Shepherdstown

[1SGDan]

Introduction

Much has been made of McClellan's failure to vigorously pursue Lee in the aftermath of the bloody battle at Antietam, but little has been made of the effort that was made. On September 18th the battered Army of Northern Virginia retreated across the Potomac at Boteler's Ford. As the Confederates made good their escape the Army of the Potomac collected its dead and wounded and reorganized. It was not until the 19th that a reconnaissance was conducted to establish the whereabouts of Lee's forces. When it was discovered that the Confederates were marching to return to Virginia MG Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps was ordered to take up the chase.

Realizing that a pursuit endangered his army General Lee ordered BG William Pendleton to form a rear guard action to cover the ford as the rest of the army moved south towards Charlestown. Pendleton placed 33 pieces from the Reserve Artillery on the heights overlooking the ford to support two small infantry brigades (approximately 600 men from Georgia and Virginia). When Porter arrived at the north bank of the river he placed his artillery (nearly 70 pieces). A lively artillery exchanged ensued in which the larger Union guns, by virtue of their longer range, drove the Confederate artillery to more secure positions. With the crossing now secure from artillery it was time for the Federals to make their move across the river.

 

[1SGDan]

September 19th – Afternoon and Evening

Around 1730 MG Porter ordered the 1st Regiment of United States Sharpshooters to execute a crossing "at any hazard." Captain John Isler managed to gather 60 men from his scattered command to make the effort. To support this move the 4th Michigan Infantry was brought forward to supply covering fire from the canal embankment for the fording Sharpshooters. On the other side of the river Pendleton was forced to reduce his already meager force when a cavalry messenger arrived seeking help to hold another nearby ford. Believing it necessary to secure his own flank Pendleton dispatched a force of "between 100 and 200 men" to their assistance.

Isler's men waded the river despite "sharp" musketry fire from the Confederate infantry. Four men were lost in the crossing, but the weight of supporting fire from the Michiganders and artillery forced the understrength Confederates to abandon the southern bank. Pendleton reported that his artillery, moving to safety down the Charlestown Road, was overtaken by his infantry that stated the defense of the ford "had all given way." With the far shore secured the 4th Michigan followed the Regulars across and together they established a position at the top of the bluff on the Charlestown Road. The Federals would certainly have maintained this position until reinforced but circumstances changed dramatically when two rebel prisoners were brought in. One of the captives claimed to be a "courier to General Hood." Upon interrogation this man revealed that Hood's brigade was nearby. This man and his information were sent to Porter. Realizing the threat to the small force on the far side of the river if these reports were true Porter ordered them back.

On the Confederate side General Pendleton moved his beleaguered units out of harm's way and went searching for help. Unable to locate the headquarters of Longstreet, Pendleton continued his search for Lee. Despite "the extreme darkness and amid the intricacies of unknown routes" around one o'clock in the morning on September 20, he finally managed to locate Confederate headquarters and reported the loss of the crossing. The events of the day came to a close when Pendleton was ordered to get some rest and was assured that actions would be taken that "suited the circumstances."

 

[1SGDan]

September 20th - Morning

The absence of enemy forces across the river gave the Federals the opportunity to gather some of the equipment abandoned by the retreating Confederates. At first light the 4th Michigan and 62nd Pennsylvania, crossed the river with some borrowed artillery horses and brought back three guns and several caissons that had been left by the Confederates. They returned to the north shore with their trophies about 8 a. m. Meanwhile, other units were receiving orders. Encouraged by the success of the 19th a full scale reconnaissance in force was being organized.

Overnight BG Alfred Pleasonton was ordered to have his cavalry and artillery on the river at day break to lead the reconnaissance. Following the cavalry, BG George Sykes was directed to cross a brigade of his regulars and push south on the Charlestown Road. Sykes selected the 2nd brigade troops of Maj. Charles Lovell to lead the infantry across the river. However when they arrived at the river the cavalry vanguard was nowhere to be found. Not wanting to delay Sykes accompanied his command to the Virginia shore without the expected horsemen. Lovell pushed his men over the bluff and headed south on the Charlestown Road looking for Confederates. About a mile from the river as they were nearing a tree line he discovered the enemy in force and it was arrayed directly in his front with what he estimated to be 3000 men. Just as the enemy line was discovered the cavalry made its appearance. Having already found the enemy they were of no use and were ordered back. Unable to challenge the strength of the Confederate position Lovell began to back his troops away.

Also receiving orders to cross the river was the brigade of Col. James Barnes. His directive was to cross the river and head west on the Shepherdstown Road and "report what is to be found there." At 0900 the lead regiment, the 18th Massachusetts, crossed but before they could proceed with their assigned mission they were confronted by Sykes. Because of the presence of a powerful enemy force just two miles away he altered their orders. Instead of marching toward Shepherdstown they were to form a line parallel to the road below the crest of the bluff in anticipation of supporting Lovell as he fell back. As the remaining brigade units arrived they were to extend the line to the right. The 1st Michigan fell in at the right of the 18th Massachusetts, followed by the 118th Pennsylvania. The 25th and 13th New York fell into line as soon as they had crossed and formed the far right. The 22nd Massachusetts and 2nd Maine formed a reserve on the road. Following their crossing was COL Gouverneur Warren's two regiment brigade of New Yorkers (5th and 10th). These units extended the line on the left of the road. At 0915 Sykes reported to Porter that he put Barnes into position to support Lovell, and suggested that additional reinforcements be sent.

 

[Carronade]

Good to see you stating another series on, as you say, one of the lesser-known actions of the war.

 

[kevikens]

I wonder if any of this activity had anything to do with Little Mac's decision not to pursue a wounded Lee after the battle?

 

[1SGDan]

I wonder if any of this activity had anything to do with Little Mac's decision not to pursue a wounded Lee after the battle?

That will be discussed later, first the rest of the story.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan of course did vigorously pursue. However, a few points.

1. None of Lee's troops crossed on the 18th.

You imply that Lee's troops withdrew the day before. They didn't. Longstreet crossed his corps around 0200. Jackson followed, and at dawn AP Hill's division and some cavalry formed the rearguard.

2. McClellan pursued at dawn.

McClellan issued a stream of orders at 0400-0430 19th to his commanders about a pursuit. Given intelligence that Lee may be withdrawing he gave the order for Pleasonton and Summer to immediately move forward and see if this was correct, and to at least Franklin and Meade (now GOC 1st Corps) to support Sumner.

Pleasonton indeed launched at dawn and encountered Fitz Lee's brigade and one gun of Ramsey's battery west of Sharpsburg. They smashed them, capturing 167 men and the artillery piece before running into AP Hill's division formed as a rearguard on the Maryland side of Botelor's Ford covered by 40-44 guns of the artillery reserve on the far side. AP Hill's division finally withdrew across the river at 1000 hrs.

The infantry were ordered forward, and the written confirmatory order at 0845 (wrongly labelled 8.45 pm in the OR) is:

"The troops of this command will immediately be placed in position as follows, viz: Franklin's corps on Hagerstown pike, Meade's corps between Franklin's and Potomac, Davis to examine country between Hagerstown pike and Potomac in front of Meade, Banks' corps on Franklin's left, Sumner to rest his left on Sharpsburg, Porter to rest his right on Sharpsburg, Burnside to take position on Porter's left, extending his left toward the Potomac."

McClellan had already signalled to Halleck at 0830 that he was conducting a pursuit, but he did not know if Lee was across the river or pulled back to an interior line.

By ca. 0930 the Federal army had advanced in a cordon thus:

As the advance continued Porter's command reached the heights where the Federal cavalry had dislodged Fitz Lee's dismounted men and relieved them. By an order of McClellan's they were sent to feed and water their horses in preparations for further action.

Around midday McClellan starts concentrating 5th and 6th Corps at the Fords and is already ordering 12th Corps down to Harper's Ferry to take possession. At 1315 he states to his commanders he only intends to cross the Potomac if it can be done at advantage. Porter takes these discretionary orders and runs with them....

 

[1SGDan]

1. None of Lee's troops crossed on the 18th.

I'll dispute this claim with Lee's own words:


Lee to Jefferson Davis September 20, 1862

Sir, Since my last letter to you of the 18th, finding the enemy indisposed to make an attack on that day, and our position being a bad one to hold with the river in the rear, I determined to cross the army to the Virginia side. This was done at night successfully, nothing being left behind, unless it may have been some disabled guns or broken down wagons, and the morning of the 19th found us satisfactorily over on the south bank of the Potomac near Shepherdstown


OR's Vol. 19 Page 142

 

[1SGDan]

40-44 guns of the artillery reserve on the far side

Indeed there were that many guns in the reserve artillery but firing positions for all could not be found. Pendleton managed to place 33 pieces.


Again I will dispute you with the words of Pendleton himself:
"The eleven remaining of the forty-four were removed"

OR's Vol. 19 Report No. 210 Pg 831

 

[1SGDan]

According to Ezra Carmen writing in :

The Maryland Campaign of September 1862

Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign


At 10.45 p. m. he was directed by McClellan to have his cavalry and artillery at the river by daylight, and precede Porter's infantry;

Pleasonton conducted another mission but did not support this one as expected

 

[67th Tigers]

I'll dispute this claim with Lee's own words:

Which does not dispute my point at all. Morning =/= dawn.

"We lay upon the field of battle that night and until the next night at 1 o'clock, when my division was silently withdrawn, and, as directed by General Lee, covered the retirement of our army.

My division crossed the Potomac into Virginia about 10 a.m. the next morning, every wagon and piece of artillery having been safely put on the Virginia shore. I bivouacked that night (19th) about 5 miles from Shepherdstown."
- AP Hill, AAR for the Maryland Campaign

Lee's withdrawal started ca. 2300-0000, but no units crossed until 0200. They pulled back into a narrow defensive position by stages. When the last division (APH) pulled back and took post ca 0200, then Longstreet started to cross his men. AP Hill crossed his division ca. 1000 hrs.

 

[1SGDan]

Lee's withdrawal started ca. 2300-0000

On the 18th. No point in quibbling about details. What we know from Lee himself was that the morning of the 19th found us satisfactorily over on the south bank of the Potomac near Shepherdstown.

 

[Saphroneth]

AIUI the reason Lee crossed so quickly was that Lee had been crossing the trains (supplies etc) over the last few days, so it was just the men left to go.

What we know from Lee himself was that the morning of the 19th found us satisfactorily over on the south bank of the Potomac near Shepherdstown.

That doesn't necessarily prove that the army crossed on the 18th. 10 AM is still the morning of the 19th, after all, and if the entire army crossed over the eight hours from 0200 to 1000 then at 1000 Lee could say that the morning of the 18th found them satisfactorily over on the south bank.

 

[67th Tigers]

According to Ezra Carmen writing in :

The Maryland Campaign of September 1862

Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign


At 10.45 p. m. he was directed by McClellan to have his cavalry and artillery at the river by daylight, and precede Porter's infantry;

Pleasonton conducted another mission but did not support this one as expected

Okay. Pleasonton's cavalry was withdrawn to the rear around 1030 (19th) by Porter (remember, that's in volume 2, not 3).

At 2200 (19th) as per normal battle procedure orders were issued; the orders to Pleasonton were to mass all his cavalry for an attack in the morning and "If great results can be obtained, do not spare your men or horses.". An hour later the news came in from Williamsport, where McClellan had sent Couch's division and 2 squadrons, that Stuart was across the Potomac there and the whole rebel army were en route. He sent half his cavalry there. The next day Stuart was decisively defeated at Williamsport.

Expired Image Removed

 

[67th Tigers]

On the 18th. No point in quibbling about details. What we know from Lee himself was that the morning of the 19th found us satisfactorily over on the south bank of the Potomac near Shepherdstown.

Indeed, but not at dawn. Ca. dawn (0600) ca. 20,000 infantry were drawn up in a defensive position on the Maryland side, still in the process of peeling.

 

[James N.]

I was fortunate to locate and visit the area of the resulting battle in 2016; above are U. S. Government tablets placed at Boteler's Ford describing at left Jackson's use of the ford for crossing Sept. 15 and 18-19, and at right the action of Sept. 20. For more photos and my brief synopsis of the battle: https://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-battle-of-shepherdstown-september-20-1862.127673/

 

[67th Tigers]

AIUI the reason Lee crossed so quickly was that Lee had been crossing the trains (supplies etc) over the last few days, so it was just the men left to go.

Indeed, and it caused problems at Antietam. Longstreet had crossed his ammunition reserve on the 16th, and his artillery ran out of rifled shells late on the 17th.

That doesn't necessarily prove that the army crossed on the 18th. 10 AM is still the morning of the 19th, after all, and if the entire army crossed over the eight hours from 0200 to 1000 then at 1000 Lee could say that the morning of the 18th found them satisfactorily over on the south bank.

Longstreet's command (by then his Corps plus Anderson and McLaws of "GW Smith's corps") crossed 0200-0600. Jackson's command (his own Corps plus DH Hill and Walker of "GW Smith's corps") crossed 0600-1000. AP Hill's division was last to cross.

 

[1SGDan]

Pendleton claims in his OR that by 0800 on the 19th the entire army had completed crossing and he manned his post as rear guard. So for all you nit-pickers the crossing was started on the 18th and finished by early morning 19th. Which sets the stage for the story I am attempting to relay.

 

[Saphroneth]

So for all you nit-pickers the crossing was started on the 18th and finished by early morning 19th. Which sets the stage for the story I am attempting to relay.

Even 8 am as you state isn't really early morning, it's two hours after dawn at equinox... it's two thirds of the way from midnight to noon.

(Does this win me a nitpicker medal?)

 

[67th Tigers]

Pendleton claims in his OR that by 0800 on the 19th the entire army had completed crossing and he manned his post as rear guard. So for all you nit-pickers the crossing was started on the 18th and finished by early morning 19th. Which sets the stage for the story I am attempting to relay.

Taking times as verbatum causes issues. The line in the report is:

"These arrangements had not been all completed, when, about 8 a.m. of the 19th, the enemy appeared on the distant heights opposite, and found our army entirely and safely across the ford, and on the Virginia side of the Potomac. They soon brought up and opened artillery much exceeding ours in weight. Still, our rifles did excellent service in keeping at bay for hours the entire hostile host, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, which, in various positions, appeared; care being taken not to waste ammunition in mere long-range exchanges of shot. Our troops that had been briefly resting in the valleys were now ordered farther inland, to be out of reach of the shells, &c., so numerously hurled by the enemy, yet near enough to turn readily upon and perhaps destroy the adverse army should it force the passage of the river and take position between it and our forces."

There's a problem here. The Federal cavalry did not crest said heights until around 1000-1030 hrs. Said artillery (Tidball's battery* and Gibson's battery**) arrived ca. 1100-1130. They were relieved by Porter's infantry ca. 1200-1230.

So, Pendleton says 0800, but other timings suggest this was 1000-1030. Certainly AP Hill in his AAR outright states his division crossed at 1000.


* From his AAR: "On the morning of September 19, I was again ordered in pursuit of the enemy, who had fled across the Potomac. Arriving near where the turnpike crosses the river just below Shepherdstown, the head of our column came under fire of the enemy's batteries posted inn the opposite side of the river. I moved my battery well forward and in a few minutes brought my pieces into battery on the left of the road, where I had an excellent fire upon those of the enemy. After a duel of about an hour's duration the enemy were driven from their guns, when I withdrew.

The next morning I was again ordered to the front for the purpose of accompanying other troops in the passage of the river. The force and arrangement for this purpose being entirely inadequate, those who crossed were soon driven back and the only part taken by my battery in this unfortunate affair was to gain a position as quickly as possible on the heights to the left of the road and from there assist in the recrossing of our troops."

** From his AAR: "On September 19, the battery was ordered to the line with the Cavalry and was warmly engaged with the enemy's artillery across the Potomac for over two hours. Meinell's section was posted on the left of the road, and the rest of the battery on the crest of a hill to the right. Lieutenant Meinell, who was exposed to a hot fire from the front and on his left flank, kept his position for a considerable time but finally withdrew to another in which his flank was protected. During the whole of the engagement, the guns were admirably served. Lieutenant [Edmund] Pendleton was prevented by sickness from taking part in the action."