Repeaters

I realize I am late to the party but - for Civil War numbers, the 106,667 government figure Spencer rifles and carbines ordered and arrived in total between 1861-66, and over 58,000,000 Spencer cartridges would definitely count as the capacity to mass produce in my book. The day the war ended, half of those guns were in use and I would consider this to be mass production.

It depends on how you define "mass production," or the capability to conduct "mass production." Spencer production was troubled early in the war. On 22 November 1861 the Spencer Repeating Rifle Company proposed to deliver 10,000 Spencer rifles with triangular bayonets to the Ordnance Office for $40 each, the cost of three plus Springfield rifle muskets. Deliveries were to start with 500 rifles in March 1862, with 1,000 rifles to be delivered each month thereafter. With no deliveries having been made in March, April, or May 1862, the Ordnance Office reduced its order to 7,500 rifles, but even then no rifles were delivered until December 1862, and the order was not completed until June 1863. As for Spencer carbines, the numbers you cite could not have been completed without the Burnside Rifle Company. Although the Federal Army purchased more than 55,000 Burnside carbines, it was overcome by events technologically. Burnside finished the war producing 34,496 Spencer repeating carbines. Over four years, this is not "mass production" capable when you have to arm an army of approximately 2 million men.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
Ok I am sure that this has been discussed befor but why the hell did the north not use repeating rifles? In units that used Winchesters the effective rate of fire was WELL above the norm. The more lead you put down range the better off you are.

14,000 Henry Rifles were produced 1860-66.
The US purchased 1,731.

200,000 Spencer Repeaters were manufactured 1860-69.
The U.S. purchased 110,000.

The Henry had 39 moving parts. The Spencer 9. The magazine tube of the Henry made it vulnerable to jamming from dirt or being dented from hard knocks. The Spencer rifle & carbine were remarkably robust, ideal for military service.

While Henry's proved lethal in the hands of Lakota warriors at the Little Big Horn, ammunition for Spencer's was available at local hardware stores into the 1920's.
 
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Over four years, this is not "mass production" capable when you have to arm an army of approximately 2 million men.
A bigger issue is breakages! On average each Union soldier broke or lost one firearm per year (and remember, a repeater is a technically complex weapon so if anything this will be higher). So if you produce 25,000 weapons per year in the last two years of the war, you can arm about 25,000 men before your production is consumed replacing breakages and lost weapons under normal usage.

With the typical Union PFD force being somewhere around 500,000-600,000, that's 4-5% of the Union army at peak.
 
A bigger issue is breakages! On average each Union soldier broke or lost one firearm per year (and remember, a repeater is a technically complex weapon so if anything this will be higher). So if you produce 25,000 weapons per year in the last two years of the war, you can arm about 25,000 men before your production is consumed replacing breakages and lost weapons under normal usage.

With the typical Union PFD force being somewhere around 500,000-600,000, that's 4-5% of the Union army at peak.

It wasn't quite that bad. But you are correct that it was not enough to merely arm the men in the field. After the war, Major General Alexander Dyer, Chief of Ordnance from 1864 to 1874, reported that consumption of small arms through loss and wear during the war had been 20 percent per year for cavalry carbines, 26 percent for cavalry pistols, and 13 percent for infantry rifle muskets. While this was an average over the entire war for the Army's entire stock of firearms, combat losses were higher in units in the field during major battles. This created the necessity of building sufficient reserves to arm new units and recruits and to quickly replace combat losses and other sources of attrition.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
It wasn't quite that bad. But you are correct that it was not enough to merely arm the men in the field. After the war, Major General Alexander Dyer, Chief of Ordnance from 1864 to 1874, reported that consumption of small arms through loss and wear during the war had been 20 percent per year for cavalry carbines, 26 percent for cavalry pistols, and 13 percent for infantry rifle muskets. While this was an average over the entire war for the Army's entire stock of firearms, combat losses were higher in units in the field during major battles. This created the necessity of building sufficient reserves to arm new units and recruits and to quickly replace combat losses and other sources of attrition.

Regards,
Don Dixon

Is this permanent losses? Breakages would frequently need for weapons to be backloaded to the local armourer for some issues, or back to the depot for more serious ones. The weapon is u/s until repaired.
 
It wasn't quite that bad. But you are correct that it was not enough to merely arm the men in the field. After the war, Major General Alexander Dyer, Chief of Ordnance from 1864 to 1874, reported that consumption of small arms through loss and wear during the war had been 20 percent per year for cavalry carbines, 26 percent for cavalry pistols, and 13 percent for infantry rifle muskets. While this was an average over the entire war for the Army's entire stock of firearms, combat losses were higher in units in the field during major battles. This created the necessity of building sufficient reserves to arm new units and recruits and to quickly replace combat losses and other sources of attrition.
I think that that consumption has to be low? By 30 June 1862 the Ordnance department has issued the Union army (at that time about 425,000 men PFD) a total of 970,000 muskets and rifles, 44,000 carbines, and 115,000 pistols. That's over a million long arms or two firearms per soldier actually issued.

By June 30 1863 the extra issued since June 30 1862 is about 580,000 muskets and rifles, 54,000 carbines, and another 115,000 pistols.

The issuance from July 1 1863 to June 30 1864 is somewhat less, at only 290,000 muskets and rifles, 93,000 carbines, and 71,000 pistols.

But you can see why my assessment is that the consumption of small arms is roughly one per soldier per year, when over the course of the first three years of the war the Union consumed 1.85 million muskets and rifles and 190,000 carbines to continuously equip an army that averaged about half a million men at a time.

Put simply, if only 13% of the Union's issued infantry rifle muskets are consumed by loss and wear, and they've issued 1.85 million of them by June 30 1864, doesn't that mean that they should have 1.6 million of them left issued? And that the ~550,000 men in the army should have about three each - regardless of combat role?
 
The 1860s were a time of massive technological development in the arms industry artillery and small arms. Both had an effect on traditional soldiering.

The Henry's effective range was 250 yards due to the ammunition used and the sighting on the rifle. The Springfield and Enfield's effective range (one man) was 500 yards. At company strength (volley) that increased to 1,000 yards. IOW the Henry, like the other repeating carbines, was a CARBINE, not a rifle. Yes it had a lot of ammunition in the magazine so it was ideal for a 'quick hit' and run. Problem is, reloading took time, so if it did not do the job with a magazine's worth of ammo, what next? The next problem is that battles were not fought in that way at this time. New tactics were needed and they had to work.

The Henry action at that time was based on what we would regard as a pistol round. which limited it's worth on the battlefield. You cannot have even an eighth of your force armed with a carbine when the enemy opens up at 600 yards. As a carbine, it has it's advantages, but if they were so good why did the cavalry stick with the Springfield carbine for so long after the war? History tells us that much of the fighting in the ivil War was at close range (2-300 yards) but that was not a factor in field tactics at the time. Another arguement against is the design itself. Firing creates heat and the Henry in particular had no protection for the supporting hand. (The Martini-Henry in British service had the same problem). In fact few rifles had any over-barrel protection, so prolonged fire was not envisaged or provided for.

What some people cannot grasp is that even breech-loading was new in armies at this time too. There were a number of problems that needed ironing out, paricularly in breech sealing as both the Germans and French found out with the reduced ranges of successful designs (Dreyse & Chassepot). The cased round was still under development, but progressing with pistol power rounds. However, the real factor was ordnance winning out on the supply side An infantryman carried 20 rounds. The officers and NCOs - and the quartermasters - knew how long he could fire without resupply How many more would he need to carry to allow resupply to work? Would the old hip pouch be sufficient? More re-design and new drills were going to be required.
 
The Henry's effective range was 250 yards due to the ammunition used and the sighting on the rifle. The Springfield and Enfield's effective range (one man) was 500 yards. At company strength (volley) that increased to 1,000 yards.
I just want to point out that those are effective ranges with a trained man who's done range estimation - battlefield effective range with a poorly trained or untrained man could be a lot less.

It's Spencer not Henry, but there's an incident during the cavalry fighting at Gettysburg where a Spencer armed cavalry regiment expends all of their ammunition (ca. 10,000 rounds) firing at a unit of dismounted Confederate cavalry and hits, at most, four men. Clearly this was well outside effective range!

What some people cannot grasp is that even breech-loading was new in armies at this time too. There were a number of problems that needed ironing out, paricularly in breech sealing as both the Germans and French found out with the reduced ranges of successful designs (Dreyse & Chassepot).

The chassepot didn't have any range issues? It was able to stop enemy attacks at a range of 800 yards.
 
The chassepot didn't have any range issues? It was able to stop enemy attacks at a range of 800 yards.

The Chassepot was ballistically extremely good. It was the first "small bore" (11 mm, .43 cal) rifle in service and with an effective obturator it could deliver effective fire to about 1,200 yards, outranging everything before it.

One major problem is that the French didn't exploit this advantage to the full.
 
Is this permanent losses? Breakages would frequently need for weapons to be backloaded to the local armourer for some issues, or back to the depot for more serious ones. The weapon is u/s until repaired.

My impression was that Dyer's figures were permanent losses, but its not spelled out in the source document.

Beginning on 18 November 1862, General Order [G. O.] 189 authorized infantry and cavalry regiments equipped with muskets, rifles, or carbines other than the Springfield rifle musket to detail from the ranks a "competent and skillful mechanic" to act as regimental armorer. The armorer was to be equipped by the Ordnance Office with a set of armorer's tools and spare parts for the regiment's arms. Given the variety of arms issued to some units, this could have amounted to a substantial variety and number of parts. For each day he worked repairing his regiment's arms, he was to be paid an additional $.40, which was a significant premium in an army which paid its enlisted men $13 per month. What one does not see was any provision or school for training the armorers. This system would have permitted substantial numbers of weapons to be returned to service quickly - and essentially off the Ordnance Office's books - even if the armorer was merely switching parts from two or three weapons to make one serviceable piece.

Both the Federals and Confederates maintained robust systems of recovering weapons from battlefields, and damaged weapons not repairable by the unit armorer, and conducting depot and arsenal level repair. Presumably weapons restored to service in this system were also not counted in Dyer's loss figures.

Put simply, if only 13% of the Union's issued infantry rifle muskets are consumed by loss and wear, and they've issued 1.85 million of them by June 30 1864, doesn't that mean that they should have 1.6 million of them left issued? And that the ~550,000 men in the army should have about three each - regardless of combat role?

You're forgetting the state militias/home guards - who received substantial numbers of weapons as the war progressed - in your calculations, which appear to be based only on the active force. As fourth, third, and ultimately second class weapons passed out of service they ended up with the state Adjutants General to arm the militia. As an example, on 5 August 1862 Secretary Stanton directed that captured arms which were not suitable for issue to volunteer regiments were to be "put in order" by the arsenals for issue to the militia.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
My impression was that Dyer's figures were permanent losses, but its not spelled out in the source document.

Beginning on 18 November 1862, General Order [G. O.] 189 authorized infantry and cavalry regiments equipped with muskets, rifles, or carbines other than the Springfield rifle musket to detail from the ranks a "competent and skillful mechanic" to act as regimental armorer. The armorer was to be equipped by the Ordnance Office with a set of armorer's tools and spare parts for the regiment's arms. Given the variety of arms issued to some units, this could have amounted to a substantial variety and number of parts. For each day he worked repairing his regiment's arms, he was to be paid an additional $.40, which was a significant premium in an army which paid its enlisted men $13 per month. What one does not see was any provision or school for training the armorers. This system would have permitted substantial numbers of weapons to be returned to service quickly - and essentially off the Ordnance Office's books - even if the armorer was merely switching parts from two or three weapons to make one serviceable piece.

Both the Federals and Confederates maintained robust systems of recovering weapons from battlefields, and damaged weapons not repairable by the unit armorer, and conducting depot and arsenal level repair. Presumably weapons restored to service in this system were also not counted in Dyer's loss figures.



You're forgetting the state militias/home guards - who received substantial numbers of weapons as the war progressed - in your calculations, which appear to be based only on the active force. As fourth, third, and ultimately second class weapons passed out of service they ended up with the state Adjutants General to arm the militia. As an example, on 5 August 1862 Secretary Stanton directed that captured arms which were not suitable for issue to volunteer regiments were to be "put in order" by the arsenals for issue to the militia.

Regards,
Don Dixon

The Porky Pies vs the Brass Tacks, as always nicely done.
 
You're forgetting the state militias/home guards - who received substantial numbers of weapons as the war progressed - in your calculations, which appear to be based only on the active force. As fourth, third, and ultimately second class weapons passed out of service they ended up with the state Adjutants General to arm the militia. As an example, on 5 August 1862 Secretary Stanton directed that captured arms which were not suitable for issue to volunteer regiments were to be "put in order" by the arsenals for issue to the militia.
Well, yes, my calculation is based on the total number of weapons issued by the Ordnance Department, because that is the overwhelming majority of active weapons employment by the Union. The state militias and home guards aren't of a comparable size to the Union army - as evidenced whenever there's an attempt to call them out in an emergency and there's hardly anything there to pull in.

Or are you really asserting that the (Union) state militias got 1.1 million weapons by June 30 1864?
 
It depends on how you define "mass production," or the capability to conduct "mass production." Spencer production was troubled early in the war. On 22 November 1861 the Spencer Repeating Rifle Company proposed to deliver 10,000 Spencer rifles with triangular bayonets to the Ordnance Office for $40 each, the cost of three plus Springfield rifle muskets. Deliveries were to start with 500 rifles in March 1862, with 1,000 rifles to be delivered each month thereafter. With no deliveries having been made in March, April, or May 1862, the Ordnance Office reduced its order to 7,500 rifles, but even then no rifles were delivered until December 1862, and the order was not completed until June 1863. As for Spencer carbines, the numbers you cite could not have been completed without the Burnside Rifle Company. Although the Federal Army purchased more than 55,000 Burnside carbines, it was overcome by events technologically. Burnside finished the war producing 34,496 Spencer repeating carbines. Over four years, this is not "mass production" capable when you have to arm an army of approximately 2 million men.

Regards,
Don Dixon
Thank you. Some of that information was quite familiar - my defining of "Mass production" goes by the fact of what was accumulated in total rather than the output over specific periods. It is worth the memory that the US was in no real position to start manufacturing on huge scales for the war, at least with such short notice, which is as has been discussed why factories of multiple companies often had to collaborate to meet orders. It is not "mass production" in the sense it was enough to more than supply every soldier in the army, I am simply talking about the scale of what was produced in total... not taking into account the time taken or exactly how it was achieved.
 
Mass production. As the Doc infers, it took the Union some 3 years to get a Springfield rifle (M1861 or 63) into their front-line troops' hands, and many second line still had the old smoothbores. ( How many units were still using older imported arms?) As for the 'armorers', repairing a musket rifle was fairly straightforward - but only if you have the spares available. As soon as you change the spec and design, the 'spares' become VERY spare. This is why many countries converted existing longarms to breech-loaders - there were still spares available for most parts of the guns.
 
The US Army did not seem to be in any particular hurry to advance weapon design or take advantage of existing improvements during the war. Rimfire brass cartridges were well known in 1860. This setup could have been used in the Sharps rifles/carbines years earlier than IRL. No effort was made to break the S+W patent to allow use in revolvers until after the war.
Even post-war they continued with single-shot carbines. IIRC the first large-scale adoption of a breech-loading repeater was the Krag-Jorgensen well into the 1890s.
 
The US Army did not seem to be in any particular hurry to advance weapon design or take advantage of existing improvements during the war. Rimfire brass cartridges were well known in 1860. This setup could have been used in the Sharps rifles/carbines years earlier than IRL. No effort was made to break the S+W patent to allow use in revolvers until after the war.
Remember, even the rifle-musket is pretty modern at this point. They are new technology - trying to leap two or three generations could have gone pretty badly.
 
Or are you really asserting that the (Union) state militias got 1.1 million weapons by June 30 1864?

1.1 million? It would take a lot more research time than I propose to devote to the question. Hundreds of thousands - Yes. Missouri, for example, had 89 regiments of Enrolled Missouri Militia which were armed by the Federal Army. Ohio received 50,000 Federal arms for its "National Guard" during Morgan's raid in 1863; the Sioux Indian rebellion in Minnesota in 1861-2 resulted in issues to militia and citizens in Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska; and the list goes on... The states had exhausted their existing arms inventories when their militia was mobilized under Lincoln's call for 75,000 troops in 1861. Any arms they acquired after that they either bought with their own funds or received from the Federal Ordnance Office. While the organized militia had essentially been non-functional in 1860, the advent of war caused an enormous revitalization with the governors screaming for arms for their home guards.
 
Remember, even the rifle-musket is pretty modern at this point. They are new technology - trying to leap two or three generations could have gone pretty badly.
Your point is well taken. The army had been using flintlock smoothbores only 12 years earlier. But most of these upgrades were not experimental. These were proven designs and the foot dragging continued for 30 years after the war ended.
I think the top brass may have been too comfortable with the current suppliers like the Springfield armory. Note I am not implying any corruption took place on either side of the supply chain. Merely that people have a natural tendency to continue to deal with people they already know.
 
1.1 million? It would take a lot more research time than I propose to devote to the question. Hundreds of thousands - Yes. Missouri, for example, had 89 regiments of Enrolled Missouri Militia which were armed by the Federal Army.
I think you're assuming a lot about how big the 89 regiments of "Enrolled Missouri Militia" were. I simply don't think it's credible that the Union had a militia of even half a million men on top of their existing and already very large army, though I'd be open to counterevidence if you could provide it... but even then, all that does is suggest that the 0.8 million firearms left over after arming the militia had all been lost to breakages - which is still far greater than the 13% figure you mentioned.

The basic problem here is scale. You highlighted two states with the most risk from Confederate raids... but it's not like anywhere north of Pennsylvania would have had any problems at all...


But most of these upgrades were not experimental. These were proven designs and the foot dragging continued for 30 years after the war ended.
What proven designs are you referring to and what are you blaming the US procurement system for not doing? They certainly tried building Sharps and Spencers as fast as possible without retooling their existing government manufactories, and if they'd done that they would have sacrificed the ability to actually arm their armies with domestically produced weapons.
 
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1.1 million? It would take a lot more research time than I propose to devote to the question. Hundreds of thousands - Yes. Missouri, for example, had 89 regiments of Enrolled Missouri Militia which were armed by the Federal Army. Ohio received 50,000 Federal arms for its "National Guard" during Morgan's raid in 1863; the Sioux Indian rebellion in Minnesota in 1861-2 resulted in issues to militia and citizens in Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska; and the list goes on... The states had exhausted their existing arms inventories when their militia was mobilized under Lincoln's call for 75,000 troops in 1861. Any arms they acquired after that they either bought with their own funds or received from the Federal Ordnance Office. While the organized militia had essentially been non-functional in 1860, the advent of war caused an enormous revitalization with the governors screaming for arms for their home guards.
Don Dixon, here is some cooperating information from different sources.

As opposed to the TransAtlantic fact free zone, we all have access to an invaluable source. In his book The Rifled Musket Fuller published a comprehensive statement of all the models & numbers of long arms purchased by the U.S. Ordinance Bureau during the Civil War. There isn't any kind of mystery about this subject. Copies of Fuller's book are available online at a moderate expense. My friends in the UK Civil War Roundtable assure me that it is available in GB as well.

With a free registration, The Rifled Musket is available



We have been through these misrepresentations many times here on CWT. The only prewar state arsenal that I am familiar with Is Tennessee's. Still the best history of the formation of the prewar Tennessee State Army is in Thomas Lawrence Connely's Army of the Heartland, The Army of Tennessee 1861-1862. ( Our British Friend told me he hasn't read any of it other than the free pages online because he can't afford the book.)

The TN state militia had been moribund for over a decade in 1860. What there was of it amounted to a county gentleman's club. A number of the arms were Tower of London Brown Bess muskets collected from the field of the Battle of New Orleans. Some of those antiques had been converted to percussion.


What happened to the ill equipped TN militia at Mill Springs / Fishing Creek.

At Stones River 40% of Rosecrans' infantry was armed with smoothbores of various pattens. 60% of Bragg's infantry was armed with them, as well. Many of the smoothbores were little more than rusted relics of a bygone era. The Florida Brigade were issued a couple of wagon loads of rejects. Many of the men had to carry the hammer in their pockets. Because there weren't enough bits & pieces to put together a musket for every man, second ranks were told to cut sticks & pick up fallen muskets during their attack on the Round Forrest. The unit took 80% casualties, no M.I.A.'s.

I have a .69 cal ball found along the tree line where Bate's infantry lined up before attempting to cross the cotton field. It is part of a collection of whole & spent rounds I use to illustrate my talks with visitors. The history of smoothbore long guns during the Civil War is fully, exhaustively documented.
 
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