Southern Nationalism

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CSA Today

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
Honored Fallen Comrade
Joined
Dec 3, 2011
Location
Laurinburg NC
“Nationalism has been a perennial theme in American historiography, but surprisingly enough historians have devoted but scant attention to the analysis of Southern nationalism. Yet the brief and tragic experiment of the Confederate States of America with nationalism provides a laboratory scarcely less interesting than that provided by the American States between 1774 and 1789.

Because historians are camp followers of victorious armies, most of them take for granted the triumph of the first American bid for nationalism and the failure of the Southern. Yet on the surface at least, the Old South of the fifties and sixties boasted more and more persuasive ingredients of national unity than had the American States in 1774.

For the South – and the Confederacy – had, among whites at least, far greater ethnic homogeneity than had the United States of the 1770s, for less than one percent of the population of the Confederate States was foreign born. It acknowledged a greater degree of religious unity than could be found in the original States – for outside Maryland and Louisiana the whole of the Southern population was not only Protestant but evangelical.

By modern standards it confessed pronounced class differences, but by its own standards it could boast that it was a classless society, for all whites could claim membership in an upper class: here was a principle of social philosophy which speedily took on the authority of a moral and a religious principle and provided the South with one of the most powerful of all the forces making for national unity – a common ideology.

Nor, for all its inferiority in population and resources, was the Confederacy without military advantages: a territory more extensive than any which had ever been conquered in the whole of modern history; interior lines of communication; a long military tradition and superior military leaders; and a not unreasonable expectation of a foreign intervention which could rescue the South as French and Dutch intervention had rescued the new United States during the Revolutionary war.”

(The Confederate Nation, 1861-1865, Emory M. Thomas, Harper & Row, 1979, pp. xi-xii)
 
"Historians are camp followers of victorious armies." What the derp is that supposed to mean?

And the idea that the Confederacy had "superior military leaders" as a generalization across the board is just preposterous.

There's an interesting thing to look at here, but I can't help but shake my head at those two points. They make me question just how well they've actually studied the subject.
 
"Historians are camp followers of victorious armies." What the derp is that supposed to mean?
Standard Lost Cause stuff. The usual attempt to paint the Confederacy as an honorable endeavor maligned by the media of the conquering Yankee foe while ignoring the pesky enslavement of a race for personal gain issue.

And the idea that the Confederacy had "superior military leaders" as a generalization across the board is just preposterous.
Indeed. As evidenced by the fact that the region south of the Mason Dixon line is still known as the United States.
 
My biggest disagreement was that large size was a Confederate advantage. In many cases size is an advantage, but not in this war where Northern strategy was to continually opened new fronts and forcing the Confederate government to disperse its much smaller armies ever thinner over a greater area. The Confederate army did best when they were able to confine major fighting to a comparatively small area such as Northern Virginia.
 
Standard Lost Cause stuff. The usual attempt to paint the Confederacy as an honorable endeavor maligned by the media of the conquering Yankee foe while ignoring the pesky enslavement of a race for personal gain issue.

Figures. A phrase like that seems intent on stirring up emotions, not encouraging analysis.

Indeed. As evidenced by the fact that the region south of the Mason Dixon line is still known as the United States.

Quite so.

I think it could be argued that the Confederacy had a chance, and it could be argued that it had factors in its favor that the thirteen colonies did not - but this is not one of those factors.

My biggest disagreement was that large size was a Confederate advantage. In many cases size is an advantage, but not in this war where Northern strategy was to continually opened new fronts and forcing the Confederate government to disperse its much smaller armies ever thinner over a greater area. The Confederate army did best when they were able to confine major fighting to a comparatively small area such as Northern Virginia.

On that note, if you haven't read it, I highly recommend a copy of Two Great Rebel Armies.

Virginia was very good ground for the Confederacy to try to defend in many regards, the West's geography played to the Confederacy's weaknesses.
 
Northern strategy was to continually open(ed) new fronts and forcing the Confederate government to disperse its much smaller armies ever thinner over a greater area.

You don't mean to suggest that inferior military leaders devised a strategy that won the war.:wink:
 
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By modern standards it confessed pronounced class differences, but by its own standards it could boast that it was a classless society, for all whites could claim membership in an upper class: here was a principle of social philosophy which speedily took on the authority of a moral and a religious principle and provided the South with one of the most powerful of all the forces making for national unity – a common ideology.

The "common ideology" referred to was not wanting to pick their own cotton when they were allowed to force other people to do it for them based on race.
 
My biggest disagreement was that large size was a Confederate advantage. In many cases size is an advantage, but not in this war where Northern strategy was to continually opened new fronts and forcing the Confederate government to disperse its much smaller armies ever thinner over a greater area. The Confederate army did best when they were able to confine major fighting to a comparatively small area such as Northern Virginia.

The Confederate Army did its best when it was supplied correctly and not hampered by state governors unwilling to share provisions and materiel with troops from out of state. No one doubts the metal of the Southern fighting man; what doomed the Confederacy (besides the fact that they were 100% in the wrong) was the unwillingness to work together as a nation.
 
I think it could be argued that the Confederacy had a chance, and it could be argued that it had factors in its favor that the thirteen colonies did not - but this is not one of those factors.
I have to disagree there. The Confederacy was never a nation of its own in any respect, and that is especially true when it comes to supplying its armies. No matter how well you fight or how well your officers lead you, you cannot make any progress with tired, shoeless, hungry troops who have no weapons or ammo.
 
The funny thing is, the American Revolution also sees governors focused on the men from their states and the rest can go hang, but it seems to have been just a little bit better at avoiding the bitter quarreling we see between Davis and Brown or Vance. Not a lot better, but there doesn't seem to have been quite as fierce a level of personal animosity clouding efforts to cooperate.

I have to disagree there. The Confederacy was never a nation of its own in any respect, and that is especially true when it comes to supplying its armies. No matter how well you fight or how well your officers lead you, you cannot make any progress with tired, shoeless, hungry troops who have no weapons or ammo.

The one thing the Confederacy seems to have been able to handle logistically seems to have been weapons and ammunition. Shoes and clothes are spotty, food is even worse.

But it managed to do enough to have some slim possibility up to 1864.
 
The funny thing is, the American Revolution also sees governors focused on the men from their states and the rest can go hang, but it seems to have been just a little bit better at avoiding the bitter quarreling we see between Davis and Brown or Vance. Not a lot better, but there doesn't seem to have been quite as fierce a level of personal animosity clouding efforts to cooperate.
I think during the Revolution the "do or die" principle came into effect a little more than during the Civil War. The South knew if they lost things would go back to semi-normal, albeit minus slavery; they would still be American citizens. The colonists stood to lose everything, including the right of self government that they had while still subjects of the Crown. Just my opinion, but you're right. Plenty of infighting in both wars.
 
My biggest disagreement was that large size was a Confederate advantage. In many cases size is an advantage, but not in this war where Northern strategy was to continually opened new fronts and forcing the Confederate government to disperse its much smaller armies ever thinner over a greater area. The Confederate army did best when they were able to confine major fighting to a comparatively small area such as Northern Virginia.

That is where Davis did poorly - not recognizing that he couldn't protect the WHOLE country. He needed to protect the vital areas, concentrate his meager forces there, and win independence. Then he could legitimately dicker for the remainder of the country that wanted to be his. Washington, for instance, gave up major areas and cities - which he got back after he won the war.

On the subject of Southern nationalism, I don't have a problem with the South wanting to be a separate country - or any other large region, for that matter. However, in the case of the South, the basic premise was land to cultivate for mostly cotton, by colored labor for white profit. It meant moving one batch of people of color to obtain the land necessary for this prospective wealth, replacing them with hardier people of color to work the confiscated land, and then the development of a white aristocracy. In much of the literature about Southern nationalism, I find this racial problem permeates it - I can't help feeling most of what is behind it is the desire for a white nation.

One big reason the South of the 19th century - and a good portion of the 20th - had few immigrants is that its climate was difficult! Hot, muggy, buggy and swampy in large areas - it was hard for people not born and raised there to live there. Irish, German, Norwegian - all these European folks came from temperate climates, much colder. They settled in areas that weren't sub-tropical, as is most of the deep South. Without the slave system, the South was a poor backwater for almost a century after the CW - then somebody invented air conditioning!
 
I think during the Revolution the "do or die" principle came into effect a little more than during the Civil War. The South knew if they lost things would go back to semi-normal, albeit minus slavery; they would still be American citizens. The colonists stood to lose everything, including the right of self government that they had while still subjects of the Crown. Just my opinion, but you're right. Plenty of infighting in both wars.

Yeah. I'm not sure if that was even conscious - but there's no equivalent to "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately."
 
The one thing the Confederacy seems to have been able to handle logistically seems to have been weapons and ammunition. Shoes and clothes are spotty, food is even worse.
I dunno, they were looking to equip men with pikes at one point. And the the quality of the ammo was always a bit questionable. Considering the blockade I guess they did as well as they could. I can't say I agree with the logistics. Maybe the materials were available, but the egos of the men responsible for getting them to where they were needed prevented it.

But it managed to do enough to have some slim possibility up to 1864.
That I'll agree with. I truly believe if Lee had won at Gettysburg the South would have gotten the European recognition it need and thus the arms and supplies they were counting on.
 
I dunno, they were looking to equip men with pikes at one point. And the the quality of the ammo was always a bit questionable. Considering the blockade I guess they did as well as they could. I can't say I agree with the logistics. Maybe the materials were available, but the egos of the men responsible for getting them to where they were needed prevented it.

True, and a Mississippi regiment at Stones River charged with sticks. But I'd say "mostly" is borne out by the record. It certainly was more reliable than any of the other stuff.

That I'll agree with. I truly believe if Lee had won at Gettysburg the South would have gotten the European recognition it need and thus the arms and supplies they were counting on.

Maybe not if it was only one battle, but it could have lead there. A Saratoga level triumph would be hard to dismiss.
 
Nor, for all its inferiority in population and resources, was the Confederacy without military advantages: a territory more extensive than any which had ever been conquered in the whole of modern history; interior lines of communication; a long military tradition and superior military leaders; and a not unreasonable expectation of a foreign intervention which could rescue the South as French and Dutch intervention had rescued the new United States during the Revolutionary war.”

(The Confederate Nation, 1861-1865, Emory M. Thomas, Harper & Row, 1979, pp. xi-xii)
The fact that the south had a territory more extensive to any that had been conquered before is probably true as far as it goes, but seems to ignore the fact that the Civil War was the first that involved modern transportation systems, railroad and steam propelled boats and ships, that were game changers. Those systems contributed greatly to Union success, particularly in the west.

As far as "long military tradition and superior military leaders" goes, the same statement could be made for the North. It just took a little while to promote them through the seniority system to positions where they could be effective. The South went through some of those same issues in the spring / summer of 1862.
 
Northern strategy was to continually open(ed) new fronts and forcing the Confederate government to disperse its much smaller armies ever thinner over a greater area.

You don't mean to suggest that inferior military leaders devised a strategy that won the war.:wink:

I would give Northern planners credit for devising a strategy that forced Confederate troop dispersal after all else failed. :sneaky:
 
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