The Tale Untwisted

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

A final point to bear in mind is to consider in any reassessment what would have been the outcome if McClellan had not been successful and what may have been the consequences of that failure.

McClellan unsuccessful as in defeated at Antietam? The AOTP retreats back to DC. The battered ANV is in no condition to exploit their victory.

 

[damYankee]

Question, What would Lee have done if he had the same intelligence windfall?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Question, What would Lee have done if he had the same intelligence windfall?

The knee-jerk reaction is that of course Lee would immediately attempt to fall on an isolated portion of his opponent's army and destroy it.

But should we really consider SO191 an intelligence windfall?

McClellan learned Lee had substantially divided the ANV and that Lee's immediate objective was Harper's Ferry.

But he also knew that information was several days old. McClellan did not know if the siege was still in progress or how long the garrison could be expected to hold out. He can only loosely estimate the strength of the different parts of the ANV.

Best case scenario the AOTP tries to surround the Confederates on Maryland Heights. Even if the siege was still ongoing and the South Mountain defenses were easily breached, the Confederates north of the Potomac can probably successfully withdraw west then cross the Potomac. McClellan clears Maryland and saves the Harpers Ferry garrison without much of a fight. A small strategic and PR victory, but not the kind of victory Lincoln is really looking for (not just because of the Emancipation Proclamation).

 

[trice]

Exactly. It's your own rhetorical device being parroted back at you.



How bizarre. If you can't see the difference, then there really isn't much point debating. However, earlier you wrote...



No. There is not a single primary account of this. Sears made it up, whole cloth, from a mistranslation of a line in the journal of la Comte de Paris. It is a wonderful example of bias. You "know" it to be true, and so don't interrogate the evidence. Indeed, you proceed to declare an abundance of evidence where none exists.

All of the above is you misleading yourself and trying to mislead others.

McClellan really did eat dinner on the Galena on June 30th, 1862. This silliness about Sears mistranslating a line in the Comte de Paris journal is yet another attempt by you to try to find a word or phrase you can pick at to make the claim the entire work of Sears is "false".

That is an odd way to look at what the Comte de Paris wrote:

"Lorsqu'on à mène pendant quelques jours une vie aussi rude, l'on se sent tout dépaysé en arrivant sur un navire ou tout est propre, ou les officers ont ligne blanc et ou l'on trouve subitement un bon dîner et du bon vin."​

which seems to translate as:

"When one has led such a harsh life for a few days, one feels totally out of place arriving on a ship where everything is clean, where the officers have a white line and where one suddenly finds a good dinner and good wine."​

(Note: I guess that "have a white line" should really translate as "have white linen".)​

Back in 2014, @67th Tigers (IOW, you, yourself) noted on your blog that the Comte de Paris then wrote:

"je me hatai de prendre ma part du repas" - literally "I quickly take my part of the meal" whilst departing McClellan with orders for the army.​

That seems to say that yes indeed there was a meal aboard the Galena, that the Comte de Paris gulped his down in a hurry and left to deliver orders, while McClellan stayed aboard to eat at a more leisurely pace.

This is from Sears To The Gates Of Richmond" and appears to be what you are referring to:

The end of all that is that Sears was correct. The Comte de Paris journal entry does describe a meal aboard the Galena and appears to say McClellan ate there.

You should stop this silliness about Sears being dishonest. He certainly does not like McClellan, but his work is well researched.

 

[67th Tigers]

All of the above is you misleading yourself and trying to mislead others.

McClellan really did eat dinner on the Galena on June 30th, 1862. This silliness about Sears mistranslating a line in the Comte de Paris journal is yet another attempt by you to try to find a word or phrase you can pick at to make the claim the entire work of Sears is "false".

Nope, that's Sears' interpolation. Virtually everything about Sears' claim that McClellan "would dine at Commander John Rodgers's table aboard the Galena where, the Comte de Paris noted appreciatively, the linen was white and there was "a good dinner with some good wine."" is false.

What is true is that the Captain's cabin, where McClellan went, did have the Captain's lunch laid out. Rodgers had promised Edge lunch, but Edge was disappointed when McClellan wanted to discuss something in person. We know that McClellan did not have a chart of the James, because he asked for one earlier that day, and Rodgers' charts would be in his cabin, where there would be a large table used both as the plotting table and dinner table.

What is not true is that there is any primary evidence of McClellan so much as touching the food, let alone sitting down to a good dinner. Paris does not mention McClellan eating. Instead he remarks on the conditions the Navy officers have with clean white linen bedsheets (on their beds, not their tables!), and the quality of their mess compared to his rough life in the field. The day before he recorded that he only ate what McClellan ate that day; a thin stew without any meat in it. In context, Paris is delivering a message received by telegraph (that same telegraph Sears claims didn't exist) about combat starting, which brings McClellan on deck (and up the mast with his binos to see the situation), and soon back to his command post ashore. He certainly isn't dining there that evening.

Now, I think it's quite possible McClellan picked up a a piece of bread or the like whilst discussing matters with Rodgers over the chart, and I don't think that it matters one iota. Generals are allowed to eat. I know Belfoured once opined that if McClellan ate the slightest crumb of bread whilst discussing matters with Rodgers it damns him utterly. Tosh.

What Sears gets completely wrong is the lack of a telegraph, and that McClellan remained aboard. McClellan received messages about the attack, transmitted orders back to shore for troop movements to reinforce the threatened sectors, and then left to return to his command post aboard the Jacob Bell. McClellan was simply caught out of position, reacted in a reasonable manner which was enabled by his prior preparation of establishing communications links, and then returned ASAP. Sears gets the most pertinent facts wrong, and his interpretation of those pseudo-facts is specious at best.

 

[damYankee]

The knee-jerk reaction is that of course Lee would immediately attempt to fall on an isolated portion of his opponent's army and destroy it.

But should we really consider SO191 an intelligence windfall?

McClellan learned Lee had substantially divided the ANV and that Lee's immediate objective was Harper's Ferry.

But he also knew that information was several days old. McClellan did not know if the siege was still in progress or how long the garrison could be expected to hold out. He can only loosely estimate the strength of the different parts of the ANV.

Best case scenario the AOTP tries to surround the Confederates on Maryland Heights. Even if the siege was still ongoing and the South Mountain defenses were easily breached, the Confederates north of the Potomac can probably successfully withdraw west then cross the Potomac. McClellan clears Maryland and saves the Harpers Ferry garrison without much of a fight. A small strategic and PR victory, but not the kind of victory Lincoln is really looking for (not just because of the Emancipation Proclamation).

Back home we call that "putting lipstick on a pig.'
I doubt any other general in either army would have muffed such an opportunity, but Lil Mac was not the average general.

 

[trice]

Nope, that's Sears' interpolation. Virtually everything about Sears' claim that McClellan "would dine at Commander John Rodgers's table aboard the Galena where, the Comte de Paris noted appreciatively, the linen was white and there was "a good dinner with some good wine."" is false.

What is true is that the Captain's cabin, where McClellan went, did have the Captain's lunch laid out. Rodgers had promised Edge lunch, but Edge was disappointed when McClellan wanted to discuss something in person. We know that McClellan did not have a chart of the James, because he asked for one earlier that day, and Rodgers' charts would be in his cabin, where there would be a large table used both as the plotting table and dinner table.

What is not true is that there is any primary evidence of McClellan so much as touching the food, let alone sitting down to a good dinner. Paris does not mention McClellan eating. Instead he remarks on the conditions the Navy officers have with clean white linen bedsheets (on their beds, not their tables!), and the quality of their mess compared to his rough life in the field. The day before he recorded that he only ate what McClellan ate that day; a thin stew without any meat in it. In context, Paris is delivering a message received by telegraph (that same telegraph Sears claims didn't exist) about combat starting, which brings McClellan on deck (and up the mast with his binos to see the situation), and soon back to his command post ashore. He certainly isn't dining there that evening.

Now, I think it's quite possible McClellan picked up a a piece of bread or the like whilst discussing matters with Rodgers over the chart, and I don't think that it matters one iota. Generals are allowed to eat. I know Belfoured once opined that if McClellan ate the slightest crumb of bread whilst discussing matters with Rodgers it damns him utterly. Tosh.

What Sears gets completely wrong is the lack of a telegraph, and that McClellan remained aboard. McClellan received messages about the attack, transmitted orders back to shore for troop movements to reinforce the threatened sectors, and then left to return to his command post aboard the Jacob Bell. McClellan was simply caught out of position, reacted in a reasonable manner which was enabled by his prior preparation of establishing communications links, and then returned ASAP. Sears gets the most pertinent facts wrong, and his interpretation of those pseudo-facts is specious at best.

This is pure spin. What you are saying is that McClellan did go on board, he was there when the food was on the table, his staff did eat -- but McClellan (despite being at the end of a long and wearing retreat) did not let the food and wine cross his lips. Unless you can come up with an actual source to say that McClellan did not eat a bite, this is an absolute example of ***you*** making things up out of whole cloth just so you can claim Sears work is "false". Be more rigorous with yourself. Show us your source, or stop filling the ether with all this silliness, please.

As to the "telegraph" issue, you absolutely know there was no telegraph. The communications were being done by flags. Sears is absolutely right in what he said and you are dissembling to make your claim. Please stop this waste of people's time and effort.

 

[67th Tigers]

This is pure spin. What you are saying is that McClellan did go on board, he was there when the food was on the table, his staff did eat -- but McClellan (despite being at the end of a long and wearing retreat) did not let the food and wine cross his lips. Unless you can come up with an actual source to say that McClellan did not eat a bite, this is an absolute example of ***you*** making things up out of whole cloth just so you can claim Sears work is "false". Be more rigorous with yourself. Show us your source, or stop filling the ether with all this silliness, please.

What amazing spin! Eating a sandwich during a 15 minute meeting is the same as sitting down for a three-course meal for the evening? Tosh!

As to the "telegraph" issue, you absolutely know there was no telegraph. The communications were being done by flags. Sears is absolutely right in what he said and you are dissembling to make your claim. Please stop this waste of people's time and effort.

That is a telegraph. Sears is simply wrong.

 

[Saphroneth]

It may help to clarify that there is the electric telegraph, which is specifically sending signals down an electric wire, and there are optical telegraph systems. For example that (optical telegraph) is how Telegraph Hill got its name in San Francisco.


The exact wording of Sears' claim is:


General McClellan, however, would not be sharing any dangers in this battle. Instead he was five miles away, at Haxall's Landing on the James behind Malvern Hill, without telegraphic communications and too distant to command the army.

Sears, Stephen W.. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign . Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.


And:


At four o'clock that afternoon, distancing himself even further from the responsibilities of command, General McClellan boarded the gunboat Galena, and forty-five minutes later, with McClellan aboard, the Galena steamed off upriver to shell an enemy column sighted on the River Road west of Malvern Hill. That evening the general would dine at Commander John Rodgers's table aboard the Galena where, the Comte de Paris noted appreciatively, the linen was white and there was "a good dinner with some good wine."

Sears, Stephen W.. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign . Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.



Meanwhile in Lincoln's Lieutenants:


John Rodgers's gunboat Galena was McClellan's haven. At 4:00 p.m. he boarded the Galena to confer with Rodgers about the navy guarding the army when it should reach the river. Already at Haxall's McClellan was miles too far from Glendale to exercise any command functions . . . although not too far to escape hearing the rising sounds of battle there. At 4:45, with general and staff aboard, the Galena steamed upriver some miles to shell a Rebel column on the riverbank. That evening, wrote the Comte de Paris, "I found the General at table with the naval officers. . . . When one has led so rude a life for several days, one feels out of place on arriving aboard a ship where everything is proper, whose officers have white linen and where one suddenly finds a good dinner and some good wine."

Sears, Stephen W.. Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac (pp. 260-261). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.

(note that the claim of a linen tablecloth is gone; Lincoln's Lieutenants is the more recent book by twenty-five years)




It is of course possible that Sears simply meant that a man on a boat was not connected by electric telegraph, but he refers to Porter using flag signals to contact the navy, and of course in Lincoln's Lieutenants he specifies that McClellan was "miles too far from Glendale to exercise any command functions". In Lincoln's Lieutenants Sears refers to signals passed during Seven Pines (by Heintzelman) as telegraphs, and he does not use the term "semaphore" (which is the unambiguous term for non-electric telegraphy) in either book.
If one is intended to read Sears' statement as being that McClellan was fully able to be in signal contact with his army with the main delay being the need to physically transmit the message, then Sears has really done a terrible job representing that.

 

[trice]

What amazing spin! Eating a sandwich during a 15 minute meeting is the same as sitting down for a three-course meal for the evening? Tosh!

In short, you have no idea at all what actually happened, but you insist Sears lied about it. This type of silliness can only undermine what you say. Please stop this. If you have any actual evidence to present, please present it.

That is a telegraph. Sears is simply wrong.

So now flag-waving signals are a "telegraph". Apparently your entire basis for your claim of Sears being a liar is a minor point of semantics. Please stop wasting all this space and time with this.

 

[1SGDan]

To quote Sonny and Cher "the beat goes on." The Mac cheer leading squad will never stop waving their pom poms.

 

[67th Tigers]

In short, you have no idea at all what actually happened, but you insist Sears lied about it. This type of silliness can only undermine what you say. Please stop this. If you have any actual evidence to present, please present it.

So now flag-waving signals are a "telegraph". Apparently your entire basis for your claim of Sears being a liar is a minor point of semantics. Please stop wasting all this space and time with this.

Yes, telegraphs are telegraphs. That you don't know what a telegraph is doesn't alter the facts. You are being confidently wrong.

I believe you think only the electrical telegraph (patented 1837) is a telegraph. The fact that there is a modifier to the word telegraph is because the telegraph already existed, and this was a new way of sending telegraphic messages. This is much like the word "mobile" modifying the word "phone." Your argument is along the lines of "phone? Those old things on the wall with wires aren't phones. A phone is carried around in my pocket and has Candy Crush on it."

Optical telegraphs are the OG telegraphs.

To be absolutely clear, Lt Clum had a telegraph detachment aboard the Galena, and was in contact with the shore. The signallers numbered their stations sequentially, and his station was no. 31:

To be clear, the operating signals stations on the 30th June were:

27: Malvern House (5th Corps HQ)
28: USS Port Royal (sent to recce Dancing Point that morning, did not return that day)
29: Dew/Crew House (McClellan's CP)
30: Binford House
31: USS Galena
32: Haxall's House (4th Corps HQ)
33: USS Aroostook
34: Below Haxall's communicating with 35
35: USS Monitor (off City Point)

Stations 36 and 37 were placed late on 1st July, giving communications links between Harrison's Landing, Malvern Hill, and the gunboats.

Communications between the main CP (29) and Sumner, and Franklin (once his station is abandoned), were by courier. AdC's couriers etc. rode back and forth between station 29 and the Nelson Farm (Sumner's HQ) etc., carrying the messages.

Sears claimed there was no communication, despite the reports showing there was, and even some of the messages surviving. He was wrong.

 

[Saphroneth]

I believe you think only the electrical telegraph (patented 1837) is a telegraph. The fact that there is a modifier to the word telegraph is because the telegraph already existed, and this was a new way of sending telegraphic messages.

A good example of this is that Vandermonde used the term "telegraph" (specifically Télégraphe as he was French) in a politics essay; he died in 1796. The word referred to the optical telegraph, which was the only kind of telegraph for decades; indeed, telegraph means distant writing and was a word invented to refer to a semaphore system used in France.


If what Sears meant was specifically the electrical telegraph, then it is effectively a pointless thing to claim because a ship being connected to an electric telegraph is not really a thing that can happen unless the ship literally has the cable running out to it. McClellan was of course in contact, through (optical) telegraph or "signals"*, to other signals stations and thence to the rest of his army.

Literally the first electric field telegraph used by any US Army was set up after Williamsburg, and was prone to being cut by Union soldiers at first because they were unfamiliar with it. Electric telegraphy at this point is a very new technology in military terms.

 

[Jantzen64]

I have come to the conclusion after much reading and study that finding they lost order had a negligible effect on the fighting at Fox's and Turner's Gap. Those battles would have happened anyway, even if the order had not been found. Pleasonton's cavalry & Cox's division were pushing west from Frederick even before the order was discovered and sent to headquarters. Stuart asked D. H. Hill for help defending Turner's Gap about the time McClellan read the order.

I do think the discovery of the lost order did influence McClellan's plan for Crampton's Gap to some extent.

Interestingly, McClellan is reported to have said that the order "was of very great service to me in enabling me to direct the movements of my own troops accordingly." and "Whoever found the order . . . rendered an infinite service." Battles & Leaders, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 603.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Interestingly, McClellan is reported to have said that the order "was of very great service to me in enabling me to direct the movements of my own troops accordingly." and "Whoever found the order . . . rendered an infinite service." Battles & Leaders, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 603.

I am aware of his statements. I believe he had more of a plan then he would have had without a copy of the orders, but I do think there would have been a battle at Turner's and Fox's gap. Both sides were already in contact before McClellan saw the orders.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan had already decided to attack South Mountain. What SO191 told him was what to expect after that.

DH Hill's wrote an 1868 article making the case that SO191 induced McClellan to be more cautious, because the details of the order were wrong. This is nonsense, but it does make the point that SO191 was very out of date.

 

[Saphroneth]

It may help for me to provide my write-up on SO 191 and what can be gleaned from it.



SO 191 was issued on Tuesday 9 September; consequently "Friday" is September 12. McClellan recieves the orders September 13.


Special Orders, No. 191
Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia
September 9, 1862

1. (missing)
2. (missing)
3. The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry.
4. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.
5. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity.
6. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with General McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.
7. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.
8. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.
9. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.
10. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance—wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood &c.

Map based on the GCACW series operational maps.


As of when the orders are captured, it's Saturday 13th. The orders expired on Friday, but because Harpers Ferry has not yet fallen they are a fairly good predictor (though not perfect) of Confederate positions.
Given that McClellan knew DH Hill left Frederick on the 11th, and assuming that he knew there was no extra division or so knocking about not included in the orders, the below is what McClellan could reasonably predict Lee's positions to be in red (along with the true positions, which are slightly different and where different are in orange).
Note that while the cavalry is not marked on this map, this is because McClellan was actually in contact with it already - Stuart's cavalry was holding the Cactotin passes as of noon on the 13th, and Jefferson Pass is not taken until near sundown.

McClellan knows that while Harpers Ferry holds out, the Confederate army is divided, but that they are to unite as soon as possible once Harpers Ferry is taken. They could also reunite around Sharpsburg by giving up the Harpers Ferry siege and concentrating on Sharpsburg, mostly by routes McClellan cannot intercept.

He has no way to know if the movement order has been superseded, since it has expired.

 

[GilbertFarney]

I wish I'd seen this thread earlier because I would have liked to chime in on several different issues. In a nutshell, this book proves the following using all of the available evidence:
1) McClellan did not march north at 6 miles per day. His troops started the campaign with marches as long as 40 miles overnight as they came up from as far away as Aquia Creek. The slow marching accusation is slander introduced by Henry Halleck during the investigations of the Harpers Ferry Military Commission, and was repeated as part of a character assassination effort led by William Swinton during the presidential election of 1864. All of this cricitism has been repeated ad nauseum to the present day.
2) McClellan knew the location of Lee's army from the day it crossed the Potomac until the day the armies fought the Battle of Antietam. What he did not know until S.O. No. 191 was found were Lee's objectives. The orders clarified those objectives for McClellan so that he could act.
3) McClellan used the information in S.O. No. 191 to design an en echelon attack on the gaps of South Mountain. En echelon means staggered or timed. Burnside's assault on Fox's and Turner's Gaps were to be first, followed by Franklin's attack on Crampton's Gap.
4) McClellan bore no responsibility for the safety of Harpers Ferry until he was given command over the garrison on Sept. 12. By then it was too late to save.
5) McClellan acted aggressively from roughly Sept. 12 onward. He even ordered the Sept. 14 attacks before having verified from Pleasonton that the lost orders he held were authentic. This was a very aggressive act in itself, as was thrusting Franklin's Sixth Corps into Pleasant Valley between McLaws' and Hill's commands.

 

[Saphroneth]

4) McClellan bore no responsibility for the safety of Harpers Ferry until he was given command over the garrison on Sept. 12. By then it was too late to save.

An intersting point about this is that in fact - had Harpers Ferry held out until the time Miles warned McClellan about, it would have been relieved. Franklin was on the march down the Pleasant Valley in the morning of the 15th, and Miles had said he could hold out until the evening of the 15th (when in fact he surrendered around 9AM).

It's an interesting what-if.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

McClellan used the information in S.O. No. 191 to design an en echelon attack on the gaps of South Mountain. En echelon means staggered or timed. Burnside's assault on Fox's and Turner's Gaps were to be first, followed by Franklin's attack on Crampton's Gap.

What is the advantage of staggering attack times on the two gaps? Hoping Confederate reserves will be directed to the first gap and unavailable for the second?

McClellan did not march north at 6 miles per day. His troops started the campaign with marches as long as 40 miles overnight as they came up from as far away as Aquia Creek.

This is about the Second Bull Run campaign, correct?

I thought criticism of the AOTP showing a lack of haste involved the units coming from Washington, not the ones coming up from Aquia.

McClellan bore no responsibility for the safety of Harpers Ferry until he was given command over the garrison on Sept. 12. By then it was too late to save.

"Authority" is not the same thing as "responsibility."

McClellan was responsible for reinforcing Pope promptly even though it was a different army.

McClellan was responsible for saving the Harpers Ferry garrison whether he could give them orders or not, and regardless of whether he had specific orders to save them. Mac was aware of their peril, which was caused by the actions of his direct opponent (Lee and the ANV).