On Lee, Stuart, Orders, and Gettysburg....

[Lubliner]

@ErnieMac. Thanks for getting back to me. Yes, I forgot about the order being at the top of the thread (?) that quick. I would cop a plea and claim "a senior moment" but the truth is I am not the brightest bubble light on the Christmas tree to begin with. I am not trying to bash Stuart, it's just that I am surprised that he appears not to have considered that establishing and maintaining contact with Ewell was the highest priority, as opposed to the wagons, etc. I know he tried hard to rectify the situation but was unable. Is it wrong to assume that contact with Ewell is the highest priority in Lee's orders to Stuart?

I feel quite the same as you do @Cavalier. As the original order is to cross (one way or another) the Potomac and then establish and maintain contact (communication) with Ewell's right, is the order at hand. The purpose of doing so would be to 'see and hear' the enemy due to blind positions of the confederate troops. Stuart's force would help to lead and keep enemy at bay.
Marshall's orders, (both times) it sounds like he is involved in foraging purposes as the primary pursuit, and this is my concern, which Longstreet may have interpreted from the campfire chats as being on a glory round. Stuart could not have made that error in judgement, which I believe is where the error stands when placed under scrutiny. Lee certainly didn't misconstrue the purpose of cavalry. Marshall did.
Lubliner.

 

[FZ11]

"WITHOUT HINDERANCE"- Hooker had moved and was in Stuarts path. It would be late June 27th- early June 28th before Stuart is across the Potomac. The last of Lees troops Hood and McClaws had already crossed on the 26th. "MUST move on and feel the right of Ewells troops" Ewell had already been engaged with the enemy when Stuart arrives at Gettysburg

I think you're missing the fact that "the right of Ewell's troops" is supposed to be in Harrisburg Pa. Once Stuart begins his scout,the most direct route to "Ewell's right",in Harrisburg, is roughly the route Stuart took. Look at the map. Hope this helps.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

I think you're missing the fact that "the right of Ewell's troops" is supposed to be in Harrisburg Pa. Once Stuart begins his scout,the most direct route to "Ewell's right",in Harrisburg, is roughly the route Stuart took. Look at the map. Hope this helps.

Precisely right. And a point that most miss.

 

[Stone in the wall]

I think you're missing the fact that "the right of Ewell's troops" is supposed to be in Harrisburg Pa. Once Stuart begins his scout,the most direct route to "Ewell's right",in Harrisburg, is roughly the route Stuart took. Look at the map. Hope this helps.

Thanks for your reply. I'll check it out when I have more time.

 

[Gettysburg Guide #154]

I agree with FZ21. Stuart was heading directly for the place where he should have found Ewell's right. Indeed, if the order says that Ewell's right will proceed by way of the Emittsburg Road, that would suggest that he the "right" would be headed toward York, which which it did. In my view the problem was the foraging. If the primary objective is to cover Ewell's right, then dragging along 100 or so captured supply wagons, which likely slowed the progress, looks like an error, at least in hindsight.

The interesting thing in the orders for me is Longstreet saying "[You will] order General Hampton, whom I suppose you will leave here in command, to report to me at Millwood, . . ." If Hampton's Legion had stayed with the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia, the cavalry available to Lee would have been much more capable (and more capably commanded) than the brigades of Robertson or Jenkins. As an aside, I think Jenkins did a fairly good job for the most part.

 

[John S. Carter]

View attachment 352840
Col. Charles C. Marshall
Wartime Artwork, Artist unknown, PD image​

Submitted for your consideration...

These are the three orders given to Jeb Stuart on June 22 and 23, 1863. They constitute the operational orders for what became his expedition. They are as clear as mud. The person responsible for drafting them was R.E. Lee's military secretary, Col. Charles C. Marshall. In an attempt to downplay his own role, Marshall later claimed that Stuart should have been shot for disobeying said orders. Read them for yourself and determine whether Stuart disobeyed them. I will submit to you that if you review them carefully, you will conclude that Stuart, in fact, obeyed them to the letter.

This is the first order, sent to Stuart on June 22, 1863. It was written by Lee's military secretary, Col. Charles Marshall:

HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863.

Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry

GENERAL:
I have just received your note of 7. 40 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday [ERIC'S NOTE: LEE REFERS HERE TO THE JUNE 21, 1863 BATTLE OF UPPERVILLE] were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army.

One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of [A. G.] Jenkins' brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff officers for their respective departmentsby no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General

Longstreet sent this letter with Lee's first order, also dated June, 22, 1863:

HEADQUARTERS, Miliwood,
June 22, 1863
7 p. m.

Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL:

General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hopewell Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton,whom I suppose you will leave here in command, to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.

Most respectfully,

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.

P. S. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you caxi take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.

Longstreet conveniently forgot about this order when he wrote his post-war memoirs and blamed Stuart for being "late" to Gettysburg.

Late in the afternoon on June 23, Lee sent a second order, also drafted by Marshall. It's so full of holes that one could drive a truck through them. But this is THE operational order for Stuart's expedition.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 23, 1863
5 p. m.

Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL:

Your notes of 9 and 10.30 a. m. to-day have just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money will not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them, but I can have nothing seized by the men.

If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown.

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, &c.

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army.

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.

The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow.

Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.

I am, very respectfully and truly, yours,

R. E. LEE,
General.

The commander of the two brigades Lee mentions was Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, who disobeyed Stuart's very detailed orders. Had he obeyed them, he and two brigades would have been in Chambersburg on June 30, and would have escorted Hill's Corps on July 1. However, Robertson dillydallied and didn't enter Pennsylvania until July 3. The best laid plans of mice and men....

"Fredericktown" is modern-day Frederick, Maryland.

Stuart's very able adjutant, Maj. Henry B. McClellan, later claimed that there was a third, verbal order delivered to Stuart on the night of June 23, but there is absolutely no evidence to support this claim. Instead, it seems likely to me that the June 23 written order is what McClellan claimed, since it would have been delivered to Stuart that night. McClellan also claimed that it more or less repeated the June 23 order, which lends further credit to the thought that there was no third order. Personally, I do not believe that there was a third order.

Since these are the operational orders for what became Stuart's expedition, it's fair to say that these are the ground rules under which Stuart operated. After years and years of study, and after examining nearly every minute of Stuart's expedition in detail (see Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg for that analysis), J. D. Petruzzi and I came to the conclusion that, while there was indeed plenty of blame to go around, Stuart nevertheless obeyed these orders to the letter. Jeff Wert disagrees with us, and Jeff and I have had some very spirited discussions about this subject over the years. Then again, that's what makes this fun.

Is this the same Marshall whose descendant was General George C. Marshall,the Chief of Staff.during World Warll? Did he send any other orders to divisional commanders during this battle like to Longstreet on the third day.Is there any bios on him or any more illustrations of other communications he had with Davis or Richmond,One has to remember that Lee gave his commanders free reign as to how they carried out the orders ,he seemed to think that Stuart was another Jackson and understood what he wanted to accomplish .You go there and then you do what you have to to accomplish whatever you can against the foe inorder for his defeat.SOMEWHAT like this?

 

[rpkennedy]

I agree with FZ21. Stuart was heading directly for the place where he should have found Ewell's right. Indeed, if the order says that Ewell's right will proceed by way of the Emittsburg Road, that would suggest that he the "right" would be headed toward York, which which it did. In my view the problem was the foraging. If the primary objective is to cover Ewell's right, then dragging along 100 or so captured supply wagons, which likely slowed the progress, looks like an error, at least in hindsight.

The interesting thing in the orders for me is Longstreet saying "[You will] order General Hampton, whom I suppose you will leave here in command, to report to me at Millwood, . . ." If Hampton's Legion had stayed with the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia, the cavalry available to Lee would have been much more capable (and more capably commanded) than the brigades of Robertson or Jenkins. As an aside, I think Jenkins did a fairly good job for the most part.

It's an interesting question to ask what if Grumble Jones was in command of the detachment rather than Beverly Robertson. Robertson was incompetent and Stuart called Jones the best outpost officer in the army. Jones would not have stayed in the lower Valley and sat idle like Robertson did. Unfortunately, Robertson was the senior officer and Stuart would not have replaced any of the brigades that he took with him with Jones since they hated one another.

Ryan

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

It's an interesting question to ask what if Grumble Jones was in command of the detachment rather than Beverly Robertson. Robertson was incompetent and Stuart called Jones the best outpost officer in the army. Jones would not have sat in the lower Valley and sat idle like Robertson did. Unfortunately, Robertson was the senior officer and Stuart would not have replaced any of the brigades that he took with him with Jones since they hated one another.

Ryan

Ryan is precisely correct.

 

[Virginia Dave]

View attachment 352840
Col. Charles C. Marshall
Wartime Artwork, Artist unknown, PD image​

Submitted for your consideration...

These are the three orders given to Jeb Stuart on June 22 and 23, 1863. They constitute the operational orders for what became his expedition. They are as clear as mud. The person responsible for drafting them was R.E. Lee's military secretary, Col. Charles C. Marshall. In an attempt to downplay his own role, Marshall later claimed that Stuart should have been shot for disobeying said orders. Read them for yourself and determine whether Stuart disobeyed them. I will submit to you that if you review them carefully, you will conclude that Stuart, in fact, obeyed them to the letter.

This is the first order, sent to Stuart on June 22, 1863. It was written by Lee's military secretary, Col. Charles Marshall:

HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863.

Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry

GENERAL:
I have just received your note of 7. 40 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday [ERIC'S NOTE: LEE REFERS HERE TO THE JUNE 21, 1863 BATTLE OF UPPERVILLE] were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army.

One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of [A. G.] Jenkins' brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff officers for their respective departmentsby no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General

Longstreet sent this letter with Lee's first order, also dated June, 22, 1863:

HEADQUARTERS, Miliwood,
June 22, 1863
7 p. m.

Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL:

General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hopewell Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton,whom I suppose you will leave here in command, to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.

Most respectfully,

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.

P. S. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you caxi take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.

Longstreet conveniently forgot about this order when he wrote his post-war memoirs and blamed Stuart for being "late" to Gettysburg.

Late in the afternoon on June 23, Lee sent a second order, also drafted by Marshall. It's so full of holes that one could drive a truck through them. But this is THE operational order for Stuart's expedition.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 23, 1863
5 p. m.

Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL:

Your notes of 9 and 10.30 a. m. to-day have just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money will not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them, but I can have nothing seized by the men.

If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown.

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, &c.

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army.

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.

The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow.

Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.

I am, very respectfully and truly, yours,

R. E. LEE,
General.

The commander of the two brigades Lee mentions was Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, who disobeyed Stuart's very detailed orders. Had he obeyed them, he and two brigades would have been in Chambersburg on June 30, and would have escorted Hill's Corps on July 1. However, Robertson dillydallied and didn't enter Pennsylvania until July 3. The best laid plans of mice and men....

"Fredericktown" is modern-day Frederick, Maryland.

Stuart's very able adjutant, Maj. Henry B. McClellan, later claimed that there was a third, verbal order delivered to Stuart on the night of June 23, but there is absolutely no evidence to support this claim. Instead, it seems likely to me that the June 23 written order is what McClellan claimed, since it would have been delivered to Stuart that night. McClellan also claimed that it more or less repeated the June 23 order, which lends further credit to the thought that there was no third order. Personally, I do not believe that there was a third order.

Since these are the operational orders for what became Stuart's expedition, it's fair to say that these are the ground rules under which Stuart operated. After years and years of study, and after examining nearly every minute of Stuart's expedition in detail (see Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg for that analysis), J. D. Petruzzi and I came to the conclusion that, while there was indeed plenty of blame to go around, Stuart nevertheless obeyed these orders to the letter. Jeff Wert disagrees with us, and Jeff and I have had some very spirited discussions about this subject over the years. Then again, that's what makes this fun.

Thank you for this explanation. JEB is a distant ancestor of mine and I always wondered about why he was blamed.

 

[ivanj05]

I agree with FZ21. Stuart was heading directly for the place where he should have found Ewell's right. Indeed, if the order says that Ewell's right will proceed by way of the Emittsburg Road, that would suggest that he the "right" would be headed toward York, which which it did. In my view the problem was the foraging. If the primary objective is to cover Ewell's right, then dragging along 100 or so captured supply wagons, which likely slowed the progress, looks like an error, at least in hindsight.

The interesting thing in the orders for me is Longstreet saying "[You will] order General Hampton, whom I suppose you will leave here in command, to report to me at Millwood, . . ." If Hampton's Legion had stayed with the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia, the cavalry available to Lee would have been much more capable (and more capably commanded) than the brigades of Robertson or Jenkins. As an aside, I think Jenkins did a fairly good job for the most part.

Those wagons proved vital to Lee on the retreat from Gettysburg, so even with the benefit of hindsight the notion of it being an error remains very arguable, but I do take your point.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Thank you for this explanation. JEB is a distant ancestor of mine and I always wondered about why he was blamed.

You're very welcome. Blowing up these stupid myths is a lifelong mission of mine.

 

[Virginia Dave]

You're very welcome. Blowing up these stupid myths is a lifelong mission of mine.

I appreciate your work. Thank you.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The key to understanding Lee & Stuart's communications before the Battle of Gettysburg is contained in Lee's letters to Stuart.

June 22, 1863, Lee to Stuart

"I have received your note of 7:45 AM this morning to Longstreet... If you find that the enemy is moving northward, & two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge & take care of your rear, you can move the three into Maryland, & take position on Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, & collect all the supplies you can for this army. One one column of Ewell's corps will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmittsburg route, the by Chambersburg. Take charge of A.G. Jenkin's cavalry & give him instructions."

June 22, 1863, Longstreet to Stuart

"General Lee has enclosed to me this letter to you [the letter above], to be forwarded to you... provided that I think you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your... passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you cross by passing to our rear..."

June 23, 1863, Longstreet to Lee

"I have forwarded your letter to Stuart with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy's rear if he thinks he may get through."

June 23, 1863, 5:00 p.m., Lee to Stuart

"Your notes of 9 & 10:30 a.m. today have just been received. If Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades (Robertson & Jones) to watch him & withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw to this side of the [Blue Ridge] tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, & move over to Fredrick."

"You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, & cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on & feel the right of Ewell's troops [Early], collecting information, provisions, etc."

"Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank & rear of the army & in the event of the enemy leaving their front, retire from the [Blue Ridge] west of Shenandoah, ... closing upon the rear of the army."

At this point, the plan that Longstreet referred to was Lee's intention to maneuver Hooker into defending Washington. The forces in the Carolinas would be moved to Virginia & placed under General Beauregard. The combined force would then move on Washington. President Davis either could not or would not do what Lee proposed. Davis' letter responding to Lee's plan was intercepted, so perhaps Lee did not receive his answer.

June 22, 1863 Davis to Lee, intercepted.

"Do not understand me as balancing accounts in the matter of brigades. I only repeat that I have not many to send you, & not enough to form an army to threaten, if not capture, Washington as soon as it is uncovered by Hooker's army."

June 29, 1863, A.G. Cooper to Lee

"While with the President last night, I received your letter of the 23rd instant. After reading it, the President [could not] understand that part of it which refers to the plan of assembling an army at Culpeper under Beauregard. This is the first intimation that he has had that such a plan was ever in contemplation, & taking things into consideration, he cannot see how it can by any possibility be carried into effect."

A few days after Cooper informed Lee that the plan he was executing to draw the AoP across the Potomac, make it withdraw to that city in response to the threat from Beauregard's force at Culpepper & overwhelm it with the combined force was not going to happen, Harry Heath bumped into Buford's cavalry at a town nobody had ever heard of in Pennsylvania. Nothing that Lee had planned for had happened as he had anticipated & that includes Stuart.

It is clear that the orders Lee gave Stuart were part of a plan that could not be implemented. There was no way for Stuart to know that the planned attack on Washington was no longer on the table. Nowhere in Lee's correspondence was a battle to the death with the AoP far away from his base been contemplated.

Given the documentary record, Stuart was acting on the orders he was given to pass around the rear of the AoP gathering up supplies & intel as he went. Nobody, Lee included, had any idea that a battle would be fought at Gettysburg PA, of all places. It appears to me that Stuart had no reason to do anything but what he did. He was carrying out a plan that was no longer in effect. Gettysburg was a complete surprise to everyone.

Is it any wonder that Lee was boiling mad by the third day of a battle that should have been fought on the outskirts of Washington?

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Given the documentary record, Stuart was acting on the orders he was given to pass around the rear of the AoP gathering up supplies & intel as he went. Nobody, Lee included, had any idea that a battle would be fought at Gettysburg PA, of all places. It appears to me that Stuart had no reason to do anything but what he did. He was carrying out a plan that was no longer in effect. Gettysburg was a complete surprise to everyone.

Is it any wonder that Lee was boiling mad by the third day of a battle that should have been fought on the outskirts of Washington?

Precisely correct. See what a difference reading the actual primary documents makes? Which was, of course, the point that I was trying to make all along.

I would add to your correct analysis that if you carefully review the historic record of what Stuart did on his expedition, it becomes clear that he obeyed the orders that he was given to the letter....

 

[Virginia Dave]

Precisely correct. See what a difference reading the actual primary documents makes? Which was, of course, the point that I was trying to make all along.

I would add to your correct analysis that if you carefully review the historic record of what Stuart did on his expedition, it becomes clear that he obeyed the orders that he was given to the letter....

Just ordered your book Plenty of Blame to Go Around. Now to find time to read it.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Just ordered your book Plenty of Blame to Go Around. Now to find time to read it.

Thank you! I hope you enjoy it.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Precisely correct. See what a difference reading the actual primary documents makes? Which was, of course, the point that I was trying to make all along.

I would add to your correct analysis that if you carefully review the historic record of what Stuart did on his expedition, it becomes clear that he obeyed the orders that he was given to the letter....

I agree, the letters convinced me. I never could understand what the heck Lee was Doing wandering around in Pennsylvania. The two pronged move on Washington might have worked. As always, logistics give me grave doubts.

 

[Virginia Dave]

Thank you! I hope you enjoy it.

I am sure i will.