Stuart's Attack on July 3rd

[Hoplite]

I was reading Custer at Gettysburg- not my cup of tea of a book, but.....

So I keep reading from that book and from others about how Stuart's repulse 'saved the day' and prevented the Union army from being taken in the rear.

Now I have been to Gettysburg numerous occasions and aside from what I would think would be the geographic/topographic problems with Stuart reaching the rear of Hancock on Cemetery Ridge, there seems to me to be the little issue of VI Corps.

Wasn't VI Corps behind the Union battle line in reserve, all 16,000 of them?

 

[frontrank2]

There's a great book titled Protecting the flank at Gettysburg, by Eric Wittenberg who is a member of this forum. In his book, he addresses that scenario and others which shed some light on Stuart's strategy and tactics regarding July 3.

 

[Jamieva]

I was reading Custer at Gettysburg- not my cup of tea of a book, but.....

So I keep reading from that book and from others about how Stuart's repulse 'saved the day' and prevented the Union army from being taken in the rear.

Now I have been to Gettysburg numerous occasions and aside from what I would think would be the geographic/topographic problems with Stuart reaching the rear of Hancock on Cemetery Ridge, there seems to me to be the little issue of VI Corps.

Wasn't VI Corps behind the Union battle line in reserve, all 16,000 of them?

Oh no you read a Philip Thomas tucker book. That's why

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I was reading Custer at Gettysburg

You will not find the author, Phillip Thomas Tucker, to be well-regarded around here.

The fight at East Cavalry Field had some great drama, was one of the highlights of Custer's service, and had for a long time been neglected in the popular understanding of the battle. Modern scholarship has generally been better about giving it proper coverage.

However, there has been a curious trend among some 21st century writers to embellish and exaggerate what Stuart intended to accomplish on July 3, based largely on speculation.

The biggest issue is Stuart's three main brigades had just completed their lengthy and somewhat infamous journey (see Plenty of Blame to Go Around) and this had worn out the horses and men, especially compared to their Union counterparts. Plus this was 1863, not 1812. A few brigades of cavalry were not going to be decisive in combat against infantry and artillery.

Had Pickett, et al broken the Union line and caused Meade to retreat Stuart would have been able to disrupt this, assuming he succeeded in driving off the Union right flank cavalry. If.

 

[George1863]

I was reading Custer at Gettysburg- not my cup of tea of a book, but.....

So I keep reading from that book and from others about how Stuart's repulse 'saved the day' and prevented the Union army from being taken in the rear.

Now I have been to Gettysburg numerous occasions and aside from what I would think would be the geographic/topographic problems with Stuart reaching the rear of Hancock on Cemetery Ridge, there seems to me to be the little issue of VI Corps.

Wasn't VI Corps behind the Union battle line in reserve, all 16,000 of them?

I am with you. 3,500 exhausted cavalry don't overrun 16,000 exhausted infantry, even taking them in flank or rear. Exhaustion in this instance favours the defender. They may overrun the first brigade of Sedgwick's command but not the entire Corps. If Stuart was in Sedgwick's rear even at the time of the Pickett/Pettigrew assault, he would have known that Gregg, Custer et al were also in his rear. I don't buy that (mounted) cavalry action by either side significantly contributed to the result.

 

[neyankee61]

I have tried to read two of Tucker's books Barksdale Charge and Washington's Surprise Attack. Pushed my way through the first because thought it would provide insight into the action around the Peach Orchard and Emmitsburg Road. Wasn't easy. As far as the other about 2 chapters in and gave up. Couldn't do it.

 

[Hoplite]

I am with you. 3,500 exhausted cavalry don't overrun 16,000 exhausted infantry, even taking them in flank or rear. Exhaustion in this instance favours the defender. They may overrun the first brigade of Sedgwick's command but not the entire Corps. If Stuart was in Sedgwick's rear even at the time of the Pickett/Pettigrew assault, he would have known that Gregg, Custer et al were also in his rear. I don't buy that (mounted) cavalry action by either side significantly contributed to the result.

Not going to comment on the author- though it was a tough read- writing style.
My main issue is that people get the impression that there was nothing back there, and there was.
Same for July 2nd and LRT- another thread in discussion. Even if the South took LRT and moved to the other side- well there were Union troops back there, along Baltimore PIke- first V Corps (I know most of it was used to blunt Longstreets attacks) and then VI Corps, not to mention all of XII Corps marching back and forth from Culps Hill save for Pap Greene's brigade.

 

[Hoplite]

There's a great book titled Protecting the flank at Gettysburg, by Eric Wittenberg who is a member of this forum. In his book, he addresses that scenario and others which shed some light on Stuart's strategy and tactics regarding July 3.

Now Wittenberg I like and respect.

 

[Hoplite]

You will not find the author, Phillip Thomas Tucker, to be well-regarded around here.

The fight at East Cavalry Field had some great drama, was one of the highlights of Custer's service, and had for a long time been neglected in the popular understanding of the battle. Modern scholarship has generally been better about giving it proper coverage.

However, there has been a curious trend among some 21st century writers to embellish and exaggerate what Stuart intended to accomplish on July 3, based largely on speculation.

The biggest issue is Stuart's three main brigades had just completed their lengthy and somewhat infamous journey (see Plenty of Blame to Go Around) and this had worn out the horses and men, especially compared to their Union counterparts. Plus this was 1863, not 1812. A few brigades of cavalry were not going to be decisive in combat against infantry and artillery.

Had Pickett, et al broken the Union line and caused Meade to retreat Stuart would have been able to disrupt this, assuming he succeeded in driving off the Union right flank cavalry. If.

But again, isn't this ignoring the fact that there were Union troops BEHIND Cemetery Ridge-namely VI Corps, it was not wide open as hyperbole leads us to believe.
Am I missing something, I look at maps of July 3 and clearly see VI Corps back there.

 

[infomanpa]

But again, isn't this ignoring the fact that there were Union troops BEHIND Cemetery Ridge-namely VI Corps, it was not wide open as hyperbole leads us to believe.
Am I missing something, I look at maps of July 3 and clearly see VI Corps back there.

Yep. The Sixth Corp were mainly spectators on July 3.

 

[Jamieva]

But again, isn't this ignoring the fact that there were Union troops BEHIND Cemetery Ridge-namely VI Corps, it was not wide open as hyperbole leads us to believe.
Am I missing something, I look at maps of July 3 and clearly see VI Corps back there.

Yes they are there.

I had totally forgotten about this fro 2 years ago. Eric Wittenberg carving him up.

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It's been about four years, since we last heard from our good friend Mr. Tucker! You know, that famous author guy? Philip Thomas Tucker. You haven't heard of him? Come on, he's a famous author, he's written many, many Civil War books! You had to of heard of this guy, he's got a Ph.D. That...

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[Eric Wittenberg]

Now Wittenberg I like and respect.

That's very kind of you. Thank you for that.

 

[121st PA Vols]

But again, isn't this ignoring the fact that there were Union troops BEHIND Cemetery Ridge-namely VI Corps, it was not wide open as hyperbole leads us to believe.
Am I missing something, I look at maps of July 3 and clearly see VI Corps back there.

July 2 end of day:
Yes you're missing something. It gets confusing with all the troop shuffling as a result of Longstreet's offensive. Hard to keep up with. Here goes....
The 6th corps was spread out piecemeal along the 3rd and 5th corps line, not in a clump along the Baltimore Pike in reserve. Those sent to 3rd and 5th corps support along the ridge included Bartlett and Torbett's brigades of Wright's Division; Nevin (Wheaton's) and Eustis brigades of Wheaton's-Newton's Division, with Howe's Division (Grant, Neill brigades) coming up the pike at the end of the column.

Late in the day, early evening, Grant's brigade arrived and was sent to Big Round Top (extending the left) at the Taneytown Road on BRT's eastern flank, the line running west to east from hill across Taneytown Road. Russell's brigade of Wright's Division also joined Grant that evening with Neill of Howe's Division held on Slocum's 12th corps right, way right, at McAllister's Hill/Rock Creek covering any flanking move on the Fed right, while Russell and Grant covered the same on extreme left behind BRT.

* And finally, Shaler's brigade of Wheaton-Newton Division was initially in support of Eustis on ridge before ordered by Slocum to support Gen. Green on Culp's Hill, to their rear in a low, deep ground still there before relieving Green and others.

 

[bayonet]

Well I wonder what would of transpired if Stuart never ran into Custer? History is written by the survivors and the living. Stuart was dead about 9 months later so who knows what was going on inside his head on July 3 1863.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I noticed that Custer at Gettysburg is 480 pages long. That's an awfully long book centered around an engagement that lasted less than an hour, and more than double the length of Eric's book on the same subject.

There's a fine line between an exhaustive study and an exhausting study.

 

[Hoplite]

July 2 end of day:
Yes you're missing something. It gets confusing with all the troop shuffling as a result of Longstreet's offensive. Hard to keep up with. Here goes....
The 6th corps was spread out piecemeal along the 3rd and 5th corps line, not in a clump along the Baltimore Pike in reserve. Those sent to 3rd and 5th corps support along the ridge included Bartlett and Torbett's brigades of Wright's Division; Nevin (Wheaton's) and Eustis brigades of Wheaton's-Newton's Division, with Howe's Division (Grant, Neill brigades) coming up the pike at the end of the column.

Late in the day, early evening, Grant's brigade arrived and was sent to Big Round Top (extending the left) at the Taneytown Road on BRT's eastern flank, the line running west to east from hill across Taneytown Road. Russell's brigade of Wright's Division also joined Grant that evening with Neill of Howe's Division held on Slocum's 12th corps right, way right, at McAllister's Hill/Rock Creek covering any flanking move on the Fed right, while Russell and Grant covered the same on extreme left behind BRT.

* And finally, Shaler's brigade of Wheaton-Newton Division was initially in support of Eustis on ridge before ordered by Slocum to support Gen. Green on Culp's Hill, to their rear in a low, deep ground still there before relieving Green and others.

Thank you, was going by memory and assumption!
Went back and looked at some sources
'Meade used Sixth Corps as the reserve manpower pool for his army, plugging in Sedgwicks units wherever help was needed. Six of his brigades were concentrated north of LRP, Sedgwick had no control over them, strange considering he was one of the few Union generals with experience at commanding multiple corps. As his brigades were parceled out and put under other officers a disappointed Sedgwick observed that he might as well go home.'

 

[bayonet]

I noticed that Custer at Gettysburg is 480 pages long. That's an awfully long book centered around an engagement that lasted less than an hour, and more than double the length of Eric's book on the same subject.

There's a fine line between an exhaustive study and an exhausting study.

So 400 pages were dedicated to photos of Custer in that snappy fine looking uniform of his? Can't argue he went the best dressed in the whole ACW. If your going to go might as well go out very well dressed!

 

[thomas aagaard]

Wasn't VI Corps behind the Union battle line in reserve, all 16,000 of them?

No it was spread out all over the place as reinforcement for the other corps.

But Stuarts orders where simply to cover the CSA flank.
The idea that they where to hit the rear of the federal center is just a myth.

And even if it was not, just a brigade of formed infantry is a serious challenge to 3500 very tired cavalry.

 

[bayonet]

No it was spread out all over the place as reinforcement for the other corps.

But Stuarts orders where simply to cover the CSA flank.
The idea that they where to hit the rear of the federal center is just a myth.

And even if it was not, just a brigade of formed infantry is a serious challenge to 3500 very tired cavalry.

and Stuart was a good one for obeying orders right! Guess if he was following orders to be Lee's eyes and ears Gettysburg may have never taken place to begin with. "3500 very tired cavalry" but highly aggressive under a very aggressive Leader. *edited*

 

[121st PA Vols]

and Stuart was a good one for obeying orders right! Guess if he was following orders to be Lee's eyes and ears Gettysburg may have never taken place to begin with. "3500 very tired cavalry" but highly aggressive under a very aggressive Leader. Why it reminds me of a very tired Country and Leader outnumbered 10 to 1 or by even much more taking it to the enemy. Ukraine!

I think the concept of Stuart being 'very tired' exaggerates the issue as all the horses were worn down from hard campaigning. All were on their last leg so to speak. And the trains Stuart captured were laden with fodder. You can probably make the argument that Stuart's cavalry was better feed than the AOP's remembering how compromised their supply lines were.