The Bragg Men

[novushomus]

The newspaper story is a myth - I don't know why Hess repeats it in his book.

Not the Pollack Lee lie where Polk was eating breakfast on the porch of a fictional house (which Hess notes as a myth started by Lee). That a different incident. (Edit: A small correction. Powell does not mention a incident with Polk in the saddle reading a paper).
This was until he got concerned that there was no firing and rode forward to find that Hill had stopped the attacks to cook and issue rations. Rather than insuring the important orders were issued and followed through, Polk turned around and left the scene of preparation. When D.H. Hill insisted his corps have breakfast "with an indifferent attitude", then Polk had to come around again. By this time, a none-to0-happy Bragg had also arrived on the scene to find out why his orders were not being followed yet again.

You cannot argue that Polk was being attentive, given the Breckinridge incident and the failure to align his command.

Yes Polk ordered Hill to take Walker's command and attack the enemy in his front, but Hill disrupted the command, and by sending it in detail, he failed not only to properly support Breckinridge, but secured the defeat of both commands. Polk was overseeing Cleburne and Cheatham's commands at the time and felt Hill could manage the attack. In Polk's sector, Cleburne's attack was also repulsed and Polk ordered Cheatham's men forward but he received a message from Hill stating that his right was threatened by Granger's corps. Polk ordered Cleburne to hold his position and directed Cheatham to the right, but Granger, making a detour to the west of the State road, moved to the rear of Thomas' line, leaving a brigade to observe the Confederate right. This is why Cheatham's men were not heavily engaged at the time.

Polk could have overruled Hill and ordered Walker's division in anyway. He was the wing commander and senior to Hill.

Yet Polk told Bragg later that morning that his men were fought out, when Cheatham's men had not even been engaged. Bragg was then operating the assumption that Polk's men were fought out, which effected the operations for the rest of the army. When Longstreet asked for help against Bragg from the Right Wing, Bragg told him what Polk had told him. And Cheatham's division was left un-engaged.

Sure Polk made some mistakes like most of the Generals, but ultimately, Bragg is responsible for the lack of direction at Chickamauga as army commander. The lack of interest which General Bragg took in the formation of his general line of battle was a misfortune to the entire army, and particularly to the right wing.

Most of the Confederate high command was tactically poor and performed poorly at Chickamauga, with a few exceptions (Longstreet being the only commander who attacked with more than one division at a time, or A.P. Stewart who used a column of brigades on September 19 to brilliant effect). Polk was one of the tactically inefficient and poorly performing commanders.

 

[novushomus]

Even so, it was fortunate that Polk disobeyed Bragg's order. If he had attacked Buell's 58,000 man army at the time specified by Bragg, his 16,000 man force would have been routed. So Polk's disobedience actually saved Bragg and did not hinder him at all.

Excepted he ended up obeying that order after Bragg arrived on the field, in the event we now call the Battle of Perryville. Buell did not hear the attacks because of an acoustic shadow. An earlier battle might have had no significant differences if the shadow were caused by the terrain.

 

[Saruman]

Polk was one of the tactically inefficient and poorly performing commanders.

As was Bragg. I'm just saying that although Polk may have hindered Bragg in this battle, he wasn't alone (eg Hill) and that Bragg himself was a primary factor in the poor leadership displayed at Chickamauga.

 

[Saruman]

Excepted he ended up obeying that order after Bragg arrived on the field, in the event we now call the Battle of Perryville. Buell did not hear the attacks because of an acoustic shadow. An earlier battle might have had no significant differences if the shadow were caused by the terrain.

Perhaps, but if there was no acoustic shadow then Polk's men would have been slaughtered. Polk's disobedience did not hinder Bragg in this instance and actually helped him.

 

[novushomus]

Perhaps, but if there was no acoustic shadow then Polk's men would have been slaughtered. Polk's disobedience did not hinder Bragg in this instance and actually helped him.

And that is speculation. Polk's disobedience of orders created a command atmosphere where other officers would not obey Bragg (Hindman, Buckner, D.H. Hill) and would hinder future commanders as well (Johnston and Hood). He hindered the army's command and control. Polk's political games also contributed to the toxic command within the Army of Tennessee, though Polk probably did not do as much as Hardee would on that account.

 

[Saruman]

And that is speculation. Polk's disobedience of orders created a command atmosphere where other officers would not obey Bragg (Hindman, Buckner, D.H. Hill) and would hinder future commanders as well (Johnston and Hood). He hindered the army's command and control. Polk's political games also contributed to the toxic command within the Army of Tennessee, though Polk probably did not do as much as Hardee would on that account.

You are also speculating that if Polk had attacked earlier an acoustic shadow would be present.

Bragg had an extremely difficult personality and managed to alienate most of his subordinates. I think he contributed equally, if not more so, to the toxic command within the Army of Tennessee.

 

[novushomus]

You are also speculating that if Polk had attacked earlier an acoustic shadow would be present.

Bragg had an extremely difficult personality and managed to alienate most of his subordinates. I think he contributed equally, if not more so, to the toxic command within the Army of Tennessee.

That is false. The sentiment was mixed. As my first post should illustrate, the anti-Bragg subordinates were a minority. Most either were quiet on the subject or even privately supported Bragg (the men listed). Bragg had a right and reasonable expectation to believe his orders would be followed as an army commander. Polk did not have the right to disobey repeated positive orders, as was his habit to do. There are scenarios where a subordinate may disagree with a commander or a changing situation may require alteration, but even in light of changed tactical situations, there is no excuse for ignoring repeated positive orders. If Leonidas Polk had been anyone else other than Davis's friend, he would not have held a commission for very long with such behavior.

 

[Saruman]

That is false. The sentiment was mixed. As my first post should illustrate, the anti-Bragg subordinates were a minority. Most either were quiet on the subject or even privately supported Bragg (the men listed). Bragg had a right and reasonable expectation to believe his orders would be followed as an army commander. Polk did not have the right to disobey repeated positive orders, as was his habit to do. There are scenarios where a subordinate may disagree with a commander or a changing situation may require alteration, but even in light of changed tactical situations, there is no excuse for ignoring repeated positive orders. If Leonidas Polk had been anyone else other than Davis's friend, he would not have held a commission for very long with such behavior.

Disagree that they were a minority. The list of Bragg detractors would be just as long (Polk, Hardee, Hill, Cleburne, Hindman, Forrest, Longstreet, Breckinridge, et al.) and this group included men of higher rank and seniority. Bragg brought the situation upon himself through poor interpersonal skills and poor tactical ability. To blame everyone else and portray Bragg as a helpless martyr is incorrect.

 

[novushomus]

Disagree that they were a minority. The list of Bragg detractors would be just as long (Polk, Hardee, Hill, Cleburne, Hindman, Forrest, Longstreet, Breckinridge, et al.) and this group included men of higher rank and seniority. Bragg brought the situation upon himself through poor interpersonal skills and poor tactical ability. To blame everyone else and portray Bragg as a helpless martyr is incorrect.

Except is literally isn't. Only 12 officers signed a petition to relieve Bragg. Of those twelve, three were newcomers to the Army of Tennessee (Longstreet, Buckner, Hill). The only names missing from the petition are Polk & Hindman (relieved), Cheatham, and Breckinridge. Adding Hardee would get you a list of 15 detractors. My list, adding missing Bragg supporters like Robert C. Tyler and States Rights Gist, is longer. Even if you look at just the detractors, that is only 15 out of 68 general officers in the army. That's not a majority.

Bragg wasn't a helpless martyr and his bumbling responses to the cliques in his army after Stones River did not help the situation. He was also poor in what we would call Public Relations today, only using his support from Davis. But the true culprit is Davis. If Davis thought no one was better for the Army of Tennessee than Bragg, then he should have intervened and got rid of Polk and Hardee after Stones River (which would have been better for the army in the long term, especially Hardee).

 

[Saruman]

Except is literally isn't. Only 12 officers signed a petition to relieve Bragg. Of those twelve, three were newcomers to the Army of Tennessee (Longstreet, Buckner, Hill). The only names missing from the petition are Polk & Hindman (relieved), Cheatham, and Breckinridge. Adding Hardee would get you a list of 15 detractors. My list, adding missing Bragg supporters like Robert C. Tyler and States Rights Gist, is longer. Even if you look at just the detractors, that is only 15 out of 68 general officers in the army. That's not a majority.

Bragg wasn't a helpless martyr and his bumbling responses to the cliques in his army after Stones River did not help the situation. He was also poor in what we would call Public Relations today, only using his support from Davis. But the true culprit is Davis. If Davis thought no one was better for the Army of Tennessee than Bragg, then he should have intervened and got rid of Polk and Hardee after Stones River (which would have been better for the army in the long term, especially Hardee).

There were also officers who hated Bragg who were no longer with the army during the signing of the petition and officers who served under him in different contexts (eg. Humphrey Marshall, WHC Whiting, William Lamb etc.) Overall the list of detractors contained the higher ranked generals, which resulted in greater detriment to the army. The lower ranked generals in your list had more of a buffer between them and Bragg in the army's command hierarchy.

Davis should never have given Bragg command of the army after the sacking of Beauregard, but in his defence, there weren't too many other options and the extent of Bragg's dysfunctional leadership style had not yet been fully exposed.

 

[novushomus]

There were also officers who hated Bragg who were no longer with the army during the signing of the petition and officers who served under him in different contexts (eg. Humphrey Marshall, WHC Whiting, William Lamb etc.) Overall the list of detractors contained the higher ranked generals, which resulted in greater detriment to the army. The lower ranked generals in your list had more of a buffer between them and Bragg in the army's command hierarchy.

Davis should never have given Bragg command of the army after the sacking of Beauregard, but in his defence, there weren't too many other options and the extent of Bragg's dysfunctional leadership style had not yet been fully exposed.

Whiting and Lamb were never with the Army of Tennessee. I can also point to Bragg supporters who served Bragg in different contexts such as Richard Taylor and Robert Hoke as well but who were never in the Army of Tennessee as well.*

It does not change the fact that Bragg detractors were never a majority in the army. Bragg and his subordinates were responsible for the chasms within the army. However, to point it all on Bragg is a false picture, especially with the grievous politicking done by Polk and Hardee to undermine him. Hardee was significantly influential for the sour attitudes developed by Cleburne and in his staff.

Given Beauregard going absent without permission first, Davis had no choice other than Bragg. Given Bragg's recent performance at Shiloh and the lack of qualified candidates in the west, I don't agree with the assertion that Bragg should not have been made commander.

*Taylor was technically commander of the Army of Tennessee for a few months when it entered his department in early 1865 following Hood's resignation, but the service wasn't significant nor was with Bragg. Likewise, Hoke fought under Bragg at Bentonville and then led a division in Hardee's corps in the consolidated Army of Tennessee in North Carolina at the end of the war but not in direct service under Bragg.

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

I think the dislike of Bragg went deeper than the generals. Numbers really for or against means nothing but the right people for or against means a lot.
The frontline soldiers had issues with Bragg and how they perceived him, from soldiers diaries and letters, Bragg wasn't all that liked. It may well have trickled down the ranks to them but when your fighting men dislike you, you are in trouble.
The signatures to have Bragg replaced was of small numbers as anyone would suspect of a career military man. Who would pen their name on paper to then be known as a troublemaker? You can find that happening today at work places, the employees will rant and rave but when they ask you to sign up to have their boss fired or changes to the status quo they turn around and walk away. They fear for their jobs, and will hope other brave enough to get changes made.
Again, numbers to say who was for or against Bragg is just the very,very tip of the iceberg.

 

[novushomus]

I think the dislike of Bragg went deeper than the generals. Numbers really for or against means nothing but the right people for or against means a lot.
The frontline soldiers had issues with Bragg and how they perceived him, from soldiers diaries and letters, Bragg wasn't all that liked. It may well have trickled down the ranks to them but when your fighting men dislike you, you are in trouble.
The signatures to have Bragg replaced was of small numbers as anyone would suspect of a career military man. Who would pen their name on paper to then be known as a troublemaker? You can find that happening today at work places, the employees will rant and rave but when they ask you to sign up to have their boss fired or changes to the status quo they turn around and walk away. They fear for their jobs, and will hope other brave enough to get changes made.
Again, numbers to say who was for or against Bragg is just the very,very tip of the iceberg.

Of course. It is a complex issue. You just can't simply say that Bragg was universally hated (he wasn't) but he wasn't universally popular either. It is dangerous to oversimplify manners like that. My point is that from their known stances, Bragg detractors were never a majority int he Army of Tennessee's command structure. This doesn't mean that Bragg supporters were a majority either, just that the issue is complex.

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

I agree completely, that is why I mentioned number to this situation (to me) doesn't mean much. It's the overall attitude or morale. The army at this time even after a great victory at Chickamauga was at a low. Yes, because they allowed Rosecran to slip back into Chattanooga without a fight but the truth is Bragg had allowed this army to be disgruntled from within.
The battle of Chattanooga is what happens when your soldiers don't believe and trust you. Cleburne men were the solid men during this battle but even then I think it was they fought for pride for their own self and the pride of Cleburne way more than fight for Bragg's reputation.

 

[Saruman]

Regardless of the actual numbers pro and against, the point is that Bragg could not forge a working relationship with his most senior and influential generals. This disqualifies him from command. His record in the war was poor (defeats at Perryville, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Fort Fisher, Wyse Fork) and his only victory (Chickamauga) was due to good fortune rather than any tactical skill. Polk and Hardee tried their hardest to remove Bragg but at least they were well liked by their men and subordinates. They couldn't have done much worse.

 

[novushomus]

Regardless of the actual numbers pro and against, the point is that Bragg could not forge a working relationship with his most senior and influential generals. This disqualifies him from command. His record in the war was poor (defeats at Perryville, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Fort Fisher, Wyse Fork) and his only victory (Chickamauga) was due to good fortune rather than any tactical skill. Polk and Hardee tried their hardest to remove Bragg but at least they were well liked by their men and subordinates. They couldn't have done much worse.

Ironic, considering that Perryville and Stones River could be considered tactical victories. Bragg attacked larger forces and gained ground. However, he couldn't make turn these efforts into strategic gains. He also restored much of the ground that A.S. Johnston had lost, and was the only Confederate commander in the west to recover large swaths of territory.

And Chickamauga, while not really Bragg's victory, was not purely due to good fortune either.

And, (the point of this thread) Bragg was liked by his some of his subordinates too. And I do think Hardee and Polk (at least Polk) could have done much worse at the helm of the Army of Tennessee.

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

Polk...commanding the AoT, whew! I shutter..........

 

[Saruman]

Ironic, considering that Perryville and Stones River could be considered tactical victories.

But significant strategic defeats.

Bragg attacked larger forces and gained ground. However, he couldn't make turn these efforts into strategic gains.

Exactly. Due to his poor generalship and inability to form functional relationships with subordinates.

And, (the point of this thread) Bragg was liked by his some of his subordinates too. And I do think Hardee and Polk (at least Polk) could have done much worse at the helm of the Army of Tennessee.

Maybe. We'll never know.

 

[Saruman]

Polk...commanding the AoT, whew! I shutter..........

Thomas Connolly - one of the most vehement critics of western Confederate commanders - called Polk a "deep strategic thinker" so maybe he would have been ok

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

Thomas Connolly - one of the most vehement critics of western Confederate commanders - called Polk a "deep strategic thinker" so maybe he would have been ok

He may well have been but he never let that "cat out of the bag" when the fighting began. I can't really say what his mind was thinking but I just refer to his actions of command on the battlefield. Hess and McMurray pretty much sums his generalship up as, he was thankful he was good friends with Jeff Davis and that even was pushed a few times.