Random Thoughts on Iuka

[Nathan Towne]

Let me provide that below.

The correspondence which begins with Hamilton having sent out Mizner was sent on September 17th and was not timestamped. It can be found at 17 OR 2:222. Yet again, it read:

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of infantry and all our cavalry, under Mizner, toward Barnett's, on the Jacinto and Iuka road. The only thing we can do to prevent Price passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

-17 OR 2: 222

The second message which I cited is found in the Reports section of the Official Records, as it was reprinted in Grant's first report of the operation dated September 20th. The original copy is not contained in the correspondence, as is the case with many messages and orders, of course. This is why it was the only correspondence which I cited which was mentioned in responses to my posts, as it is the only one which others were aware of as they hadn't read the correspondence contained in the Official Records.

It was also not timestamped and is dated September 18th from Rosecrans to Grant. It read, in full:

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Springs Road, tells of a continuous movement since last Friday of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, and Price to attack Iuka or to go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?"

-17 OR 1: 66

Remember, Grant had sent the following message to Halleck at 8:00 A.M. on September 16th, as well.

"For ten days or more the enemy have been hovering in our front in reported large force. I have watched their moves closely until I could concentrate my forces. All are now in good shape. Hurlbut's division has come from Memphis to Bolivar and about 6,000 troops from Bolivar brought here. General Orice is southeast from us, near Bay Springs, moving northeast. It is reported that Van Dorn and Breckinridge are to join and attack. Form the best information they cannot reach here under four days. My view is they are covering a move to get General Price into East Tennessee. If I can I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent either the design to go north or to unite forces and attack here."

-17 OR 2:220

The above was sent before it had been ascertained from Mower's reconnaissance that Price was already at Iuka with "a strong force," which was, of course, basically, the Army of the West, which was reported back later in the day on the 16th.

As can be seen, the Fulton road was one way out. You seem to have this notion embedded in your mind that it was "the best way out." It was just one way out. I have covered that all extensively in my previous comments. Rosecrans and Grant has been in communication regarding the situation fairly steadily and continuously, of course, to that point.

Further, amidst the beginning of the operation, on September 17th, Rosecrans sent this message to Grant, concerned that they may have already missed their window of opportunity.

"Mizner's dispatch just in reports that the cannonading of our reconnoitering party ceased at 4.40 last evening, and that about 8 o'clock last evening a very large fire was seen in the direction of Iuka; the distance is 20 miles. Mizner has gone to feel of them since 4 a.m. My suspicions are that some houses and stores have been burned in Iuka, the place abandoned, and that Price has crossed the defiles of Bear Creek, and will pass the Tennessee before it rises- at the Shoals, if possible; if not, will proceed at once to above Decatur, near Whitesburg."

-17 OR 2: 222-223

As we know, Stanley's Division was divided, with Mower's brigade having moved to Iuka conducting the reconnaissance and Fuller's brigade coming from the west (aside from the 39th Ohio, at least, which would be given another assignment amidst this process). (See 17 OR 2: 221)

It isn't intended as an insult, it is just the obvious truth in that it is absolutely clear that I was the only one here who had actually read the relevant correspondence. That may be why we haven't heard again from Ned and Eric and the like, as it is clear at this point that the positions which they were putting forward did not reflect a comprehensive understanding of this subject. Again, that is not an insult. It is just the obvious truth from this thread, the exchanges and comments, which is okay, but hopefully this has provided them with the incentive to now go do so that way and as stated, I would happily engage in a constructive discussion from here.

^One such place.

 

[tony_gunter]

Cite sources please.

Again, go back and read the relevant correspondence.

And one could attempt to make the same claim regarding the roads. Obviously, that wouldn't be workable.

Cite sources? You're the one claiming that they could have crossed in a flood because they had crossed earlier when it wasn't. I'm just pointing out that there's a possibility the flooding could prevent or impede their progress.

They did have a bridge collapse on them at Bay Springs forcing them to divert a distance to find another.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Cite sources? You're the one claiming that they could have crossed in a flood because they had crossed earlier when it wasn't. I'm just pointing out that there's a possibility the flooding could prevent or impede their progress.

They did have a bridge collapse on them at Bay Springs forcing them to divert a distance to find another.

Please cite your sources regarding the rain between the 17th and 19th showing this "flooding" and cite your source regarding your claim as to Sanborn's and/or Sullivan's brigades moving into position.

I am not making claims. The record does that. You are saying that they were wrong in their understanding of the situation, or that the situation had fundamentally changed enough that this was suddenly the situation. A "flood" as you state. Cite your sources please.

The bridge collapse at Bay Springs. Who? When?

 

[tony_gunter]

Please cite your sources regarding the rain between the 17th and 19th showing this "flooding" and cite your source regarding your claim as to Sanborn's and/or Sullivan's brigades moving into position.

I am not making claims. The record does that.

The bridge collapse at Bay Springs. Who? When?

The flooding has been discussed here before, as well as the bridge collapse at Bay Sorings.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The flooding has been discussed here before, as well as the bridge collapse at Bay Sorings.

I am going to just take that as nothing of substance is forthcoming, other than just statements without any foundation.

 

[tony_gunter]

"Start at 8 A.M. - Infantry still marching through the woods and brush - Tiresom marching - reach Bay Springs at 4 P.M, B. Davidson met us here and said a wagon & team had fallen through a bridge and so injured it that we could not cross on it - Had to go to a bridge 13 miles below - This stream is the headwater of the Tombigby"

Tracing Price's retreat from Iuka and advance on Corinth 1862 - an account | South & Western Theaters

Ok, I am trying to map out as best I can the retreat from Iuka to the link up with Van Dorn at Ripley and the advance on Corinth. If anyone can help I would be most appreciative! So far I am using the journal of John M. Weidemeyer Capt. CO F 6th MO Inf (CSA) Saturday 20th 1862 Iuka: *"The...

civilwartalk.com

 

[tony_gunter]

You have absolutely nothing. Got it.

No, I'm just pointing out something you haven't resolved and you're hand-waving so you don't have to resolve it.

 

[Nathan Towne]

^Okay, so nothing there about supposed flooding in that comment you quoted. It comes from late in the day on September 21st (we know of the rain in the intervening period between the night of the 19th-20th and the 21st) and merely says that the road was muddy.

No source for the statement regarding the deployment at Iuka. I have read every report on both sides multiple times and lots of other accounts, as well.

Please go back and read the contemporary correspondence which I provided for you.

 

[tony_gunter]

^Okay, so nothing there about supposed flooding in that comment you quoted. It comes from late in the day on September 21st (we know of the rain in the intervening period between the night of the 19th-20th and the 21st) and merely says that the road was muddy.

No source for the statement regarding the deployment at Iuka. I have read every report on both sides multiple times and lots of other accounts, as well.

Please go back and read the contemporary correspondence which I provided for you.

"The country was exceedingly difficult of passing, being but little better from Thompson's Crossroads to within about two miles of Iuka an uninterrupted swamp, extending indefinitely on either side of the road upon which the column was moving. From the northern margin of this extensive bog to Iuka, the face of the country is broken into innumerable hills and ravines, the hills riding gradually higher and higher toward the north with southern slopes admirably suitable for the maneuvers of battle, or at any rate, admirably adapted to the posting of troops so that their fire could be simultaneously effective."

Rosecrans at Iuka | South & Western Theaters

I’ve never seen this before, and it offers a great explanation for Rosecrans’ decision to pitch into the Confederates with darkness looming. Apparently, the only approach to the city was bounded for miles on both sides by marsh. The Confederates had extended their pockets to cover the area...

civilwartalk.com

Again, both the flooding and the bridge collapse have been discussed here previously.

 

[Nathan Towne]

"The country was exceedingly difficult of passing, being but little better from Thompson's Crossroads to within about two miles of Iuka an uninterrupted swamp, extending indefinitely on either side of the road upon which the column was moving. From the northern margin of this extensive bog to Iuka, the face of the country is broken into innumerable hills and ravines, the hills riding gradually higher and higher toward the north with southern slopes admirably suitable for the maneuvers of battle, or at any rate, admirably adapted to the posting of troops so that their fire could be simultaneously effective."

Rosecrans at Iuka | South & Western Theaters

I’ve never seen this before, and it offers a great explanation for Rosecrans’ decision to pitch into the Confederates with darkness looming. Apparently, the only approach to the city was bounded for miles on both sides by marsh. The Confederates had extended their pockets to cover the area...

civilwartalk.com

Again, both the flooding and the bridge collapse have been discussed here previously.

^The above has absolutely nothing to do with flooding. It does support the severity of the country between the Jacinto and Fulton roads though.

I don't doubt that a bridge at Bay Springs may have given way at some point later on, or significantly earlier. The other stuff which you were saying cannot be supported though.

 

[DanSBHawk]

"The country was exceedingly difficult of passing, being but little better from Thompson's Crossroads to within about two miles of Iuka an uninterrupted swamp, extending indefinitely on either side of the road upon which the column was moving. From the northern margin of this extensive bog to Iuka, the face of the country is broken into innumerable hills and ravines, the hills riding gradually higher and higher toward the north with southern slopes admirably suitable for the maneuvers of battle, or at any rate, admirably adapted to the posting of troops so that their fire could be simultaneously effective."

Rosecrans at Iuka | South & Western Theaters

I’ve never seen this before, and it offers a great explanation for Rosecrans’ decision to pitch into the Confederates with darkness looming. Apparently, the only approach to the city was bounded for miles on both sides by marsh. The Confederates had extended their pockets to cover the area...

civilwartalk.com

Again, both the flooding and the bridge collapse have been discussed here previously.

Interesting. From the blog post linked in that thread, Colonel Matthies of the 5th Iowa understood the plan was to get close and then bring on the battle in the morning:

 

[Nathan Towne]

Interesting. From the blog post linked in that thread, Colonel Matthies of the 5th Iowa understood the plan was to get close and then bring on the battle in the morning:

View attachment 520458

From the Charles Tompkins Diary, who was in Ord's force:

"Everyone thinks we ought to have caught Price at Iuka, and we would have done it if the left had gone in eighteen hours sooner"

-Charles Brown Tompkins Papera, Duke University.

You see, I can pull random accounts out which say all sorts of things, as well.

That was a good account provided by Tony above regarding the ground between the Jacinto and Fulton roads.

 

[DanSBHawk]

From the Charles Tompkins Diary, who was in Ord's force:

"Everyone thinks we ought to have caught Price at Ouka, and we would have done it if the left had gone in eighteen hours sooner"

-Charles Brown Tompkins Papera, Duke University.

You see, I can pull random accounts out which say all sorts of things, as well.

That was a good account provided by Tony above regarding the ground between the Jacinto and Fulton roads.

Actually, Colonel Matthies' claim makes perfect sense. They didn't intend to bring on a battle that late in the day. They blundered too close to the confederates.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Unreal. Glad to see that you just had an epiphany on this and discovered your new theory.

Please go read the reports and the correspondence. Come back when you have done so. I am interested in having serious and instructive discussions.

 

[tony_gunter]

^The above has absolutely nothing to do with flooding. It does support the severity of the country between the Jacinto and Fulton roads though.

I don't doubt that a bridge at Bay Springs may have given way at some point later on, or significantly earlier. The other stuff which you were saying cannot be supported though.

It has everything to do with flooding. Look at the map, there's no swamp on either side of the road.

 

[Nathan Towne]

It has everything to do with flooding. Look at the map, there's no swamp on either side of the road.

Alright.

Unfortunately, I don't have time for just picking up stuff and throwing it around and seeing what sticks. Please go back to the sources, or go back through my comments on here. I put up lots of valuable stuff. If you want to read through it and have thoughtful comments to bring to the table, then you can then do so. As was the case involving Ned regarding Snake Creek Gap, I laid out a wholly accurate perception on the basis of the record and rectified a number of substantial, albeit honest, errors which he made. If one wants to discuss the situation they can go back and see what was written and respond accordingly.

 

[tony_gunter]

Nice to have your two cents.

Please come back when there is something of substance to discuss.

You have a firsthand account of both sides of the road being inundated to the extent that there was no dry ground on which to deploy, and you dismiss it as "nothing of substance?"

You claim to want to stick to the record, then when you have something from the actual record, you choose to ignore it.

 

[Nathan Towne]

You have a firsthand account of both sides of the road being inundated to the extent that there was no dry ground on which to deploy, and you dismiss it as "nothing of substance?"

You claim to want to stick to the record, then when you have something from the actual record, you choose to ignore it.

I don't ignore anything contained in the record.

The account stated that a bog ran on both sides of the road. A few hours ago your friend was saying that the roads not being mutually supportive was an excuse.

I will tell you what. If you go back through all of my comments and carefully read them and want to respond with something well thought out, feel free to do so and I will happily respond.

 

[tony_gunter]

The account stated that a bog ran on both sides of the road. A few hours ago your friend was saying that the roads not being mutually supportive was an excuse.

You two don't know what you believe, are ignoring the contemporary record which was never really addressed, have nothing and are now throwing mud at the wall.

I will tell you what. If you go back through all of my comments and carefully read them and want to respond with something well thought out, feel free to do so.

I'm not trying to "believe" anything. I'm just pointing out that the record shows that heavy rain flooded the area.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not trying to "believe" anything. I'm just pointing out that the record shows that heavy rain flooded the area.

Your quote was of a bog. I don't accept that at all. Nor do I see any reason to overlook the available contemporary record.

The snapshotted comment below was the final straw in convincing me how much of a waste of time this is.

Tony, I would be happy to talk to you offline in the Personal Messages on this topic further if you would like.