The Peninsula Pinkerton and Mac

[JerryD]

Confused?

I've given up reading the fanboy posts.

 

[67th Tigers]

I had a look at the 1st NY's roster, and it says they suffered:

	K	W	C	M	Died of Illness	Deserted	Total	Notes
25th		3​					3​	1 W no further record
26th							0​
27th	2​	1​	1​				4​
28th	2​	2​					4​
29th							0​
30th	34​	42​	7​	8​	1​	2​	94​	3 W DOW, 3 Missing mustered out with coy, 1 mustered out to date 30th June
1st	1​	4​	1​			3​	9​
2nd							0​
3rd							0​
4th							0​
Total	39​	52​	9​	8​	1​	5​	114​

They had 39 KIA vs 22 on the chart, 52 wounded vs 127 and we have detail that 9 soldiers were captured, 5 deserted, and died of sickness during this period. Of the 8 recorded as missing, 4 later mustered and and 4 had no further record and so likely died.

There are a lot more KIA, and the extra KIA were certainly bourn as MIA in the immediate post-battle numbers. Three of the wounded died of their wounds, and 4 of the missing were never heard of again, and so probably died, putting the death toll of the regiment at 46. There are a lot less wounded and missing. When resolved, the 87 MIA drops to 22.

I'm certainly wondering what the difference is.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Seven Pines casualties, Confederate


Longstreet's command, S1 V11 pt1 p942: 816 killed, 3739 wounded, 296 missing, 4851 total
Anderson's brigade, same book, p953: 149 killed, 680 wounded, 37 missing, 866 total
Whiting's division, S1 V11 pt2 p506: 164 killed, 1010 wounded, 109 missing, 1283 total (Whiting gives 1273 total but there is an addition error in the row for Law, Law should be 28 + 286 + 42 = 356, not 346)

Full total: 1129 killed, 5429 wounded, 442 missing, exactly 7000 total.

@Saphroneth,

Regarding Seven Pines/Fair Oaks (meaning the full fighting on May 31-June 1), I was always confused by this and it just crossed my mind today and I went to take a look at it.

I see/saw your error essentially right away. You are double counting G.B. Andersons brigade of Hill's Division. They were already tabulated in the previous casualty figures for Hill's Division. The Divisions of Hill, Huger and Longstreet combined (total) suffered 4,851 casualties. Whiting's Division sustained another 1,283 casualties.

-980 men killed
-4,749 men wounded
-405 men captured or missing

6,134 Total Confederate casualties.

U.S. casualties were reported as follows:

-790 men killed
-3,594 men wounded
-647 men captured or missing

5,031 Total Federal casualties.

G.B. Anderson's brigade was tabulated at 11 OR 1:953. You accidentally added it on top of the cumulative figures for the entire right wing, tabulated at 11 OR 1:942.

 

[Nathan Towne]

You're probably aware of it but Steve Newton's 1989 dissertation at William and Mary, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (subsequently published in book form) is a good study of the period from February/March up through Seven Pines and is useful on this topic.

The interesting thing is that most subsequent histories, including Vignola, do not use Newton's artificially inflated figures for the Peninsula and for good reason, in my view.

 

[Belfoured]

The interesting thing is that most subsequent histories, including Vignola, do not use Newton's artificially inflated figures for the Peninsula and for good reason, in my view.

Of course, that's only one element of Newton's study.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Of course, that's only one element of Newton's study.

To be sure. It is a book which I own and have used.

 

[Bryce]

For those who have studied McClellan in detail, do you think Mac really believed the Pinkerton reports? Or was he just using the inflated estimates as excuse/cover to justify his actions?

If he was a true believer, then his cries for reinforcement and warnings how if the army is destroyed he will die with it but it won't be his fault are a little more sympathetic.

Conversely, love him or hate him, he was an intelligent man. And he clearly understood logistics. How did it not dawn on him that the estimates just didn't make sense?

Last time I talked to Gordon Rhea he was doing research on the relationship between Pinkerton and McClellan. They actually met before the war when McClellan was running a railroad line. If you want me to, I can put you in touch with Gordon.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

For those who have studied McClellan in detail, do you think Mac really believed the Pinkerton reports? Or was he just using the inflated estimates as excuse/cover to justify his actions?

If he was a true believer, then his cries for reinforcement and warnings how if the army is destroyed he will die with it but it won't be his fault are a little more sympathetic.

Conversely, love him or hate him, he was an intelligent man. And he clearly understood logistics. How did it not dawn on him that the estimates just didn't make sense?

McClellan's inability to properly estimate enemy troop strengths goes all the way back to Manassas: " Johnston withdrew his army from Manassas to a more easily defensible position at Culpeper, some 40 miles south and on the other side of the Rappahannock. The Union Army's inspection of the abandoned Confederate works revealed that the enemy's defenses had been far weaker than McClellan had claimed. In particular, a number of the Confederate cannons were found to be only logs painted black, known as "Quaker guns." – History.com Editors, Nov. 9, 2009

 

[rpkennedy]

McClellan's inability to properly estimate enemy troop strengths goes all the way back to Manassas: " Johnston withdrew his army from Manassas to a more easily defensible position at Culpeper, some 40 miles south and on the other side of the Rappahannock. The Union Army's inspection of the abandoned Confederate works revealed that the enemy's defenses had been far weaker than McClellan had claimed. In particular, a number of the Confederate cannons were found to be only logs painted black, known as "Quaker guns." – History.com Editors, Nov. 9, 2009

Prior to his wartime association with Pinkerton, McClellan was overestimating Confederate numbers. When Pinkerton arrived, he ran with those inaccurate numbers.

Ryan

 

[67th Tigers]

The interesting thing is that most subsequent histories, including Vignola, do not use Newton's artificially inflated figures for the Peninsula and for good reason, in my view.

How are they artificially inflated?

Newton made two corrections:

1. Losses

In units where he had a "before" and an "after" strength, he found they lost 10-20% during the siege. Some of this is doubtless sickness and discharges at reorganisation.

2. Convert to PFD

He used Livermore's conversion of effectives to PFD, which is actually a little off.

 

[67th Tigers]

Prior to his wartime association with Pinkerton, McClellan was overestimating Confederate numbers. When Pinkerton arrived, he ran with those inaccurate numbers.

Ryan

This doesn't seem to be true, and Pinkerton soon got some very accurate numbers in late 1861.

The problem is, people compare the whole of the Virginia theatre with just Centreville.

I've seen some confirmation bias in the Rich Mountain operations, for example, where McClellan's estimate for the whole rebel force, and even Sears admitted McClellan's estimates were correct, and that 6-7,000 was correct for 7.5 infantry regts, 6 coys of cavalry and 2 batteries.

 

[Nathan Towne]

How are they artificially inflated?

Newton made two corrections:

1. Losses

In units where he had a "before" and an "after" strength, he found they lost 10-20% during the siege. Some of this is doubtless sickness and discharges at reorganisation.

2. Convert to PFD

He used Livermore's conversion of effectives to PFD, which is actually a little off.

The "conversion" method which he developed is pseudoscience essentially, which is why it hasn't been adopted by virtually anyone else studying the war.

Precise definitions and differences between effective and PFD count fluctuated heavily over the course of the war. You can see Confederate PFD figures at Centreville at 5 OR 1086 and they line up very well with the figures presented on the Peninsula. If anything, the figures on the Peninsula were a little higher than those which we have at Centreville for the same units, although understandably so in that they had been supplemented by several units units and they line up pretty well after making deductions for additional units which had supplemented them.

A fine historian. He didn't use it that extensively in Lost for the Cause, although he did use it some. You essentially just have to find the requisite matching figures.

 

[67th Tigers]

The "conversion" method which he developed is pseudoscience essentially, which is why it hasn't been adopted by virtually anyone else studying the war.

Precise definitions and differences between effective and PFD count fluctuated heavily over the course of the war. You can see Confederate PFD figures at Centreville at 5 OR 1086 and they line up very well with the figures presented on the Peninsula.

The major step, the conversion from effectives to an estimate of PFD, is taken straight from Livermore and is used by the likes of Busey. It is wrong, because it is miscalibrated, but the reasoning is sound.

I happen to have all the returns for the ANV in a spreadsheet, and the correct value for adding back officers is +8%, thus:

We then have the problem of conversion to PFD, as the rebels don't report slaves in their trains etc. In the Federal army these were around 1/6th of the whole force. For the Federals this would give a conversion 0.77 PFD (inc. offrs) = rebel definition of effectives

Now, whenever I have good samples for effective strength of the Federals, it's something close to this. I personally think that converting the Federals to effectives is a better idea.

However, McClellan's estimates are made in the aggregate present category. This is an easy conversion:

Take the reported value of "effectives" and multiply by 1.2889.

So, with regards to Yorktown and Warwick infantry on the 5th April, there were ca. 14,173 effective infantry and heavy arty on the line on the 5th April, using the 30th April memo strengths. This would equate to 18,268 aggregate present, exclusive of field artillery and cavalry, without making any adjustment for losses during the siege. If you accept the various observations of heavy sickness and discharged troops at reorganisation for the war, then adding 10-20% is not unreasonable. If not correcting, then you should acknowledge that the value 3.5 weeks earlier was higher.

McClellan stated on the 3rd April he expected to find 15,000 in the position, which was the bottom end of the estimates he had from Heintzelman etc. (who gave estimates of 15-20,000). If you track McClellan's estimates of Magruder's strength during the Yorktown operations they are quite good. He expected 15,000 on 3rd April, on the 4th staff estimated Magruder had been reinforced and now had 20-25,000, and debriefs on the 6th of PW's said 30-40,000. McClellan stated he thought he was facing 30,000, which was about right. On the 20th April, McClellan wrote Burnside that Johnston's whole force had finally joined Magruder, and was above 80,000 (again, correct for AP).

Whatever decisions McClellan made, he was never fooled.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

The major step, the conversion from effectives to an estimate of PFD, is taken straight from Livermore and is used by the likes of Busey. It is wrong, because it is miscalibrated, but the reasoning is sound.

I happen to have all the returns for the ANV in a spreadsheet, and the correct value for adding back officers is +8%, thus:

View attachment 517765

We then have the problem of conversion to PFD, as the rebels don't report slaves in their trains etc. In the Federal army these were around 1/6th of the whole force. For the Federals this would give a conversion 0.77 PFD (inc. offrs) = rebel definition of effectives

Now, whenever I have good samples for effective strength of the Federals, it's something close to this. I personally think that converting the Federals to effectives is a better idea.

However, McClellan's estimates are made in the aggregate present category. This is an easy conversion:

View attachment 517769

Take the reported value of "effectives" and multiply by 1.2889.

So, with regards to Yorktown and Warwick infantry on the 5th April, there were ca. 14,173 effective infantry and heavy arty on the line on the 5th April, using the 30th April memo strengths. This would equate to 18,268 aggregate present, exclusive of field artillery and cavalry, without making any adjustment for losses during the siege. If you accept the various observations of heavy sickness and discharged troops at reorganisation for the war, then adding 10-20% is not unreasonable. If not correcting, then you should acknowledge that the value 3.5 weeks earlier was higher.

McClellan stated on the 3rd April he expected to find 15,000 in the position, which was the bottom end of the estimates he had from Heintzelman etc. (who gave estimates of 15-20,000). If you track McClellan's estimates of Magruder's strength during the Yorktown operations they are quite good. He expected 15,000 on 3rd April, on the 4th staff estimated Magruder had been reinforced and now had 20-25,000, and debriefs on the 6th of PW's said 30-40,000. McClellan stated he thought he was facing 30,000, which was about right. On the 20th April, McClellan wrote Burnside that Johnston's whole force had finally joined Magruder, and was above 80,000 (again, correct for AP).

Whatever decisions McClellan made, he was never fooled.

McClellan "was never fooled." That is the Joke of the Day!

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

McClellan "was never fooled." That is the Joke of the Day!

Well, then, it's really good that he wasn't fooled early in the Peninsula Campaign because he surely was fooled earlier at SECOND Manassas.
Per History.com Editors, August 21, 2018: "Though much loved by his men, McClellan was deliberate and cautious in the extreme, and from early in the conflict he consistently overestimated the strength of Confederate troops facing him."

McClellan's inability to properly estimate enemy troop strengths goes all the way back to Manassas: " Johnston withdrew his army from Manassas to a more easily defensible position at Culpeper, some 40 miles south and on the other side of the Rappahannock. The Union Army's inspection of the abandoned Confederate works revealed that the enemy's defenses had been far weaker than McClellan had claimed. In particular, a number of the Confederate cannons were found to be only logs painted black, known as "Quaker guns." – History.com Editors, Nov. 9, 2009

 

[67th Tigers]

Well, then, it's really good that he wasn't fooled early in the Peninsula Campaign because he surely was fooled earlier at First Manassas.
Per History.com Editors, August 21, 2018: "Though much loved by his men, McClellan was deliberate and cautious in the extreme, and from early in the conflict he consistently overestimated the strength of Confederate troops facing him."

McClellan's inability to properly estimate enemy troop strengths goes all the way back to Manassas: " Johnston withdrew his army from Manassas to a more easily defensible position at Culpeper, some 40 miles south and on the other side of the Rappahannock. The Union Army's inspection of the abandoned Confederate works revealed that the enemy's defenses had been far weaker than McClellan had claimed. In particular, a number of the Confederate cannons were found to be only logs painted black, known as "Quaker guns." – History.com Editors, Nov. 9, 2009

McClellan was at 1st Bull Run now?

 

[Nathan Towne]

The major step, the conversion from effectives to an estimate of PFD, is taken straight from Livermore and is used by the likes of Busey. It is wrong, because it is miscalibrated, but the reasoning is sound.

I happen to have all the returns for the ANV in a spreadsheet, and the correct value for adding back officers is +8%, thus:

View attachment 517765

We then have the problem of conversion to PFD, as the rebels don't report slaves in their trains etc. In the Federal army these were around 1/6th of the whole force. For the Federals this would give a conversion 0.77 PFD (inc. offrs) = rebel definition of effectives

Now, whenever I have good samples for effective strength of the Federals, it's something close to this. I personally think that converting the Federals to effectives is a better idea.

However, McClellan's estimates are made in the aggregate present category. This is an easy conversion:

View attachment 517769

Take the reported value of "effectives" and multiply by 1.2889.

So, with regards to Yorktown and Warwick infantry on the 5th April, there were ca. 14,173 effective infantry and heavy arty on the line on the 5th April, using the 30th April memo strengths. This would equate to 18,268 aggregate present, exclusive of field artillery and cavalry, without making any adjustment for losses during the siege. If you accept the various observations of heavy sickness and discharged troops at reorganisation for the war, then adding 10-20% is not unreasonable. If not correcting, then you should acknowledge that the value 3.5 weeks earlier was higher.

McClellan stated on the 3rd April he expected to find 15,000 in the position, which was the bottom end of the estimates he had from Heintzelman etc. (who gave estimates of 15-20,000). If you track McClellan's estimates of Magruder's strength during the Yorktown operations they are quite good. He expected 15,000 on 3rd April, on the 4th staff estimated Magruder had been reinforced and now had 20-25,000, and debriefs on the 6th of PW's said 30-40,000. McClellan stated he thought he was facing 30,000, which was about right. On the 20th April, McClellan wrote Burnside that Johnston's whole force had finally joined Magruder, and was above 80,000 (again, correct for AP).

Whatever decisions McClellan made, he was never fooled.

I own Livermore's Numbers and Losses. As you know, while it is a book which has value, it was really a very cursory examination relative to the scale of resources which are and even then were available if one really goes digging.

Busey and Martin's figures were derived directly from a combination of Army returns, but also directly from Confederate and Federal rolls.

Your assessment regarding Confederate force strength is just not accurate. It is simply false that Confederate figures were typically only formulated in "effectives" and we have extensive documentation to show that officers were included in the rolls, as well as in the Reports from which the Antietam figures are derived.

Your theory regarding converting U.S. forces to effectives and vice versa is simply unworkable. Sherman's Army Group in the Atlanta Campaign reported "effectives" figures which actually tended to be slightly higher than his PFD figures, for instance. In that special case, the "effectives" tally for U.S. forces is often used, but the PFD figures are not far off. You simply take Confederate PFD figures, or figures which otherwise roughly match what they would be based on what else is known and compare them to the corresponding U.S. figures.

To be sure, not everyone in U.S. PFD returns was holding a rifle on the firing line. Neither was such the case in the Confederate Army either. It is well known that Confederate PFD figures should be used and that some older historiography sometimes misleadingly used lower effectives returns which can be misleading for comparison purposes.

As you know, not all units were included in the latter returns, such as the April 30th return.

The way that this is being done in the overwhelming majority of the historiography today is sound and correct.

 

[67th Tigers]

I own Livermore's Numbers and Losses. As you know, it was really a very cursory examination relative to the scale of resources which are and even then were available.

Busey and Martin's figures were derived directly from a combination of Army returns, but also directly from Confederate and Federal rolls.

and from a conversion via Livermore's formulae when they only had "effectives" to go on. Newton did the same.

Your assessment regarding Confederate force strength is just not accurate. It is simply false that Confederate figures were typically only formulated in "effectives" and we have extensive documentation to show that officers were included in the rolls, as well as in the Reports from which the Antietam figures are derived.

Your theory regarding converting U.S. forces to effectives and vice versa is completely bogus, in my view. Sherman's Army Group in the Atlanta Campaign reported "effectives" figures which actually tended to be slightly higher than his PFD figures, for instance. In that special case, the "effectives" tally for U.S. forces is often used, but the PFD figures are not far off. You simply take Confederate PFD figures, or figures which otherwise roughly match what they would be based on what else is known and compare them to the corresponding U.S. figures.

Sherman defined his logistics etc. as being "effective" and thus he used a different meaning to the rebels.

To be sure, not everyone in U.S. PFD returns was holding a rifle on the firing line. Neither was such the case in the Confederate Army either.

In the ANV, it was. Johnston had redefined PFD to be only effectives. If you look at ANV returns, as explained by Taylor, they only were the "fighting strength" of the army. If you find an ANV return, it will have an entry for "effectives" or sometimes two. Usually it is only the enlisted "fighting strength" of the army, but "total effectives" is sometimes found adding officers. The logistics trains etc. were not listed under this category.

When Johnston took over in the west, he again separated out the fighting troops and the logistics troops, and the latter was around 1/6th of the total. He wanted to have slaves replace them but, unlike the east, the slaves were unreliable.

Hooker also did the same in the Federal army. Hence about 20,000 "for duty" in the logistics train weren't carried under PFD on the 30th April 1864 return, but only appeared under aggregate present. In McClellan's time, returns were made out as per the regulation, including the logistics troops under PFD, and McClellan himself comments about needing to make the adjustment to effectives.

Since this is a Pinkerton thread, Pinkerton reported aggregate present estimates, and attempted to correct to effectives by removing 1/6th, but his calculator instead removed 6% or so.

As you know, not all units were included in the later returns, such as the April 30th return.

Yes. We are missing the 26th VA, 32nd VA and several other units on this memo.

 

[Belfoured]

This doesn't seem to be true, and Pinkerton soon got some very accurate numbers in late 1861.

The problem is, people compare the whole of the Virginia theatre with just Centreville.

I've seen some confirmation bias in the Rich Mountain operations, for example, where McClellan's estimate for the whole rebel force, and even Sears admitted McClellan's estimates were correct, and that 6-7,000 was correct for 7.5 infantry regts, 6 coys of cavalry and 2 batteries.

How accurate were Pinkerton's numbers for the time frame of the Seven Days?

 

[Nathan Towne]

and from a conversion via Livermore's formulae when they only had "effectives" to go on. Newton did the same.



Sherman defined his logistics etc. as being "effective" and thus he used a different meaning to the rebels.



In the ANV, it was. Johnston had redefined PFD to be only effectives. If you look at ANV returns, as explained by Taylor, they only were the "fighting strength" of the army. If you find an ANV return, it will have an entry for "effectives" or sometimes two. Usually it is only the enlisted "fighting strength" of the army, but "total effectives" is sometimes found adding officers. The logistics trains etc. were not listed under this category.

When Johnston took over in the west, he again separated out the fighting troops and the logistics troops, and the latter was around 1/6th of the total. He wanted to have slaves replace them but, unlike the east, the slaves were unreliable.

Hooker also did the same in the Federal army. Hence about 20,000 "for duty" in the logistics train weren't carried under PFD on the 30th April 1864 return, but only appeared under aggregate present. In McClellan's time, returns were made out as per the regulation, including the logistics troops under PFD, and McClellan himself comments about needing to make the adjustment to effectives.

Since this is a Pinkerton thread, Pinkerton reported aggregate present estimates, and attempted to correct to effectives by removing 1/6th, but his calculator instead removed 6% or so.




Yes. We are missing the 26th VA, 32nd VA and several other units on this memo.

Confederate PFD returns included both officers and the file (and some others). Have you looked at these returns @67th Tigers? I have poured through more of them then I can even express. Here, again, is the February, 1862 return for the Department of Northern Virginia. Notice how it contains both officers and men.

5 OR 1086:

Yes, I am fully aware as to what McClellan was stating that way as far as his PFD figures not being a precise measure as to how many men were actually on the line in each given unit, particularly if only attempting to get the file strength, but his PFD figures were readily comparable to Confederate PFD figures for the same purpose.

Regarding the April 30th returns, yes, that is what raises the total. We can then backtrack this from each point of the campaign. For instance, we can do so from the 34,400 men PFD, for instance, which the Army approximately had on April 11th and run it back (and forward) from there and match it up to see that these are real numbers, not made up numbers after "conversions" or "corrections."

The bizarre thing about this is that the numbers which you have used at Yorktown are not the numbers which you would get after adding in additional men per the Newton formula. They are what you get straight from what we have available to us.

Vignola, who is essentially using the numbers from rolls and returns for the earlier figures, quotes Newton's figure of approximately 87,890 men PFD on page xii for the approximate size of the Confederate Army on May 31st. This ultimately works out pretty well though because Newton missed several Confederate units which had joined the Army, as you know.