Johnston's Turning Movement at Shiloh

[OldReliable1862]

At about 9:30 AM on 6 April General Albert Sidney Johnston made what was certainly one of, if not the, critical decisions of the first day's fighting at Shiloh. Prentiss' division had collapsed, and, not hearing any firing coming from the Union left, Johnston determined that he had indeed found the Union left flank. It was at this point that he began ordering his brigades to turn left, beginning what was intended to be the flanking move that would hopefully envelop the Union army.

Of course, Johnston was incorrect. He had not found the Union left flank, as Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division was to the left of Prentiss. I do not think we can judge Johnston too harshly for his mistake—the battle of Shiloh was a confused affair, and Johnston made the decision based on what he knew at the time. After beginning his turning movement, Captain Samuel Lockett arrived, reporting a Union "division" (Stuart's brigade) to the left. Johnston was forced to send Jackson's and Chalmers' brigades to deal with this new threat, and replace them with Bowen's and Statham's brigades.

However, what if Johnston does not begin his turning movement too early? Let's say Johnston decides that it's better to be safe than sorry, and decides to extend his line to the Hamburg Road. If I have my chronology correct, Johnston could have taken Bowen's and Statham's reserve brigades and used them to extend his line, and then start the turning movement.

Shiloh was always going to be a risky gamble for the Confederates, and it is true that the terrain made it very difficult to coordinate an attack such as this one. That said, I think that having Johnston not begin his turning movement too early has the potential to greatly alter the first day's fighting at Shiloh. I think that there are two main advantages:

• Dealing with Stuart's Brigade Sooner: The battle on the left flank began quite late at Shiloh, around 11:00 AM. Here, the fight begins sooner, and Stuart could find himself attacked from a direction he does not expect. This could lead to Stuart collapsing earlier than he did historically, which is a benefit to the Confederates.
• Preventing the Hornets' Nest: Assuming Stuart collapses earlier, the Confederates will now be in a position to flank the Wallace/Hurlbut defensive position along the "Sunken" Road and the Peach Orchard. Instead, I expect the battle would likely move in the direction of the Wicker and Cloud Fields. How long this position would hold, I am not sure.

Does this win the battle for the Confederates? Once again, I am not sure, but it does help matters for them considerably.

@DixieRifles: can you please fact-check me on my chronology?

 

[DixieRifles]

the battle of Shiloh was a confused affair,

I'm not sure what you want me to check. I'm not that familiar how the timing of the moves on the different fronts. I would have to read thru one of my Shiloh books. The latest book on Johnston, "The Iron Dice of Battle", mostly speaks of his command style and not details of events that shaped his decisions.

 

[OldReliable1862]

I'm not sure what you want me to check. I'm not that familiar how the timing of the moves on the different fronts.

My apologies, I was hoping you could help check my statement on the timing of Johnston's decision to begin the turning movement, along with the general locations of units.

I would have to read thru one of my Shiloh books. The latest book on Johnston, "The Iron Dice of Battle", mostly speaks of his command style and not details of events that shaped his decisions.

Recently, Australian author Leigh S. Goggin has written a new book entitled Reckless In Their Statements: Challenging History's Harshest Criticisms of Albert Sidney Johnston in the Civil War. I think it is a rather thought-provoking book.

 

[RedRover]

At about 9:30 AM on 6 April General Albert Sidney Johnston made what was certainly one of, if not the, critical decisions of the first day's fighting at Shiloh. Prentiss' division had collapsed, and, not hearing any firing coming from the Union left, Johnston determined that he had indeed found the Union left flank. It was at this point that he began ordering his brigades to turn left, beginning what was intended to be the flanking move that would hopefully envelop the Union army.

Of course, Johnston was incorrect. He had not found the Union left flank, as Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division was to the left of Prentiss. I do not think we can judge Johnston too harshly for his mistake—the battle of Shiloh was a confused affair, and Johnston made the decision based on what he knew at the time. After beginning his turning movement, Captain Samuel Lockett arrived, reporting a Union "division" (Stuart's brigade) to the left. Johnston was forced to send Jackson's and Chalmers' brigades to deal with this new threat, and replace them with Bowen's and Statham's brigades.

The Confederate plan, from three days before the commencement of the battle, was to turn the Union left near the River.

The Confederate force was formed between the Owl and Lick Creeks. The latter on the Confederate right flank, near the Union left.

The plan of battle, allowed for the cavalry to form between the Confederate right flank, and lick creek. And that troops from the succeeding lines of battle or reserve might fill that gap if necessary....

Here's General Beauregard's map of the opposing lines...

Map of the battle field of Shiloh, April 6 & 7, 1862

Relief shown by hachures. Endorsed in ink: Approved G.T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg. Pen-and-ink and watercolor. LC Civil War Maps (2nd ed.) 435.3 Available also through the Library of Congress Web site as a raster image. Vault Acquisitions control no. 15-85

www.loc.gov

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044005544390&seq=356&q1=oblique

During the morning of the battle, it was found necessary to move troops to extend the right, toward Lick Creek. And to press much of Breckinridge's reserve down the bank of Lick Creek, and practically to the river to press back Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division... (shown below in a map of the positions of Sherman's troops, including Stuart's detached brigade on the Union left, joining Lick Creek.

Here's another map of the battlefield, from the official records, showing Stuart's position behind the ravine/creek.

Here's Col. Stuart's report...

The War of the Rebellion: v. 1-53 [serial no. 1-111] Formal reports, both Union and Confederate, of the first seizures of United States property in the southern states, and of all military operations in the field, with the correspondence, order and r

Official records produced by the armies of the United States and the Confederacy, and the executive branches of their respective governments, concerning the military operations of the Civil War, and prisoners of war or prisoners of state. Also annual reports of military departments, calls for...

www.google.com

However, what if Johnston does not begin his turning movement too early? Let's say Johnston decides that it's better to be safe than sorry, and decides to extend his line to the Hamburg Road. If I have my chronology correct, Johnston could have taken Bowen's and Statham's reserve brigades and used them to extend his line, and then start the turning movement.

W. Preston reported on this circumstance that as the Confederate line on the right was reinforced for driving Stuart's brigade.

Col. Roman, for General Beauregard, described the circumstances as followed in his history of General Beauregard's operations...

More description from Roman's work, produced with the aid of General Beauregard...

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044005544390&seq=312

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044005544390&seq=318

General Johnston's son, William Preston Johnston, observed...

Shiloh was always going to be a risky gamble for the Confederates, and it is true that the terrain made it very difficult to coordinate an attack such as this one. That said, I think that having Johnston not begin his turning movement too early has the potential to greatly alter the first day's fighting at Shiloh. I think that there are two main advantages:

• Dealing with Stuart's Brigade Sooner: The battle on the left flank began quite late at Shiloh, around 11:00 AM. Here, the fight begins sooner, and Stuart could find himself attacked from a direction he does not expect. This could lead to Stuart collapsing earlier than he did historically, which is a benefit to the Confederates.

General Sherman noted later the two creeks rendered the Union Army's position pretty secure. Col. Roman of General Beauregard's staff, observed the two creeks certainly secured the left and right flanks of the Union forces, once in line between them... In other words, there was no outflanking Col. Stuart's brigade. It had to be driven from its position along or near the creek, which required Breckinridge's reserves.

• Preventing the Hornets' Nest: Assuming Stuart collapses earlier, the Confederates will now be in a position to flank the Wallace/Hurlbut defensive position along the "Sunken" Road and the Peach Orchard. Instead, I expect the battle would likely move in the direction of the Wicker and Cloud Fields. How long this position would hold, I am not sure.

Does this win the battle for the Confederates? Once again, I am not sure, but it does help matters for them considerably.

@DixieRifles: can you please fact-check me on my chronology?

All of the circumstances mentioned might have pressed Grant's army northward faster, say to the cover of the north bank of the large Dill Branch ravine, etc. Maybe the Confederates might have had enough daylight to organize some more severe attack through that point, and take Pittsburg landing, etc. Even so, Grant would likely have rolled with the punches. Always struck me that short of the Confederates driving Grant's army back a couple more miles against the Owl/Snake creek in disorder, (which was apparently their plan basically), a Confederate victory seems unlikely.

Even if Pittsburg Landing was lost, the Union reinforcements under Buell would have had to land at Crump's landing several miles north of Pittsburg landing, but closer to the point of embarkation at Savannah on the east bank.

 

[Rhea Cole]

RedRover's maps & citations clearly indicate why Grant's left was not in danger of being turned. Nathan Bedford Forrest's bold personal scout after dark is revelatory. It was a physical challenge to cross the banks of the creeks.

In any case, because of the profoundly flawed tactical formation imposed by Beauregard's plan, there was no way for Johnston to issue orders for the proposed movement.

It is useful to note that due to poor staff work or planning, Neither Forrest nor the infantry on the far right received orders to attack in the first place. That might account for the lack of fire on Johnston's right.

 

[rbasin]

He'd have to work it before Buell started arriving. Before that, with his army in hand, absolutely.