Chickamauga Polk at Chickamauga

[uaskme]

@edfranksphd Wheeler has been lately under severe criticism as well. I am beginning to think if the actions weren't in Virginia, they weren't creditable. This opposing field of opinions makes it a bit more difficult to read first hand reports, but maybe not historians, per se. The actuality of the battlefield can only be known by one that was on it. Why we tend to visit and dream of how much we can reckon on a calm, sunny day.
Lubliner.

Mr Franks wrote a great paper about Bragg and the Knoxville campaign. It became a chapter in one of Woodworth's books. He has been gracious enough to converse with me. He is knowledgeable and has studied Bragg. A published Historian.

I have been Critical of Bragg. He had his Faults. How He or any Commander performed all these duties they were entrusted with is beyond me. Rosecrans had a Telegraph line. He had mapping and map duplicating ability. Yankee Commanding Generals had larger and higher Ranked Staff. Need to study more about that, but they did. Something else Davis rejected. Braggs Army doubled in size during this campaign. So the Army didn't have time to become a effective unit. All of these personalities didn't coalesce.

Fun to study.

 

[th'anchoriticsybarite]

From what I heard he was still having breakfast when he should have been briefing Hill.
Lubliner.

Am I confusing Chicamauga with Stones River or was Polk guilty of breakfasting in his robe at both. Either way an egregious error.

 

[edfranksphd]

Wheeler refused Braggs orders repeatedly. Wheeler was directed to picket the TN River from Just north of Chattanooga to the South in Alabama. Wheeler failed to discover 60K Federals crossed the TN in the area around Bridgeport. Then Bragg ask him to probe the Federals and find where they were crossing Lookout Mountain, Even if it meant the loss of Calvary. Wheeler didn't think that was the purpose of Calvary. Bragg ended up sending for NBF to do Wheeler's job. This was in the lead up to Chickamauga. Wheeler had issues at Chickamauga also.

Yes, my recall is that Wheeler was mediocre at best, except perhaps for the great wagon train raid over the Wauhatchie Mtn when Wheeler left miles of Yankee wagons burning after he descended on it with about 3000 cavalry. Rosecrans was in deep trouble. This made the Cracker Line imperative, which Rosie had all set to implement when Grant swooped in to take the credit. Poor Rosie. : ) Perhaps Wheeler redeemed himself in the Span-Amer War?

 

[edfranksphd]

Mr Franks wrote a great paper about Bragg and the Knoxville campaign. It became a chapter in one of Woodworth's books. He has been gracious enough to converse with me. He is knowledgeable and has studied Bragg. A published Historian.

I have been Critical of Bragg. He had his Faults. How He or any Commander performed all these duties they were entrusted with is beyond me. Rosecrans had a Telegraph line. He had mapping and map duplicating ability. Yankee Commanding Generals had larger and higher Ranked Staff. Need to study more about that, but they did. Something else Davis rejected. Braggs Army doubled in size during this campaign. So the Army didn't have time to become a effective unit. All of these personalities didn't coalesce.

Fun to study.

Thanks for the kind words about my humble Bragg project. Your timing is good as now I seem to have the moderator on my case for comparing the death rate in the ACW to what it would have been if the US had the population it has today. Hardly seems to violate the intent of the moderators rule to stick to ACW issues, but there it is. Anyway, thanks again. Kind words in my direction a rare events for me in these forums, I suppose in part b/c I tend to take on issues that are already matters of considerable disputation. : )

 

[Saruman]

Am I confusing Chicamauga with Stones River or was Polk guilty of breakfasting in his robe at both. Either way an egregious error.

Just a myth. Here is the timeline:

* Late on the evening of the 19th, at his headquarters at Thedford's Ford, Bragg directed Polk orally (no written order was made) to resume the battle early Sunday morning "at day-dawn." D.H. Hill's Corps was to lead the way, and Polk was to advise Hill of his assignment.

* Polk rode back to his own HQ at Alexander's Bridge, and on the way, bumped into D.H. Hill's chief of staff, Archer Anderson. When asked about Hill's whereabouts, Anderson said he was at Thedford's Ford - to Polk's surprise, having just left that vicinity.

* Polk directed Anderson to tell Hill that he was now under Polk's authority and that Polk desired to see him presently at his own HQ to discuss particulars.

* Polk then rode to his HQ. Members of Polk's escort had been posted at key roadway positions in the vicinity to tend signal fires and to direct those looking for Polk.

* Polk immediately dictated Bragg's oral orders to his chief of staff, Thomas Jack, addressing the written versions to Polk's three field commanders: Hill, Cheatham, and Walker. The attack was to take place "tomorrow morning at daylight."

* A little after midnight, a courier led Walker into Polk's camp and his orders were personally handed to him. At about 1am, a courier found Cheatham and delivered the orders. The courier sent to find Hill, John H. Fisher, said in a sworn statement that he vainly searched for Hill for about 4 hours and upon his return to HQ did not report to Col. Jack as "he was not to be disturbed."

* Two officers on Hill's staff were drawn by firelight to a fork in the road near Alexander's Bridge, and directed to Polk's camp. They told Polk that they had themselves been looking for their leader futilely for almost 4 hours. Polk sent them back out into the smoky fog to continue their search in order to inform Hill of the urgency of the ordered daylight attack.

* Between first light and sunrise Polk sent another courier with orders to attack, this time to Hill's subordinates, Cleburne and Breckinridge.

* The courier found Cleburne and Breckinridge having breakfast with Hill. One of them remarked that "the men could not go into the fight until they had their rations" to which Hill consented.

* Riding off to Hill's camp at about 7am, Polk said "General, why have you not attacked?" Hill answered: "General, my men are drawing rations, etc." Polk said: "Sir, this is not the time for eating; this is the time for fighting. Attack immediately; attack immediately."

* The attack finally commenced some three hours later than Bragg had desired.

 

[farmerjohn]

Not with the AoT.

why you say that? i believe lee wouldve whupped rosecrans and, would have follwed up into chattanooga. lee and longstreet wouldve been together on the battlefield. plus, the othe genls. had a healthy respect for lee, which made all the political infighting mute point. dh hill wouldve , snapped too, as would polk, and others.

 

[Irishtom29]

why you say that? i believe lee wouldve whupped rosecrans and, would have follwed up into chattanooga. lee and longstreet wouldve been together on the battlefield. plus, the othe genls. had a healthy respect for lee, which made all the political infighting mute point. dh hill wouldve , snapped too, as would polk, and others.

A lovely fantasy. Your faith in Lee is religious.

 

[farmerjohn]

A lovely fantasy. Your faith in Lee is religious.

u think old rosy woulve beat lee. yeah right. have ya taken your meds?

 

[Jamieva]

Read Powell's book on the battle. He lays it all out very well and assigns blame where due with plenty of documentation for it. From my recollection @Saruman timeline above is basically what Powell laid out. They couldn't find Hill in the dark

 

[Lubliner]

Wheeler refused Braggs orders repeatedly. Wheeler was directed to picket the TN River from Just north of Chattanooga to the South in Alabama. Wheeler failed to discover 60K Federals crossed the TN in the area around Bridgeport. Then Bragg ask him to probe the Federals and find where they were crossing Lookout Mountain, Even if it meant the loss of Calvary. Wheeler didn't think that was the purpose of Calvary. Bragg ended up sending for NBF to do Wheeler's job. This was in the lead up to Chickamauga. Wheeler had issues at Chickamauga also.

Was Wheeler a part of the cabal opposing Bragg at Tullahoma?
Lubliner.

 

[uaskme]

Was Wheeler a part of the cabal opposing Bragg at Tullahoma?
Lubliner.

No. He supported Bragg and Bragg returned the favor. Loyalty was rewarded. This instance wasn't unique.

 

[Irishtom29]

u think old rosy woulve beat lee. yeah right. have ya taken your meds?

Keep a civil tongue in your head when you address me.

 

[speedylee]

Is Bragg correct in his complaint of Polk at Chickamauga or is Polk just a scapegoat. Wasn't Polk slow in getting D H Hill into action on 20th September.

Polk's actions are not defensible. He refused to follow direct orders from his commanding officer.

 

[edfranksphd]

Just a myth. Here is the timeline:

* Late on the evening of the 19th, at his headquarters at Thedford's Ford, Bragg directed Polk orally (no written order was made) to resume the battle early Sunday morning "at day-dawn." D.H. Hill's Corps was to lead the way, and Polk was to advise Hill of his assignment.

* Polk rode back to his own HQ at Alexander's Bridge, and on the way, bumped into D.H. Hill's chief of staff, Archer Anderson. When asked about Hill's whereabouts, Anderson said he was at Thedford's Ford - to Polk's surprise, having just left that vicinity.

* Polk directed Anderson to tell Hill that he was now under Polk's authority and that Polk desired to see him presently at his own HQ to discuss particulars.

* Polk then rode to his HQ. Members of Polk's escort had been posted at key roadway positions in the vicinity to tend signal fires and to direct those looking for Polk.

* Polk immediately dictated Bragg's oral orders to his chief of staff, Thomas Jack, addressing the written versions to Polk's three field commanders: Hill, Cheatham, and Walker. The attack was to take place "tomorrow morning at daylight."

* A little after midnight, a courier led Walker into Polk's camp and his orders were personally handed to him. At about 1am, a courier found Cheatham and delivered the orders. The courier sent to find Hill, John H. Fisher, said in a sworn statement that he vainly searched for Hill for about 4 hours and upon his return to HQ did not report to Col. Jack as "he was not to be disturbed."

* Two officers on Hill's staff were drawn by firelight to a fork in the road near Alexander's Bridge, and directed to Polk's camp. They told Polk that they had themselves been looking for their leader futilely for almost 4 hours. Polk sent them back out into the smoky fog to continue their search in order to inform Hill of the urgency of the ordered daylight attack.

* Between first light and sunrise Polk sent another courier with orders to attack, this time to Hill's subordinates, Cleburne and Breckinridge.

* The courier found Cleburne and Breckinridge having breakfast with Hill. One of them remarked that "the men could not go into the fight until they had their rations" to which Hill consented.

* Riding off to Hill's camp at about 7am, Polk said "General, why have you not attacked?" Hill answered: "General, my men are drawing rations, etc." Polk said: "Sir, this is not the time for eating; this is the time for fighting. Attack immediately; attack immediately."

* The attack finally commenced some three hours later than Bragg had desired.

I'm not an expert on the tactical details of any battle, let alone this one, but I've never seen such an account that even hints at this explanation for Polk's ridiculous delay on day 2 at Chicka. What was your source for this timeline, or your sources, if you have have compiled this from a variety of sources? Thank you.

 

[Saruman]

I'm not an expert on the tactical details of any battle, let alone this one, but I've never seen such an account that even hints at this explanation for Polk's ridiculous delay on day 2 at Chicka. What was your source for this timeline, or your sources, if you have have compiled this from a variety of sources? Thank you.

Check out these recently published books: The Chickamauga Campaign by David Powell and Leonidas Polk by Huston Horn.

 

[Gavrilo Sartorys]

While being a pro-D.H. Hill, I should admit that he didn't perform well during the battle but let's see the situation, from what I understood :

- Gen. Bragg starts the battle with five infantry corps (Polk's, D.H. Hill's, Buckner's, Walker's and Hood's) and two cavalry corps (Wheeler's and Forrest's) but he cannot coordinate the efforts of his subordinates. Concluding that he cannot trust his corps commanders to execute his plan, he rearranges the army for next battle-day, splitting the Army of Tennessee into two wings, commanded by Longstreet and Polk, both being senior Lt-Gens.

- This leaves D.H.Hill, also being a Lt-Gen., in a lower level of command, under the supervision of Polk. Having three Lt-Gens. could have resulted in a three-wings structure, better suited for constituting a reserve force and allowing extra punch at critical moment. Moreover, D.H. Hill is initially unaware of this awkward situation and couldn't be found by any when Bragg gives nightime oral instructions to Longstreet and Polk, informing them of their top-leading role for tomorrow. This mess results with a confusion of command because, neither Hill nor the other subordinate corps commanders are aware of their executive role and therefore cannot prepare their men according to Bragg's plan.

Polk must have informed Hill of his role, he couldn't find him during the night and finally did nothing more to inform Hill. Hill learned finally that he was relegated under Polk but didn't know much more about his role. Bragg should have been more effective in communication, but he relied on Longstreet and Polk to inform his generals. Polk and Bragg had mutual distrust and each of them wants the other to fail, in order to get rid of him (it's quite sure that Polk intrigued to get Bragg's post since fall 1862). With this conflictual situation in the Confederate High Command of the Army of Tennessee, it's logical that Polk and the whole of his command (including Hill's one) performs badly or average-at-best when giving uncomplete and unclear instructions from Bragg.

The main problem here was to maintain Bragg at the head of the Army of Tennessee, perhaps it would have been simpler to handle this heterogenous command by splitting it into three wings, under Longstreet, Polk and Hill, with written instructions distributed among top and subordinate commanders. Because of this distrustful situation and because of Bragg's lacks of "meticulousness", the Army couldn't achieve a brilliant campaign without missing several opportunities.

To conclude, Bragg and Polk were equally responsible for this half-failure, and Hill's command can be included into. Bragg was a bold strategist but his temper makes almost every of his subordinates prone to neglict his orders and question his abilities. As a chief-of-staff, with mainly administrative role, he could have done far better. Polk was a mediocre-at-best commander, he was loved by his troops but didn't possess any tactical skills and frequently disobeyed the orders of almost any of his superiors. Gathering these two personalities nullified the military capacity of the Army of Tennessee (that's my opinion).

I propose here a possible order of battle, with a three-wing structure :

Army of Tennessee : Gen. Braxton Bragg (33 infantry brigades / 4 cavalry brigades)

Right Wing : Lt-Gen. James Longstreet (14 infantry brigades)

- Longstreet's Corps : Maj-Gen. John Bell Hood

- - - Johnson's Provisional Division : Brig-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson
- - - - - Johnson's Brigade
- - - - - Gregg's Brigade
- - - - - McNair's Brigade
- - - Hood's Division : Brig.-Gen. Evander M. Law
- - - - - Robertson's Brigade
- - - - - Law's Brigade
- - - - - Benning's Brigade
- - - McLaws' Division : Brig-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw
- - - - - Kershaw's Brigade
- - - - - Humphrey's Brigade

- Buckner's Corps : Maj-Gen. Simon B. Buckner

- - - Stewart's Division ; Maj-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
- - - - - Bate's Brigade
- - - - - Brown's Brigade
- - - - - Clayton's Brigade
- - - Preston's Division : Brig-Gen. William Preston
- - - - - Gracie's Brigade
- - - - - Trigg's Brigade
- - - - - Kelly's Brigade

Left Wing : Lt-Gen. Leonidas Polk (13 infantry brigades)

- Polk's Corps : Maj-Gen. Bejamin F. Cheatham

- - - Cheatham's Division : Brig-Gen. John K. Jackson
- - - - - Jackson's Brigade
- - - - - Smith's Brigade
- - - - - Maney's Brigade
- - - - - Wright's Brigade
- - - - - Strahl's Brigade
- - - Hindman's Division : Maj-Gen. Thomas C. Hindman
- - - - - Anderson's Brigade
- - - - - Deas' Brigade
- - - - - Manigault's Brigade

- Walker's Corps : Maj-Gen. William H. T. Walker

- - - Walker's Division : Brig-Gen. States R. Gist
- - - - - Gist's Brigade
- - - - - Ector's Brigade
- - - - - Wilson's Brigade
- - - Liddell's Division : Brig-Gen. St-John R. Liddell
- - - - - Liddell's Brigade
- - - - - Walthall's Brigade

Center / Reserve Wing : Lt-Gen. Daniel H. Hill (6 infantry brigades / 4 cavalry brigade)

- Hill's Corps : Maj-Gen. John C. Breckinridge

- - - Breckinridge's Division : Brig-Gen. Benjamin H. Helm
- - - - - Helm's Brigade
- - - - - Adams' Brigade
- - - - - Stovall's Brigade
- - - Cleburne's Division : Maj-Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne
- - - - - Wood's Brigade
- - - - - Polk's Brigade
- - - - - Deshler's Brigade

- Forrest's Cavalry Corps : Brig-Gen. Nathan B. Forrest

- - - Armstrong's Division : Brig-Gen. Frank C. Armstrong
- - - - Armstrong's Brigade
- - - - Forrest's Brigade
- - - Pegram's Division : Brig-Gen. John Pegram
- - - - Davidson's Brigade
- - - - Scott's Brigade

 

[David Moore]

why you say that? i believe lee wouldve whupped rosecrans and, would have follwed up into chattanooga. lee and longstreet wouldve been together on the battlefield. plus, the othe genls. had a healthy respect for lee, which made all the political infighting mute point. dh hill wouldve , snapped too, as would polk, and others.

Lee and Rosecrans met in West Virginia in 1861 and it was Lee who retreated.

 

[David Moore]

u think old rosy woulve beat lee. yeah right. have ya taken your meds?

They met in West Virginia in 1861. Lee left with the name "Granny." Not meant as a compliment.

 

[GwilymT]

u think old rosy woulve beat lee. yeah right. have ya taken your meds?

Rosy could have beat Lee, along with Tomas, Sherman, and as history shows- Grant. Lee had the easiest job in the war (defending Richmond) but managed to lose a height portion of his army on a consistent basis vs his opponents. Lee was no demigod.

 

[uaskme]

While being a pro-D.H. Hill, I should admit that he didn't perform well during the battle but let's see the situation, from what I understood :

- Gen. Bragg starts the battle with five infantry corps (Polk's, D.H. Hill's, Buckner's, Walker's and Hood's) and two cavalry corps (Wheeler's and Forrest's) but he cannot coordinate the efforts of his subordinates. Concluding that he cannot trust his corps commanders to execute his plan, he rearranges the army for next battle-day, splitting the Army of Tennessee into two wings, commanded by Longstreet and Polk, both being senior Lt-Gens.

- This leaves D.H.Hill, also being a Lt-Gen., in a lower level of command, under the supervision of Polk. Having three Lt-Gens. could have resulted in a three-wings structure, better suited for constituting a reserve force and allowing extra punch at critical moment. Moreover, D.H. Hill is initially unaware of this awkward situation and couldn't be found by any when Bragg gives nightime oral instructions to Longstreet and Polk, informing them of their top-leading role for tomorrow. This mess results with a confusion of command because, neither Hill nor the other subordinate corps commanders are aware of their executive role and therefore cannot prepare their men according to Bragg's plan.

Polk must have informed Hill of his role, he couldn't find him during the night and finally did nothing more to inform Hill. Hill learned finally that he was relegated under Polk but didn't know much more about his role. Bragg should have been more effective in communication, but he relied on Longstreet and Polk to inform his generals. Polk and Bragg had mutual distrust and each of them wants the other to fail, in order to get rid of him (it's quite sure that Polk intrigued to get Bragg's post since fall 1862). With this conflictual situation in the Confederate High Command of the Army of Tennessee, it's logical that Polk and the whole of his command (including Hill's one) performs badly or average-at-best when giving uncomplete and unclear instructions from Bragg.

The main problem here was to maintain Bragg at the head of the Army of Tennessee, perhaps it would have been simpler to handle this heterogenous command by splitting it into three wings, under Longstreet, Polk and Hill, with written instructions distributed among top and subordinate commanders. Because of this distrustful situation and because of Bragg's lacks of "meticulousness", the Army couldn't achieve a brilliant campaign without missing several opportunities.

To conclude, Bragg and Polk were equally responsible for this half-failure, and Hill's command can be included into. Bragg was a bold strategist but his temper makes almost every of his subordinates prone to neglict his orders and question his abilities. As a chief-of-staff, with mainly administrative role, he could have done far better. Polk was a mediocre-at-best commander, he was loved by his troops but didn't possess any tactical skills and frequently disobeyed the orders of almost any of his superiors. Gathering these two personalities nullified the military capacity of the Army of Tennessee (that's my opinion).

I propose here a possible order of battle, with a three-wing structure :

Army of Tennessee : Gen. Braxton Bragg (33 infantry brigades / 4 cavalry brigades)

Right Wing : Lt-Gen. James Longstreet (14 infantry brigades)

- Longstreet's Corps : Maj-Gen. John Bell Hood

- - - Johnson's Provisional Division : Brig-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson
- - - - - Johnson's Brigade
- - - - - Gregg's Brigade
- - - - - McNair's Brigade
- - - Hood's Division : Brig.-Gen. Evander M. Law
- - - - - Robertson's Brigade
- - - - - Law's Brigade
- - - - - Benning's Brigade
- - - McLaws' Division : Brig-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw
- - - - - Kershaw's Brigade
- - - - - Humphrey's Brigade

- Buckner's Corps : Maj-Gen. Simon B. Buckner

- - - Stewart's Division ; Maj-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
- - - - - Bate's Brigade
- - - - - Brown's Brigade
- - - - - Clayton's Brigade
- - - Preston's Division : Brig-Gen. William Preston
- - - - - Gracie's Brigade
- - - - - Trigg's Brigade
- - - - - Kelly's Brigade

Left Wing : Lt-Gen. Leonidas Polk (13 infantry brigades)

- Polk's Corps : Maj-Gen. Bejamin F. Cheatham

- - - Cheatham's Division : Brig-Gen. John K. Jackson
- - - - - Jackson's Brigade
- - - - - Smith's Brigade
- - - - - Maney's Brigade
- - - - - Wright's Brigade
- - - - - Strahl's Brigade
- - - Hindman's Division : Maj-Gen. Thomas C. Hindman
- - - - - Anderson's Brigade
- - - - - Deas' Brigade
- - - - - Manigault's Brigade

- Walker's Corps : Maj-Gen. William H. T. Walker

- - - Walker's Division : Brig-Gen. States R. Gist
- - - - - Gist's Brigade
- - - - - Ector's Brigade
- - - - - Wilson's Brigade
- - - Liddell's Division : Brig-Gen. St-John R. Liddell
- - - - - Liddell's Brigade
- - - - - Walthall's Brigade

Center / Reserve Wing : Lt-Gen. Daniel H. Hill (6 infantry brigades / 4 cavalry brigade)

- Hill's Corps : Maj-Gen. John C. Breckinridge

- - - Breckinridge's Division : Brig-Gen. Benjamin H. Helm
- - - - - Helm's Brigade
- - - - - Adams' Brigade
- - - - - Stovall's Brigade
- - - Cleburne's Division : Maj-Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne
- - - - - Wood's Brigade
- - - - - Polk's Brigade
- - - - - Deshler's Brigade

- Forrest's Cavalry Corps : Brig-Gen. Nathan B. Forrest

- - - Armstrong's Division : Brig-Gen. Frank C. Armstrong
- - - - Armstrong's Brigade
- - - - Forrest's Brigade
- - - Pegram's Division : Brig-Gen. John Pegram
- - - - Davidson's Brigade
- - - - Scott's Brigade

Hill's performance in McLemore Cove was dismal. He told Bragg that Cleuburn was sick, which latter Bragg found out he wasn't. Polk wanted Hill to have a Wing or 3 Separate Commands. Hill's was a Provisional position which Davis is going to countermand. Bragg didn't write about some of this stuff. Obviously something going on between Bragg and Hill from the time Hill came West. So, Bragg excluded him. Did the slight from Bragg cause Hill's demeanor, who knows. Bragg, Hill and Polk argue all day after the morning assault on the 20th. Bragg finally gets them to move again about 4:30. Bragg met with Longstreet about 2:30. Longstreet ask for fresh Troops. Bragg tells him there isn't a man on the Right that has any fight left in him. So, there is no further adjustments with the 2 wings.

Bragg stopped have War Councils after he had the one post Stones River. Bragg ask for a vote of confidence and lost. So communication was a huge issue.