at Chickamauga. Deep scholarship isn't defined by what can be found for free searching the internet.

 

[uaskme]

Actually the telegrams didn't turn really negative until the situation at Chattanooga had stabilized. No historian today believes Rosecrans was about to evacuate Chattanooga once it was decided to send troops from the Army of the Potomac there. Dana sent a telegram in October suggesting otherwise. This is all covered in depth in various books for those really wanting to know. Dana was technically Asst Secy of War. The blending of politics and the military is perhaps the most important overlooked aspect of the war. But there was going to be a political revolution of sorts after the war. Politics would naturally have a big impact on military commands. Few would dispute this in the 19th century. In fact many would have said it was a good thing.

Dana sent a telegram immediately when he got to Chattanooga. He said in his message, as only a newspaper guy could; the rout was worse than Bull Run. He had a Front Row dear to the Breakthrough. An hour it so latter, when others got to Chattanooga, and after Dana's adrenaline subsided, he wrote the second Telegram. News of his first Telegram had already been dispersed thru Washington.

Why don't you quote the next message sent to Washington by Dana?

Which telegram had the most impact. Clearly it was the First.

 

[David Moore]

Dana sent a telegram immediately when he got to Chattanooga. He said in his message, as only a newspaper guy could; the rout was worse than Bull Run. He had a Front Row dear to the Breakthrough. An hour it so latter, when others got to Chattanooga, and after Dana's adrenaline subsided, he wrote the second Telegram. News of his first Telegram had already been dispersed thru Washington.


Which telegram had the most impact. Clearly it was the First.

Your calling Dana a "newspaper guy" is not the whole story. He had an official position of sorts Assistant Secretary of War and was widely seen as a spy for Stanton. He was also called a "loathsome pimp" by Gordon Granger. However if you read his correspondence post Chickamauga it's not until October that he starts to portray Rosecrans as a broken man. That portrait can be contradicted by other eyewitness accounts including Montgomery Meigs'. A lot has been written on this but it does require time and effort to read it.