The Tale Untwisted

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Gene Thorp's essay on the discovery of SO191 is being expanded into a full book. I'm sure we're all looking forward to it.

It seems like an awfully narrow topic to expand to book length.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It's worth remembering that Sears' Landscape Turned Red is almost 40 years old. Great read, but it should have been eclipsed by a newer, better single-volume study of the Antietam Campaign by now.

 

[Saphroneth]

It seems like an awfully narrow topic to expand to book length.

Which is why the book's probably going to cover a wider expanse of material, plus getting into the details of how the campaign played out in general (since the events of the 15th depend on those of the 14th, which depend on those of the 13th etc.)
It'd also make sense to cover Lee's initial intent and how it was impacted by both events before the 13th and the events of the 13th and later.

 

[MHB1862]

But how do any of those purported deficiencies (which aren't really anything distinctively different - for example estimation is just hard in general and there are good cases of other generals making mis-estimates at least as bad) actually apply to his use of Special Order 191? That's about the events of the afternoon of the 13th (from 2PM-3PM onwards) and the 14th, as that is the point at which SO191 still has any utility.

On the 13th specifically, McClellan's main column was on the move before SO 191 was found, while Franklin went from encamped at Buckeystown to attacking at Cramptons Gap over the 24 hours after SO 191 was found - that's about 16 miles and would normally be more like two days' march than one.

There's no delay/reluctance there.

After the surrender of Harpers Ferry early on the 15th, then it is no longer a question of exploiting SO 191 since any benefit it could have offered has gone - McLaws' and Anderson's divisions have escaped their vulnerable position in the Pleasant Valley.


So - what is the better course of action that could have more fully exploited the lost orders, at an army-command level where you are telling corps which way to go and what to do?

The key fact missing from SO 191 was the troop strength of each column.
What could he have done differently? Emulated Jackson and have troops moving at "early dawn."

 

[Pat Answer]

What could he have done differently? Emulated Jackson and have troops moving at "early dawn."

The video in the OP is actually pretty informative on that. Bottom line: he did.

 

[Saphroneth]

The key fact missing from SO 191 was the troop strength of each column.

Yes.

What could he have done differently? Emulated Jackson and have troops moving at "early dawn."

This might actually mean a delay, since 9th and 6th Corps moved overnight (9th continuously, 6th to the foot of Jefferson Pass) and 1st Corps got up at 3AM. I'm not sure the exact time 6th Corps started moving on the 14th but their head of column arrived around noon, and if they started about 6AM then they'd moved at about 1 1/2 miles per hour - which is about the speed of AP Hill's march to the Antietam battlefield on the 17th. It then takes three hours for the column to close up, which is about right for typical marching speeds (but could be used to work out how fast they were going).


It may actually be because 9th Corps was on the go all night 13th/14th that they're so sluggish on the 15th and onwards.

 

[AA484]

It's worth remembering that Sears' Landscape Turned Red is almost 40 years old. Great read, but it should have been eclipsed by a newer, better single-volume study of the Antietam Campaign by now.

Sears is overrated as a historian, in my opinion. His Chancellorsville book is probably his best. His Antietam and Peninsula Campaign books are decent overall studies, with the former especially being one of the first books I ever read on the Civil War. Once Hartwig releases his second volume on the Maryland campaign, it will far surpass anything else out there as far as overall studies are concerned. I'm no big fan of McClellan, but even I understand that Sears has let his bias seep through into his work. Perhaps that's why I like Chancellorsville the best out of his books.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Sears is overrated as a historian, in my opinion. His Chancellorsville book is probably his best. His Antietam and Peninsula Campaign books are decent overall studies

I think his Gettysburg book is his best work.

I like his Chancellorsville book, but it's controversial in it's own right for being pro-Hooker (some would say too much so).

Once Hartwig releases his second volume on the Maryland campaign, it will far surpass anything else out there as far as overall studies are concerned.

True, but it's also a multi-volume work. That's going to get read less than a single-volume work due to cost, reading time, and simply being more in-depth on the subject than some readers want.

Dave Powell's Chickamauga trilogy is a great work, but I wouldn't recommend it to a new Civil War reader or even someone that has never read a book on that battle.

Sears' length and writing style are great for that.

 

[AA484]

I think his Gettysburg book is his best work.

I like his Chancellorsville book, but it's controversial in it's own right for being pro-Hooker (some would say too much so).



True, but it's also a multi-volume work. That's going to get read less than a single-volume work due to cost, reading time, and simply being more in-depth on the subject than some readers want.

Dave Powell's Chickamauga trilogy is a great work, but I wouldn't recommend it to a new Civil War reader or even someone that has never read a book on that battle.

Sears' length and writing style are great for that.

The only issue is that Sears's evaluation of McClellan is dated and cliche. Again, I'm not a McClellan apologist, but several works released since Sears's have been more fair to McClellan's performance in the Maryland Campaign. Hartwig's second volume will focus solely on the battle, so in a sense, it's a one volume treatment.

I have less to say about McClellan's performance on the Peninsula (in addition to Sears's coverage) as much of that criticism is at least partly deserved, but that campaign is still in need of new coverage.

 

[Saphroneth]

Again, I'm not a McClellan apologist, but several works released since Sears's have been more fair to McClellan's performance in the Maryland Campaign. Hartwig's second volume will focus solely on the battle, so in a sense, it's a one volume treatment.

I have less to say about McClellan's performance on the Peninsula (in addition to Sears's coverage) as much of that criticism is at least partly deserved, but that campaign is still in need of new coverage.

Part of what makes this whole thing particularly difficult is that some later historians have actually been misled by Sears, in so far as they have accepted his account of the facts even when attempting to dispute his spin - and that doesn't help when Sears has got the facts wrong.

For example on the Peninsula Sears presents McClellan as staying on the ironclad Galena during the fighting at Glendale and being out of contact, and Rafuse accepts this as fact when the primary sources indicate that - while he was on the ironclad when reports of the attack came - he sent messages back and forth (and was thus directing the army) before returning to shore quite soon after.

Sears' specific claims IIRC include that McClellan ate dinner during the fighting (a mistranslation of the French aided in this, I checked with an actual French speaker and the meaning of the sentence isn't what Sears presents it as), that there was no telegraphic contact (verifiably false, we have some of the messages) and that McClellan didn't return from the Galena until the fighting was over (I believe there's evidence to the point that a staff officer came aboard looking for McClellan around 1730, about half an hour after the news of the fighting was transmitted to the Galena, but McClellan had already left).

This serves mostly to illustrate that Rafuse (whose PhD had not been on the Peninsula campaign) was relying on Sears for the facts about the Peninsula and those facts were not correct.

 

[trice]

Part of what makes this whole thing particularly difficult is that some later historians have actually been misled by Sears, in so far as they have accepted his account of the facts even when attempting to dispute his spin - and that doesn't help when Sears has got the facts wrong.

For example on the Peninsula Sears presents McClellan as staying on the ironclad Galena during the fighting at Glendale and being out of contact, and Rafuse accepts this as fact when the primary sources indicate that - while he was on the ironclad when reports of the attack came - he sent messages back and forth (and was thus directing the army) before returning to shore quite soon after.

Sears' specific claims IIRC include that McClellan ate dinner during the fighting (a mistranslation of the French aided in this, I checked with an actual French speaker and the meaning of the sentence isn't what Sears presents it as), that there was no telegraphic contact (verifiably false, we have some of the messages) and that McClellan didn't return from the Galena until the fighting was over (I believe there's evidence to the point that a staff officer came aboard looking for McClellan around 1730, about half an hour after the news of the fighting was transmitted to the Galena, but McClellan had already left).

We have been through this before. You have been shown that your claims here are incorrect many times, yet you continue to repeat them.

Example:

You write this about the day of the battle of Glendale:

" (I believe there's evidence to the point that a staff officer came aboard looking for McClellan around 1730, about half an hour after the news of the fighting was transmitted to the Galena, but McClellan had already left)."​

You know this is incorrect.

1600 The battle of Glendale started.
1600 McClellan boarded the Galena at Haxall's Landing.
1645 McClellan is aboard the Galena when she steams upriver to shell Confederate troops during the battle of Glendale.
2030 The Galena having returned to dock McClellan has left Haxall's Landing, riding with his staff back to Malvern Hill.

You have seen evidence already from people on McClellan's staff that he did, indeed, eat dinner on board the Galena that evening. How can you possibly claim that an officer came aboard the Galena at 1530 looking for McClellan when the Galena (and McClellan) are out on the James River shelling Confederate troops?

Why are you pushing this false narrative again?

 

[Hannover]

Those individuals on both sides of the argument for and against McClellan and his conduct in the Maryland Campaign should consider reading Steven Stotelmyer's book, 'Too Useful To Sacrifice' (shown below).

Both sides seem to be fairly entrenched in their views on McClellan with the problem being that even many of the so called 'facts' can be embellished with different interpretations depending on the outlook of the author.

Having considered this campaign for many years I would just like to make a few personal observations:
1. Several well known authors have seemingly started out with a definite narrative and then picked the facts or interpretations of them to suit that narrative. This may be an accepted method of historical reporting in order to sell more books but has the problem of not being as unbiased as any truly reflective historical report or book perhaps should be.
2. These 'views' once published have a habit of being repeated throughout the ages - a 'once written in stone' mentality and is a consequence of either poor research, poor referencing or time constraints on publishing schedules.
3. The outlook that historians have is generally influenced by access to subsequent information that was unavailable to those at the time (beautifully illustrated and discussed in depth by Joseph Harsh in his excellent 'Taken at the Flood') and is further compounded by the impact of what is the present day view is on these events.
4. Reporting of McClellan's generalship is heavily influenced by both his personality traits, his political stance and the overt and sometimes shocking criticism of figures that have become to some extent immortalised - Lincoln being the prime example.
5. Often the criticism is so great that in order to counter this tsunami of 'bad press' the counter argument is also embellished so that the only thing left are the two extremes and little if any of the centre ground remains. People are deemed to be 'for' or 'against' and there is no alternative apart from these two extremes. One might argue that Stotelmyer is sometimes guilty of overpresenting his case as a consequence of trying to 'swim against the tide'.

My final point is to try and look past the 'facts' and look at the overall picture such as with the statement - 'what was achieved?'
From my point of view I could never understand how Meade could be virtually sanctified for saving the Union at Gettysburg. Yet despite this would be castigated for his subsequent 'failure' to destroy the AoNV in the pursuit afterwards and even more criticism for the Bristoe and Wilderness Campaign.

In contrast McClellan had by far the most difficult job. He had inherited a demoralised and badly beaten army that had shortfalls in both ammunition and provisions, had seen the North invaded for the first time in its history and as a consequence of these events was at serious risk of losing the war. It was extremely unlikely that McClellan could have won the war either on the Peninsula or after the Antietam campaign, as in hindsight it even took Grant (combined with a fair amount of luck!) 18 months to grind down the AoNV to a point where it could no longer continue the war. A further requirement was a highly co-ordinated strategy that threatened the Confederacy at its most vulnerable points. So a 'quick fix' often proposed by many arguing against McClellan was in effect unattainable simply due to the highly effective mobilisation of assets within the Confederacy.

So McClellan's major aims on taking over from Pope were to reinvigorate and resupply the army so that it was able to resist the AoNV for any immediate battle. To prevent the further invasion of any more northern states and repel the AoNV back into Virginia. To attain a victory that would enable Lincoln to issue his Emancipation Proclamation (although he did not know it at the time) and thereby change the course of the war by preventing foreign intervention.
To all intents and purposes all of these objectives were achieved and with considerable success.
If Meade can therefore be proclaimed as 'Saviour of the Union' in 1863, surely what is the problem of applying the same tag to McClellan for 1862 despite what you may think of his personal characterics, political beliefs or personality flaws?
Read 'Too Useful To Sacrifice' - it may change your mind!

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I have come to the conclusion after much reading and study that finding they lost order had a negligible effect on the fighting at Fox's and Turner's Gap. Those battles would have happened anyway, even if the order had not been found. Pleasonton's cavalry & Cox's division were pushing west from Frederick even before the order was discovered and sent to headquarters. Stuart asked D. H. Hill for help defending Turner's Gap about the time McClellan read the order.

I do think the discovery of the lost order did influence McClellan's plan for Crampton's Gap to some extent.

 

[67th Tigers]

You know this is incorrect.

1600 The battle of Glendale started.
1600 McClellan boarded the Galena at Haxall's Landing.
1645 McClellan is aboard the Galena when she steams upriver to shell Confederate troops during the battle of Glendale.
2030 The Galena having returned to dock McClellan has left Haxall's Landing, riding with his staff back to Malvern Hill.

You have seen evidence already from people on McClellan's staff that he did, indeed, eat dinner on board the Galena that evening. How can you possibly claim that an officer came aboard the Galena at 1530 looking for McClellan when the Galena (and McClellan) are out on the James River shelling Confederate troops?

Why are you pushing this false narrative again?

You know this is incorrect. This is Sears' false narrative.

The attack at the crossroads started around 1630-1645. McClellan had received a note from Rodgers around 1600, to gone to see him personally.

The decklog of the Galena records McClellan as coming aboard at 1645, and the ship going into action at 1700. McClellan was communicating with his commanders by telegraph. After the first "check fire," a message comes in relaying the beginning of an attack at the crossroads. McClellan issues several orders (including to move Couch to the crossroads), and then crossdecks to the Jacob Bell. The Jacob Bell runs him back down to the landing.

The exact timing of the run down to the landing on the Jacob Bell is unknown, as her deck log only records McClellan coming aboard, and her surgeon left a rather distorted account of the event. However, when one of McClellan's staff came aboard the Galena at 1730, he could not find McClellan there. Given the timings, the crossdecking must have been around 1710-1720.

McClellan is seen riding up Malvern Hill around 1800, he is seen in his command post at 1830, and he writes to Washington, from Malvern Hill at 1900.

At around 2030, McClellan returns to the Galena from his HQ, having done a round-robin of his commanders etc. He is carrying his despatches, and entrusts them to the French Princes. There is a reputable account of them toasting goodbye to the French princes as they crossdecked to the Jacob Bell. The Jacob Bell got underway for Ft. Monroe at 2120. When McClellan came back ashore, he still hadn't had contact with Heintzelman or Franklin, and sent officers to find them.

 

[Saphroneth]

The really operative point here is the timings we can verify as being from the same source or closely correlated. i.e. we know A came before B.

Principally there is that Paris (per his diary) reported the crossroads attack taking place to McClellan around 1710, and on the Galena. Obviously this would simply not happen if the crossroads attack (as a serious thing) was already known information when McClellan boarded the Galena; at most you have one or two single brigade advances taking place before 5PM, and those ones are separated in time from the other sources; to have an ongoing attack before 5PM you need to take all the subsequent attacks (which were reported after 5PM) and move them earlier.


Jenkins gives no specific time.
Kemper said he was told to attack at "about 5PM" and had 2/3 of a mile to advance.
Strange was ordered to advance at 1700 but did not make an attack.
Wilcox saw Pickett/Strange move past them and was ordered to form a line, then advanced afterwards.
Pryor says he was ordered to advance at 4PM but when he reached the front Jenkins had already been repulsed and he made no significant progress.
Featherston said he was ordered to advance around 5PM.

Gregg said he was ordered to support Longstreet at half past six.
Anderson says he was ordered forward around sundown.
Field said he was ordered to move to the front "late in the evening".
Branch (per Extraordinary Circumstances) was ordered to attack along with Kemper, but was cooking their dinner. They attacked after Kemper had broken.
(Archer and Pender are similar to Field.)


None of these individual reports support McCall's claim of an infantry advance at 3PM. Longstreet claims 3 o'clock as well; this may be Jenkins which gives no specific time (and which was before Pryor).


However, there is a clear focus of timings where units are ordered in around 5PM (Kemper, Strange, Wilcox, Featherston, Branch) and afterwards (Gregg, Field, Anderson). The only unit which gives an attack time before 5PM is Pryor and if he and Jenkins were sent in before 5PM only Jenkins did anything significant; the main attack on a divisional scale is 5PM and afterwards. More to the point, if the 3PM attack is correct then it's a minor incident and is over by the time McClellan boards the Galena.

That is, there are effectively two possibilities:

1) A minor attack around 3PM on the scale of an infantry brigade (Jenkins), with another ordered to support (Pryor). Then a big attack goes in around 5PM.
In this case the times which Federal units reported being attacked (or open-fire by the Rebels) would largely be incorrect.

2) Huger opens fire around 4PM and this is a trigger for Longstreet to begin suppressing enemy batteries (initially with a cannonade), which escalates significantly around 5PM when a major attack is ordered by Longstreet.
In this case then Longstreet and McCall's times have drifted earlier than reality, and possibly Pryor as well. If Pryor was intended to support Jenkins and Longstreet committed to expand an attack which seemed to be stalling then this is a viable model for the engagement.


The main attack took place after 5PM.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The outlook that historians have is generally influenced by access to subsequent information that was unavailable to those at the time (beautifully illustrated and discussed in depth by Joseph Harsh in his excellent 'Taken at the Flood') and is further compounded by the impact of what is the present day view is on these events.

Is there any particular information that you're referring to here?

I think something that clouds our understanding of the Maryland Campaign: the uncertainty of how many men McClellan had at Antietam and how many Lee had. We've discussed the subject before here. The extensive straggling makes thus hard to accurately determine. The difference is certainly less than was supposed for a long time.

One might argue that Stotelmyer is sometimes guilty of overpresenting his case as a consequence of trying to 'swim against the tide'.

This is what concerns me. I'm open to reappraisal of McClellan, especially in the Maryland Campaign. What I'm not interested in reading is McClellan apologia by a McClellan partisan. I'm looking for something akin to Earl Hess' biography of Bragg.

So McClellan's major aims on taking over from Pope were to reinvigorate and resupply the army so that it was able to resist the AoNV for any immediate battle.

Not just morale and logistics, but also reorganizing two armies into one and figuring out which units would pursue Lee and which should stay in Washington. I'm not sure how closely this had been studied. Does Stotelmyer cover it in detail?

 

[Hannover]

Is there any particular information that you're referring to here?

This is why I referred to Harsh as I think he covers this point in a very comprehensive way by considering what was known and at what time was it known. Too often historians are tempted to consider things with a fair helping of 'hindsight'. It is perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of our time that Harsh did not complete his assessment of the Union Army during this campaign. You only have to read 'Taken at the Flood' to appreciate Harsh's wonderful knowledge and insight into the campaign in its entirety.

I'm open to reappraisal of McClellan, especially in the Maryland Campaign.

I think that it what Stotelmyer is hoping to achieve, yet you may think at times he overstates his case but I think that this is partly in response to the large amount of invective targetted at McClellan. Views on McClellan are rather like what people think of 'Marmite' (a yeast extract spread reknown for opposing viewpoints!) - you either love it or hate it, there is no in-between.

Does Stotelmyer cover it in detail?

The five major chapters are:
1. Fallacies regarding the Lost Orders
2. Antietam - The Sequel to South Mountain
3. All the Injury Possible: The day between South Mountain and Antietam
4. General John Pope and the politics behind the myth of the unused reserves
5. Supplies and demands - The Demise of General McClellan

So I think that most of the points you have raised are covered.

A final point to bear in mind is to consider in any reassessment what would have been the outcome if McClellan had not been successful and what may have been the consequences of that failure.
From that point alone you might begin to see that the invective metered out to McClellan is to say the least very harsh considering his overall accomplishment.
With the passing of years one would hope that a more realistic assessment of him would be achievable and available.

 

[trice]

You know this is incorrect.

No, I do not know that.

This is Sears' false narrative.

It is generally the same as Sears. Please show actual evidence instead of constantly claiming anything Stephen Sears said is "false".

 

[67th Tigers]

No, I do not know that.

Exactly. It's your own rhetorical device being parroted back at you.

It is generally the same as Sears. Please show actual evidence instead of constantly claiming anything Stephen Sears said is "false".

How bizarre. If you can't see the difference, then there really isn't much point debating. However, earlier you wrote...

You have seen evidence already from people on McClellan's staff that he did, indeed, eat dinner on board the Galena that evening.

No. There is not a single primary account of this. Sears made it up, whole cloth, from a mistranslation of a line in the journal of la Comte de Paris. It is a wonderful example of bias. You "know" it to be true, and so don't interrogate the evidence. Indeed, you proceed to declare an abundance of evidence where none exists.

 

[Lubliner]

A final point to bear in mind is to consider in any reassessment what would have been the outcome if McClellan had not been successful and what may have been the consequences of that failure.

Generally, prior to the discovery of the lost order, McClellan had a plan of action. This lost order is similar to a rock thrown into a lake, causing ripples to spread outward. Or it can be as if a magnet was suddenly placed next to iron shavings. McClellan was always known to follow his own path unless interference came from Washington. He is already under great pressure from Lincoln to move on the rebels, and certainly had developed a plan of action, contingent upon the confederates. Yet when this lost order is handed to him, he had to reevaluate his own army location, its structure, and new possibilities. This appears that for once he strayed from his own predetermination and was puppeted by the newfound intelligence. Conjecture builds within his own outlook, and what he had in store to do is changed to an entirely different tempo and pace, resulting in his apparent hesitancy. Should McClellan have only modified his plans to develop a better aim at the rebels and carried on with his original movement to apprehend them, I think his performance would have remained solid. How much did these lost orders change and disrupt McClellan's planning once they were found?
Lubliner.