Pickett's Charge Objective

[E_just_E]

If we accept Imboden's OR as credable the question remains who /what is the support Lee was missing July 3rd ? .

Support? You mean what would have turned day 3 around? Aerial assault, helicopters, armored vehicles, or about 50,ooo more troops. Neither of those happened. They were not there. I think that Lee was not missing support, he was missing judgement. Gettysburg was a chance encounter anyways. Grab the troops after day 1, while you are ahead, move up North, regroup some place more appropriate, dig in and wait.

 

[jharold587]

Lee was going by his training as do most military commanders. He was trained in Napolionic tactics. Which stated when attacking a triangle defense (forget the fish hook) hit both legs of the triangle and if unsuccessfull the point has been weakended by drawing off troops to support the atttacks on the legs. Those would be the attacks on Culps hill and up the Emmettsburg Rd on July 2. Also napolionic tactics say in an assault on an entrenched force the attacking force needs a 3 to 1 advantage. WE know there were about 7,00o federals at the point of concentration on Cemetary ridge, Lee did not. The assault was doomed because it needed 21,000 assault troops to be successfull.

J H Harker Chaplain 4th OVI

 

[rpkennedy]

Excellent thread .

I've been trying to compose my thoughts for a few days as this topic is of great interest .

For a long time the idea of the so-called Pickett's Charge was Lee investing everything on a " Hail Mary " ; a frontal assault against a strong defensive position across an open field more than a mile wide . Those 13,000 troops were then supposed to break through the Union lines at the "copse of trees " and somehow defeat 80,000 Union soilders and their plentiful artillery support . It makes Lee seem crazy to attempt such a feat .

Given this scenario we also are supposed to accept that Lee only used 20% of his available troops while the rest of his army licked their wounds .

Historians have been having a field day with this topic and there are numerous pedigreed scholars debating and studying every "what if " imaginable . So what was Lee's objective July 3rd ????

There is a " Three Prong Attack " theory I find interesting .

Some believe it was Lee's most brilliant and daring plan ever but he kept the fact of its failure secret out of concern for his army's morale . (?)

Here is a brief outline :

The first of the three planned attacks was " Pickett's Charge ".....nine brigades about 13,000 men .

The second attack was to be launched by Ewell . At 10am July 3rd Ewell got a message from Lee to stop fighting and wait for a signal, at which time he would renew his own attack . But after Ewell pulled his men out of combat around 10:30, no other concerted attack was ever launched by these seven brigades . Why not ?

The triggering event for Ewell's attack was to be the arrival of about 6,000 rebel cavalry in the rear of Culp's Hill...... which represented the third planned attack .

The third attack suggests that Lee orders Stuart around the northeastern tip of the Union lines with orders to circle back west and charge Cemetery Ridge from the REAR in support of Pickett's charge from the front . Why didn't Stuart arrive ? Custer and his 2700 troopers prevented Stuart's 6000 exhausted men from reaching their goal .

With J.E.B Stuart behind Culp's Hill he could have dropped off 1000 men from Jenkin's brigade to attack Culp's Hill from the rear while Ewell's 10,000 attacked from the front while his remaining 5000 horsemen moved across the Fishook to hit the copse of trees from the rear while Pickett's Charge hit it from the front . Confederate Horsemen could have driven off the Union artillerymen...who evidently carried no personal weapons behind their own infantry lines....and turned the Union cannon around and fired canister into the rear of the Union infantrymen anticipating only a Confederate attack from their front . Attacked from front and rear with nowhere to retreat surrender would be their only way out alive .

Longstreet says in his memoirs that , had Pickett's Charge been successful , his divisions under Hood and McLaws were ready to "spring to the charge " . The two brigades of Anderson's division under Wilcox and Lang received orders from Gen. Anderson...who was WITH Lee...which means the orders came from Lee himself . Its important to note that these troops were to attack in SUPPORT and not part of Pickett's charge . Their role as support became moot as it became obvious that the attack had failed .

Custer certinly deserves credit for stopping Stuart from reaching Culp's Hill . The fight on East Cavalry Field may have been one of the most decisive actions of the entire battle but its often been dismissed as a meaningless event .

The final insight into Lee's plan appears in Gen Imboden's OR .

Lee is quoted as saying that if his troops " had been supported as they were to have been - but for some reason not yet fully explained to me, were not - we would have held the position and the day would have been ours . Too bad ! Too Bad ! TOO BAD !! " .

What does he mean by " if they had been supported as they were to have been " ????

Two brigades never made it all the way across the field before turning back . Thats not it . Artillery ??? They hammered the Union lines for two hours but ran out of ammo . Is that the " support " Lee questions ? Its not Anderson's brigade ....or AP Hill......Longstreet??? ....the only reasonable explanation is the arrival of Stuart's men at Culp's Hill and behind the Copse of Trees .

If so here is some legitimate blame laid on JEB Stuart and the consequences of his ill fated ride . His men were too worn out and he failed to anticipate the suicidal tenacity of Gen George Armstrong Custer .

If Stuart was supposed to be attacking the Union lines, then why did Lee write in his report that the cavalry was sent off to the left to protect the flank?

I've never been particularly convinced that there was some grand scheme that was derailed by a division of cavalry under Gregg. Longstreet's attack was what it was; a roll of the dice by an aggressive commander that failed.

R

 

[cash]

Lot's of folklore and hypothesis in this, including the fact that Custer was neither a General then nor commanded the troops that fought with Stuart's 3 miles east of Gettysburg.

Well, Custer was a brevet brigadier general during this battle, so yes, he was a general. Correct that he wasn't in command of the Federal cavalry on the field, other than his own brigade.

Here is a fairly long and detailed compilation of what CSA members said about Stuart's orders in the campaign, written by Stuart's chief of staff who knew his orders. Quoting on the subject:

We may dismiss at once the inconsiderate charge that Stuart disobeyed or exceeded the orders given to him by General Lee, for General Lee states that Stuart acted "in the exercise of the discretion given to him." Stuart had submitted his plans to his commander, in a personal interview. Those plans were approved, and he was authorized to carry them out if in his opinion it seemed best to do so. The responsibility of the movement, strategically considered, rests with General Lee. Many considerations may be urged in its favor. Two objects were placed before Stuart. He was desired to gain information of the enemy's movements, and to damage and delay him on his march. Let us consider the latter object. Among the direct results of Stuart's movement we find that Meade was deprived of the services of all of his cavalry except Buford's division until noon on the 2d of July, and that Buford's division was withdrawn from Meade's left on the second day of the battle at Gettysburg to protect the depot of supplies at Westminster, leaving unguarded the flank of Sickles' corps, to which circumstance is largely attributed the success of Longstreet's attack upon that corps. A portion of French's command was also diverted eastward, to protect communication with Washington. Indeed, no one can read the despatches which passed between Meade and Halleck from the 28th of June to the 1st of July without noting the perplexity which existed in regard to Lee's movements, and the wide divergence eastward of Meade's corps, both caused by the presence of Stuart in his rear. From this cause alone the 6th corps was able to participate only in the battle of the last day. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that in one respect General Stuart's movement accomplished all that was anticipated. General Lee expected that he would be able to delay the movements of the enemy, and produce confusion and uncertainty in regard to the movements of his own army.

That excerpt doesn't deal with the Picket-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge.

There have been a lot of what-ifs about Stuart at Gettysburg since the 1860s, somehow those what-ifs became unsubstantiated and alternate "reality" and blame at some point.

True. One of the biggest unsubstantiated claims is that Stuart was attacking the Union rear on July 3.

 

[cash]

Excellent thread .

I've been trying to compose my thoughts for a few days as this topic is of great interest .

For a long time the idea of the so-called Pickett's Charge was Lee investing everything on a " Hail Mary " ; a frontal assault against a strong defensive position across an open field more than a mile wide . Those 13,000 troops were then supposed to break through the Union lines at the "copse of trees " and somehow defeat 80,000 Union soilders and their plentiful artillery support . It makes Lee seem crazy to attempt such a feat .

Given this scenario we also are supposed to accept that Lee only used 20% of his available troops while the rest of his army licked their wounds .

Historians have been having a field day with this topic and there are numerous pedigreed scholars debating and studying every "what if " imaginable . So what was Lee's objective July 3rd ????

There is a " Three Prong Attack " theory I find interesting .

Some believe it was Lee's most brilliant and daring plan ever but he kept the fact of its failure secret out of concern for his army's morale . (?)

Here is a brief outline :

The first of the three planned attacks was " Pickett's Charge ".....nine brigades about 13,000 men .

The second attack was to be launched by Ewell . At 10am July 3rd Ewell got a message from Lee to stop fighting and wait for a signal, at which time he would renew his own attack . But after Ewell pulled his men out of combat around 10:30, no other concerted attack was ever launched by these seven brigades . Why not ?

The triggering event for Ewell's attack was to be the arrival of about 6,000 rebel cavalry in the rear of Culp's Hill...... which represented the third planned attack .

The third attack suggests that Lee orders Stuart around the northeastern tip of the Union lines with orders to circle back west and charge Cemetery Ridge from the REAR in support of Pickett's charge from the front . Why didn't Stuart arrive ? Custer and his 2700 troopers prevented Stuart's 6000 exhausted men from reaching their goal .

With J.E.B Stuart behind Culp's Hill he could have dropped off 1000 men from Jenkin's brigade to attack Culp's Hill from the rear while Ewell's 10,000 attacked from the front while his remaining 5000 horsemen moved across the Fishook to hit the copse of trees from the rear while Pickett's Charge hit it from the front . Confederate Horsemen could have driven off the Union artillerymen...who evidently carried no personal weapons behind their own infantry lines....and turned the Union cannon around and fired canister into the rear of the Union infantrymen anticipating only a Confederate attack from their front . Attacked from front and rear with nowhere to retreat surrender would be their only way out alive .

Longstreet says in his memoirs that , had Pickett's Charge been successful , his divisions under Hood and McLaws were ready to "spring to the charge " . The two brigades of Anderson's division under Wilcox and Lang received orders from Gen. Anderson...who was WITH Lee...which means the orders came from Lee himself . Its important to note that these troops were to attack in SUPPORT and not part of Pickett's charge . Their role as support became moot as it became obvious that the attack had failed .

Custer certinly deserves credit for stopping Stuart from reaching Culp's Hill . The fight on East Cavalry Field may have been one of the most decisive actions of the entire battle but its often been dismissed as a meaningless event .

The final insight into Lee's plan appears in Gen Imboden's OR .

Lee is quoted as saying that if his troops " had been supported as they were to have been - but for some reason not yet fully explained to me, were not - we would have held the position and the day would have been ours . Too bad ! Too Bad ! TOO BAD !! " .

What does he mean by " if they had been supported as they were to have been " ????

Two brigades never made it all the way across the field before turning back . Thats not it . Artillery ??? They hammered the Union lines for two hours but ran out of ammo . Is that the " support " Lee questions ? Its not Anderson's brigade ....or AP Hill......Longstreet??? ....the only reasonable explanation is the arrival of Stuart's men at Culp's Hill and behind the Copse of Trees .

If so here is some legitimate blame laid on JEB Stuart and the consequences of his ill fated ride . His men were too worn out and he failed to anticipate the suicidal tenacity of Gen George Armstrong Custer .

There was no route to the rear of the Union line that Stuart could use. Check out a topographical map of the area. Also, Stuart's actions make no sense if his job was to attack the rear of the Union line. If that was his job, he wouldn't have tried so lightly to test the Union cavalry. He wouldn't have broken off so easily. Also, he wouldn't have fired a cannon in all four directions to announce his presence and kill any element of surprise.

It makes far more sense that Stuart was guarding the confederate left flank. He would advance to contact with the Federals in order to ascertain where they were, then withdraw to be able to guard against them attacking on the left.

 

[ole]

Lots of speculation as to why Stuart was on on East Cavalry Field. His troops were exhausted and his horses needed another week of care to get back the strength wasted. If he was intended to do something significant there, it was a misjudgement. So I lean toward the guarding of the left flank.

 

[W. Richardson]

If Stuart was supposed to be attacking the Union lines, then why did Lee write in his report that the cavalry was sent off to the left to protect the flank?

I've never been particularly convinced that there was some grand scheme that was derailed by a division of cavalry under Gregg. Longstreet's attack was what it was; a roll of the dice by an aggressive commander that failed.

R

All good questions rpkennedy, but if he were protecting the flank why attack ?

Let's say he attacks to "protect" the flank...........One must now ask............What if he had been beaten and broken (remember his men were tired, his horses wore out) and driving from the field ? Now the left flank is open, that isn't protecting the flank.

What if the opposite had happened...........Stuart drives Gregg from the field, does Stuart..........

A. Stop and hold the line there ?
B. Does he continue on into the rear of the AoTP ?

He doesn't have to actually reach Cemetery Ridge to throw fear into the AoTP. The enemy just being in the rear of an American Civil War Army was enough to cause fear and demoralizing effects, especially when 12,000 - 15,000 enemy infantry are marching toward them in the front. One of the biggest fears of an Army is to have the enemy get into it's rear, and even more so when being slammed from the front as well.

I am not saying Stuart and Lee planned a coordinated attack on Cemetery Hill cause I honestly do not know, but I see it as possible, maybe as no more than Stuart being in the rear.

Respectfully,

William

 

[W. Richardson]

There was no route to the rear of the Union line that Stuart could use. Check out a topographical map of the area. Also, Stuart's actions make no sense if his job was to attack the rear of the Union line. If that was his job, he wouldn't have tried so lightly to test the Union cavalry. He wouldn't have broken off so easily. Also, he wouldn't have fired a cannon in all four directions to announce his presence and kill any element of surprise.

It makes far more sense that Stuart was guarding the confederate left flank. He would advance to contact with the Federals in order to ascertain where they were, then withdraw to be able to guard against them attacking on the left.

Very well could have been as you stated, I can't disagree with your post. That would explain the cannon fire in all four directions as a way to possibly draw out Gregg and locate him.

Respectfully,

William

 

[AUG]

While all this is being discussed, what I have always wondered was if a full scale assault on Cemetery Hill would have been successful. The attempt made by Ewell late on July 2 with only two brigades was merely a demonstration to support Longstreet's attacks to the southwest. It managed to reach the crest, but failed to achieve a major breakthrough. Of course Rhodes' Division never made their assault.

Would it have been possible (or logical) to send Pickett's Division along with Pettigrew and Trimble up Cemetery Hill rather than Cemetery Ridge and have Rhodes' Division support a breakthrough? In my opinion, Cemetery Hill looks like an exposed position. When attacking across the left flank of the AoP any assault must be more spread out and, as is the case with Pickett's Charge, fire can be concentrated on a particular attack much more easily, whereas an assault up Cemetery Hill would have been much more concentrated. Unless I am missing something, a direct assault up Cemetery Hill sounds much more logical than Cemetery Ridge. Any thoughts?

 

[E_just_E]

While all this is being discussed, what I have always wondered was if a full scale assault on Cemetery Hill would have been successful. The attempt made by Ewell late on July 2 with only two brigades was merely a demonstration to support Longstreet's attacks to the southwest. It managed to reach the crest, but failed to achieve a major breakthrough. Of course Rhodes' Division never made their assault.

Would it have been possible (or logical) to send Pickett's Division along with Pettigrew and Trimble up Cemetery Hill rather than Cemetery Ridge and have Rhodes' Division support a breakthrough? In my opinion, Cemetery Hill looks like an exposed position. When attacking across the left flank of the AoP any assault must be more spread out and, as is the case with Pickett's Charge, fire can be concentrated on a particular attack much more easily, whereas an assault up Cemetery Hill would have been much more concentrated. Unless I am missing something, a direct assault up Cemetery Hill sounds much more logical than Cemetery Ridge. Any thoughts?

I think that Sickles moving his troops to low ground provided an easy target for Longstreet that Lee could not resist; had that attack gone differently and the confederates captured the Round Tops, the federals would be surrounded with no place to go. Maybe a direct N to S attack was planned, but got to keep in mind that the Cemetery Hill is pretty high as well. Still think that Lee had no business fighting day 2, because the terrain was so unfavorable for him.

 

[AUG]

I think that Sickles moving his troops to low ground provided an easy target for Longstreet that Lee could not resist; had that attack gone differently and the confederates captured the Round Tops, the federals would be surrounded with no place to go. Maybe a direct N to S attack was planned, but got to keep in mind that the Cemetery Hill is pretty high as well. Still think that Lee had no business fighting day 2, because the terrain was so unfavorable for him.

I agree, a number of Hood's Division probably would have been put to better use in an assault on the Peach Orchard and southern end of Cemetery Ridge on July 2 rather than the rough ground to the south. But I am speaking of an attack on Cemetery Hill on July 3 with Pickett, Pettigrew, Trimble, and Rhodes.

 

[E_just_E]

I agree, a number of Hood's Division probably would have been put to better use in an assault on the Peach Orchard and southern end of Cemetery Ridge on July 2 rather than the rough ground to the south. But I am speaking of an attack on Cemetery Hill on July 3 with Pickett, Pettigrew, Trimble, and Rhodes.

Ok. That's a different story

Reference point, day 3 map:

Expired Image Removed

I suspect that that attack would have to happen North to South. And the line would have to be in town. So you take all the Red troops and you stack them right about were the 2 North-most red lines are, and behind them. And you take artillery out of the equation, because you cannot shoot from canons located in the town, and the feds will not shoot towards the town. So you are going to send 50,000 people up hill (got to check my altimeter next time I am there on the difference between the town and Cemetary Hill) against 50,000 more dug in. Through a very narrow sieve. Disaster.

 

[AUG]

Ok. That's a different story

Reference point, day 3 map:

Expired Image Removed

I suspect that that attack would have to happen North to South. And the line would have to be in town. So you take all the Red troops and you stack them right about were the 2 North-most red lines are, and behind them. And you take artillery out of the equation, because you cannot shoot from canons located in the town, and the feds will not shoot towards the town. So you are going to send 50,000 people up hill (got to check my altimeter next time I am there on the difference between the town and Cemetary Hill) against 50,000 more dug in. Through a very narrow sieve. Disaster.

Well my original point is that an assault up Cemetery Hill would seem like a much more logical choice than Cemetery Ridge. As we know, a direct assault on Cemetery Ridge with Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble failed because they were attacking a front wider than their own, which means they were too spread out to cause a major breakthrough and drew fire to both flanks. An attack up Cemetery Hill would be a much narrower front; fire could not be massed as easily on an attacking force. Cemetery Hill is small enough that an attack by Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble would come up the north and western sides of the hill. If successful it would place Culps Hill and Cemetery Ridge in danger.

I don't believe Pickett, Pettigrew, Trimble and Rhodes could roll up the whole Federal left, but if Lee had to make an attack on July 3, I just wonder if Cemetery Hill would have been a better choice. I would guess it comes down to what Lee's ultimate objective of Pickett's Charge was in the first place and whether he could achieve the same by taking Cemetery Hill.

 

[E_just_E]

Well my original point is that an assault up Cemetery Hill would seem like a much more logical choice than Cemetery Ridge. As we know, a direct assault on Cemetery Ridge with Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble failed because they were attacking a front wider than their own, which means they were too spread out to cause a major breakthrough. They were enfiladed from north and south. An attack up Cemetery Hill would be a much narrower front; fire could not be massed as easily on an attacking force. Cemetery Hill is small enough that an attack by Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble would come up the north and western sides of the hill. If successful it would place Culps Hill and Cemetery Ridge in danger.

I don't believe Pickett, Pettigrew, Trimble and Rhodes could roll up the whole Federal left, but if Lee had to make an attack on July 3, I just wonder if Cemetery Hill would have been a better choice. I would guess it comes down to what Lee's ultimate objective of Pickett's Charge was in the first place and whether he could achieve the same by taking Cemetery Hill.

Here is the thing: If you attack an equal number of the enemy who has a much better advantage of terrain you are going to lose. Lee knew that. He was not stupid. Any way he was going to attack, he was going to lose in Gettysburg once the federals took the superior terrain after the retreat in day one.

That's why it baffles me that he did not do the only logical move after day one, which would had been to go North, find a suitable place for a battle, take the terrain advantage and let them come to him. But he didn't.

The only explanation I can give is that he really did not realize how many federal troops there were. I think that he might have thought that he had a 3:1 advantage. Otherwise, attacking the same number of troops that are fortified in a better terrain is a sure loss. And he knew it. And he was not suicidal/careless/stupid.

I'd love to hear alternative explanations...

 

[rpkennedy]

All good questions rpkennedy, but if he were protecting the flank why attack ?

Let's say he attacks to "protect" the flank...........One must now ask............What if he had been beaten and broken (remember his men were tired, his horses wore out) and driving from the field ? Now the left flank is open, that isn't protecting the flank.

What if the opposite had happened...........Stuart drives Gregg from the field, does Stuart..........

A. Stop and hold the line there ?
B. Does he continue on into the rear of the AoTP ?

He doesn't have to actually reach Cemetery Ridge to throw fear into the AoTP. The enemy just being in the rear of an American Civil War Army was enough to cause fear and demoralizing effects, especially when 12,000 - 15,000 enemy infantry are marching toward them in the front. One of the biggest fears of an Army is to have the enemy get into it's rear, and even more so when being slammed from the front as well.

I am not saying Stuart and Lee planned a coordinated attack on Cemetery Hill cause I honestly do not know, but I see it as possible, maybe as no more than Stuart being in the rear.

Respectfully,

William

Cash answered your question. Stuart was feeling for the Union cavalry in order to figure out their dispositions so he c poo uke react to them, if necessary.

R

 

[OpnCoronet]

General Lee wanted to break the Union Line in the center... If Pickett's Charge had succeded and the Union Line was split in two what happens next? Does the Union/Meade "give" up? Does the Union/Meade retreat further back like they did on Day 1 taking a defensive position along Pipe Creek etc? I've read that Jeb Staurt was suppose to swing wide around the north end of Gettysburg and "meet" Pickett's Division behind Cem. Ridge. once they had broken through. Again, what exactly is the objective of breaking the Union Line into two?

In the absence of any evidence of a comprehensive plan of Lee's extant(so far) for Day 3(or apparently 1 and 2 also) in military practice, breaking an enemy line is the first step in rolling up the line in one direction or another; in this case, to role up the Union left onto Cemetary Hill. Lee's original orders to Ewell, apparently envisioned him either taking that position, or at least fixing the Union Right as almost 2/3's of the AoP is crushed at Cemetary Hill.
Military practice for a force whose line is pierced, is to either counter-attack and repair the line, or, depending upon circumstances and/or commander's temperament, retreat(if he can) to fight another day.
IMO, Lee's not just trying to break the Union Line, but planning on enveloping the entire Union Right and crush it. If he were successful, the remnants of the Union Left and survivors of the Right, would be in no condition to make a stand anywhere short of the Washington or Baltimore defenses.

 

[War Horse]

Support? You mean what would have turned day 3 around? Aerial assault, helicopters, armored vehicles, or about 50,ooo more troops. Neither of those happened. They were not there. I think that Lee was not missing support, he was missing judgement. Gettysburg was a chance encounter anyways. Grab the troops after day 1, while you are ahead, move up North, regroup some place more appropriate, dig in and wait.

Where were the helicopters anyway? Good post!

 

[War Horse]

Here is the thing: If you attack an equal number of the enemy who has a much better advantage of terrain you are going to lose. Lee knew that. He was not stupid. Any way he was going to attack, he was going to lose in Gettysburg once the federals took the superior terrain after the retreat in day one.

That's why it baffles me that he did not do the only logical move after day one, which would had been to go North, find a suitable place for a battle, take the terrain advantage and let them come to him. But he didn't.

The only explanation I can give is that he really did not realize how many federal troops there were. I think that he might have thought that he had a 3:1 advantage. Otherwise, attacking the same number of troops that are fortified in a better terrain is a sure loss. And he knew it. And he was not suicidal/careless/stupid.

I'd love to hear alternative explanations...

Let's not forget about the captured courier. Lee really didn't know the size of the force he was facing. He also had an enormous respect for his troops and felt they could accomplish what may seem impossible to others. All of your questions are very good! I would love to know myself.

 

[ellsworthpc]

Having a bit of fun as a Gettysburg studier, 'alt history fan' and armchair strategist, so please forgive if what I am about to suggest is appropriate for another thread. I would second the idea that Lee's strategy of attacking the middle was the critical mistake because his best corp -- Longstreets -- had already basically lost to Hancock's core formations on day 2. By the morning of day 3, the Union forces are in enfillade positions where the middle ground becomes a killing zone no matter what. Without controlling both the Round Tops and Cemetary Hill, they've put their infantry into the worst possible world even if they break through. Picture this instead... At around 1:00p.m., about 30% of the Rebel Artillery opens up exactly as before... while the remaining 60% gets set up to move. The three divisions line up.... and march through the treelines against Kilpatrick to the south, supported by the remaining 10% (2-3 batteries) target the infantry positions. Part of Stuart's group demonstrates where they were, the rest are positioned to support the new charge... They leave the AotP in control of now useless high ground, with 12000-15000 troops and all the Union artillery facing the wrong direction, yes?