The Tale Untwisted

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

An intersting point about this is that in fact - had Harpers Ferry held out until the time Miles warned McClellan about, it would have been relieved. Franklin was on the march down the Pleasant Valley in the morning of the 15th, and Miles had said he could hold out until the evening of the 15th (when in fact he surrendered around 9AM).

Franklin has been criticized for showing no urgency or haste on the morning of the 15th.

 

[Saphroneth]

Franklin has been criticized for showing no urgency or haste on the morning of the 15th.

I don't really think it's within his power to save Harpers Ferry at that point. Harpers Ferry surrendered not long after 8AM, and by 8:50 Franklin was sending to McClellan that the surrender had taken place (he could tell because the guns had stopped).

From Cramptons Gap to the Maryland Heights is about 8-9 miles, which is on the order of a full day's march rather than what can be achieved in a couple of hours after sunrise (and sunrise on the western side of a mountain range, at that, which has an effect). You really need to get several extra hours somewhere and have Franklin in the Pleasant Valley no later than noon of the 14th, so he can advance down on the afternoon of the 14th, but that then runs into the fact that Franklin was at Urbana MD at the beginning of the 13th - in effect he has to make a total distance of 30 miles (Urbana -> Buckeystown -> Jefferson -> Crampton is 22, Crampton -> Maryland Heights is 8) and fight a battle in no more than two days (13th and 14th) plus maybe an extra couple of hours on the 15th. It becomes quite a major ask of the troops, even before considering that there's a quarter of Lee's army* in the Pleasant Valley and so you have to advance ready to give battle instead of pushing forwards in road column.

* McLaws and Anderson are 430 companies of men all told and were more than once observed to number anything up to 30,000; Franklin has 425 companies inclusive of Couch's 4th Corps division. He probably has the numerical advantage with Couch but not without Couch.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I wish I'd seen this thread earlier because I would have liked to chime in on several different issues. In a nutshell, this book proves the following using all of the available evidence:
1) McClellan did not march north at 6 miles per day. His troops started the campaign with marches as long as 40 miles overnight as they came up from as far away as Aquia Creek. The slow marching accusation is slander introduced by Henry Halleck during the investigations of the Harpers Ferry Military Commission, and was repeated as part of a character assassination effort led by William Swinton during the presidential election of 1864. All of this cricitism has been repeated ad nauseum to the present day.
2) McClellan knew the location of Lee's army from the day it crossed the Potomac until the day the armies fought the Battle of Antietam. What he did not know until S.O. No. 191 was found were Lee's objectives. The orders clarified those objectives for McClellan so that he could act.
3) McClellan used the information in S.O. No. 191 to design an en echelon attack on the gaps of South Mountain. En echelon means staggered or timed. Burnside's assault on Fox's and Turner's Gaps were to be first, followed by Franklin's attack on Crampton's Gap.
4) McClellan bore no responsibility for the safety of Harpers Ferry until he was given command over the garrison on Sept. 12. By then it was too late to save.
5) McClellan acted aggressively from roughly Sept. 12 onward. He even ordered the Sept. 14 attacks before having verified from Pleasonton that the lost orders he held were authentic. This was a very aggressive act in itself, as was thrusting Franklin's Sixth Corps into Pleasant Valley between McLaws' and Hill's commands.

If we suppose the lost orders had never been found, what would have happened?

Because Pleasonton and Stuart were already in contact and the 9th corps was already at and beyond Frederick, I believe the fight at Fox and Turner Gap would probably have unfolded similarly although probably not exactly the same.based on where different units might have been at dawn on the 14th.

McClellan did not expect a battle for the gaps to begin with. He believed the battle would be on the other side of the mountains. Lee also did not plan to fight in the gaps until he learned U. S. forces were beyond Frederick late on the 13th.

I am not aware that McClellan had any plans.for Crampton's Gap until after seeing the order. Franklin's attack was a direct result of the lost order.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Franklin has been criticized for showing no urgency or haste on the morning of the 15th.

iorder.i find it hard to believe Franklin would have accomplished anything on the 15th. If he had attacked promptly on the 14th, possibly. His lack of action on the 14th is to me the biggest what if of the campaign.

 

[Saphroneth]

iorder.i find it hard to believe Franklin would have accomplished anything on the 15th. If he had attacked promptly on the 14th, possibly. His lack of action on the 14th is to me the biggest what if of the campaign.

Again, you have to look at time and motion. Franklin needs to have his forces closed up at the foot of the gap before he attacks - he can't just attack off the line of march because then he's feeding brigades into a defensive position one at a time. You can gain an hour or two but you can't gain the several hours you need to advance down the Pleasant Valley on the 14th.

It's just a long way to go.

I am not aware that McClellan had any plans.for Crampton's Gap until after seeing the order. Franklin's attack was a direct result of the lost order.

Do we know at what point the news reached McClellan that Harpers Ferry had been cut off? Given when that actually happened it might be that the Lost Order is McClellan's first confirmation that the enemy is actually doing that.

A plausible reason for the timing in ordering Franklin forwards might be that the Jefferson pass hadn't been taken yet; once the pass is taken (which was near sundown on the 13th) then it's an obvious thing to do to push Franklin over that pass, as it avoids the massive traffic jam at Frederick.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I don't really think it's within his power to save Harpers Ferry at that point. Harpers Ferry surrendered not long after 8AM, and by 8:50 Franklin was sending to McClellan that the surrender had taken place (he could tell because the guns had stopped)

i find it hard to believe Franklin would have accomplished anything on the 15th.

I'm not saying haste by Franklin on the morning of the 15th would have saved Harpers Ferry.

I'm saying Franklin didn't know the garrison would surrender at 8 AM. He should have had forces moving at dawn. Stopping for instructions after it the surrender was apparent is reasonable, but he showed no urgency before that time.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I'm not saying haste by Franklin on the morning of the 15th would have saved Harpers Ferry.

I'm saying Franklin didn't know the garrison would surrender at 8 AM. He should have had forces moving at dawn. Stopping for instructions after it the surrender was apparent is reasonable, but he showed no urgency before that time.

He showed no urgency at any point, I agree. Again, I believe this is the great missed opportunity of the campaign -- September 14 & 15 at Crampton's Gap & Pleasant Valley. At the least, Franklin could have put a lot more pressure on McLaws and, ultimately, Lee.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm saying Franklin didn't know the garrison would surrender at 8 AM. He should have had forces moving at dawn. Stopping for instructions after it the surrender was apparent is reasonable, but he showed no urgency before that time.

But if moving faster than he did would have no actual consequent benefit, then it's not really a case of a missed opportunity; meanwhile you can't have troops operating at 100 percent capacity all the time, it simply exhausts them, and there'd been some night marching over the 13th/14th by 6th Corps so they were already operating with a bit of a sleep deficit.

He showed no urgency at any point, I agree. Again, I believe this is the great missed opportunity of the campaign -- September 14 & 15 at Crampton's Gap & Pleasant Valley. At the least, Franklin could have put a lot more pressure on McLaws and, ultimately, Lee.

As noted, there's issues of how much you work the men, but there's also the defile to handle. I understand Franklin to have been at least ready to advance, if not actually advancing, by between eight and nine, and given how long it takes to get a formation through a defile then that's about how long it would take to get his corps through the gap starting at dawn.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I see your point. My thought is more that if he hadnbegun his attack around noon or shortly thereafter on the 14th, he might have passed through the gaps before nightfall and then have been a better position to accomplish something on the 15th.

 

[Saphroneth]

I see your point. My thought is more that if he hadnbegun his attack around noon or shortly thereafter on the 14th, he might have passed through the gaps before nightfall and then have been a better position to accomplish something on the 15th.

And, again, that comes back to the issue of closing up and how far one actually expects 6th Corps to march. There's some potential benefit there, but really just to have Franklin in position to hit McLaws before Harpers Ferry surrenders he has to march 30 miles, fight a battle and be ready to fight another battle in not more than about two days. It's a really big ask in the real world; I agree there was potential there, but the time constraints are massively relaxed by Harpers Ferry holding out even a few hours longer simply because that takes it into something that's actually doable given historical evidence (i.e. how fast 6th Corps managed to historically move).

There's always going to be situations where a bit of improvement seems to have the potential for a lot of benefit, but you do eventually run up against the limitations of what was possible (or at least possible without straggling the unit to pieces so badly that it has no effective fighting value).

 

[OpnCoronet]

McClellan and his apologists, always had excuses for failure, no matter how spectacular.

The message should have confirmed what little mac should have known already, i.e., that Lee's Army was widely separated and the AoP was closer to Lee than Jackson.

During the battle, the confederate left flank was crumbling under the last Federal attack when taken in their flank by Jackson's force from Harper's Ferry, i.e., if McClellan had not hesitated 24hrs to begin his assault, Or, if he had just started it only a few hrs earlier(Morning) the battle would have been over before confederate relief arrived.

Even at the end McClellan still had a fresh corps in reserve, with which to continue the battle against the exhausted force from Harper's Ferry.; Or even to continue the battle the next day, when Lee waited a further 24 hrs before actually retreating, apparently daring little mac to continue the battle.



P.S. It always intrigued me that the confederate force from Harpers Ferry, was able to force march to Antietam, without McClellan anticipating and being prepared for just such an event?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It always intrigued me that the confederate force from Harpers Ferry, was able to force march to Antietam, without McClellan anticipating and being prepared for just such an event?

How would McClellan know whether Lee still had forces at Harpers Ferry and how many? All he can see is the ANV in an arc around Sharpsburg.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

McClellan and his apologists, always had excuses for failure, no matter how spectacular.

The message should have confirmed what little mac should have known already, i.e., that Lee's Army was widely separated and the AoP was closer to Lee than Jackson.

During the battle, the confederate left flank was crumbling under the last Federal attack when taken in their flank by Jackson's force from Harper's Ferry, i.e., if McClellan had not hesitated 24hrs to begin his assault, Or, if he had just started it only a few hrs earlier(Morning) the battle would have been over before confederate relief arrived.

Even at the end McClellan still had a fresh corps in reserve, with which to continue the battle against the exhausted force from Harper's Ferry.; Or even to continue the battle the next day, when Lee waited a further 24 hrs before actually retreating, apparently daring little mac to continue the battle.



P.S. It always intrigued me that the confederate force from Harpers Ferry, was able to force march to Antietam, without McClellan anticipating and being prepared for just such an event?

While I agree there are times McClellan could have been more aggressively, it is not correct to say that McClellan wasted 24 hours before attacking on September 14. The infantry fight at Fox's Gap opened less than 24 hours after McClellan first saw the orders. Cavalry and artillery opened sooner. In fact U. S. Cavalry pushed the Confederates back to South Mountain all day in September 13 (beginning before the orders were found).

I don't know where McClellan could have started the battle a few hours earlier. The fighting at South Mountain started around 7 am with infantry engaging at little before 9. The fighting at Antietam began on September 16 and resumed before dawn on September 17.

I still contend that Franklin could have attacked at Crampton's Gap earlier than he did one September 14.

I believe McClellan made mistakes but he was not incompetent as many would make him out to be.

 

[Jantzen64]

While I agree there are times McClellan could have been more aggressively, it is not correct to say that McClellan wasted 24 hours before attacking on September 14. The infantry fight at Fox's Gap opened less than 24 hours after McClellan first saw the orders. Cavalry and artillery opened sooner. In fact U. S. Cavalry pushed the Confederates back to South Mountain all day in September 13 (beginning before the orders were found).

I don't know where McClellan could have started the battle a few hours earlier. The fighting at South Mountain started around 7 am with infantry engaging at little before 9. The fighting at Antietam began on September 16 and resumed before dawn on September 17.

I still contend that Franklin could have attacked at Crampton's Gap earlier than he did one September 14.

I believe McClellan made mistakes but he was not incompetent as many would make him out to be.

I am puzzled as to why McClellan didn't order Franklin to move until the morning of the 14th, instead of pushing him that evening over the Catoctins and set up an attack on the Gap earlier in the morning. Burnside and Hooker were already moving out of Fredrick into the Middleton/Catoctin Valley, and McClellan's order tells Frankling that McLaws/Anderson were in Pleasant Valley, so there is no tangible concern that Franklin couldnt have entered Middleton/Catoctin valley as well. Yes, an evening move. Yes, troops are tired. But, as evidenced by all of his messages, McClellan seemed to recognize the opportunity he had been given. Yet, he didn't push Franklin, despite his stated intention of wanting to split Lee in two.

 

[Jantzen64]

How would McClellan know whether Lee still had forces at Harpers Ferry and how many? All he can see is the ANV in an arc around Sharpsburg.

Franklin reported to McClellan on the morning of the 15th that he had encountered a large force (apparently was McLaws/Anderson) as he was moving down the valley to try to open communications with Harper's Ferry. EDITED: I should add that McClellan ordered Franklin to watch that force, and had, in a previous order, envisioned the possibility of Franklin moving into Sharpsburg to cut off Longstreet/Hill AND prevent the recrossing of Jackson. I can't tell exactly what happened on the evening of the 15th/day of the 16th, but Franklin was recalled to Keedysvile on the evening of the 16th. I can find no further reference to the need/wisdom of monitoring what was happening to the Confederate troops surrounding Harper's Ferry.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I am puzzled as to why McClellan didn't order Franklin to move until the morning of the 14th, instead of pushing him that evening over the Catoctins and set up an attack on the Gap earlier in the morning. Burnside and Hooker were already moving out of Fredrick into the Middleton/Catoctin Valley, and McClellan's order tells Frankling that McLaws/Anderson were in Pleasant Valley, so there is no tangible concern that Franklin couldnt have entered Middleton/Catoctin valley as well. Yes, an evening move. Yes, troops are tired. But, as evidenced by all of his messages, McClellan seemed to recognize the opportunity he had been given. Yet, he didn't push Franklin, despite his stated intention of wanting to split Lee in two.

I have the same puzzle.

 

[trice]

How would McClellan know whether Lee still had forces at Harpers Ferry and how many? All he can see is the ANV in an arc around Sharpsburg.

That's what intel and scouting is for.

Seriously, generals should always have staff and subordinates looking for information about the enemy. On something like this, cavalry patrols (large or small), scouts (IOW, spies), civilian sources and simple observation from across the river would have been able to tell McClellan a lot. The type of info Meade got on the night of July 2nd-3rd at Gettysburg (identifying the units that they had fought on days 1 & 2) from his staff would have let McClellan know he had already fought most of Lee's army.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Seriously, generals should always have staff and subordinates looking for information about the enemy. On something like this, cavalry patrols (large or small), scouts (IOW, spies), civilian sources and simple observation from across the river would have been able to tell McClellan a lot. The type of info Meade got on the night of July 2nd-3rd at Gettysburg (identifying the units that they had fought on days 1 & 2) from his staff would have let McClellan know he had already fought most of Lee's army.

The AOTP's cavalry was very different in July 1862 than it had been in Sep 1862 - quantity, quality, and doctrine.

 

[67th Tigers]

The AOTP's cavalry was very different in July 1862 than it had been in Sep 1862 - quantity, quality, and doctrine.

Indeed. During early lockdown I realised that the organisation of the cavalry at Antietam was not that in the OR. What is in the OR reflects an ad-hoc organisation about a week after Antietam, when Pleasonton submitted his report.

 

[OpnCoronet]

How would McClellan know whether Lee still had forces at Harpers Ferry and how many? All he can see is the ANV in an arc around Sharpsburg.

How indeed, perhaps little Mac as Commanding General, should have made it his business to know. What, for instance, was Union Cavalry doing all this time and was he reading intel. reports from Washington?