Stuart's Attack on July 3rd

[Eric Wittenberg]

I don't doubt that at all. I am wondering if Stuart's command was any more worn out than many others. I understand that Sedgwick's men may have marched similar distances in about the same time.

Read the accounts in my Plenty of Blame to Go Around. Those troopers were at the limits of their endurance from being constantly on the move for eight days.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I am wondering if Stuart's command was any more worn out than many others.

I think a tired man can defend easier and more effectively than a tired horse can attack.

While everyone, AOTP and ANV, had marched a long distance ro reach Gettysburg, most of it was steady marching.

Stuart's route not only involved more mileage, but more urgency. He was trying to get around or ahead of the various Union Corps to get back to Lee. When he heard Ewell was at the Susquehanna Stuart hurried to catch up to him only to find Ewell already gone to Gettysburg.

There were also several fights with Union cavalry (it was no joyride) and the added stress of knowing Union movements had complicated plans and isolated Stuart far more than expected while preventing him from communicating with Lee.

Stuart had also captured supplies which were within his orders and helped justify the entire expedition...if he could successfully get then back to the main army. Now he's slowed down with wagons he has to carefully guard, and he has good reason to suspect cavalry and militia lurking around.

 

[thomas aagaard]

Kent Masterson Brown maintains half the AOP was barefoot after the battle.

The official records make it clear than even before the battle this was an issue for federal soldiers.
The paved roads in the area was very had on shoes... both for men and for horses.

 

[George1863]

Read the accounts in my Plenty of Blame to Go Around. Those troopers were at the limits of their endurance from being constantly on the move for eight days.

I am currently reading it - as kindly recommended by Joshism above. It is a great read and full of fascinating detail. You are to be congratulated, in fact. However, it doesn't substantiate the implication - by yourself or others - that Stuart's men spent 8 days continuously in the saddle or deprived of rest. On the 25th June, they rested overnight at Buckland; on the 26th, they rested overnight between Brentsville and Wolf Run Shoals; on the same day, they fed and reshod horses at Fairfax Station; on the 28th, they rested for a few hours at Fairfax Court House, at which point you write that:

'Stuart's progress had been badly impeded by the need to stop and graze his horses.'

On reaching Rockville on the 29th June, Stuart's men are said to have been in the saddle for five days. This is true in a general sense but they had been in the saddle in a literal sense only for one day. On 29th June, Stuart's command rested at Westminster for a number of hours, obtaining ample forage (this is as far as I have got since yesterday).

I am very much enjoying your study and would recommend it to interested parties without hesitation. But I am not sure that the length of Stuart's march (arduous though it was) can be cited as any more debilitating than - for instance - the 37 miles in a day by elements of Sedgwick's corps just to reach Meade by late afternoon of 2nd July; or the Alabamian regiments of Longstreet's corps who were thrown in against LRT had marched 20 plus miles in a shorter time without water, their canteens being captured along with the men who were filling them. In short, more or less everyone had been constantly on the move for eight days.

 

[thomas aagaard]

But I am not sure that the length of Stuart's march (arduous though it was) can be cited as any more debilitating than - for instance - the 37 miles in a day by elements of Sedgwick's corps just to reach Meade by late afternoon of 2nd July; or the Alabamian regiments of Longstreet's corps who were thrown in against LRT had marched 20 plus miles in a shorter time without water, their canteens being captured along with the men who were filling them. In short, more or less everyone had been constantly on the move for eight days.

Remember, You can push a human way more than you can a horse.
And a human can go a lot longer without proper food than a horse.

 

[George1863]

Remember, You can push a human way more than you can a horse.
And a human can go a lot longer without proper food than a horse.

Yup. I agree entirely. But a cavalry horse with shoes and fodder can be pushed at least to some extent.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

the 37 miles in a day by elements of Sedgwick's corps just to reach Meade by late afternoon of 2nd July

Has the distance of this feat ever been examined to ensure it's not some mistake? It seems improbable, almost impossible. Presumably the farthest line infantry marched in a single day during the war and double what a typical long day of marching would have covered. Did Jackson's "foot cavalry" ever come close?

A normal long day of marching is about 20 miles. And that's what Sedgwick's men did several days in a row on their way to Maryland, and would do again on the way to Williamsport.

 

[George1863]

Has the distance of this feat ever been examined to ensure it's not some mistake? It seems improbable, almost impossible. Presumably the farthest line infantry marched in a single day during the war and double what a typical long day of marching would have covered. Did Jackson's "foot cavalry" ever come close?

A normal long day of marching is about 20 miles. And that's what Sedgwick's men did several days in a row on their way to Maryland, and would do again on the way to Williamsport.

My source is the 'Gettysburg National Military Park' blog. The wardens recreated the latter stages of the march. 6th Corps were at Manchester on the evening of Wednesday, July 1st. They had marched 63 miles in the previous three days (from Edward's Ferry on the Potomac). After dark (about 7.30 pm in July in that area?) a courrier arrived and ordered them up first south from Manchester to Westminster, then west on the Baltimore Turnpike through Union Mills and Littlestown to Gettysburg. On looking at the blog again, the distance is 38 miles rather than 37; and they were ordered to join the AOP by midday on Thursday, 2nd July. I think they arrived around 4.pm. By any standards, that is a remarkable achievement.

 

[tmsneeringer]

I noticed that Custer at Gettysburg is 480 pages long. That's an awfully long book centered around an engagement that lasted less than an hour, and more than double the length of Eric's book on the same subject.

There's a fine line between an exhaustive study and an exhausting study.

I'll have to check the book but there's a lot more to Custer at Gettysburg than just ECF, right? Hanover, Hunterstown, Monterey Gap, chasing Lee, all preceded by the end whole instant elevation to General thing. Maybe it's all in there. Agree the one battle should not require 400+.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

I'll have to check the book but there's a lot more to Custer at Gettysburg than just ECF, right? Hanover, Hunterstown, Monterey Gap, chasing Lee, all preceded by the end whole instant elevation to General thing. Maybe it's all in there. Agree the one battle should not require 400+.

Please don't waste your time on that piece of redundant garbage.

 

[Trooper "D"]

Please don't waste your time on that piece of redundant garbage.

Don't hold back. Tell us how you really feel.

 

[RoBert "Bert" Hile]

No it was spread out all over the place as reinforcement for the other corps.

But Stuarts orders where simply to cover the CSA flank.
The idea that they where to hit the rear of the federal center is just a myth.

And even if it was not, just a brigade of formed infantry is a serious challenge to 3500 very tired cavalry.

Well, we really don't know what Lee told Stuart on the second night when they say Lee nearly hit Stuart. And everyone overlooks the fact that Custer failed to follow orders and go to the other flank. Seems like Meade was thrown off by the attack the day before. Again Lee studied Battles and how they were won and lost. Not a subject in West Point which was mainly an engineers school with only one class of military theory/tactics and the rest was drill. Many of the historians have stated you can have combat anywhere a man can face another man, but battle, there is only about 3% of the earths surface open, flat, and have enough roads that allow for a Gettysburg or Waterloo. (the roads are for supplies and for re-enforcements. And how you got there with your army to start with. For those who don't know.)

 

[Dr. Stephen Law]

I have just finished Edward G. Longacre's "The Cavalry at Gettysburg: A Tactical Study of Mounted Operations during the Civil War's Pivotal Campaign, 9 June - 14 July 1863." The work seems to be well researched and thoroughly documented. Is this a recommended work? I live just east of Gettysburg, and can vouch for the challenges Stuart faced in the undulating terrain of the area. Of particular interest to me is the all night march on the night of June 30 - July 1. After spending the day fighting in south Hanover (with Kilpatrick, Farnsworth, and (yes) Custer), Stuart slides east and north as darkness sets in. The route taken was over to Marburg (now flooded under Codorus State Park) then NNE up to Jefferson, a turn to the NW to Spring Grove, and then N to the vicinity of Baer Station and Thomasville. All this done in the dark … with the wagons. By dawn, they'd traveled 23 miles. Reports say that troopers slept in their saddles and occasionally horses would simply stop in their tracks. Then, it was still on to Dover, where total exhaustion dictated a short rest. Nevertheless scouts were sent out to look for the ANV. Then, they rode on to Carlisle … yeah, Stuart's cavalry were all played out, but were still game for a thunderous charge on the 3rd.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I have just finished Edward G. Longacre's "The Cavalry at Gettysburg: A Tactical Study of Mounted Operations during the Civil War's Pivotal Campaign, 9 June - 14 July 1863." The work seems to be well researched and thoroughly documented. Is this a recommended work?

@Eric Wittenberg what are your thoughts on Longacre's book?

 

[121st PA Vols]

I have just finished Edward G. Longacre's "The Cavalry at Gettysburg: A Tactical Study of Mounted Operations during the Civil War's Pivotal Campaign, 9 June - 14 July 1863." The work seems to be well researched and thoroughly documented. Is this a recommended work? I live just east of Gettysburg, and can vouch for the challenges Stuart faced in the undulating terrain of the area. Of particular interest to me is the all night march on the night of June 30 - July 1. After spending the day fighting in south Hanover (with Kilpatrick, Farnsworth, and (yes) Custer), Stuart slides east and north as darkness sets in. The route taken was over to Marburg (now flooded under Codorus State Park) then NNE up to Jefferson, a turn to the NW to Spring Grove, and then N to the vicinity of Baer Station and Thomasville. All this done in the dark … with the wagons. By dawn, they'd traveled 23 miles. Reports say that troopers slept in their saddles and occasionally horses would simply stop in their tracks. Then, it was still on to Dover, where total exhaustion dictated a short rest. Nevertheless scouts were sent out to look for the ANV. Then, they rode on to Carlisle … yeah, Stuart's cavalry were all played out, but were still game for a thunderous charge on the 3rd.

@Dr. Stephen Law, is this the account that mentioned Stuart attacking the Fed rear in conjunction with Pickett? Thanks. Been awhile since reading that one. I'm guessing you're in Hanover being familiar with Codorus State Park and the 'flood'?

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

@Eric Wittenberg what are your thoughts on Longacre's book?

For its time--it was written in 1986--it's a groundbreaking work. Ed writes very well, and it's a good overview--you're never going to get detailed tactics from Ed, as that's not his thing. If you want tactics, go elsewhere.

That said, it has problems. It repeats the myth that Buford's men had Spencers, and it also does not draw on the reports of Buford and his brigade commanders for Brandy Station. The second is not Ed's fault--those reports were not found until after his book was published. But the discovery of those reports changed a lot about the interpretation of the battle.

As a one-volume treatment, it's still good. But again, don't look for tactical detail, because you will never find it in Ed's books. It's not his thing.

 

[Dr. Stephen Law]

For its time--it was written in 1986--it's a groundbreaking work. Ed writes very well, and it's a good overview--you're never going to get detailed tactics from Ed, as that's not his thing. If you want tactics, go elsewhere.

That said, it has problems. It repeats the myth that Buford's men had Spencers, and it also does not draw on the reports of Buford and his brigade commanders for Brandy Station. The second is not Ed's fault--those reports were not found until after his book was published. But the discovery of those reports changed a lot about the interpretation of the battle.

As a one-volume treatment, it's still good. But again, don't look for tactical detail, because you will never find it in Ed's books. It's not his thing.

Thank you for the assessment. I gravitated to Longacre's book after digesting the revised and expanded (2014) "Gettysburg Campaign Atlas" by Philip Laino. The 444 maps of the entire campaign are an interesting exercise in trying to put the assumed tactics into visual form. Laino's honesty is manifest in thorough notes and, in some cases, multiple maps based on diverse reports. When merited, he honestly admits to inductive speculation. I like that.
Yes, I live in the area, just south of Hanover Station. My family has been in York and Adams Counties since 1735. A widowed 3G grandmother was in Hanover during the battle, with her family; JEB Stuart passed though the family acreage on his all night ride of the 30th - 1st. At the same time, a 3G grandfather trudged though the area with the 123d NY of the 12th Corps.
I am a member of the Gettysburg encampment of the SUVCW.

 

[Trooper "D"]

Please don't waste your time on that piece of redundant garbage.

Have your read Saber and Scapegoat by Mark Nesbitt?
Stockpole Books
1994

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Have your read Saber and Scapegoat by Mark Nesbitt?
Stockpole Books
1994

I have. It's a solid book.

 

[Trooper "D"]

I have. It's a solid book.

I pulled it from the shelf to review its contents when I saw this thread. I found it to be solid also.
Cheers!