The Tale Untwisted

[67th Tigers]

Gene Thorp's essay on the discovery of SO191 is being expanded into a full book. I'm sure we're all looking forward to it.

Thorp has given a presentation to a round table about it:

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Have always thought that any Union advantage gained by knowing 'Lee's lost orders' was largely nullified by McClellan's tentative and cautious approach.

 

[1SGDan]

Have always thought that any Union advantage gained by knowing 'Lee's lost orders' was largely nullified by McClellan's tentative and cautious approach.

Mac was always tentative and his results confirm it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Have always thought that any Union advantage gained by knowing 'Lee's lost orders' was largely nullified by McClellan's tentative and cautious approach.

The interesting thing about the claim that McClellan's approach was "tentative and cautious" is that it implies there was a better course of action that could have more fully exploited the lost orders. I'm of course open to hear what that might be.

As far as I'm able to tell the absolute most that could have been gained (without the Union doing better in a similar battle between the same units started at about the same time) is the cutting off of 1/4 of Lee's army in the Pleasant Valley between Cramptons Gap and Harpers Ferry. However, the actual march times required make that a difficult thing to do if Harpers Ferry surrenders at the time it did historically - you need Franklin's army to be advancing down the Pleasant Valley from Cramptons Gap on the 14th, not the 15th, and to do that you need the whole of Franklin's force concentrated at the foot of the gap in the morning of the 14th (so you can take the gap and still have hours of marching time on the 14th). But when you look at when they'd need to start moving, given how long the march historically took (with McClellan's orders to Franklin urging speed) you end up running pretty hard into the time SO 191 was actually received (and probably requiring night marching down an unfamiliar country road that looks like any other, as opposed to the historical night march by 9th Corps down a straight road where you can easily tell if you've left it.)

 

[Nathan Stuart]

The interesting thing about the claim that McClellan's approach was "tentative and cautious" is that it implies there was a better course of action that could have more fully exploited the lost orders. I'm of course open to hear what that might be.

Think McClellan's 'tentative and cautious' approach was manifest in his frequent significant overestimations of enemy strength (which fed his caution) and delays/reluctance (natural inclinations) to launch attacking and follow-up actions.

Thought it was Lincoln's perception (rightly or wrongly) of McClellan's lack of aggressiveness that led to his removal from high command following Antietam.

 

[Saphroneth]

Think McClellan's 'tentative and cautious' approach was manifest in his frequent significant overestimations of enemy strength (which fed his caution) and delays/reluctance (natural inclinations) to launch attacking and follow-up actions.

But how do any of those purported deficiencies (which aren't really anything distinctively different - for example estimation is just hard in general and there are good cases of other generals making mis-estimates at least as bad) actually apply to his use of Special Order 191? That's about the events of the afternoon of the 13th (from 2PM-3PM onwards) and the 14th, as that is the point at which SO191 still has any utility.

On the 13th specifically, McClellan's main column was on the move before SO 191 was found, while Franklin went from encamped at Buckeystown to attacking at Cramptons Gap over the 24 hours after SO 191 was found - that's about 16 miles and would normally be more like two days' march than one.

There's no delay/reluctance there.

After the surrender of Harpers Ferry early on the 15th, then it is no longer a question of exploiting SO 191 since any benefit it could have offered has gone - McLaws' and Anderson's divisions have escaped their vulnerable position in the Pleasant Valley.


So - what is the better course of action that could have more fully exploited the lost orders, at an army-command level where you are telling corps which way to go and what to do?

 

[Nathan Stuart]

The interesting thing about the claim that McClellan's approach was "tentative and cautious" is that it implies there was a better course of action that could have more fully exploited the lost orders. I'm of course open to hear what that might be.

Think the core issue raised here is, …'Could McClellan have done better with his knowledge of the lost order (SO 191)?'…

At the outset, think that notwithstanding this added knowledge, McClellan's 'delays in actions' and 'inflation of enemy numbers' hampered his command performance during the Maryland campaign. (merely my view)

McClellan received the lost order (with authentication of it) in the late morning of September 13. The records indicate that McClellan realized he had an opportunity to defeat Lee and he intended to seize it. At this time, he knew Lee's operational plan and the dispersal of his scattered commands (but not their strengths), he knew that Harpers Ferry still held out, and he had most of his Army positioned around Frederick. (Consequently, his noon wire to Lincoln that same day indicated that he would move immediately). But McClellan delayed marching his relatively fresh Army for a full 18 hours, thereby losing any advantage gained by surprise. He delayed the planned march of the bulk of his Army (almost 70,000 men) through Turner's Gap. He also assigned Franklin's much smaller force (less than 20,000 men) and without reinforcements, to relieve Harpers Ferry via Crampton's Gap and through the Pleasant Valley, and to deal with any resistence met along the way. The orders to all of his Corps commanders at Frederick, as well as to Franklin, did not instruct marching before daylight, the next day. (Franklin's orders were not sent until 6.20 pm on the 13 th).

In his planned two-pronged offensive, it seems there were inappropriate manpower allocations for both actions, and that these intended movements might have been based moreso on misapprehensions than him being tentative or overly cautious. And as usual, McClellan still grossly overestimated enemy numbers, as a basis for concentrating his force.

As Stephen Sears poses in 'Landscape Turned Red' (at page 121), one can only wonder how much more cautious McClellan might have become with his movements to rescue the Federals at Harpers Ferry, if he did not have the Lost Order. At least cautiously advancing Franklin's insufficient force gave the garrison a chance, rather than no chance at all.

The Lost Order emboldened McClellan to call Lee's bluff and eventually force an engagement upon him at Sharpsburg. It might also be argued that any confidence generated by the Lost Order impacted on McClellan's apparent lack of urgency in marching his Army through Turners Gap to Sharpsburg and delays in deploying it ready to launch an attack on Lee's smaller force positioned there, which did not occur until early on September 17. (McClellan's explanation for the attacking delay, was that he needed more time to reconnoiter the ground and find fords). As Sears says (at page 163), …"Perhaps he needed more time to nerve himself for the test against Lee. Except for a minor engagement on the Peninsula, McClellan had never planned and directed a battle. Certainly he had never been so boldly challenged to initiate one, and he was intent on having everything just right."….

With the extra knowledge he fortuitously possessed, personally thought McClellan could have moved more immediately and with greater swiftness and urgency in his actions, as well as allocated more even numbers for troop movements in the directions he chose for cutting Lee's force in two.

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan received the lost order (with authentication of it) in the late morning of September 13.

This is incorrect, and in fact is the precise issue that The Tale Untwisted (the shorter version already published) was about. McClellan recieved the Lost Order between 2pm and 3pm, at his headquarters (at which he arrived after 2PM).

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan received the lost order (with authentication of it) in the late morning of September 13. The records indicate that McClellan realized he had an opportunity to defeat Lee and he intended to seize it. At this time, he knew Lee's operational plan and the dispersal of his scattered commands (but not their strengths), he knew that Harpers Ferry still held out, and he had most of his Army positioned around Frederick. (Consequently, his noon wire to Lincoln that same day indicated that he would move immediately). But McClellan delayed marching his relatively fresh Army for a full 18 hours, thereby losing any advantage gained by surprise. He delayed the planned march of the bulk of his Army (almost 70,000 men) through Turner's Gap. He also assigned Franklin's much smaller force (less than 20,000 men) and without reinforcements, to relieve Harpers Ferry via Crampton's Gap and through the Pleasant Valley, and to deal with any resistence met along the way. The orders to all of his Corps commanders at Frederick, as well as to Franklin, did not instruct marching before daylight, the next day. (Franklin's orders were not sent until 6.20 pm on the 13 th).

So to go through this in a bit more detail.

1) McClellan did not recieve the Lost Order in the late morning. The noon telegram you describe, as outlined in The Tale Untwisted, is actually impossible as no telegraph link existed over which the message could travel; it also describes a situation which did not exist until the afternoon, and the retained copy says "12 midnight". Sears has actually accepted that the copy says "12 midnight", but has argued that the "idnight" is a later addition.
The telegram was a midnight telegram, not a noon one.
McClellan was told that the signature was genuine, but that doesn't automatically preclude it being a fake, and he sent Pleasonton to try and verify it around 3PM.

2) McClellan did not delay marching his army for 18 hours. Cox's division was ordered out of Frederick to the west around noon (i.e. before the Lost Order was recieved) and that division of 9th Corps led the rest of the main column of the army (all of which had to fit through Frederick, which took Lee more than a complete day with his army). There was certainly a big traffic jam delaying the movements of part of the army, but the column was on the move, with the closest thing to a delay being that the Kanawha division (Cox's) appears to have had trouble pulling itself together on the western side of Frederick; nonetheless Cox said that he'd been ordered out around noon.

3) McClellan did not delay his planned march.

4) Franklin's force is the only force that does not have to fit through Frederick (or take a large detour to avoid doing so) and as such is the only force that can be sent to Crampton's Gap without delaying the advance of the main column. McClellan did however pull in Couch's division to reinforce Franklin; any other units McClellan could have sent would have to be from the main column moving through Frederick, or would have to divert by several hours to avoid the Frederick traffic jam.
Franklin's force was at Buckeystown that afternoon, and from there to Cramptons Gap is about 16 miles (about 1 1/2 days' march); the fact that Franklin's head of column arrived at Cramptons Gap at noon indicates that Franklin had actually moved quite fast, though McClellan's orders envisaged Franklin attacking sooner. (It is my understanding that Franklin moved to the foot of Jefferson Gap overnight.)

5) Armies tend to move during the day, not at night. This is because, and forgive me if this gets a bit technical, during the day you can see where you're going.
9th Corps actually did march by night, and 1st Corps woke up hours before dawn to follow them, while 6th Corps also did some movement by night. 2nd and 12th Corps were stacked up behind 9th and 1st trying to fit through Frederick.

6) McClellan's orders to Franklin were sent at the end of the day, around 3-4 hours after he'd got the Lost Order, yes. However, during this time Jefferson Gap had been taken (which allowed Franklin to pass over the Catoctins) and while McClellan hadn't yet got verification from Pleasonton he appears to have decided to go ahead and proceed as if the dispatch was accurate.
It is perfectly normal for orders to be sent in the evening containing instructions for the next day's movements; the reason McClellan didn't order 9th Corps, or 1st Corps, after getting the Lost Order is that they were already moving.



It's important to consider the specific ways in which the changed timeline of events (from McClellan immediately ordering Franklin, for example) would actually impact the campaign.

For example, if McClellan sends an extra corps as well as Franklin to Cramptons Gap, which corps should he send and by what route? The corps around Frederick are all waiting to get over the same bridge and there's not another one for miles, so you have to wait until 9th Corps clears the road unless you send a corps by a long detour; then you have to wait for them to arrive before an attack is launched, since having a long column of men behind your army doesn't actually make the fighting front hit harder.

The Lost Order emboldened McClellan to call Lee's bluff and eventually force an engagement upon him at Sharpsburg. It might also be argued that any confidence generated by the Lost Order impacted on McClellan's apparent lack of urgency in marching his Army through Turners Gap to Sharpsburg and delays in deploying it ready to launch an attack on Lee's smaller force positioned there, which did not occur until early on September 17. (McClellan's explanation for the attacking delay, was that he needed more time to reconnoiter the ground and find fords). As Sears says (at page 163), …"Perhaps he needed more time to nerve himself for the test against Lee. Except for a minor engagement on the Peninsula, McClellan had never planned and directed a battle. Certainly he had never been so boldly challenged to initiate one, and he was intent on having everything just right."….

This is a little odd; McClellan directed events at army command level at Williamsport, Seven Pines, Oak Grove, Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill, Glendale and Malvern Hill, while at Savage Station he was orchestrating a stepwise pullback from the other side of the White Oak. During the movement to Sharpsburg he ordered his forces through Turners Gap, but 9th Corps was sluggish and so other units got priority to push through them; the attack on September 17 is entirely justified by the need to attack with mass and across a wide front rather than just pushing forward the first-arriving units over a single bridge and up a hill to a killing field.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

This is incorrect, and in fact is the precise issue that The Tale Untwisted (the shorter version already published) was about. McClellan recieved the Lost Order between 2pm and 3pm, at his headquarters (at which he arrived after 2PM).

Thought that Colonel Samuel Pittman, who knew well the order's signatory, R. H. Chilton (and his handwriting) from prewar experiences, authenticated the handwriting beforehand. Alpheus Williams delivered the document to McClellan's headquarters for the high commander to read.

According to Stephen Sears in 'Landscape Turned Red', at page 113, …"It was late morning when the copy of Order 191 was handed to McClellan"….

Thought McClellan followed this up with a wire to Lincoln at noon, acknowledging the existence of the Lost Order.

 

[Saphroneth]

Thought that Colonel Samuel Pittman, who knew well the order's signatory, R. H. Chilton (and his handwriting) from prewar experiences, authenticated the handwriting beforehand. Alpheus Williams delivered the document to McClellan's headquarters for the high commander to read.

Yes, but the fact that an order was written by the right person does not mean that the right person has not written it as a fake. This is why the author was verified, but the truth of the order being a genuine captured order was not automatically verified by that detail.

According to Stephen Sears in 'Landscape Turned Red', at page 113, …"It was late morning when the copy of Order 191 was handed to McClellan"….

Thought McClellan followed this up with a wire to Lincoln at noon, acknowledging the existence of the Lost Order.

Sears is wrong. His evidence rests on the noon telegram, but it wasn't a noon telegram - it was a midnight one. The retained copy says "12 midnight", and "recieved 2:30 AM".

 

[Nathan Stuart]

So to go through this in a bit more detail.

1) McClellan did not recieve the Lost Order in the late morning. The noon telegram you describe, as outlined in The Tale Untwisted, is actually impossible as no telegraph link existed over which the message could travel; it also describes a situation which did not exist until the afternoon, and the retained copy says "12 midnight". Sears has actually accepted that the copy says "12 midnight", but has argued that the "idnight" is a later addition.
The telegram was a midnight telegram, not a noon one.
McClellan was told that the signature was genuine, but that doesn't automatically preclude it being a fake, and he sent Pleasonton to try and verify it around 3PM.

2) McClellan did not delay marching his army for 18 hours. Cox's division was ordered out of Frederick to the west around noon (i.e. before the Lost Order was recieved) and that division of 9th Corps led the rest of the main column of the army (all of which had to fit through Frederick, which took Lee more than a complete day with his army). There was certainly a big traffic jam delaying the movements of part of the army, but the column was on the move, with the closest thing to a delay being that the Kanawha division (Cox's) appears to have had trouble pulling itself together on the western side of Frederick; nonetheless Cox said that he'd been ordered out around noon.

3) McClellan did not delay his planned march.

4) Franklin's force is the only force that does not have to fit through Frederick (or take a large detour to avoid doing so) and as such is the only force that can be sent to Crampton's Gap without delaying the advance of the main column. McClellan did however pull in Couch's division to reinforce Franklin; any other units McClellan could have sent would have to be from the main column moving through Frederick, or would have to divert by several hours to avoid the Frederick traffic jam.
Franklin's force was at Buckeystown that afternoon, and from there to Cramptons Gap is about 16 miles (about 1 1/2 days' march); the fact that Franklin's head of column arrived at Cramptons Gap at noon indicates that Franklin had actually moved quite fast, though McClellan's orders envisaged Franklin attacking sooner. (It is my understanding that Franklin moved to the foot of Jefferson Gap overnight.)

5) Armies tend to move during the day, not at night. This is because, and forgive me if this gets a bit technical, during the day you can see where you're going.
9th Corps actually did march by night, and 1st Corps woke up hours before dawn to follow them, while 6th Corps also did some movement by night. 2nd and 12th Corps were stacked up behind 9th and 1st trying to fit through Frederick.

6) McClellan's orders to Franklin were sent at the end of the day, around 3-4 hours after he'd got the Lost Order, yes. However, during this time Jefferson Gap had been taken (which allowed Franklin to pass over the Catoctins) and while McClellan hadn't yet got verification from Pleasonton he appears to have decided to go ahead and proceed as if the dispatch was accurate.
It is perfectly normal for orders to be sent in the evening containing instructions for the next day's movements; the reason McClellan didn't order 9th Corps, or 1st Corps, after getting the Lost Order is that they were already moving.



It's important to consider the specific ways in which the changed timeline of events (from McClellan immediately ordering Franklin, for example) would actually impact the campaign.

For example, if McClellan sends an extra corps as well as Franklin to Cramptons Gap, which corps should he send and by what route? The corps around Frederick are all waiting to get over the same bridge and there's not another one for miles, so you have to wait until 9th Corps clears the road unless you send a corps by a long detour; then you have to wait for them to arrive before an attack is launched, since having a long column of men behind your army doesn't actually make the fighting front hit harder.





This is a little odd; McClellan directed events at army command level at Williamsport, Seven Pines, Oak Grove, Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill, Glendale and Malvern Hill, while at Savage Station he was orchestrating a stepwise pullback from the other side of the White Oak. During the movement to Sharpsburg he ordered his forces through Turners Gap, but 9th Corps was sluggish and so other units got priority to push through them; the attack on September 17 is entirely justified by the need to attack with mass and across a wide front rather than just pushing forward the first-arriving units over a single bridge and up a hill to a killing field.

Thank you for providing the detailed extra information. Appreciate that timelines are crucial for tracing these matters.

 

[Saphroneth]

So (per Tale Untwisted) I thought I'd outline how far various Union corps moved on the 13th and 14th.

9th Corps: starts the 13th a couple of miles from Frederick. Passes through Frederick, is delayed for a couple of hours after noon and then stays on the move overnight. The leading corps of the army appears to have made it heavy going, but they reach Turner's Gap and are closed up enough to attack at 9AM on the 14th.
About 17 miles in slightly more than a day.

1st Corps: Starts the 13th on the National Road, between the Monocacy Bridge and New Market. Had to wait for 9th Corps. 21-22 miles from their start position on the 13th to reach Turner's Gap.

2nd Corps: Starts the 13th at Urbana. Had to wait for 9th and 1st Corps. 21-22 miles from their start position on the 13th to reach Turner's Gap.

12th Corps: Starts the 13th at Ijamsville. Had to wait for 9th, 1st and 2nd Corps. 22-23 miles from their start position on the 13th to reach Turner's Gap.

6th Corps: Starts the 13th at Urbana, moves via Buckeystown and Jefferson. 21-22 miles from their start position on the 13th to reach Cramptons Gap, where the head of column arrives around noon.
~22 miles in a day and a half.

These are actually quite fast movements.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Yes, but the fact that an order was written by the right person does not mean that the right person has not written it as a fake. This is why the author was verified, but the truth of the order being a genuine captured order was not automatically verified by that detail.



Sears is wrong. His evidence rests on the noon telegram, but it wasn't a noon telegram - it was a midnight one. The retained copy says "12 midnight", and "recieved 2:30 AM".

Okay.

Interestingly, also at page 113, Sears in referring to McClellan's follow up wire to Lincoln says,
..."Datelined 'Frederick, September 13, 1862 - 12 m.' (12 meridian, or noon),"....

Nevertheless, your point is understood.

 

[Saphroneth]

Interestingly, also at page 113, Sears in referring to McClellan's follow up wire to Lincoln says,
..."Datelined 'Frederick, September 13, 1862 - 12 m.' (12 meridian, or noon),"....

Yes, because Sears is insistent that "12 m" in this case means 12 meridian, as it's the key piece of evidence for his "McClellan got the Lost Orders in the morning" thesis. However, the existing retained telegram says 12 midnight, something which someone (I believe Gene Thorp?) eventually managed to get Sears to admit in an email exchange, but Sears still claimed the "idnight" was a forgery!

Note that it says "time recieved: 2/35 a m" in the top left as well.



The telegram also describes events which had not yet taken place as of 12 noon. For example the Catoctin passes which McClellan describes in the telegram as secured were not taken until after noon. Braddock Heights was not taken until ~1pm and Jefferson Pass not until ~5:30 pm.
Meanwhile the commander of the 27th Indiana said that the march of the regiment didn't end until "about noon" and that he got given the Lost Order after the march ended.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Yes, because Sears is insistent that "12 m" in this case means 12 meridian, as it's the key piece of evidence for his "McClellan got the Lost Orders in the morning" thesis. However, the existing retained telegram says 12 midnight, something which someone (I believe Gene Thorp?) eventually managed to get Sears to admit in an email exchange, but Sears still claimed the "idnight" was a forgery!
View attachment 448686
Note that it says "time recieved: 2/35 a m" in the top left as well.



The telegram also describes events which had not yet taken place as of 12 noon. For example the Catoctin passes which McClellan describes in the telegram as secured were not taken until after noon. Braddock Heights was not taken until ~1pm and Jefferson Pass not until ~5:30 pm.
Meanwhile the commander of the 27th Indiana said that the march of the regiment didn't end until "about noon" and that he got given the Lost Order after the march ended.

Thank you for this interesting and compelling piece of information.

 

[Saphroneth]

Thank you for this interesting and compelling piece of information.

It's definitely a good example of how a historian boldly stating something incorrect can contaminate the general understanding.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Appreciate that point made.

Sears is in my own list of favored published historians read that include (not in any particular order):

Eric Jacobson
James Lee McDonough
Thomas Connelly
Peter Cozzens
Stephen Sears
Wiley Sword
Noah Trudeau
Kenneth Noe
Franis O'Reilly
William Shea
Earl Hess
Harry Pfanz

Have generally liked Sear's works because they provide readable and comprehensive overviews (at a more introductory level) on subjects like Antietam, Gettysburg and the Peninsula Campaign. Have noticed, though, past threads in these forums that have questioned bits of his content.

 

[Pat Answer]

At the very least, the "18 hours of inactivity" meme makes no sense whether we assume McClellan had (and verified!) SO191 by noon, Sept 13 or not. Eighteen hours from noon, Sept 13 is 6 AM, Sept 14. If it was truly the case that McClellan had not made up his mind to advance until then, the fact that any Federal troops were in shape to fight at South Mountain on the 14th is hard to explain. They would have had to cover about 20 miles in six (and for some as little as three) hours. (And we haven't factored in the normal 'getting orders out' delays.)
I'm convinced that Sears is simply wrong on this one and a map of Union movements on Sept 13 is enough in itself to show why.

 

[Saphroneth]

At the very least, the "18 hours of inactivity" meme makes no sense whether we assume McClellan had (and verified!) SO191 by noon, Sept 13 or not. Eighteen hours from noon, Sept 13 is 6 AM, Sept 14. If it was truly the case that McClellan had not made up his mind to advance until then, the fact that any Federal troops were in shape to fight at South Mountain on the 14th is hard to explain. They would have had to cover about 20 miles in six (and for some as little as three) hours. (And we haven't factored in the normal 'getting orders out' delays.)
I'm convinced that Sears is simply wrong on this one and a map of Union movements on Sept 13 is enough in itself to show why.

Indeed - as it is, the movements of the 13th and the 14th are actually quite rapid. The "18 hours delay" meme is based on the idea that it just sounds like a long time, but of course night time exists, and at least three corps were on the move during the night in some way.

(It's actually sort of convenient that Antietam was so close to the equinox as we can just say night time is 12 hours long and be pretty close to correct, though there's also a period of navigable light after sunset and before sunrise, and on top of that there's that the valley between South Mountain and the Catoctins has mountains on both sides which reduce the amount of light in the morning and evening).

Something related is actually how much sleep McClellan was getting. The existence of the 11pm telegram to Halleck is hard to dispute, and of course there's the midnight telegram as well - McClellan was probably running on only a few hours sleep on the 14th, for example.

He was a young man for a general, but he does have to sleep sometime!

Have generally liked Sear's works because they provide readable and comprehensive overviews (at a more introductory level) on subjects like Antietam, Gettysburg and the Peninsula Campaign. Have noticed, though, past threads in these forums that have questioned bits of his content.

This is honestly a big part of the issue with Sears - the combination of being a readable and comprehensive introductory overview and having a bias means that people get a biased view of certain subjects quite early on. This can even apply to other historians, because for example Rafuse in McClellan's War assumed in places that Sears was accurate on matters of fact (if not interpretation) instead of looking into whether Sears was incorrectly reporting facts.

This is why McClellan's War accepts the Sears timing for the telegram. (Rafuse cites Sears for the telegram, in fact, so this is no supposition - Rafuse is explicit what his source was.) However, since Rafuse also checked other facts, he (correctly) stated that 9th Corps was on the move already.


Rafuse also points out something interesting in connection with Franklin not moving far during the 13th, which is that Halleck was warning and arguing that McClellan should keep troops in a position where they could quickly return to defend the capital (from a Confederate move south of Point of Rocks, based on positioning). Over the course of the 13th this pressure from his superior probably did influence McClellan to keep Franklin in such a position, and so the orders to Franklin represent the point he decided to override Halleck's concern (probably because of a combination of SO 191 and a lack of evidence of any body of troops making the Confederate move about which Halleck was worried).