Pickett's Charge Objective

[cash]

Interesting thing: There is a whole hypothesis of the charge called "the little clump of trees" hypothesis. This is the map they use to support it:

Expired Image Removed

and we know it's not close to reality...

Troy Harman's view is that the actual "clump of trees" they were supposed to head for was Ziegler's Grove, which would put them on a line to Cemetery Hill. He bases that on the fact that you can't see the copse of trees from where the Virginians formed, but you can see the top of Zigler's Grove. I've spoken with him about his viewpoint a few times and a lot of it makes sense.

 

[cash]

Sometime ago I read (or saw) an article on why Pickett's charge failed. It was because Lee couldn't see the terrain.
He saw "the little clump of trees" but didn't see the fences on the Emmetsburg road, and the dips in the ground, that terribly slowed the advancing troops and made them targets of artillery. Some hypothesis is that Lee was used to plantation ground, uninterrupted terrain, unlike Pennsylvania farms, replete with fences.

I wouldn't put much credence in that. The dips in the terrain were useful to give the troops some cover on their march forward. I would speculate that was part of the plan. Lee knew farms had fences. Virginia farms had fences, too. On July 2 there were attacks all along the Union front on Cemetery Ridge, so it would be reasonable to assume that the fences were taken down on July 2.

 

[Drew]

Sometime ago I read (or saw) an article on why Pickett's charge failed. It was because Lee couldn't see the terrain.
He saw "the little clump of trees" but didn't see the fences on the Emmetsburg road, and the dips in the ground, that terribly slowed the advancing troops and made them targets of artillery. Some hypothesis is that Lee was used to plantation ground, uninterrupted terrain, unlike Pennsylvania farms, replete with fences.

I think Lee had been around the block, a few times. You know, outside of plantation grounds, like Mexico City and every where else he'd worked. He'd defeated the Union Army of the Potomac outside of plantation grounds several times.

He could see the terrain very well and he could also see the Union batteries on Cemetery Ridge. Those were comprised almost completely of rifled guns, that could not fire canister as effectively as smooth bore cannons. The latter were of far greater danger to a force advancing across an open field. The position appeared not nearly as impregnable to him as it is does to us in our hindsight.

 

[ole]

When you stand on Seminary Ridge and look over to Cemetery Ridge, you can't help but think "What was he thinking!"

With few exceptions, the marching troops were exposed to shot and shell and subsequently cannister. By the time the Rebs got within rifle range, a good many had laid down. It is to the great credit of the Rebs that some of them continued on and actually assailed the angle and almost took it.

It was suicide.

 

[rpkennedy]

Troy Harman's view is that the actual "clump of trees" they were supposed to head for was Ziegler's Grove, which would put them on a line to Cemetery Hill. He bases that on the fact that you can't see the copse of trees from where the Virginians formed, but you can see the top of Zigler's Grove. I've spoken with him about his viewpoint a few times and a lot of it makes sense.

I tend to agree with Harmon on this point. Ziegler's Grove makes the a lot of sense as a target for an attack on Cemetery Hill.

R

 

[cash]

When you stand on Seminary Ridge and look over to Cemetery Ridge, you can't help but think "What was he thinking!"

With few exceptions, the marching troops were exposed to shot and shell and subsequently cannister. By the time the Rebs got within rifle range, a good many had laid down. It is to the great credit of the Rebs that some of them continued on and actually assailed the angle and almost took it.

It was suicide.

Next time stand where the Virginia troops formed, by the Spangler Farm. You won't think that.

 

[brass napoleon]

Not sure what his next objective would had been. All I know is that he could have not gone over Culp's Hill (and other, bigger actually, wooded hills) to converge on cemetery ridge with the rest of the forces. They'd have to walk the horses up and down Culp's Hill ...

And anyone who's "walked" up Culp's Hill, even without a horse, can tell you that's no stroll in the park!

 

[ole]

Sometime ago I read (or saw) an article on why Pickett's charge failed. It was because Lee couldn't see the terrain.
He saw "the little clump of trees" but didn't see the fences on the Emmetsburg road, and the dips in the ground, that terribly slowed the advancing troops and made them targets of artillery. Some hypothesis is that Lee was used to plantation ground, uninterrupted terrain, unlike Pennsylvania farms, replete with fences.

Problem was, godofredus, that these weren't the snake fences that could be quickly dismantled. These were post and rail fences. They can also be dismantled quickly, but not by someone who is not familiar with them.

 

[ole]

Next time stand where the Virginia troops formed, by the Spangler Farm. You won't think that.

Were we talking about the PPT Charge? Or not?

 

[Lost Cause]

They had generally fought well but had been let down by their commanders. Post-Chancellorsville, the AotP had probably its best crop of officers of the war in command positions at all levels.

Even with what Lee knew, what could realistically be accomplished by 15,000 men in that particular attack? There was no real plan to follow up any breaches (with the exception of Wilcox and Lang's Brigades) and so everything depended on the initial attack force to not only take the position but also exploit it. That's an awfully tall order unless one believes that the breach itself would cause the AotP to fall apart which is, as I said, a very optimistic appraisal of the situation.

R

One does not have to look further to see what would have happened if the Confederates broke through during the charge than Longstreet's attack at Chicamauga. Although different circumstances and hindsight aside, this is merely a possible answer to the question. Fortunately for the AOP, Meade was not Rosecrans.

 

[cash]

Were we talking about the PPT Charge? Or not?

Yes. Stand where the Virginia troops formed for the charge. It was near the Spangler Farm. You won't question it.

 

[wescul]

I'm not sure that we know this. In fact, the more I learn (and I'm still learning) the more I think we don't know what we think we know. All of the arguing in this Forum is indicative of that. Everyone's got an opinion, but no one really knows. I don't mean just Gettysburg, but the whole dang thing.

Drew you are very correct and I had no idea that my original post would generate such debate! Over 150 years later all we have are opinions and in some cases a few "Battle Reports" and the "Fog of War" from those that were there. Like a few others I have read Alternate Theory Books/Articles about Gettysburg/Pickett's Charge/and Longstreet's Mood. Another hot topic was Slavery and General Ewell...the alternate theory was if General Ewell had taken the Heights (If practicable) the first day, the Union Army would have had to retreat possibly to Pipe Creek or ground not as suitable and The ANV would have won the Penn/Gettysburg Campaign thus being recognized by Europe and other foreign powers thus enabling slavery into the 1900's. AGAIN THIS WAS AN ALTERNATE THEORY ARTICLE I READ...With the passion of this forum, I'm sure that it will generate a ton of HEALTHY DEBATE forums (-:

 

[shoney]

Charges over open ground happened many times during the war, and some of them succeeded. We also have to remember that more than just numbers count when an attack is made. I think Lee thought "those people" defending would run, lose their nerve, panic etc. People forget how important command is during a fight. People always look at the common soldier and blame them for running or breaking when it was actually the Brigade or Division commanders who lost their nerve. It happened a lot during the war. Hancock was not running, he was the perfect man to command that part of the battle and repulse that attack.

 

[E_just_E]

Yes. Stand where the Virginia troops formed for the charge. It was near the Spangler Farm. You won't question it.

Didn't the VA troops formed on what is today Confederate Rd, with Pickett's battalion located pretty much between the VA and FL monuments? Spangler's Farm is South of the Round Top on Tangletown Rd. That was the area where the Hospitals were...

Here is a visual:

Pickett's troops were on that brown wooded area from the C of "Confederate Ave" to the VA monument (you can see up the street.) The High Water Mark was right at the Ave of "Hancock Ave". Spangler's Farm in off the bottom right in the picture.

 

[Lost Cause]

Hypothetically speaking, Longstreet could have ordered his division commanders line up their brigades in columns rather than long lines, with supporting units protecting their flanks. IMO this presented a greater chance of exploiting a breach. The issue would have been Union artillery and the open ground in which they charged across, just as it was with the actual charge. Alexander would have obviously needed to take it out, or the Confederate troops would have been knocked down like bowling pins.

 

[cash]

Didn't the VA troops formed on what is today Confederate Rd, with Pickett's battalion located pretty much between the VA and FL monuments? Spangler's Farm is South of the Round Top on Tangletown Rd. That was the area where the Hospitals were...

Here is a visual:

Pickett's troops were on that brown wooded area from the C of "Confederate Ave" to the VA monument (you can see up the street.) The High Water Mark was right at the Ave of "Hancock Ave". Spangler's Farm in off the bottom right in the picture.

You're thinking of the George Spangler Farm, which is different from the Spangler Farm. It gets confusing because kids grew up and got their own farms and had the same last name, and it seems like nearly every wife was named Catherine. The George Spangler Farm is off Hospital Road and is where Armistead was taken and where he died.

The Spangler Farm is just to the east of where the Florida Monument is. There's a path from Confederate Avenue to it. Look at your map in Post #25 and see where Kemper's troops are depicted and you can see the Spangler Farm just behind them.

If you go to the Virginia Monument and walk out toward the cannon you can see it to your right in a large depression. The Virginia troops were formed up in that depression, out of sight of Cemetery Ridge. They didn't become visible until they came up to the ridge by the Emmitsburg Road.

 

[JEB]

Excellent thread .

I've been trying to compose my thoughts for a few days as this topic is of great interest .

For a long time the idea of the so-called Pickett's Charge was Lee investing everything on a " Hail Mary " ; a frontal assault against a strong defensive position across an open field more than a mile wide . Those 13,000 troops were then supposed to break through the Union lines at the "copse of trees " and somehow defeat 80,000 Union soilders and their plentiful artillery support . It makes Lee seem crazy to attempt such a feat .

Given this scenario we also are supposed to accept that Lee only used 20% of his available troops while the rest of his army licked their wounds .

Historians have been having a field day with this topic and there are numerous pedigreed scholars debating and studying every "what if " imaginable . So what was Lee's objective July 3rd ????

There is a " Three Prong Attack " theory I find interesting .

Some believe it was Lee's most brilliant and daring plan ever but he kept the fact of its failure secret out of concern for his army's morale . (?)

Here is a brief outline :

The first of the three planned attacks was " Pickett's Charge ".....nine brigades about 13,000 men .

The second attack was to be launched by Ewell . At 10am July 3rd Ewell got a message from Lee to stop fighting and wait for a signal, at which time he would renew his own attack . But after Ewell pulled his men out of combat around 10:30, no other concerted attack was ever launched by these seven brigades . Why not ?

The triggering event for Ewell's attack was to be the arrival of about 6,000 rebel cavalry in the rear of Culp's Hill...... which represented the third planned attack .

The third attack suggests that Lee orders Stuart around the northeastern tip of the Union lines with orders to circle back west and charge Cemetery Ridge from the REAR in support of Pickett's charge from the front . Why didn't Stuart arrive ? Custer and his 2700 troopers prevented Stuart's 6000 exhausted men from reaching their goal .

With J.E.B Stuart behind Culp's Hill he could have dropped off 1000 men from Jenkin's brigade to attack Culp's Hill from the rear while Ewell's 10,000 attacked from the front while his remaining 5000 horsemen moved across the Fishook to hit the copse of trees from the rear while Pickett's Charge hit it from the front . Confederate Horsemen could have driven off the Union artillerymen...who evidently carried no personal weapons behind their own infantry lines....and turned the Union cannon around and fired canister into the rear of the Union infantrymen anticipating only a Confederate attack from their front . Attacked from front and rear with nowhere to retreat surrender would be their only way out alive .

Longstreet says in his memoirs that , had Pickett's Charge been successful , his divisions under Hood and McLaws were ready to "spring to the charge " . The two brigades of Anderson's division under Wilcox and Lang received orders from Gen. Anderson...who was WITH Lee...which means the orders came from Lee himself . Its important to note that these troops were to attack in SUPPORT and not part of Pickett's charge . Their role as support became moot as it became obvious that the attack had failed .

Custer certinly deserves credit for stopping Stuart from reaching Culp's Hill . The fight on East Cavalry Field may have been one of the most decisive actions of the entire battle but its often been dismissed as a meaningless event .

The final insight into Lee's plan appears in Gen Imboden's OR .

Lee is quoted as saying that if his troops " had been supported as they were to have been - but for some reason not yet fully explained to me, were not - we would have held the position and the day would have been ours . Too bad ! Too Bad ! TOO BAD !! " .

What does he mean by " if they had been supported as they were to have been " ????

Two brigades never made it all the way across the field before turning back . Thats not it . Artillery ??? They hammered the Union lines for two hours but ran out of ammo . Is that the " support " Lee questions ? Its not Anderson's brigade ....or AP Hill......Longstreet??? ....the only reasonable explanation is the arrival of Stuart's men at Culp's Hill and behind the Copse of Trees .

If so here is some legitimate blame laid on JEB Stuart and the consequences of his ill fated ride . His men were too worn out and he failed to anticipate the suicidal tenacity of Gen George Armstrong Custer .

 

[JeffBrooks]

Don't rely on the History Channel for accurate information.

Truth, indeed. Which is very sad, considering what it once was. And even sadder, considering what it could be.

 

[E_just_E]

If so here is some legitimate blame laid on JEB Stuart and the consequences of his ill fated ride . His men were too worn out and he failed to anticipate the suicidal tenacity of Gen George Armstrong Custer .

Lot's of folklore and hypothesis in this, including the fact that Custer was neither a General then nor commanded the troops that fought with Stuart's 3 miles east of Gettysburg. Here is a fairly long and detailed compilation of what CSA members said about Stuart's orders in the campaign, written by Stuart's chief of staff who knew his orders. Quoting on the subject:

We may dismiss at once the inconsiderate charge that Stuart disobeyed or exceeded the orders given to him by General Lee, for General Lee states that Stuart acted "in the exercise of the discretion given to him." Stuart had submitted his plans to his commander, in a personal interview. Those plans were approved, and he was authorized to carry them out if in his opinion it seemed best to do so. The responsibility of the movement, strategically considered, rests with General Lee. Many considerations may be urged in its favor. Two objects were placed before Stuart. He was desired to gain information of the enemy's movements, and to damage and delay him on his march. Let us consider the latter object. Among the direct results of Stuart's movement we find that Meade was deprived of the services of all of his cavalry except Buford's division until noon on the 2d of July, and that Buford's division was withdrawn from Meade's left on the second day of the battle at Gettysburg to protect the depot of supplies at Westminster, leaving unguarded the flank of Sickles' corps, to which circumstance is largely attributed the success of Longstreet's attack upon that corps. A portion of French's command was also diverted eastward, to protect communication with Washington. Indeed, no one can read the despatches which passed between Meade and Halleck from the 28th of June to the 1st of July without noting the perplexity which existed in regard to Lee's movements, and the wide divergence eastward of Meade's corps, both caused by the presence of Stuart in his rear. From this cause alone the 6th corps was able to participate only in the battle of the last day. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that in one respect General Stuart's movement accomplished all that was anticipated. General Lee expected that he would be able to delay the movements of the enemy, and produce confusion and uncertainty in regard to the movements of his own army.

There have been a lot of what-ifs about Stuart at Gettysburg since the 1860s, somehow those what-ifs became unsubstantiated and alternate "reality" and blame at some point.

 

[JEB]

If we accept Imboden's OR as credable the question remains who /what is the support Lee was missing July 3rd ?

I'm also accepting the fact that Stuart's troopers were burnt out from their journey to Gettyburg .