Grant Not impressed with Grants performance

I have a collector's edition of campaigning with Grant -- love that book! I have quoted from it on the Meade's
'
Mistakes at Cold harbour thread :smile:

Be sure to list page numbers when quoting so I can look it up.
Good for you, Bee! Shoulda known you are way ahead of me on the Grant curve!
I've got the 1992 hardbound Konecky & Konecky edition; this passage is on pp. 39-40.
 
Good for you, Bee! Shoulda known you are way ahead of me on the Grant curve! I've got the 1992 hardbound Konecky & Konecky edition; this passage is on pp. 39-40.

Brooks Simpson mentioned some time back about both John Rawlins & Horace Porter being close to Grant, the two of them have remained high on my historical persons of interest list (along with Eliahu Washburne)
 
Brooks Simpson mentioned some time back about both John Rawlins & Horace Porter being close to Grant, the two of them have remained high on my historical persons of interest list (along with Eliahu Washburne)
It's interesting, though, that Rawlins and Porter have different accounts of Grant's arrival at Chattanooga. Porter's can be found here: https://civilwartalk.com/threads/campaigning-with-grant.6624/
If I remember right, Rawlins was one of those who criticized Thomas's lack of consideration for his visitor. That has always bothered me -- just didn't sound like Thomas's character to be rude. When I read Porter's account (see my comment on @samgrant's thread), it rang true to my impressions of both Grant and Thomas. If it makes any difference, Porter was at that time on Thomas's staff, not Grant's. So I'm sure some cynics will say that Porter was just painting a more favorable portrait of his then-boss, Gen. Thomas. But I think his account is closer to the truth than the irascible Rawlins's.
 
The arrival at Chattanooga is one of the instances in which Grant was very impressive. He traveled to Louisville and then to Nashville and Bridgeport with a very sore leg. The trip from Bridgeport had been harrowing, over a very bad road, more like a logging road in the Washington backwoods than anything when we think of as a road.
By the time Grant got a roof over his head, and a seat by the fireplace, he probably was comfortable enough, especially if he was dressed mainly in wool.
It is virtually impossible for a person without military experience or extensive mountaineering experience just how tough Grant was by 1863.
Just a few months previously he road along with the army in Mississippi without a change of clothes and without an assigned mess.
 
The arrival at Chattanooga is one of the instances in which Grant was very impressive. He traveled to Louisville and then to Nashville and Bridgeport with a very sore leg. The trip from Bridgeport had been harrowing, over a very bad road, more like a logging road in the Washington backwoods than anything when we think of as a road.
By the time Grant got a roof over his head, and a seat by the fireplace, he probably was comfortable enough, especially if he was dressed mainly in wool.
It is virtually impossible for a person without military experience or extensive mountaineering experience just how tough Grant was by 1863.
Just a few months previously he road along with the army in Mississippi without a change of clothes and without an assigned mess.
Wrecked his horse once as General and survived.
 
My two cents, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson, Shiloh; Vicksburg and Jackson, Mississippi; Chattanooga; Willderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor, Seige of Petersburg, Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Atlanta Campaign, and Appomattox Courthouse.
 
I so admire people who can sum up things nicely in one paragraph. You've done that here. Bravo!
Yes. There was plenty of blame to go around on this tragic situation. Those who wish to further the myth of "Grant the Butcher" conveniently leave out half the details, and they indignantly proclaim their outrage with their own hacked version of the events.

Facts be damed, just craft the version of the story that fits the agenda.
The real difference between Grant and certain previous generals who faced Lee and his army is that Grant was a more determined general than the previous generals.This was a general that as Lee realized was one who would not retreat and wait for another try or find fault with other factors in their losses . Grant turned the war into one of nutrition on both sides.This general also gained the support for his actions from Lincoln because he was the Rockwhiler that was called for to place Lee on the defense .It did help that he had a staff of officers who saw the war has he did.Grant while being a noted tactician ,it should be noted that he was supplied with both materiel and soldiers for him to accomplish this.Lee had used his resources in the first two years of the war.If supplied with the ordnance and men which Grant had ,what could Lee and accomplished?.But the home front played a large factor in the end,esp. when there was lack of supplies and food ,some things which the Union home front had plenty of. For those who call Grant a butcher , in order to shorten the war so that fewer lives could be saved prehabs it was best done this way.Lee sent thousands of his soldiers into similar situations .
 
The real difference between Grant and certain previous generals who faced Lee and his army is that Grant was a more determined general than the previous generals.

Superficial.

This was a general that as Lee realized was one who would not retreat and wait for another try or find fault with other factors in their losses . Grant turned the war into one of nutrition on both sides.

Steaks for everyone!

This general also gained the support for his actions from Lincoln because he was the Rockwhiler

No, that was George Thomas. He was the Rock-whiler of Chickamauga.



that was called for to place Lee on the defense .It did help that he had a staff of officers who saw the war has he did.Grant while being a noted tactician ,it should be noted that he was supplied with both materiel and soldiers for him to accomplish this.Lee had used his resources in the first two years of the war.If supplied with the ordnance and men which Grant had ,what could Lee and accomplished.

Sour grapes.


But the home front played a large factor in the end,esp. when there was lack of supplies and food ,some things which the Union home front had plenty of. For those who call Grant a butcher but in order to shorten the war so that fewer lives could be saved prehabs it was best done this way.Lee sent thousands of his soldiers into similar situations .

Lee was the bloodiest general of the war. Anyone going up against him was going to get bloody.
 
Gary Gallagher one of the foremost Civil War historians, teacher, mentor and speaker considers Grant to be one of the five greatest American generals....the others are Washington, Scott, Eisenhower and Marshall. That's quite impressive company.
For those wondering why Lee isn't on that list, Professor Gallagher holds him in high esteem, but does not consider him an American General.
 
Lee was offered the resources that Grant had and he turned the offer down.
Not strictly true. The offer to Lee on April 18, 1861 was "command of an army of 75,000, perhaps 100,000 men" being organized.<Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee, a Biography. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons,. 1934), Vol. XXV, p. 436.>
On March 4, 1864, Grant took over a much larger army- about 860,000 men in total- that was already well organized, well trained and combat-experienced.
 
The real difference between Grant and certain previous generals who faced Lee and his army is that Grant was a more determined general than the previous generals

This really sells Grant short on his abilities to manage the Washington power structure in order to maximize his ability as commanding general:

General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, now outranked by his former subordinate, had forced Grant's hand by requesting to be relieved. Higher rank required Grant to assume overall command.Grant resolved the problem by arranging Halleck's appointment as chief of staff, leaving him in Washington to coordinate orders, freeing Grant to establish headquarters wherever he wished. Halleck's new post separated strategic command from administration, a crucial innovation in modern warfare. Grant avoided the role of military advisor to Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, a role congenial to Halleck, but intolerable to Grant, who intended to remain a commander, rather than a courtier, and to distance himself from politicians. Lincoln's Generals, Grant, Lincoln, and Unconditional Surrender, John Y. Simon, [pg 165-6]
 
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Grant did three things well.
1. He was a field commander at Vicksburg. He rode with the army, ate with them, slept with them. He read the reports everyday; kept track of his logistical arithmetic. He never let his army become stationary until connection with the Mississippi and the Yazoo had been re-established. He took the chance that the plan would fail, and he would be cashiered from command. Then he took responsibility for paroling the Confederate army, instead of capturing it. He knew that would be criticized politically, but at that point he was willing to play the game.
2. Without much preparation, he became the theater commander and army group co-ordinator at Chattanooga. He got Hooker, Sherman and Thomas in position to create problems for Bragg, while constantly fending off the exaggerated concerns over Burnside in Knoxville. His subordinates, including Thomas' division commanders turned in brilliant performances
3. He took the top job. He commanded in form, but he was neither King, Emperor, or President. He accepted the terrible risk that he would be the commander when the war was lost. He commanded armies he could no longer see and advise directly. In this regard, he was the equal of Eisenhower. But Grant's opponent was an American, on American soil, with a tremendous amount of sympathetic support in a legitimate political party in the United States. George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, as great as they were, did not have to deal with Douglas MacArthur, as an example, running for President in 1944 on a peace ticket.
 
To respond to the Original Post:

I am reading (and immensely enjoying) Horace Porter's Campaigning with Grant, his memoir of October 1863 through May 1865, which he spent at Grant's side as part of his very close circle of aides. The following passage is the best short summary I have seen of the nature and magnitude of the challenges Grant faced in the Overland Campaign in the spring of 1864. (Porter's original passage is all one long paragraph; I have added the paragraph breaks below.)

Those familiar with military operations, and unprejudiced in their opinion, will concede that, notwithstanding Lee's inferiority in numbers, the advantages were, nevertheless, in his favor in the approaching campaign. Having interior lines, he was able to move by shorter marches, and to act constantly on the defensive at a period of the war when troops had learned to intrench themselves with marvelous rapidity, and force the invading army continually to assault fortified positions. The task to be performed by the Union forces was that of conducting a moving siege.
you certainly have good taste in books.
The field of operations, with its numerous rivers and creeks difficult of approach, its lack of practicable roads, its dense forests, its impassable swamps, and its trying summer climate, debilitating to Northern troops, seemed specially designed by nature for purposes of defense.

Lee and his officers were familiar with every foot of the ground, and every inhabitant was eager to give them information. His army was in a friendly country, from which provisions could be drawn from all directions, and few troops had to be detached to guard lines of supply. The Union army, on the contrary, was unfamiliar with the country, was without accurate maps, could seldom secure trustworthy guides, and had to detach large bodies of troops from the main command to guard its long lines of communication, protect its supply-trains, and conduct the wounded to points of safety.

The Southern Confederacy was virtually a military despotism, with a soldier at the head of its government, and officers were appointed in the army entirely with reference to their military qualifications.

Since Lee had taken command he had not lost a single battle fought in the State of Virginia, and the prestige of success had an effect upon his troops the importance of which cannot easily be over-estimated.

His [Lee's] men were made to feel that they were fighting for their homes and firesides; the pulpit, the press, and the women were making superhuman efforts to "fire the Southern heart"; disasters were concealed, temporary advantages were magnified into triumphant victories, and crushing defeats were hailed as blessings in disguise. In the North there was a divided press, with much carping criticism on the part of journals opposed to the war, which was fitted to discourage the troops and destroy their confidence in their leaders. There were hosts of Southern sympathizers, constituting a foe in the rear, whose threats and overt acts often necessitated the withdrawal of troops from the front to hold them in check.

In all the circumstances, no just military critic will claim that the advantage was on the side of the Union army merely because it was numerically larger.
The above passage can be picked apart and perhaps some will dispute various details. My aim is not to provoke a bunch of side-debates, but merely to share a passage that, in its totality, blew me away when I read it a few days ago. It made me see the "big picture" of the Overland Campaign afresh. When you add up everything that Grant was up against in the spring of '64, it helps you to appreciate how huge his -- and the Army of the Potomac's -- accomplishments that spring really were.
 
If you want to understand what a disgraceful scumbag Grant could be, I recommend reading two books:

General Grant and the Rewriting of History, by Frank Varney.

Master of War: The Life of General George H. Thomas, by Benson Bobrick

Grant repeatedly smeared officers/generals he didn't like and/or that he viewed as rivals. His memoirs have been proven to be loaded with lies, distortions, and outright fabrications.

This is not to mention the fact that Grant used his men as canon fodder for most of the war and on at least two occasions (that we know of) left wounded men to die on the battlefield because he was too proud to follow the tradition of sending a flag of truce to call for the retrieval of the wounded and the burial of the dead.

Like most human beings, Grant was not all bad. Sometimes he behaved honorably and showed he was capable of being decent and noble. His order prohibiting large-scale frontal assaults is very commendable (and was long overdue). His decision to stand up to the Radicals when they tried to prosecute Robert E. Lee deserves great praise. But, sadly, when all the facts are weighed, the picture that emerges of Grant is not a pretty one.
 
Grant did three things well.
1. He was a field commander at Vicksburg. He rode with the army, ate with them, slept with them. He read the reports everyday; kept track of his logistical arithmetic. He never let his army become stationary until connection with the Mississippi and the Yazoo had been re-established. He took the chance that the plan would fail, and he would be cashiered from command. Then he took responsibility for paroling the Confederate army, instead of capturing it. He knew that would be criticized politically, but at that point he was willing to play the game.
2. Without much preparation, he became the theater commander and army group co-ordinator at Chattanooga. He got Hooker, Sherman and Thomas in position to create problems for Bragg, while constantly fending off the exaggerated concerns over Burnside in Knoxville. His subordinates, including Thomas' division commanders turned in brilliant performances
3. He took the top job. He commanded in form, but he was neither King, Emperor, or President. He accepted the terrible risk that he would be the commander when the war was lost. He commanded armies he could no longer see and advise directly. In this regard, he was the equal of Eisenhower. But Grant's opponent was an American, on American soil, with a tremendous amount of sympathetic support in a legitimate political party in the United States. George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, as great as they were, did not have to deal with Douglas MacArthur, as an example, running for President in 1944 on a peace ticket.
Explanation ; I did not mean to demean the General. What I was stating was that he was a Eisenhower ,Patton,or Alexander as for as his military skills than the previous commanders where.Lee was taken off his strategy by Grant's persistent moves . Grant never retreated as with the other generals . He has Eisenhower recognized the abilities in subordinates as with Sherman and Thomas,he even kept Meade in charge of the PA and Burnside.He as with Patton was like the Pit Bull that would not retreat or let go once committed..Grant did not have a Monty to placate.
 

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