The Bragg Men

[novushomus]

I recently finished Earl J. Hess's excellent little study on Bragg. While many people are aware of the enemies of Bragg in the Army of Tennessee (Polk, Hardee, Cheatham, Cleburne, Breckinridge, etc.), it turns out that Bragg had quite an extensive list of supporters in his own camp. They were not as vocal as Bragg's opponents (reminds me of President Nixon's silent majority) but maintained close relations with Bragg and frequently corresponded with him. Quite a few (including W.H.T. Walker, Wheeler, and A.P. Stewart) actually expressed wishes that Bragg be reappointed to command the army during the Atlanta Campaign in 1864.

Bragg's supporters include:
Lt. Gen. A.P. Stewart*
Maj. Gen. Patton Anderson*
Maj. Gen. W.H.T. Walker
Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson (though Bragg appreciated his support, he considered Stevenson an "utter imbecile")
Maj. Gen. Jones M. Withers (Withers thought Bragg a tyrant when he first served under him, but gradually came to appreciate Bragg as a commander before his health ended his active field service).
Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler* (one of the most notable examples of Bragg's patronage)
Maj. Gen. William B. Bate* (another beneficiary of Bragg's patronage, though like Wheeler he would ultimately prove detrimental to the army and the command he held).
Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall
Brig. Gen. Adley Gladden (killed at Shiloh, but considered by Bragg to be his "truest friend")
Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers (surprising given his service under Forrest, but he always held a favorable opinion of Bragg and considered him "the beau ideal of a soldier.")
Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson, a frequent supporter of Bragg in private correspondence, but like Stevenson, Bragg held a negative opinion of his martial ability.
Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigault (who would latter be harshly critical of his division commander, Bragg opponent Thomas C. Hindman)
Col. C. Irvine Walker
Col. Bolling Hall Jr.

Other Bragg supporters:
Maj. Gen. William T. Martin
Brig. Gen. Robert C. Tyler
Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist
Brig. Gen. John H. Kelly

There are several things to note about this list. The first is that the asterisk denotes men who were promoted directly by Bragg and found advancement through his favor. This is not to imply these men were not meritorious or sycophants who got undue promotion, just to note that Bragg favored them and promoted them either based on their military ability (like Stewart and Patton Anderson) or for their loyalty (Wheeler and Bate). Several (Withers, Chalmers, Jackson, and Gladden) served under Bragg at Pensacola or in Bragg's corps at Shiloh (Patton Anderson). When Bragg assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi/Tennessee, most of these men and others (such as Walthall) surprisingly served in Polk's corps, while the men who served in Hardee's corps (Cleburne, Buckner, Breckinridge, Stovall, James A. Smith, etc.) tended to be Bragg opponents. Bragg was directly responsible for appointing Stewart to division command (twice), and as Davis's military adviser probably approved his appointment to corps command. Likewise, Bragg reorganized his opponent Breckinridge's division in his reshuffling after Chickamauga so that Bate would command it (and later endorsed his promotion to Maj. Gen.), an unfortunate act that ruined the combat efficiency of what had been a first-rate division. Bragg was responsible for Patton Anderson's assignment to command Withers's/Hindman's old division at Atlanta.

W.H.T. Walker likely found a kindred spirit in the belief of discipline in Bragg when his command was transferred to Tennessee after the Vicksburg Campaign, who would give the newcomer to his army a corps (albiet a small one) in the Chickamauga Campaign.

It just goes to illustrate the complexity of army politics and that not all issues such as Bragg's popularity are black and white. Several of the officers of the list were good combat commanders such as Stewart and Withers, while others tended to be mediocre (Stevenson and Bate). It is also important to note that this men did not an active role in Bragg's defense in public either, despite their private support, which is something that Hess notes. Unlike Lee, Bragg could not openly inspire men who held favorable opinions of him to defend him.

 

[nc native]

If Bragg had taken over during the Atlanta campaign, even though the morale of
his men would have suffered, I can't imagine him doing a worse job than J.B. Hood
did. It would have been interesting to see what he would have done once Atlanta had
fallen. I'm sure an invasion of Tennessee would not have been in the cards. If past
history is a predictor of future actions, he would have fallen back from Sherman
delaying his advance and looking for an opportunity to strike whenever he felt
comfortable. Sherman would have to keep an eye on him leaving him less of a
free hand to do his will during his March to the Sea.

 

[novushomus]

If Bragg had taken over during the Atlanta campaign, even though the morale of
his men would have suffered, I can't imagine him doing a worse job than J.B. Hood
did. It would have been interesting to see what he would have done once Atlanta had
fallen. I'm sure an invasion of Tennessee would not have been in the cards. If past
history is a predictor of future actions, he would have fallen back from Sherman
delaying his advance and looking for an opportunity to strike whenever he felt
comfortable. Sherman would have to keep an eye on him leaving him less of a
free hand to do his will during his March to the Sea.

And as events as Perryville (as well as his own suggestions to Johnston) illustrate, Bragg would have been inclined to take the offensive in the face of overwhelming numbers. It would be interesting to see Bragg in command of an army unhindered by Polk.

 

[BillO]

If Bragg had taken over during the Atlanta campaign, even though the morale of
his men would have suffered, I can't imagine him doing a worse job than J.B. Hood
did. It would have been interesting to see what he would have done once Atlanta had
fallen. I'm sure an invasion of Tennessee would not have been in the cards. If past
history is a predictor of future actions, he would have fallen back from Sherman
delaying his advance and looking for an opportunity to strike whenever he felt
comfortable. Sherman would have to keep an eye on him leaving him less of a
free hand to do his will during his March to the Sea.

His commissaries would have had to row out into the Atlantic to resupply his men.

 

[Saruman]

And as events as Perryville (as well as his own suggestions to Johnston) illustrate, Bragg would have been inclined to take the offensive in the face of overwhelming numbers. It would be interesting to see Bragg in command of an army unhindered by Polk.

The Bragg vs Polk & Hardee dynamic is an interesting one. I used to be slightly pro-Bragg but now I'm not so sure. On what specific occasions do you think Polk hindered Bragg?

 

[novushomus]

The Bragg vs Polk & Hardee dynamic is an interesting one. I used to be slightly pro-Bragg but now I'm not so sure. On what specific occasions do you think Polk hindered Bragg?

Perryville and its' campaign, where Polk refused Bragg's direct orders to attack and Bragg had to come to the field himself to ensure that his orders were carried out, Polk's general pessimism in the Tullahoma campaign, the Pea Vine ridge incident where Polk refused Bragg's order to attack, or the whole fiasco that was the Confederate Right Wing on September 20 at Chickamauga (which D.H. Hill also played a very large role in).

 

[Will Carry]

I am reading that book now. It is painful. Not the writing but the subject. Bragg was a troubled man.

 

[Tennessee_Mountainman]

In my opinion Forrest had it right about Bragg.

"Promoted in July 1862 to brigadier general, Forrest was given command of a Confederate cavalry brigade.[26] In December 1862, Forrest's veteran troopers were reassigned by Gen. Braxton Bragg to another officer, against his protest. Forrest had to recruit a new brigade, composed of about 2,000 inexperienced recruits, most of whom lacked weapons. Again, Bragg ordered a raid, this one into west Tennessee to disrupt the communications of the Union forces under Grant, which were threatening the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Forrest protested that to send such untrained men behind enemy lines was suicidal, but Bragg insisted, and Forrest obeyed his orders. On the ensuing raid, he showed his brilliance, leading thousands of Union soldiers in west Tennessee on a "wild goose chase" to try to locate his fast-moving forces."

Wheeler made a huge error at the 2nd Battle of Fort Donelson, which ended in a bloody failure. The only reason he was in command was because he was a personal friend of Bragg. Forrest should've been in command.

After the battle, Forrest denounced Wheeler, and threatened to kill Bragg if they crossed paths again. I bet it stuck in the Bragg's tent when Forrest walked out of it!

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

The Bragg vs Polk & Hardee dynamic is an interesting one. I used to be slightly pro-Bragg but now I'm not so sure. On what specific occasions do you think Polk hindered Bragg?

Polk hindered just about any General above him. If he wasn't such a Jeff Davis man he would have never gained the rank that he did.

 

[novushomus]

After the battle, Forrest denounced Wheeler, and threatened to kill Bragg if they crossed paths again. I bet it stuck in the Bragg's tent when Forrest walked out of it!

That story, while entertaining, is likely apocryphal. While it fits Forrest's character, there is not a lot of documentation that backs it up, especially the timing and the alleged trigger of Forrest's outburst (the transfer of his corps to Wheeler) and the fact that none of Bragg's staff officers (including George Brent who kept a journal of Bragg's headquarters) make no mention of such an incident. In fact, the staff paperwork indicates that Forrest didn't visit headquarters after the transfer had been ordered.

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

I think Hess mentioned in his book that Forrest never visited the tent of Bragg after the disagreement they had also. Might be wrong here...

 

[Tennessee_Mountainman]

That story, while entertaining, is likely apocryphal. While it fits Forrest's character, there is not a lot of documentation that backs it up, especially the timing and the alleged trigger of Forrest's outburst (the transfer of his corps to Wheeler) and the fact that none of Bragg's staff officers (including George Brent who kept a journal of Bragg's headquarters) make no mention of such an incident. In fact, the staff paperwork indicates that Forrest didn't visit headquarters after the transfer had been ordered.

I found this to be interesting: https://books.google.com/books?id=7...forrest really threaten to kill bragg&f=false

 

[novushomus]

I found this to be interesting: https://books.google.com/books?id=7mdrbAwMbsQC&pg=PA16&lpg=PA16&dq=did+forrest+really+threaten+to+kill+bragg&source=bl&ots=2udO-ZOp1n&sig=eUW2Z04z2b5napu3vU3O_t8a6LQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwijnL3g5rPSAhVnz1QKHTb1DVcQ6AEIRjAG#v=onepage&q=did forrest really threaten to kill bragg&f=false

Interesting novel. This is the Hess argument for that never happening: https://books.google.com/books?id=N...g#v=snippet&q=Forrest attacking Bragg&f=false

Among other things, the story only surfaced years after the war. This incident is alleged to have taken place on September 30 and has Davis visiting Bragg at the time. Actually, Davis hadn't arrived yet and from Brent's journal Forrest did not meet Bragg that day (not visiting army headquarters until October 20). While Forrest was unhappy with Bragg and Brent records Forrest "being disastified", he doesn't describe such an incident as Dr. Cowan wrote (like he described Buckner's dispatches about being unhappy at losing his corps). Additionally, they met only a week after Bragg had approved Forrest's requested transfer to West Tennessee (which is what Forrest wanted).

Dave Powell, an expert on the Chickamauga Campaign with a book on Forrest and Wheeler and their role in it, also thinks the incident didn't happen as has been told.

 

[Saruman]

Perryville and its' campaign, where Polk refused Bragg's direct orders to attack and Bragg had to come to the field himself to ensure that his orders were carried out, Polk's general pessimism in the Tullahoma campaign, the Pea Vine ridge incident where Polk refused Bragg's order to attack, or the whole fiasco that was the Confederate Right Wing on September 20 at Chickamauga (which D.H. Hill also played a very large role in).

Do you think Polk was justified in not attacking? Bragg had totally misread the situation and sent 36,000 men towards Frankfort to oppose 12,000 Federals under Sill, detaching Polk at the same time with 16,000 men toward Perryville to oppose 58,000 under Buell, the distance between these two scenes of action being about twenty-five miles. Polk seems very prudent in refusing to attack against such odds.

In addition, two days after the battle of Perryville, Bragg wrote: "To Major General Polk commanding the forces, to Major General Hardee commanding the left wing, and Major Generals Cheatham, Buckner, and Anderson, commanding divisions, is mainly due the brilliant achievement on this memorable field. Nobler troops were never more gallantly led."

 

[novushomus]

Do you think Polk was justified in not attacking? Bragg had totally misread the situation and sent 36,000 men towards Frankfort to oppose 12,000 Federals under Sill, detaching Polk at the same time with 16,000 men toward Perryville to oppose 58,000 under Buell, the distance between these two scenes of action being about twenty-five miles. Polk seems very prudent in refusing to attack against such odds.

In addition, two days after the battle of Perryville, Bragg wrote: "To Major General Polk commanding the forces, to Major General Hardee commanding the left wing, and Major Generals Cheatham, Buckner, and Anderson, commanding divisions, is mainly due the brilliant achievement on this memorable field. Nobler troops were never more gallantly led."

Bragg's objective in Polk's attack was not to win a decisive battle but to delay the enemy to allow Bragg to concentrate with Kirby Smith. Additionally, Polk himself was not fully aware of the extent of the Union army on the battlefield.

Bragg was not aware that Polk had held a council of war specifically on the subject of disobeying Bragg's orders when he filed his first report and there was still a veneer of respect between the two (however in private they may have held negative opinions of one another). Polk's campaign against Bragg did not take off until after Perryville.

 

[Saruman]

Perryville and its' campaign, where Polk refused Bragg's direct orders to attack and Bragg had to come to the field himself to ensure that his orders were carried out, Polk's general pessimism in the Tullahoma campaign, the Pea Vine ridge incident where Polk refused Bragg's order to attack, or the whole fiasco that was the Confederate Right Wing on September 20 at Chickamauga (which D.H. Hill also played a very large role in).

Can Polk really be blamed for the fiasco at Chickamauga? In 1873, Bragg wrote a letter which seems to blame Hill: "As to General D.H. Hill's critical, captious, and dictatorial manner, etc. This manner of Hill's and his general deportment, united to the fact (which came to my knowledge after Polk's suspension from command) that Polk did order two of his division commanders in writing, soon after sunrise, to attack, and that Hill, being present in person, countermanded the order, without notifying either Polk or myself, induced me to ask his suspension from command, and he was removed by the President before the battle of Missionary Ridge. He had, however, greatly demoralized the troops he commanded, and sacrificed thousands at Chickamauga."

 

[Saruman]

Bragg's objective in Polk's attack was not to win a decisive battle but to delay the enemy to allow Bragg to concentrate with Kirby Smith. Additionally, Polk himself was not fully aware of the extent of the Union army on the battlefield.

Bragg was not aware that Polk had held a council of war specifically on the subject of disobeying Bragg's orders when he filed his first report and there was still a veneer of respect between the two (however in private they may have held negative opinions of one another). Polk's campaign against Bragg did not take off until after Perryville.

But Bragg's objective was based on faulty information so Polk was still correct in choosing not to attack. His 16,000 would have no chance against Buell's 58,000.

 

[novushomus]

Can Polk really be blamed for the fiasco at Chickamauga? In 1873, Bragg wrote a letter which seems to blame Hill: "As to General D.H. Hill's critical, captious, and dictatorial manner, etc. This manner of Hill's and his general deportment, united to the fact (which came to my knowledge after Polk's suspension from command) that Polk did order two of his division commanders in writing, soon after sunrise, to attack, and that Hill, being present in person, countermanded the order, without notifying either Polk or myself, induced me to ask his suspension from command, and he was removed by the President before the battle of Missionary Ridge. He had, however, greatly demoralized the troops he commanded, and sacrificed thousands at Chickamauga."

He is partially to blame for the confusion. He somehow did not tell Breckinridge that his division was to lead an asssault in the morning despite Breckinridge camping with him that night. When he issued direct orders to Breckinridge and Cleburne in the morning, he allowed Hill to interfere so the troops could cook and eat breakfast, which was against Bragg's order for a daylight assault (Polk was more interested in reading a newspaper at Reed's Bridge rather than look to his wing). He also failed to insure that Breckinridge was reinforced after that division had turned the Union left (letting Hill reject Walker's division because Hill wanted only Gist's brigade) and not using Cheatham's division at all, letting the largest division in the Confederate army sit without firing a shot for the majority of the day. Polk can be blamed.

But Bragg's objective was based on faulty information so Polk was still correct in choosing not to attack. His 16,000 would have no chance against Buell's 58,000.

It was still a direct order and Polk did not know that Buell had 58,000 on the field. He simply wanted to remain on the defensive. It was not in Polk's prerogative to simply ignore repeated orders. He could protest those orders, but there doesn't seem to be a record of Polk lodging an official protest.

In fact, Polk's only reported objection was not having Withers's division of his wing brought down: Information having been received through General Hardee that the enemy was pressing with heavy force upon his position it was resolved by the general commanding the forces to attack him at that point. He accordingly directed me on the evening of the 7th to order Anderson's division, of Hardee's wing, to return to Perryville and also to order General Cheatham, with Donelson's division of his wing, to follow it immediately, and to return myself to that place, to take charge of the forces and attack the enemy next morning. I urged the strong expediency of concentrating all our forces upon the point to be attacked, and at all events the necessity of having the remaining division of the Army of the Mississippi (Withers') placed at my disposal. To this the general objected, upon the ground that General Kirby Smith had informed him that the enemy was in force in his front and that his troops could not be spared from that part of the field, nor could the division of Withers be spared, as he thought the force in front of Smith made it necessary for him to be re-enforced. He therefore proposed to order Withers to the support of Smith and to take charge of those combined forces himself in person. Generals Anderson and Cheatham proceeded to Perryville and reported to General Hardee as ordered, and on arriving were posted by that officer in a line of battle which he had selected. I followed as soon as practicable, arrived during the night, and reconnoitred the line of battle early on the following morning.

Polk then proposed a "defensive-offensive" battle after his council of war, apparently to counterattack an expected attack from Buell. His own attitude became more offensive inclined when Bragg himself arrived on the battlefield.

About 10 o'clock Liddell became hotly engaged and it became evident that the enemy was disposed to press upon our right. I directed General Buckner to retire Liddell's brigade and let it fall back upon our general line, and ordered General Cheatham to move the whole of his command from the left to the right of our line. These orders were promptly executed and Cheatham's command was held in column of brigades. It was now near 1 o'clock and the movements of the enemy were not continued. It was then determined by General Bragg, commander of the forces, who had arrived on the field some hours before, to assume the offensive, and by his direction orders were given for a general movement throughout our whole line. General Cheatham's column of brigades was deployed into line and ordered, with Wharton's cavalry still upon its right, to attack. At this juncture I was informed by Colonel Wharton that a column of the enemy's infantry was seen approaching by the Mackville road in a direction to support the enemy's left. This column I discovered was still quite distant, but concluding that our chances of success were greater against the line in my front even when re-enforced than it would be by attacking it as it stood and exposing my flank to the approaching force, I awaited until the reinforcements got into position. The attack was then ordered.

 

[Saruman]

He is partially to blame for the confusion. He somehow did not tell Breckinridge that his division was to lead an asssault in the morning despite Breckinridge camping with him that night. When he issued direct orders to Breckinridge and Cleburne in the morning, he allowed Hill to interfere so the troops could cook and eat breakfast, which was against Bragg's order for a daylight assault (Polk was more interested in reading a newspaper at Reed's Bridge rather than look to his wing). He also failed to insure that Breckinridge was reinforced after that division had turned the Union left (letting Hill reject Walker's division because Hill wanted only Gist's brigade) and not using Cheatham's division at all, letting the largest division in the Confederate army sit without firing a shot for the majority of the day. Polk can be blamed.

The newspaper story is a myth - I don't know why Hess repeats it in his book.

Bragg wrote: "the staff officer sent to General Polk, - Major Lee, A.I.G., - to urge his compliance with the orders of the previous night, reported to me that he found him at a farmhouse, three miles from the line of his troops, about one hour after sunrise, sitting on the gallery reading a newspaper, and waiting, as he (the general) said, for his breakfast."

But Bragg was lying. Major Lee denied ever making such a report. Polk's HQ were at Alexander's Bridge, located in a spot cleared of undergrowth and small trees the day before by troops temporarily camped there - no farmhouse was near.

Major Frank McNairy, Cheatham's aide-de-camp, wrote: "I left General Cheatham's HQ before daylight the morning of the battle, and went to General Polk's HQ with a message from General Cheatham to General Polk. When I got there, which was about daylight, I found General Polk and staff on their horses, about moving to the field, which they did at once; they got there before I did..."

Yes Polk ordered Hill to take Walker's command and attack the enemy in his front, but Hill disrupted the command, and by sending it in detail, he failed not only to properly support Breckinridge, but secured the defeat of both commands. Polk was overseeing Cleburne and Cheatham's commands at the time and felt Hill could manage the attack. In Polk's sector, Cleburne's attack was also repulsed and Polk ordered Cheatham's men forward but he received a message from Hill stating that his right was threatened by Granger's corps. Polk ordered Cleburne to hold his position and directed Cheatham to the right, but Granger, making a detour to the west of the State road, moved to the rear of Thomas' line, leaving a brigade to observe the Confederate right. This is why Cheatham's men were not heavily engaged at the time.

Sure Polk made some mistakes like most of the Generals, but ultimately, Bragg is responsible for the lack of direction at Chickamauga as army commander. The lack of interest which General Bragg took in the formation of his general line of battle was a misfortune to the entire army, and particularly to the right wing.

 

[Saruman]

It was still a direct order and Polk did not know that Buell had 58,000 on the field. He simply wanted to remain on the defensive. It was not in Polk's prerogative to simply ignore repeated orders. He could protest those orders, but there doesn't seem to be a record of Polk lodging an official protest.

Even so, it was fortunate that Polk disobeyed Bragg's order. If he had attacked Buell's 58,000 man army at the time specified by Bragg, his 16,000 man force would have been routed. So Polk's disobedience actually saved Bragg and did not hinder him at all.