Repeaters

The Florida Brigade were issued a couple of wagon loads of rejects. Many of the men had to carry the hammer in their pockets. Because there weren't enough bits & pieces to put together a musket for every man, second ranks were told to cut sticks & pick up fallen muskets during their attack on the Round Forrest. The unit took 80% casualties, no M.I.A.'s.
What nonsense. The only Florida units at Stones River were in Preston's Brigade, and:

1750345317429.png



Preston's Brigade as a whole suffered 8 1/3 % casualties on the 31st, followed by a more swingeing 19 1/3 % casualties on the 1st. Out of their total casualties, there were:

KIA 4+54 (58)
WIA 28+356 (384)
MIA 4+93 (97)

So 18% of the casualties suffered by Preston's Bde were MIA.

But we can go further.


1750345516618.png


This is the tabular statement of loss. The 4th Florida (with smoothbores) suffered 34 killed, 129 wounded and 31 missing, while the 1st/3rd Florida (with Enfields) suffered 7 killed, 88 wounded and 43 missing.

And the 4th Florida took 458 into action, suffering 194 casualties of any kind over two days - about 42% for both days combined. Swingeing, but not 80% casualties and not "no MIA".
 
I think you're assuming a lot about how big the 89 regiments of "Enrolled Missouri Militia" were. I simply don't think it's credible that the Union had a militia of even half a million men on top of their existing and already very large army, though I'd be open to counterevidence if you could provide it... but even then, all that does is suggest that the 0.8 million firearms left over after arming the militia had all been lost to breakages - which is still far greater than the 13% figure you mentioned.

The basic problem here is scale. You highlighted two states with the most risk from Confederate raids... but it's not like anywhere north of Pennsylvania would have had any problems at all...



What proven designs are you referring to and what are you blaming the US procurement system for not doing? They certainly tried building Sharps and Spencers as fast as possible without retooling their existing government manufactories, and if they'd done that they would have sacrificed the ability to actually arm their armies with domestically produced weapons.
Both the Henry and Spencer showed themselves to be reliable and effective weapons for use in combat. In fact the Henry design concept lives on, at least in spirit today. I'd said that was a proven design then, wouldn't you agree?

And I'm faulting the Army for continuing to order and issue single shot weapons well in the 1890s, when they were hopelessly obsolete even by the time of Little Big Horn.
 
Both the Henry and Spencer showed themselves to be reliable and effective weapons for use in combat. In fact the Henry design concept lives on, at least in spirit today. I'd said that was a proven design then, wouldn't you agree?
That's post hoc, though - they weren't proven designs at the time. Indeed, as we'll see, they fared poorly in comparative testing in some respects...


And I'm faulting the Army for continuing to order and issue single shot weapons well in the 1890s, when they were hopelessly obsolete even by the time of Little Big Horn.
They were not hopelessly obsolete. No great power adopted a repeater of that sort as a primary weapon. What you're thinking of I think is the adoption of full power magazine rifles, which did happen, but these are quite different from the Civil War era low power black powder repeaters.

If the US government had had a Lee-Enfield in 1860 and not adopted it, that would have been a mistake - but they didn't.

But I'll actually point out here that the British did a comparative trial of various repeaters (including the Henry and the Spencer) against the Martini-Henry single shot breechloader.

To summarize.

The Spencer specifically (and note that this is a post-ACW Spencer, not the gen 1 design from during the war) was rejected for multiple jams in testing, while the concept of a repeating weapon was rejected at the time as being too fragile and resulting in a weapon that was too heavy for general use while not offering sufficient benefit. (n.b. in the tests the Martini-Henry was fired at 20 rounds in 1 minute 3 seconds, averaging 1 round per 3 seconds, so the Winchester firing 25 rounds in 1 minute 18 seconds is identical.)

Notably the Ball and Lameson repeater was actually fired faster as a single shot weapon than using the magazine, and the Winchester was about the same. The repeater part of the weapon didn't offer an improvement in sustained fire rate.


So yes, the British evaluated the weapon and found the Spencer too unreliable, and repeating weapons as not offering sufficient benefit to fire rate relative to the Martini-Henry.
 
This will be my last comment on this thread. I'm not going to go in circles on this topic as it's obvious it won't change someone's point of view. I will say the army had no issue going from single shot muzzle loading pistols to cap and ball revolvers and eventually cartridge versions long before they adapted to use repeating long arms.
 
This will be my last comment on this thread. I'm not going to go in circles on this topic as it's obvious it won't change someone's point of view. I will say the army had no issue going from single shot muzzle loading pistols to cap and ball revolvers and eventually cartridge versions long before they adapted to use repeating long arms.
Well, yes, because the revolvers are a far different use case. Notably and critically, the revolver patterned repeating long arm - the Colt repeating rifle - had the unfortunate problem that a misfire could blow the user's hand off, because a long arm requires a hand in front of the action to steady it.
 
There were no Winchesters. Look at the Spencer first then the Henry. Ammo was a big part of why, retooling in the middle of a war when you dan't have enough arms to arm the men you have in the field... reality vs fantasy and history vs what if.
The first task to be completed in the US was standardizing the parts for the Springfield rifle so that any company in New England with available space could take part in assembly. Standardized parts also were valuable in restoring damaged weapons. It has been debated here., but I think with as much close range fighting as occurred in the Civil War, the ability to fire 3-4 shots in quick secession at a range under 150 yards was valuable. The Spencer magazine rifle was expensive. And by 1864 the US war effort was becoming very expensive.
Nonetheless, Spencer and his investors cut the price of the Spencer rifle in 1864 and the helped the US put the weapons in the hands of the cavalry divisions.
 
Well, yes, because the revolvers are a far different use case. Notably and critically, the revolver patterned repeating long arm - the Colt repeating rifle - had the unfortunate problem that a misfire could blow the user's hand off, because a long arm requires a hand in front of the action to steady it.
The range at which each type of weapon was most often employed may have made a difference too. Accuracy at an extended range makes a difference in the use of rifles.
 
The range at which each type of weapon was most often employed may have made a difference too. Accuracy at an extended range makes a difference in the use of rifles.
Revolvers are very much a very-close-range weapon, for melees - and of course, you don't much mind having a lower muzzle velocity, not at such short range.
 
The basic problem here is scale. You highlighted two states with the most risk from Confederate raids... but it's not like anywhere north of Pennsylvania would have had any problems at all...

Let's see:

The 89 Enrolled Missouri Militia regiments:
Standard 1,000 man regiments (unlikely): 890,000 muskets
500 man regiments (more likely): 445,000 muskets
250 man regiments (probably more than a bit small): 222,500 muskets
Its only one state and its still at least several hundreds of thousands of muskets, which is precisely what I wrote.

Other states at risk: Illinois; Indiana (also hit by Morgan's Raid); Ohio (Morgan's Raid and threats of other raids); Maryland and Pennsylvania (the militia was mobilized during the Antietam and Gettysburg Campaigns and Early's Raid on Washington); Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin (the Sioux Indian rebellion); New York (I believe there were some riots there); and all of New England after the St. Albans Raid. You seem to assume that the governors of none of these states would have requested arms from the Ordnance Office. :smile:

You might want to write about something you know something about.
 
At Stones River 40% of Rosecrans' infantry was armed with smoothbores of various pattens. 60% of Bragg's infantry was armed with them, as well. Many of the smoothbores were little more than rusted relics of a bygone era. The Florida Brigade were issued a couple of wagon loads of rejects. Many of the men had to carry the hammer in their pockets. Because there weren't enough bits & pieces to put together a musket for every man, second ranks were told to cut sticks & pick up fallen muskets during their attack on the Round Forrest. The unit took 80% casualties, no M.I.A.'s.

You've wrongly asserted this before, and I answered you thus:

"Ah, you've told us the regiment. The 4th Florida famously was issued old smoothbores, and was the only smoothbore armed Florida regiment at Stones River. The 1st/3rd Florida had Enfields.

The 4th Florida took 458 into action, and suffered 6 KIA on the day you mentioned. Thus, rather than 80% KIA, they suffered 1.3% KIA."
 
Other states at risk: Illinois; Indiana (also hit by Morgan's Raid); Ohio (Morgan's Raid and threats of other raids); Maryland and Pennsylvania (the militia was mobilized during the Antietam and Gettysburg Campaigns and Early's Raid on Washington); Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin (the Sioux Indian rebellion); New York (I believe there were some riots there); and all of New England after the St. Albans Raid. You seem to assume that the governors of none of these states would have requested arms from the Ordnance Office. :smile:

You might want to write about something you know something about.
...so surely there must be some kind of paperwork to that effect that you can highlight? You've listed off an awful lot of states, but no sense of scale for most of them (and for Missouri, you've assumed that all the regiments reflect several hundred men actually armed); conversely, for example, we know what happened when in May 1862 (by which point, I'll remind you, the Ordnance Department had issued over a million long arms and had about 450,000 soldiers PFD actually in the field, meaning at least 370,000 long arms had gone to the militia by this metric) the War Department tried to call out the militia.

Most of the states rebuffed him completely, having none available; he got about 19 regiments, 12 of them from New York. Of course, places like Maryland and Kentucky already had their Home Guards quite active, but then again don't forget that at least some militia already had firearms before the start of the war...


Quite frankly it seems incredible that there should be any doubt whatsoever about the outcome of Price's raid if there were several hundred thousand (pro-Union) armed militia in Missouri - there were certainly over 13,000 "Missouri State Militia" mustered into Federal service for the war, most of them cavalry, but when Price takes an army of 12,000 men into Missouri in 1864 it's the lack of (Confederate) infantry that causes him to change it from a full-on invasion into a cavalry raid, and the Union response includes a corps of conventional Union infantry (16th Corps), Pleasonton's cavalry, and militia from Kansas - something that should have been completely unnecessary if there were, as you suggest, over two hundred thousand armed militia in Missouri.

Which is what leads me to think that your estimate of the actual number of armed militia in Missouri is not correct. Why bother bringing in Kansas militia if you've got a number of militia in Missouri greater in size than the largest army anyone ever uses in the entire war?
 
All this depends on planning. Nobody thought too much about short-range fighting for the infantry as the introduction of the rifle musket extended ranges, even for 'The Line'. You HAVE to keep up to date. The only arm that needed rapid, short range arms was the cavalry using a carbine. Bear in mind that only a small proportion of the infantry were armed with rifle musket, and that many of the new recruits were not trained to use the rifle at the extended ranges. The 1855 rifle musket was notperfect and it took some time to make it better. The 1861 was the answer to high rate production, but even that was superceded by the 1863. TWO years, just to get it right! The P53 was no better. The Type 3, which was the 'standard' for the Civil War, took seven years to get right.

Despite the fact that the War of Independence was a short-range war, no one seemed to think that far back. No one knew where this war would be fought so they stuck with the old tactics and ideas. So to suggest that the army should have had 'repeaters' from Day1 is really a none starter. Bearing in mind the length of development of 'standard' weapons already in service, how do you think a 'new' idea would take to perfect for the soldier? In this case we are looking at not only a new mechanism, but also a new ammunition. Bear in mind, it was not just the weapon and ammunition but also the way it was made. High tolerances do not go well with mass production - and mass production was new here too! The Enfield P1853s needed for the Crimean War (1854-5) were contracted out to private consortiums (Tower) in England, to Liege, and to France (St Etienne) and this was non-interchangable! Once you have that sorted, then you have to develop your new tactics, train you soldier to be as effective as possible with that new weapon and get them combined to be effective in the field.
 
I think to be honest the procurement decisions taken by the Union suggest they were quite willing to make major investments in new weapons, just as they were willing to make major investments in old weapons. What they weren't willing to do is to cancel rifle-musket production to try and get a few more repeaters, and this has to be correct in context.


The Union orders so many Spencers at the opening of the war that Spencer actually has to ask them to reduce the order, and he's also late starting deliveries - the Federal government has ordered more weapons than Spencer can physically produce. There's no way to improve on that.
 
The Missouri Enrolled Militia were not provided with weapons by the Federal government.

In FY 1865, most state arms were handed back in (including ex-Federal weapons with the MSM), and the total state stock (including weapons still on issue) was:

CARBINES
538 carbines of various patterns

MUSKETS
8,100 rifled muskets, .58 of various patterns
150 cadet muskets
13,512 smoothbore muskets (9,225 in the issue .69 calibre, others in larger calibres and hence not useful)
454 musketoons

MILITARY RIFLES
131 Austrian Rifles, .54
2 Sharps Rifles
5 other BL rifles
79 German rifles (i.e. Suhl's)
75 Austrian rifles, .71 (i.e. old smoothbores since rifled)
1,358 Garibaldi rifles, .71 (generally considered to be the worst gun of the war)
273 US Rifles (i.e. Mississippi rifles, .54)

OTHER
893 Squirrel rifles
896 Shotguns
749 Revolvers, all patterns
275 Pistols (i.e. muzzleloading)

The MSM would take almost all the good weapons (the carbines, rifle-muskets, revolvers etc.), leaving about 9,000 smoothbores for the enrolled militia if called out. They certainly did not have enough to arm 89 militia regiments, but probably about a tenth of this.
 
Remember, even the rifle-musket is pretty modern at this point. They are new technology - trying to leap two or three generations could have gone pretty badly.
Indeed. This is a very transformative era, not as though every government can afford to keep leaping through each rung of the technical ladder as soon as the jumps happen.
 
I think to be honest the procurement decisions taken by the Union suggest they were quite willing to make major investments in new weapons, just as they were willing to make major investments in old weapons. What they weren't willing to do is to cancel rifle-musket production to try and get a few more repeaters, and this has to be correct in context.


The Union orders so many Spencers at the opening of the war that Spencer actually has to ask them to reduce the order, and he's also late starting deliveries - the Federal government has ordered more weapons than Spencer can physically produce. There's no way to improve on that.
This, and another reply by @ReriredCanuck have summarized this whole thing quite perfectly. Orders more than can realistically be immediately or in a short timeframe be fulfilled. Your opening statement does remind me of the conversation on Ironclads - just how many monitors, casemates, and designs of both willing to be funded and be invested in is staggering, though that did not always turn out beautifully (Casco class comes to mind).
 
I do actually wonder about whether the "errror" - if there is one - in US arms procurement is to see it as a case of "manning equipment" rather than "arming men". The shift from the US percussion muskets (which were fine) to the Springfield rifle-muskets with the ammunition they used resulted in a very slow rate of fire for the new rifle-muskets - a problem comparable to the Enfield's initial problems with slow rate of fire - but the British both sought to solve this and also trained their men extensively in range estimation and marksmanship. The result of which was that the British got much more accurate fire, and over time they reached the point where they'd also got rapid fire because they'd improved the ammunition (chiefly increased the windage and used a design that expanded more effectively against the rifling).

The US didn't really do either of those parts.

Then with the repeater you have the same sort of thing - the focus on a BL or repeater as the way to improve battlefield performance, which is an equipment upgrade, but without also (or instead) doing the kind of improvement in range estimation and marksmanship that would have made the existing rifles much more effective.

Basically the (unstated) assumption that getting a better weapon makes you better - in particular that getting a rifle rather than a smoothbore makes you a better shot. It doesn't unless you're able to use the smoothbore to the limits of its ability.
 
I think to be honest the procurement decisions taken by the Union suggest they were quite willing to make major investments in new weapons, just as they were willing to make major investments in old weapons. What they weren't willing to do is to cancel rifle-musket production to try and get a few more repeaters, and this has to be correct in context.


The Union orders so many Spencers at the opening of the war that Spencer actually has to ask them to reduce the order, and he's also late starting deliveries - the Federal government has ordered more weapons than Spencer can physically produce. There's no way to improve on that.
The numbers from Mark Wilson's book on the US quartermaster purchases suggest that there was more interest and expenditure on the Spencer repeater in 1863-1864 once the problem of mass producing the Springfield rifles had been solved. Experience may have shown that the hard cased ammunition was durable, and that may have contributed to acceleration in the production of Spencer repeaters. Generals Halleck and Meigs had several other pressing problems that were of higher priority.
 
Experience may have shown that the hard cased ammunition was durable, and that may have contributed to acceleration in the production of Spencer repeaters.
Given that Spencer barely got the 7,500 Spencers (reduced from 10,000) out the door by the end of Q2 1863, I think you can't really accelerate the production of Spencer repeaters much over historical.
 
Given that Spencer barely got the 7,500 Spencers (reduced from 10,000) out the door by the end of Q2 1863, I think you can't really accelerate the production of Spencer repeaters much over historical.
Except Q3 of 1863 is when Lincoln took some interest in the weapon and I think units in the Cumberland Army had success when armed with Spencers. It took some extra money some additional well equipped shops in New England to increase production. My recollection is that originally Spencers were produced in a piano factory.
 

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