Shepherdstown

[1SGDan]

Aftermath

No further effort was made at Boteler's Ford. The engagement at Shepherdstown ended the Maryland campaign. The strong effort to secure the ford convinced McClellan that the Confederates might return to Maryland. To cover the possible crossing sites of any such movement McClellan ordered Porter's Fifth Corps to guard the Potomac River while he tended to the recovery of the Army from the costly fight at Antietam. While these decisions displayed a certain military soundness they did not meet with the approval of the administration that wanted a more vigorous pursuit. In their estimation Lee's army was allowed to get away and prepare to fight another day. Ultimately this attitude led to the dismissal of McClellan as the commander of the Army of the Potomac.

The fight at Boteler's Ford and the tragic result for the 118th Pennsylvania raises several questions.

Why did the cavalry fail to appear for their role in the crossing?

Why did Sykes continue the mission without the promised cavalry?

Why was a unit that had knowingly been issued faulty weapons ordered into combat before the situation was corrected?

What happened to the original messenger carrying orders to Prevost to retire?

Why did Prevost not obey the oral order to retire?

Why did Gywn order an attack?

Failure to answer these questions as they arose led directly to the fate of the 118th.

 

[1SGDan]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official Records of the War of the Rebellion; Volume 5

The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign, Ezra Carman

Fighting with the Eighteenth Massachusetts: the Civil War memoir of Thomas H. Mann

Antietam to Appomattox with 118th Penna. vols., Corn exchange regiment"

Antietam and the Maryland and Virginia Campaigns of 1862; Isaac W. Heysinger

"Baptism of Fire: The 118th Pennsylvania ("Corn Exchange") Infantry at the Battle of Shepherdstown"; Mark A. Snell

Shepherdstown: Last Clash of the Antietam Campaign, September 19–20, 1862; Thomas A. McGrath

Antietam, South Mountain, and Harpers Ferry: A Battlefield Guide; Ethan Sepp Rafuse

"Henry Wilson's regiment. History of the Twenty-second Massachusetts infantry in the war of the rebellion"; John L. Parker

 

[rpkennedy]

Excellent job as always.

Ryan

 

[67th Tigers]

Why did the cavalry fail to appear for their role in the crossing?

Because Porter had ordered away their forage wagons, and so Pleasonton had to disperse his cavalry to feed them.

 

[67th Tigers]

Why was a unit that had knowingly been issued faulty weapons ordered into combat before the situation was corrected?

Because this was not known, and indeed we're not sure this is what happened.

Col Gwyn after the event blamed the muskets, after it was known that some faulty muskets were issued to Humphreys' division. However, the faults were detected at the test firings before the division marched out and replaced with servicable weapons.

The 118th however were not issued these faulty muskets. According to one of the coy comds (Capt Donaldson) they'd been issued perfected servicable Belgian muskets. The issue was the troops were so green they loaded them randomly and so 50% of them rammed the first round ball first. Hence major problems....

 

[Saphroneth]

Which is what happens when you have troops who haven't had ball practice as part of their basic training, I suppose. You've got to feel sorry for them... it was either faulty muskets or faulty drill, but either way they didn't know soon enough to correct it.

 

[CW3O]

Good read, thanks!
It is unfortunate, but not rare at this stage of the war, that a unit with so little time in service and so little time to train was committed to such a mission. Lack of training among the officer corps, staff elements and ranks led to many of these mistakes. War, like everything else, requires training to conduct properly, the price for that education is very high.

 

[1SGDan]

Because this was not known, and indeed we're not sure this is what happened.

Col Gwyn after the event blamed the muskets, after it was known that some faulty muskets were issued to Humphreys' division. However, the faults were detected at the test firings before the division marched out and replaced with servicable weapons.

The 118th however were not issued these faulty muskets. According to one of the coy comds (Capt Donaldson) they'd been issued perfected servicable Belgian muskets. The issue was the troops were so green they loaded them randomly and so 50% of them rammed the first round ball first. Hence major problems....

Again the OR's tell a diffenet story.

According to Corps commander Porter:

These defective arms had been reported but all efforts to replace them had failed.

OR's Vol 19 Part 1 Pg 340 See footnote

The problem with the weapons had been identified prior. They were not the only unit to receive them. Some corrections had been made in other units but the 118th had not yet been resupplied.

 

[1SGDan]

Because Porter had ordered away their forage wagons, and so Pleasonton had to disperse his cavalry to feed them.

Problems with logistics do not preclude you from mission requirements. His orders were to precede the infantry and he did not. There can be no debate about that.

 

[CW3O]

Problems with logistics do not preclude you from mission requirements. His orders were to precede the infantry and he did not. There can be no debate about that.

In general I would agree, however, there are logistic requirements which can negatively effect mission requirements. In modern day we could order a tank unit forward but if they have no fuel it cannot happen. Logistics is a mission planning requirement. I don't know enough (or for that matter anything) about the requirements for horses which might have been been involved in this matter.

 

[1SGDan]

In general I would agree, however, there are logistic requirements which can negatively effect mission requirements. In modern day we could order a tank unit forward but if they have no fuel it cannot happen. Logistics is a mission planning requirement. I don't know enough (or for that matter anything) about the requirements for horses which might have been been involved in this matter.

Knowing something about horses is not the issue. We know from our military experience that orders are to be served. If not there better be a good reason. I feel that if Pleaston could not obey his orders that some adjustment to the plan could have been made.

 

[CW3O]

Your description here did not include the battle planning phase. I wonder if the requirement for the horses was addressed during the planning or an order simply issued. I suspect that battle planning was somewhat different in the 1860's than it is now.

Cavalry commanders should certainly have raised the issue prior to the mission being initiated.

 

[1SGDan]

Your description here did not include the battle planning phase. I wonder if the requirement for the horses was addressed during the planning or an order simply issued. I suspect that battle planning was somewhat different in the 1860's than it is now.

Cavalry commanders should certainly have raised the issue prior to the mission being initiated.

Given the ferocity of the battle on the 17th I doubt that there was much in the way of a well thought out plan for the pursuit of the Confederates. Reactive planning on the fly can lead to such errors. But again the cavalry commander needed to supply that which was ordered or perhaps a different plan adopted. Sykes willingness to execute this plan without the cavalry support is partially to blame for the result. Had the cavalry been there the Confedeate forces may have been identiifed without a lopsided engagement.

 

[ErnieMac]

Another interesting series, thanks for your efforts. IMO one of McClellan's larger failings during his tenure as commander of the Army of the Potomac was his failure to develop and use his cavalry effectively. That failure was certainly evident at Shepherdstown.