Shepherdstown

Even 8 am as you state isn't really early morning, it's two hours after dawn at equinox... it's two thirds of the way from midnight to noon.

(Does this win me a nitpicker medal?)
Your argument is with General Lee and General Pendleton. Nit pick with them at your convience.
 
Your argument is with General Lee and General Pendleton. Nit pick with them at your convience.

1. Lee

Lee's statement says nothing about when the army finished crossing other than it was in the morning. You've used said data incorrectly to suggest a much more precise timing which is inappropriate.

2. Pendleton

Whilst he says 8 am, he also gives a context of other things happening at that time. Those things happened after 1000 hrs. We thus have a conundrum.

3. AP Hill

His division was last to cross and his AAR says it crossed at 1000 hrs.
Edited by Moderator
 
The crossing is only relevant to this as background to the coming events.We know that federal forces had artillery placed there and were swapping fire with Pendleton making the 1730 crossing possible. Placing that much artillery did not happen in minutes.

I'll take Lee's word on it. He seems a fairly reliable and well informed source for an otherwise insignificant point.
Edited by Moderator.
 
As for me I'll take Lee's word on it. He seems a fairly reliable and well informed source for an otherwise insignificant point.
But Lee's word is "morning". It's not any more specific than that.

67th's interpretation fits this.
 
I don't know the exact timing of the events described here and I doubt anyone else does either. We can see from the above that it has been reported in various fashions open to some level of interpretation. More importantly I fail to see how quibbling over an hour here or there makes a substantial difference in the history being presented.
 
Shepherdstown doesn't come out of a void. In the first post vast swathes of detail about pre-1730 events were ignored or swept under the carpet. Where is the charge against Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade? Where is the charge against AP Hill's skirmishers ca. 1030 hrs that captured 2 coys of the 14th SC? (The skirmish line still being on the Md side of the river after AP Hill's main body crossed at 1000). What aboutthe artillery duel with Pendleton ca. 1030-1230, which continued are the three horse batteries were reinforced with 2 batteries of 20 pdrs and then relieved by the 5th Corps artillery?

It puts events in context.
 
The events prior to 1730 were only briefly described because they are basically unimportant to the events I want to focus on. The artillery duel served to free the crossing and that is where my interest begins.
 
September 20th –Early afternoon

The enemy force that was discovered was A. P. Hill’s Division. When General Lee received Pendleton’s report that Union forces were across the river he suspended his movement and searched for troops “to rectify occurrences in that quarter.” Longstreet was left in bivouac and the duty of repelling the pursuing Yankees fell to General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. Jackson ordered MG A. P. Hill and BG Jubal Early to countermarch their divisions some five miles and return to Boteler’s Ford. There they were to drive the Federal troops into the river. The march began at 0630 with Hill in the lead. Arriving about a mile and a half from the ford he threw out skirmishers. This Confederate vanguard ran directly into Lovell’s advancing troops. As the two skirmish lines wrestled for position Hill formed a double battle line in the trees. In the first line were the brigades of Thomas, Gregg and Pender while the second line formed with Brockenbrough’s, Lane’s and Archer’s brigades. Early, with three brigades supported Hill from a position in a wood on the right and left of the road.

As soon as the Confederate line began to advance against Lovell’s men the Union artillery on the other side of the river opened on them. Unfortunately some of the rounds fell short and landed near the regulars as they attempted an orderly withdrawal. It soon became apparent to Sykes that he was outnumbered and flanked. He appealed to Porter that “that the Virginia side of the river was no place for troops until a proper reconnaissance had been made.” Porter saw the immediate danger of leaving the isolated troops on the Virginia side of the river and ordered all troops to recross to the Maryland side. While the Union batteries pounded the advancing Confederates Lovell and Warren completed their escape. Warren’s two regiments, with the assistance of the 1st US Sharpshooters took positions behind the canal embankment and threw out a covering fire for the other crossing troops. Despite the dire circumstances the losses for these two brigades were slim; 1 killed and 8 wounded. For Barnes’ brigade the story was quite different.
 
I don't know the exact timing of the events described here and I doubt anyone else does either. We can see from the above that it has been reported in various fashions open to some level of interpretation. More importantly I fail to see how quibbling over an hour here or there makes a substantial difference in the history being presented.

Agreed. Battle reports were written from memory and not in real time. FWIW, a wise battlefield guide pointed out to me several years ago, those affluent enough to bring time pieces to war usually kept them set to their own local time. One needs not much more than a few degrees of longitude to explain time keeping discrepancy in this case.

(Edit to add: There were no standardized time zones on the 1860s!)
 
(Edit to add: There were no standardized time zones on the 1860s!)
There was - Railway Time, specifically. It was standardized across Britain in practice though not law in 1860.

It so happens that on the date of Antietam it was very easy to standardize watches, too - sunrise was at 6 AM, because it was the Equinox.
 
There was - Railway Time, specifically. It was standardized across Britain in practice though not law in 1860.

It so happens that on the date of Antietam it was very easy to standardize watches, too - sunrise was at 6 AM, because it was the Equinox.

Which commander ordered time pieces synchronized? Reference to a written order will be much appreciated.

Fog of war in addition to faulty memory after the fact contribute to uncertainty, but I'd love to know everyone during the war had his pocket watch synced with the other guy's.
 
Which commander ordered time pieces synchronized? Reference to a written order will be much appreciated.
I don't mean that commanders did it, I mean that anyone who happened to want to know the time at all precisely would have a very easy way of setting up their watch - at other times it's complicated and you have to rely on the meridian, but on 21 September it's just "dawn is 6 AM".
 
Which commander ordered time pieces synchronized? Reference to a written order will be much appreciated.

Fog of war in addition to faulty memory after the fact contribute to uncertainty, but I'd love to know everyone during the war had his pocket watch synced with the other guy's.

The Royal Navy has run chronometer times since the 18th Century. The same is true in the US Navy. Ships chronometer times are absolute, but often army times vary. When researching the sequence of events at Glendale I found all the ships times consistent, but people could report the same event several hours different.

The act of "synchronising watches" started in the trenches of Sebastapol. It came from a major French screw-up where the first major assault of summer '55 failed when all the assaulting columns became uncoordinated and were defeated in detail. The lesson was that officers needed to know the exact common time. It wasn't a common practice though.
 
There was - Railway Time, specifically. It was standardized across Britain in practice though not law in 1860.

It so happens that on the date of Antietam it was very easy to standardize watches, too - sunrise was at 6 AM, because it was the Equinox.
As I recall, there was no standardization of time in North America then. A standard, like that already in effect in Britain, was not proposed until 1869.
All times recorded during the rebellion must be 'taken with a grain of salt'. Even if one carried a timepiece, it was set by the observer's opinion of the position of the sun and was therefore inherently inaccurate.
 
All times recorded during the rebellion must be 'taken with a grain of salt'. Even if one carried a timepiece, it was set by the observer's opinion of the position of the sun and was therefore inherently inaccurate.
Which is why I highlight that it's on or about the Equinox - the one period of the year (or two) where it's easy to determine local time. Dawn == 6 AM.
 
Which is why I highlight that it's on or about the Equinox - the one period of the year (or two) where it's easy to determine local time. Dawn == 6 AM.
Thanks for your response.
But even then, there is little- if any- likelihood that every timepiece in both of the armies present was set the same. That's why arguments over a few minutes difference, either way, are meaningless....
 
But even then, there is little- if any- likelihood that every timepiece in both of the armies present was set the same. That's why arguments over a few minutes difference, either way, are meaningless....
I concur. The disagreement which started this, however, was over roughly two hours!
 
I concur. The disagreement which started this, however, was over roughly two hours!
Thanks for your response.
And that difference is worth examining- or at least allowing for in any assessment of the action.
 
Agreed. Battle reports were written from memory and not in real time. FWIW, a wise battlefield guide pointed out to me several years ago, those affluent enough to bring time pieces to war usually kept them set to their own local time. One needs not much more than a few degrees of longitude to explain time keeping discrepancy in this case.

(Edit to add: There were no standardized time zones on the 1860s!)

Agreed. For the vast majority of men in both armies, it was noon when the nearest town clock said it was noon. This led to a lot of variety in chronological reporting.

Ryan
 
The Tragedy of the Corn Exchange Regiment

While Warren and Sykes completed their withdrawal a staff officer approached Barnes, who was placing his regiments as directed, and announced that the enemy was advancing in heavy force. Barnes, apparently believing that this required immediate action to slow the enemy advance turned to Col. Prevost, who was riding along side, and asked if he could gain the summit of the bluff. Col Prevost accepted the challenge and led the portion of his regiment, the 118th Pennsylvania, which had completed the crossing up a small path to the summit, while Barnes returned to the river and urged the rest of the regiment forward. When the regiment topped the bluff they were presented with a clear view across the open fields. Prevost selected company E as skirmishers and had the rest of the regiment form a battle line for their inaugural combat experience. The regiment had been fielded only twenty days prior.

Lieutenants Hunterson and Lewis led the skirmishers forward, but after advancing only a short distance they were greeted by a heavy fire from the advancing masses. They were almost instantly pushed back into the main line, which was also being reinforced by the soldiers pushed forward by Barnes. About half the regiment was on hand when they became hotly engaged with the Confederate line. Seeing the developing situation the acting assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, Lieutenant Davis, called to the closest officer he could find, Lieutenant Kelly, "tell Colonel Prevost, Colonel Barnes directs that he withdraw his regiment at once." Kelly relayed this message to his company commander, Captain Bankson. Bankson, in turn, found Colonel Prevost and advised him of the order. Despite the obviously dangerous situation Prevost, either by inexperience or strict adherence to military protocol, announced he would not obey an order received in this manner. He demanded that the order to withdraw come directly to him from Barnes’ aide.

Prevost continued pushing his men into line as they came to the crest even as his men were falling in droves. One survivor remembered “from the beginning the fire of the enemy was tremendous; the rush of bullets was like a whirlwind. The slaughter was appalling; men dropped by the dozens.” Still the men completed the alignment and “stood up handsomely against a dozen times their number.” Compounding the already deadly equation was the fact that the regiment had been issued faulty weapons. Fully a quarter would not fire at all while others failed after but a few rounds.

When the Confederate line closed in panic began to strike the men as they realized the helplessness of their position. Being over lapped by the enemy line on the right caused Prevost to move the two right companies into position to face the new threat. The remainder of the hard pressed line, believing this movement was the beginning of a withdrawal began to fall back in disorder. Sensing a loss of control Prevost seized the colors and rallied the center back into position. He was rewarded for his efforts with a severe wound to his shoulder. He was escorted from the field and command fell to Lieutenant-Colonel James Gwyn. On his way to medical attention Prevost was met by Barnes who asked why his order to retire was not obeyed. Prevost stated that he had never received them. Barnes assured him that a new order would be issued.

Instead of ordering the clearly needed retreat Gywn gathered 200 men and charged the approaching line, many of the men with nothing but bayonets with which to fight. The effort was met with a withering blast of musketry and fell back. Fortunately, as Gywn attempted to continue the uneven fight a staff officer, Adjutant James P. Perot*, from brigade appeared and ordered them to safety. This time there was no refusal.

The trip down the bluff proved every bit eventful as the trip up. As they retreated “in wild confusion” the crest and mill building were occupied by Confederates who fired at the retreating Federals from these advantageous points. It was like shooting fish in a barrel. And again friendly fire from short fused artillery rounds began to play on the regimental survivors. At long last the colors were borne across the dam by Private William Hummell, of Company D and the ordeal was over. Recalling the episode in his formal report A.P. Hill stated “the broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe.” Gywn’s after action report echoed the enormity of the loss. Of 737 men present 277** had fallen dead, wounded, or missing.


*For his effort Perot was wounded and taken prisoner.

** The total was later revised to 269 K, W, and M
 
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