Grant Not impressed with Grants performance

[KansasFreestater]

Logistics make the difference between a winning army and one that is not. Whether that failure began at the highest levels of the CS or was just a general lack of understanding is up to interpretation. What is not up to interpretation is that Grant understood the importance of logistics, certainly more so than any adversary he faced on the CS side.

Amateurs study battles & tactics while the professionals study logistics & geography.

For want of a nail the shoe was lost,
for want of a shoe the horse was lost,
for want of a horse the knight was lost,
for want of a knight the battle was lost,
for want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
So a kingdom was lost—all for want of a nail.

 

[KansasFreestater]

In the Vicksburg campaign, Grant maneuvered his army in such a way as to keep two rebel forces separate, fought several battles (and won them all) and locked the larger of the two Confeferate forces inside its fortress at Vicksburg then proceeded to "out camp" the enemy until they cashed in their chips on 4 July. In the Overland campaign it took Grant just six weeks to maneuver the Army of Northern Virginia away from the Rapidan line into the Petersburg defenses and effectively remove that army's ability to threaten any major offensive action. In doing so, though his own casualties were high, he darn near bled the rebel army to death. In the Vicksburg campaign, until they settled into a siege, the two rebel forces were roughly equal in size to Grant's army. In the Overland campaign, Grant had greater numbers, but as one Union soldier said, "the rebel lines were always as long as ours." In the Union army, every living and breathing soldier was counted as present for duty whereas, in the ANV, they tended not to count support troops. In mumbers of men actually in the firing line there wasn't much difference between the two armies until very near the end. Grant's record, in short, was spectacular. He didn't win every battle, but he did win every campaign and captured three rebel armies whole along the way.

I so admire people who can sum up things nicely in one paragraph. You've done that here. Bravo!

 

[Jimklag]

I so admire people who can sum up things nicely in one paragraph. You've done that here. Bravo!

Merci beaucoups.

 

[KansasFreestater]

I understand what you mean now, after I found this. Looney! Nutty as a praline.

1. 
   View attachment 133652William T. Sherman‏ @March_totheSea 16 May 2015
   I'd like the confederacy to try and stop me. I'd like the union to try and stop me. With out the telegraph Lincoln won't know what I've done
   
   0 replies0 retweets0 likes
   
2. 
   View attachment 133653William T. Sherman‏ @March_totheSea 16 May 2015
   Hahahahahahahha. they said I'm crazy I'm not crazy cause if I was crazy I'd have to be crazy so science proves you wrong nice try Sebastian.
   
   0 replies0 retweets0 likes
   
3. 
   View attachment 133654William T. Sherman‏ @March_totheSea 16 May 2015
   So This guy calls me a lunatic and expects me not to rip his heart out. View attachment 133655 amateur. Kids don't forget to wear a coat it's a tad chilly out.View attachment 133656View attachment 133657
4. 1. 
      View attachment 133658William T. Sherman‏ @March_totheSea 16 May 2015
      Jammin to Virgina Belle by Stephen Foster in my undies because I've been relieved of duty due to "allegations of insanity" View attachment 133659 #hatasgonnahate
   2. 1. William T. Sherman Retweeted
         View attachment 133660Abraham Lincoln‏ @AbrahamLinc6 13 May 2015
         Make'em pee their pants Sherm. @March_totheSea
         
         0 replies1 retweet0 likes
         
      2. 
         
      3. 
         View attachment 133661William T. Sherman‏ @March_totheSea 13 May 2015
         Ma bro Abe just gave me the okay on destroying everything you love and hold dear.. Stay in school kids.
         https://twitter.com/march_tothesea

So I went to Twitter and checked out @March_totheSea.
OMG, hilarious! (And I'm a Sherman fan, mind you -- but c'mon, you gotta have a sense of humor!)

 

[O' Be Joyful]

So I went to Twitter and checked out @March_totheSea.
OMG, hilarious! (And I'm a Sherman fan, mind you -- but c'mon, you gotta have a sense of humor!)

I glad someone finally got the joke.

 

[8thFlorida]

Thanks I'll check them out.

However, this is a message board. If I am not mistaken, it is the intention to have conversation and interaction.

Maybe I was fishing for some activity. Instead of leaving to read a bunch of material, how about discussing it here?

How about a few examples to prove my completely uninformed opinion wrong?

If we all take to the library, why have this place?

I'm currently reading a great Grant biography by Jean Edward Smith. I highly recommend it. Although I do hate the tone of the previous responses you received I can say that Grant's grit and risk taking are what set him apart from Federal Generals. What set him apart from a more logistical standpoint was his experience as a Quartermaster in the Mexican War. He learned the persistence he would need to keep his troops constantly resupplied. He also was a quick study during the Mexican war and learned by serving under old Rough and Ready Zachary Taylor. I am fully convinced from this book that these two factors are what made him a great General. Not as good as Lee but pretty darn close to it. His surrender terms to Lee were identical to the surrender terms Taylor had used during some of his greatest campaigns in Mexico. Ironically all these Generals were in the Mexican War. Longstreet was even Grants best man in his wedding. There is so much fascinating history here.

 

[cash]

Historian Nick Sacco of the US Grant National Historic Site has a blog post on Grant biographies.

https://pastexplore.wordpress.com/2...ediocre-good-and-great-u-s-grant-biographies/

 

[KansasFreestater]

Not enough. He could only do that because he a better trampoline and a better stunt cushion, they would report

So true!

 

[KansasFreestater]

Historian Nick Sacco of the US Grant National Historic Site has a blog post on Grant biographies.

https://pastexplore.wordpress.com/2...ediocre-good-and-great-u-s-grant-biographies/

That is a wonderful post, but it needs updating. I am happy to report that even though at the time Sacco wrote this, the excellent book President Grant Reconsidered, by Frank Scaturro, could not be found for less than $125, there is now a paperback edition, which you can get new for $34.57 -- or used, for only $10.20! And I will vouch for it to anyone interested: It is a fascinating book, and worth every cent.

 

[hanna260]

Nor would Lee, nor Longstreet, nor Johnston, etc., etc., etc.

If I recall correctly, Lee had a hand in this situation as well.

 

[cash]

If I recall correctly, Lee had a hand in this situation as well.

There you go relying on what really happened instead of vilifying.

 

[DanSBHawk]

If I recall correctly, Lee had a hand in this situation as well.

Very true. I didn't know much about this situation, so out of curiosity read the relevant correspondence in the OR, and it's pretty obvious that Lee had a major hand in this fiasco.

It is in Series 1, Volume 36, part 3...

On June 3rd, Hancock writes there are many wounded men between the lines, but that they will be "brought off at night."

On June 5th, at 1:00 pm, Hancock writes Meades adjutant that there are still wounded in front of Barlow and asks if they could be brought off. Meade writes Grant asking if it would be possible to "ask, under a flag of truce, to remove the wounded now laying between our lines?" This is the first time Grant is informed there are still some wounded on the field, and he grants permission to "send a flag proposing to suspend firing until each party get their own" wounded.

A half-hour later, Meade writes to Grant that the confederates won't accept a communication under a flag of truce unless it comes from Grant. Apparently the confederates won't honor Meades authority for some reason.

Grant sends a communication to Lee immediately, proposing that unarmed men with litters be allowed to pick up the wounded when no battle is raging. Lee writes back the same day (the 5th) that he fears there might be difficulties or misunderstandings unless it is done in the usual way under a flag of truce.

On the 6th, Grant receives the message from Lee dated the 5th, and writes back to Lee proposing Noon to 3:00 pm for his men to collect wounded under a white flag.

Lee writes back refusing consent to Grants proposal, saying that "either party" must ask for a truce in the "usual way" in order to pick up prisoners. So Grant writes back and accedes to Lees demands, and asks for a "suspension of hostilities" to satisfy Lee, and asks that Lee designate two hours for Grant to pick up his wounded.

So in all, roughly 24 hours has passed, from the time Grant was told about the wounded on the 5th, until the time on the 6th that he asked Lee for a general suspension of hostilities in order to collect the wounded. They each exchanged two communications, and the slowness of the delivery is really what delayed the resolution.

At this point, the whole thing turns into a tragic comedy of errors, with messages between Grant and Lee not being received until after the times requested for the truce, and a confederate litter party mistakenly being captured by union troops. The confederates thought they were in the middle of a truce, but it had not yet been communicated to the union side.

It was, no doubt, a fiasco. But not all on Grant.

 

[Bee]

It was, no doubt, a fiasco. But not all on Grant.

Yes. There was plenty of blame to go around on this tragic situation. Those who wish to further the myth of "Grant the Butcher" conveniently leave out half the details, and they indignantly proclaim their outrage with their own hacked version of the events.

Facts be damed, just craft the version of the story that fits the agenda.

 

[cash]

Very true. I didn't know much about this situation, so out of curiosity read the relevant correspondence in the OR, and it's pretty obvious that Lee had a major hand in this fiasco.

It is in Series 1, Volume 36, part 3...

On June 3rd, Hancock writes there are many wounded men between the lines, but that they will be "brought off at night."

On June 5th, at 1:00 pm, Hancock writes Meades adjutant that there are still wounded in front of Barlow and asks if they could be brought off. Meade writes Grant asking if it would be possible to "ask, under a flag of truce, to remove the wounded now laying between our lines?" This is the first time Grant is informed there are still some wounded on the field, and he grants permission to "send a flag proposing to suspend firing until each party get their own" wounded.

A half-hour later, Meade writes to Grant that the confederates won't accept a communication under a flag of truce unless it comes from Grant. Apparently the confederates won't honor Meades authority for some reason.

Grant sends a communication to Lee immediately, proposing that unarmed men with litters be allowed to pick up the wounded when no battle is raging. Lee writes back the same day (the 5th) that he fears there might be difficulties or misunderstandings unless it is done in the usual way under a flag of truce.

On the 6th, Grant receives the message from Lee dated the 5th, and writes back to Lee proposing Noon to 3:00 pm for his men to collect wounded under a white flag.

Lee writes back refusing consent to Grants proposal, saying that "either party" must ask for a truce in the "usual way" in order to pick up prisoners. So Grant writes back and accedes to Lees demands, and asks for a "suspension of hostilities" to satisfy Lee, and asks that Lee designate two hours for Grant to pick up his wounded.

So in all, roughly 24 hours has passed, from the time Grant was told about the wounded on the 5th, until the time on the 6th that he asked Lee for a general suspension of hostilities in order to collect the wounded. They each exchanged two communications, and the slowness of the delivery is really what delayed the resolution.

At this point, the whole thing turns into a tragic comedy of errors, with messages between Grant and Lee not being received until after the times requested for the truce, and a confederate litter party mistakenly being captured by union troops. The confederates thought they were in the middle of a truce, but it had not yet been communicated to the union side.

It was, no doubt, a fiasco. But not all on Grant.

Thanks for doing the correct action by going to the primary source. If only more would do that.

 

[KansasFreestater]

Very true. I didn't know much about this situation, so out of curiosity read the relevant correspondence in the OR, and it's pretty obvious that Lee had a major hand in this fiasco.

It is in Series 1, Volume 36, part 3...

On June 3rd, Hancock writes there are many wounded men between the lines, but that they will be "brought off at night."

On June 5th, at 1:00 pm, Hancock writes Meades adjutant that there are still wounded in front of Barlow and asks if they could be brought off. Meade writes Grant asking if it would be possible to "ask, under a flag of truce, to remove the wounded now laying between our lines?" This is the first time Grant is informed there are still some wounded on the field, and he grants permission to "send a flag proposing to suspend firing until each party get their own" wounded.

A half-hour later, Meade writes to Grant that the confederates won't accept a communication under a flag of truce unless it comes from Grant. Apparently the confederates won't honor Meades authority for some reason.

Grant sends a communication to Lee immediately, proposing that unarmed men with litters be allowed to pick up the wounded when no battle is raging. Lee writes back the same day (the 5th) that he fears there might be difficulties or misunderstandings unless it is done in the usual way under a flag of truce.

On the 6th, Grant receives the message from Lee dated the 5th, and writes back to Lee proposing Noon to 3:00 pm for his men to collect wounded under a white flag.

Lee writes back refusing consent to Grants proposal, saying that "either party" must ask for a truce in the "usual way" in order to pick up prisoners. So Grant writes back and accedes to Lees demands, and asks for a "suspension of hostilities" to satisfy Lee, and asks that Lee designate two hours for Grant to pick up his wounded.

So in all, roughly 24 hours has passed, from the time Grant was told about the wounded on the 5th, until the time on the 6th that he asked Lee for a general suspension of hostilities in order to collect the wounded. They each exchanged two communications, and the slowness of the delivery is really what delayed the resolution.

At this point, the whole thing turns into a tragic comedy of errors, with messages between Grant and Lee not being received until after the times requested for the truce, and a confederate litter party mistakenly being captured by union troops. The confederates thought they were in the middle of a truce, but it had not yet been communicated to the union side.

It was, no doubt, a fiasco. But not all on Grant.

Thank you, Dan. You've done a service here.

 

[Jimbo_Poke]

Very true. I didn't know much about this situation, so out of curiosity read the relevant correspondence in the OR, and it's pretty obvious that Lee had a major hand in this fiasco.

It is in Series 1, Volume 36, part 3...

On June 3rd, Hancock writes there are many wounded men between the lines, but that they will be "brought off at night."

On June 5th, at 1:00 pm, Hancock writes Meades adjutant that there are still wounded in front of Barlow and asks if they could be brought off. Meade writes Grant asking if it would be possible to "ask, under a flag of truce, to remove the wounded now laying between our lines?" This is the first time Grant is informed there are still some wounded on the field, and he grants permission to "send a flag proposing to suspend firing until each party get their own" wounded.

A half-hour later, Meade writes to Grant that the confederates won't accept a communication under a flag of truce unless it comes from Grant. Apparently the confederates won't honor Meades authority for some reason.

Grant sends a communication to Lee immediately, proposing that unarmed men with litters be allowed to pick up the wounded when no battle is raging. Lee writes back the same day (the 5th) that he fears there might be difficulties or misunderstandings unless it is done in the usual way under a flag of truce.

On the 6th, Grant receives the message from Lee dated the 5th, and writes back to Lee proposing Noon to 3:00 pm for his men to collect wounded under a white flag.

Lee writes back refusing consent to Grants proposal, saying that "either party" must ask for a truce in the "usual way" in order to pick up prisoners. So Grant writes back and accedes to Lees demands, and asks for a "suspension of hostilities" to satisfy Lee, and asks that Lee designate two hours for Grant to pick up his wounded.

So in all, roughly 24 hours has passed, from the time Grant was told about the wounded on the 5th, until the time on the 6th that he asked Lee for a general suspension of hostilities in order to collect the wounded. They each exchanged two communications, and the slowness of the delivery is really what delayed the resolution.

At this point, the whole thing turns into a tragic comedy of errors, with messages between Grant and Lee not being received until after the times requested for the truce, and a confederate litter party mistakenly being captured by union troops. The confederates thought they were in the middle of a truce, but it had not yet been communicated to the union side.

It was, no doubt, a fiasco. But not all on Grant.

Thanks for this post.

What a mess. I haven't spent much time studying this aspect of the war, but anyone know if it was typical to have a two day period before seeking a truce to pick up wounded? Also anyone know what happened to that litter party?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Thanks for this post.

What a mess. I haven't spent much time studying this aspect of the war, but anyone know if it was typical to have a two day period before seeking a truce to pick up wounded? Also anyone know what happened to that litter party?

Grant ordered Meade to return the captured confederates to their own side.

 

[KansasFreestater]

I've come to the conclusion that besides a couple of small time battles along the Cumberland against subpar leadership and accepting the surrender of Lee, Grant was an unimpressive tactical general.

Many times he simply used his superior numbers until the rebels had to back out or give up due to attrition. Vicksburg and The Wilderness are a couple of examples.

Even when Lee surrendered at Appomattox, he was simply overwhelmed after accidentally running into the entire Army of the Potomac on their way to North Carolina.

Outside of his tenacity, I'm not impressed with his performance.

I do realize I am but an infant in my quest for Civil War knowledge, but if I am wrong, I'd like to hear examples
of his tactics winning battles onstead of just having superior numbers.

To respond to the Original Post:

I am reading (and immensely enjoying) Horace Porter's Campaigning with Grant, his memoir of October 1863 through May 1865, which he spent at Grant's side as part of his very close circle of aides. The following passage is the best short summary I have seen of the nature and magnitude of the challenges Grant faced in the Overland Campaign in the spring of 1864. (Porter's original passage is all one long paragraph; I have added the paragraph breaks below.)

Those familiar with military operations, and unprejudiced in their opinion, will concede that, notwithstanding Lee's inferiority in numbers, the advantages were, nevertheless, in his favor in the approaching campaign. Having interior lines, he was able to move by shorter marches, and to act constantly on the defensive at a period of the war when troops had learned to intrench themselves with marvelous rapidity, and force the invading army continually to assault fortified positions. The task to be performed by the Union forces was that of conducting a moving siege.

The field of operations, with its numerous rivers and creeks difficult of approach, its lack of practicable roads, its dense forests, its impassable swamps, and its trying summer climate, debilitating to Northern troops, seemed specially designed by nature for purposes of defense.

Lee and his officers were familiar with every foot of the ground, and every inhabitant was eager to give them information. His army was in a friendly country, from which provisions could be drawn from all directions, and few troops had to be detached to guard lines of supply. The Union army, on the contrary, was unfamiliar with the country, was without accurate maps, could seldom secure trustworthy guides, and had to detach large bodies of troops from the main command to guard its long lines of communication, protect its supply-trains, and conduct the wounded to points of safety.

The Southern Confederacy was virtually a military despotism, with a soldier at the head of its government, and officers were appointed in the army entirely with reference to their military qualifications.

Since Lee had taken command he had not lost a single battle fought in the State of Virginia, and the prestige of success had an effect upon his troops the importance of which cannot easily be over-estimated.

His [Lee's] men were made to feel that they were fighting for their homes and firesides; the pulpit, the press, and the women were making superhuman efforts to "fire the Southern heart"; disasters were concealed, temporary advantages were magnified into triumphant victories, and crushing defeats were hailed as blessings in disguise. In the North there was a divided press, with much carping criticism on the part of journals opposed to the war, which was fitted to discourage the troops and destroy their confidence in their leaders. There were hosts of Southern sympathizers, constituting a foe in the rear, whose threats and overt acts often necessitated the withdrawal of troops from the front to hold them in check.

In all the circumstances, no just military critic will claim that the advantage was on the side of the Union army merely because it was numerically larger.
​

The above passage can be picked apart and perhaps some will dispute various details. My aim is not to provoke a bunch of side-debates, but merely to share a passage that, in its totality, blew me away when I read it a few days ago. It made me see the "big picture" of the Overland Campaign afresh. When you add up everything that Grant was up against in the spring of '64, it helps you to appreciate how huge his -- and the Army of the Potomac's -- accomplishments that spring really were.

 

[Bee]

I am reading (and immensely enjoying) Horace Porter's Campaigning with Grant, his memoir of October 1863 through May 1865, which he spent at Grant's side as part of his very close circle of aides.

I have a collector's edition of campaigning with Grant -- love that book! I have quoted from it on the Meade's
'
Mistakes at Cold harbour thread

Be sure to list page numbers when quoting so I can look it up.

 

[Karen Lips]

The fact remains that he was on the side that won the war.