Chickamauga Polk at Chickamauga

Begin by reading Connelly’s account, which is purely from the CSA side. The footnotes are a wellspring of references that a 2021reader can access online. The original documentation is there for you to read for yourself. For a straight forward account of Chickamauga, ranger Lee White’s recent book is hard to beat. Cozzen’s book is another one that analyzes the battle from a different perspective. After reading those books, I believe you will understand the answer to your question.
For the entire winter & spring of 1863 Bragg & Polk’s HQ’s were a block apart in Shelbyville TN. When Bragg finally realized that Rosecrans had in fact opened the Tullahoma Campaign, Polk had absolutely no idea what Bragg intended for him to do, nor did any other commander. Apart from a hale & hearty handshake at 1:00 in the morning when he arrived, Longstreet received no orders from Bragg. He finally attacked on his own initiative.
The simple fact of the matter is that Bragg had little to no ability to conceive a plan or communicate a plan or adapt to events once a plan was put into motion. Everyone else, including Polk, were just bit players. The inescapable conclusion is that Bragg’s failures were his & his alone. It is right there on the documentation.
 
Begin by reading Connelly’s account, which is purely from the CSA side. The footnotes are a wellspring of references that a 2021reader can access online. The original documentation is there for you to read for yourself. For a straight forward account of Chickamauga, ranger Lee White’s recent book is hard to beat. Cozzen’s book is another one that analyzes the battle from a different perspective. After reading those books, I believe you will understand the answer to your question.
For the entire winter & spring of 1863 Bragg & Polk’s HQ’s were a block apart in Shelbyville TN. When Bragg finally realized that Rosecrans had in fact opened the Tullahoma Campaign, Polk had absolutely no idea what Bragg intended for him to do, nor did any other commander. Apart from a hale & hearty handshake at 1:00 in the morning when he arrived, Longstreet received no orders from Bragg. He finally attacked on his own initiative.
The simple fact of the matter is that Bragg had little to no ability to conceive a plan or communicate a plan or adapt to events once a plan was put into motion. Everyone else, including Polk, were just bit players. The inescapable conclusion is that Bragg’s failures were his & his alone. It is right there on the documentation.
Bragg should have had Polk shot. If Polk didn't know what his commander wanted he should have found out, not sit on a porch reading a newspaper.
 
If you ever get to the Battlefield for one of Jim Ogdens (Park Historian) battlefield walks in Sept. on the Anniversary of the Battle
he goes over this very subject in depth...
 
Yep, I did a Battlefield walk with Ogden and David Powell Saturday. One of our Studies was the morning of the 20th on the Confederate Right Flank. Not going to recreate the Wheel.

Powell places most of the blame on DH Hill. Hill organized the battle lines into 1 continuous line by Brigade. Which resulted in No Support. He left out Cheatham‘s and Walkers Divisions. Cheatham could of advanced with Breckinridge. Hit the Left Flank with support, could of made a huge difference. Polk sends couriers to find Hill with instructions for the 20th. Couriers can’t find Hill. Morning of the 20th Polk rides to Hill. Tells him to advance immediately. Hills Corps didn’t get their Rations for the 19th until the morning of the 20th. So, Hill let’s them eat. Causing further delay.

Bragg doesn’t have a inclusive Staff Conference on the evening of the 19th. He does meet and instruct Polk and latter with Longstreet when he comes up. So Polks subordinates don’t understand clearly what the objectives are for the 20th. Plenty of blame to go around.

Federals have the preferred Ground. They are on a reverse slope. Confederates are advancing up slope into fortified positions with up to 6 lines of defense. Thomas has moved probably half of the Army to the Kelly Field Line. At the expense of Rosecrans Right Flank. Thomas thinks on the 20th he is facing twice his numbers. He knows DH Hill is there. Thinks Longstreet is. So, he don’t know how much of the ANV is here. Some intel has Joe Johnson there.

Confederates are lined up wrong. Pretty much a waisted assault on the Right. Recover about 4:30 about the time of the Federals Withdrawal. Could of, Should of, didn’t happen. David Powell has spent a lot of time at Chattanooga and written the most extensive account. Ogden has been here for 30+ years. Grateful for being able to spend time with them.
 
Yep, I did a Battlefield walk with Ogden and David Powell Saturday. One of our Studies was the morning of the 20th on the Confederate Right Flank. Not going to recreate the Wheel.

Powell places most of the blame on DH Hill. Hill organized the battle lines into 1 continuous line by Brigade. Which resulted in No Support. He left out Cheatham‘s and Walkers Divisions. Cheatham could of advanced with Breckinridge. Hit the Left Flank with support, could of made a huge difference. Polk sends couriers to find Hill with instructions for the 20th. Couriers can’t find Hill. Morning of the 20th Polk rides to Hill. Tells him to advance immediately. Hills Corps didn’t get their Rations for the 19th until the morning of the 20th. So, Hill let’s them eat. Causing further delay.

Bragg doesn’t have a inclusive Staff Conference on the evening of the 19th. He does meet and instruct Polk and latter with Longstreet when he comes up. So Polks subordinates don’t understand clearly what the objectives are for the 20th. Plenty of blame to go around.

Federals have the preferred Ground. They are on a reverse slope. Confederates are advancing up slope into fortified positions with up to 6 lines of defense. Thomas has moved probably half of the Army to the Kelly Field Line. At the expense of Rosecrans Right Flank. Thomas thinks on the 20th he is facing twice his numbers. He knows DH Hill is there. Thinks Longstreet is. So, he don’t know how much of the ANV is here. Some intel has Joe Johnson there.

Confederates are lined up wrong. Pretty much a waisted assault on the Right. Recover about 4:30 about the time of the Federals Withdrawal. Could of, Should of, didn’t happen. David Powell has spent a lot of time at Chattanooga and written the most extensive account. Ogden has been here for 30+ years. Grateful for being able to spend time with them.
Woah baby, you got it from the horse’s mouth. Jim Ogden has forgotten more about Chicka/Chattanooga than... wait a minute... I am not aware of Jim Ogden having forgotten anything. It is a wonder he doesn’t have to push his memory around in a wheelbarrow. I only know Powell on paper, but I am sure that was quite a combo.
 
I hope you realize this has little or nothing to do with the outcome of the battle.
I know that Polk was a wing commander and Hill was his subordinate, Bragg made plenty of mistakes but if your made a wing or Corp commander the expectation is high. The foundation of my thread is that the popular view that every ill that befell the army of Tennessee is the fault of Bragg is not correct.
 
I know that Polk was a wing commander and Hill was his subordinate, Bragg made plenty of mistakes but if your made a wing or Corp commander the expectation is high. The foundation of my thread is that the popular view that every ill that befell the army of Tennessee is the fault of Bragg is not correct.
Polk had rank. Bragg had no confidence in him. Davis was a personal friend of Polk’s or he would of been gone. Hill performed poorly in McLemore Cove, had no confidence in him. Bragg did have the option of putting Longstreet on the right. Longstreet’s forces end up on the 19th on the left flank. Longstreet didn’t get to the Battlefield until 11pm on the 19th. Bragg could of directly engaged Hill and Polk. Came up and took charge. Bragg could of met with all of his subordinates, Division and above. Explained what he expected. It was a continuous problem. Morning of the 20th was the most important day of Bragg’s career. It was his greatest success, but it was Incomplete.
 
Polk had rank. Bragg had no confidence in him. Davis was a personal friend of Polk’s or he would of been gone. Hill performed poorly in McLemore Cove, had no confidence in him. Bragg did have the option of putting Longstreet on the right. Longstreet’s forces end up on the 19th on the left flank. Longstreet didn’t get to the Battlefield until 11pm on the 19th. Bragg could of directly engaged Hill and Polk. Came up and took charge. Bragg could of met with all of his subordinates, Division and above. Explained what he expected. It was a continuous problem. Morning of the 20th was the most important day of Bragg’s career. It was his greatest success, but it was Incomplete.
A fair assessment. I think Lee would have destroyed completely the union forces at Chickamauga.
 
I know that Polk was a wing commander and Hill was his subordinate, Bragg made plenty of mistakes but if your made a wing or Corp commander the expectation is high. The foundation of my thread is that the popular view that every ill that befell the army of Tennessee is the fault of Bragg is not correct.
You might want to entertain the possibility that it is a popular conclusion because it is true.
Polk had rank. Bragg had no confidence in him. Davis was a personal friend of Polk’s or he would of been gone. Hill performed poorly in McLemore Cove, had no confidence in him. Bragg did have the option of putting Longstreet on the right. Longstreet’s forces end up on the 19th on the left flank. Longstreet didn’t get to the Battlefield until 11pm on the 19th. Bragg could of directly engaged Hill and Polk. Came up and took charge. Bragg could of met with all of his subordinates, Division and above. Explained what he expected. It was a continuous problem. Morning of the 20th was the most important day of Bragg’s career. It was his greatest success, but it was Incomplete.
Bragg could have done a list of things as long as my arm... but he didn’t. When the Army of Tennessee did not take Chattanooga, Chickamauga became nothing but a tactical reverse for the Army of the Cumberland. Shuffling the blame around the A of TN’s commanders is nothing but rear ray deck chairs on the Titanic. Or in a more academic turn of phrase, distinctions without a difference.
 
As I have said many times, Bragg was a moron and could have routed the yankee army but did not. Just ask NBF :D
 
A fair assessment. I think Lee would have destroyed completely the union forces at Chickamauga.
Chickamauga is called bushwhacking on a grand scale for good reason. Even the sainted Lee could not flatten ridges & leap deep valleys in a single bound. The convoluted terrain of the Chickamauga watershed would have made cutting Rosecrans off from Chattanooga & retaking the city all but physically impossible.
 
Begin by reading Connelly’s account, which is purely from the CSA side. The footnotes are a wellspring of references that a 2021reader can access online. The original documentation is there for you to read for yourself. For a straight forward account of Chickamauga, ranger Lee White’s recent book is hard to beat. Cozzen’s book is another one that analyzes the battle from a different perspective. After reading those books, I believe you will understand the answer to your question.
For the entire winter & spring of 1863 Bragg & Polk’s HQ’s were a block apart in Shelbyville TN. When Bragg finally realized that Rosecrans had in fact opened the Tullahoma Campaign, Polk had absolutely no idea what Bragg intended for him to do, nor did any other commander. Apart from a hale & hearty handshake at 1:00 in the morning when he arrived, Longstreet received no orders from Bragg. He finally attacked on his own initiative.
The simple fact of the matter is that Bragg had little to no ability to conceive a plan or communicate a plan or adapt to events once a plan was put into motion. Everyone else, including Polk, were just bit players. The inescapable conclusion is that Bragg’s failures were his & his alone. It is right there on the documentation.
This is a highly inaccurate assessment of Bragg, due, no doubt, in large part to reliance on one of the worst histories of any army written by anyone of the Civil War, Connelly's history of the Army of TN. He was a lazy historian, who simply perpetuated the received wisdom w/o the slighest effort to really understand what might have motivated the events that occurred. If Bragg did something puzzling, Connelly simply concluded that Bragg was crazy, or stupid, or both. There is little debate these days that Polk should have remained an Anglican Bishop and stayed out of the war, as he was clearly a very poor asset for Bragg, since he would rarely obey the orders he received, and would, instead, do what he determined to be the proper thing, regardless of his orders. Read Woodworth's books on Davis' generals and his Six Armies in TN to better understand Bragg. There are many other good sources as well. Cozzens is an amateur, not a trained historian. Bragg is a favorite whipping boy, but unfairly so. It's too easy to simply write him off as being crazy and/or stupid, yet able to maintain Davis' trust as a commanding general in the west for 2 yrs, a 2 yr period in which he fought many hard battles, always outnumbered, and even won the single greatest reb victory of the entire war at Chickamauga, which had the effect of pushing Yank Atlanta plans back by a year! Cut Bragg some slack!
 
@edfranksphd Wheeler has been lately under severe criticism as well. I am beginning to think if the actions weren't in Virginia, they weren't creditable. This opposing field of opinions makes it a bit more difficult to read first hand reports, but maybe not historians, per se. The actuality of the battlefield can only be known by one that was on it. Why we tend to visit and dream of how much we can reckon on a calm, sunny day.
Lubliner.
 
Wheeler refused Braggs orders repeatedly. Wheeler was directed to picket the TN River from Just north of Chattanooga to the South in Alabama. Wheeler failed to discover 60K Federals crossed the TN in the area around Bridgeport. Then Bragg ask him to probe the Federals and find where they were crossing Lookout Mountain, Even if it meant the loss of Calvary. Wheeler didn’t think that was the purpose of Calvary. Bragg ended up sending for NBF to do Wheeler’s job. This was in the lead up to Chickamauga. Wheeler had issues at Chickamauga also.
 
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