Grant Not impressed with Grants performance

However some, like Forrest imo, don't get enough credit. But I think that's mostly because of his Klan affiliation. It's not good PR.

I think Forrest gets great credit as a soldier, I can't recall any reading that touched on him that didn't give him adequate credit. He was mainly a partisan raider and defender of strategic backwaters and so while a most interesting and talented character he wasn't a vital one.
 
I think Forrest gets great credit as a soldier, I can't recall any reading that touched on him that didn't give him adequate credit. He was mainly a partisan raider and defender of strategic backwaters and so while a most interesting and talented character he wasn't a vital one.
It is quite telling that both Sherman and Grant viewed him as an exceptional general. Often the greatest praise a soldier can receive is from an adversary.
 
Frankly, it was the most impressive of the war.

A Soviet General who knew what he was talking about said that wars are won by the least incompetent army. He was quite right, whether speaking about the Legions of Rome, the Tumans of Genghis Khan or the Armies of Napoleon. An army moves on its stomach, Grant understood this but Lee & the CS military in general did not. The US did a far better job of supplying its forces in the field and keeping them supplied than the CS. Logistics make the difference between a winning army and one that is not. Whether that failure began at the highest levels of the CS or was just a general lack of understanding is up to interpretation. What is not up to interpretation is that Grant understood the importance of logistics, certainly more so than any adversary he faced on the CS side.

Amateurs study battles & tactics while the professionals study logistics & geography.

Grant understood that the moment you force an opponent to suffer a siege he is done for. Every time he initiated a siege a CS Army would surrender to him.

Most Europeans were rather critical of the ACW as they viewed it as a war between bumbling amateurs commanding howling mobs. Those who actually saw the various armies first hand, however, had a rather different view. To paraphrase an acquaintance from college (another professional soldier who knew what he was talking about) at the beginning of the American Civil War both sides were fielding good fighters; America has always fielded good fighters. But by the end of the War both sides were fielding good soldiers.

Grant forged and shaped the US Army of the West starting with what would become the Army of the Tennessee and his influence would continue to have an impact all the way through the end of the war. The result of his leadership would be the utter & complete destruction of the CS. By the spring of 1865 the CS could field no army capable of defeating a US army facing it.

Was Grant brilliant? No, he never would have claimed he was. He put the responsibility for the victories of the US where they belonged: squarely on the shoulders of those on the sharp end of the spear.

Those who claim 'they had more' therefore they won fail to understand military history. More is not always better, in fact the best armies in history consistantly won against numerically superior foes. Though if they wish to say the CS soldier wasn't half the soldier of the Roman Legions, Mongol Tumans, or French Divisions... well history seems to bear that out.

There are those on this site who would say the US soldier was a craven coward who raped, pillaged and looted his way across the Confederacy and that 360,000 dead US soldiers was a good thing as it was that much less of a plague upon the continent. I see that kind of thing and know full well they have a very poor understanding of history or military matters at all and any claim they have to honor or integrity is self styled... at best.
The sieges were successful, but they weren't planned, they were forced.
 
The sieges were successful, but they weren't planned, they were forced.

At Fort Donelson Grant besieged a garrison that was content to sit in place and be besieged. At Vicksburg he forced a mobile field army back to it's fortifications where it could be besieged, a pretty neat trick and one that allowed him to bag the entire army, a good thing. Of course Grant was helped by Pemberton's refusal to make a getaway while the getting was good.

Petetsburg wasn't a siege but Grant did force Lee into a situation where he was pinned in place and had lost the initiative, a good thing.
 
Not
Nearly every union army commander had overwhelming superiority in men and materiel over his confederate counterpart but Grant was the one that accepted the surrender of three rebel armies
Not always true in the West. Union forces were outnumbered at Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove , Arkansas and the Union still won. There may be other examples.
@cash and @johan_steele might have more examples.
Leftyhunter
 
Not

Not always true in the West. Union forces were outnumbered at Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove , Arkansas and the Union still won. There may be other examples.
@cash and @johan_steele might have more examples.
Leftyhunter
Wilsons Creek is another example. Lyons was severely outnumbered and still very nearly carried the day. Even after the US forces withdrew the CS was incapable of pursuit. Wilsons Creek was proof that the US soldier was every bit as good as his CS opponent. Those who continually preach otherwise aren't interested in history and likely wouldn't honestly know a 3" gun from a .58 rifle without a google search let alone have any understanding of what it took to feed a Regiment.
 
Grant had what most men don't, command presence. Is that an inherent trait or is it acquired I will leave to others to debate but I am convinced that when he walked into a room you knew this guy is a leader of men.
 
Plan B does when you have every imaginable advantage.
Is that Grant and the union army's fault? Should they have sent a courier through the line to see how many men, guns rations etc. Lee had and then only used that many and much himself? Should he have allowed Lee to move to nice flat land or onto a ridge and then fight just to politely even up the odds? Lots of bragging takes place around here when Lee defeated "every imaginable advantage." I guess excuses are what is to be expected when he didn't.
 
I have never understood why folks seem to obsess that the length of one's duty roster is the sole determining factor in the outcome of a battle. Clearly, many battles have hinged on other factors. Also, the Generals at the time seemed more than willing to fight it out even when their own duty roster was of inferior length.
 
Do you have a source for those desertions?

You supplied one of the sources for those desertions yourself.[/QUOTE]

Union desertion

In view of the conditions which prevailed in the war department and in the Union army, it is not surprising that desertion was a common fault. Even so the actual extent of it, shown in official reports, comes as a distinct shock. Though the determination of the full number is a bit complicated, the total would have been over 200,000. From New York there were 44,913 deserters according to the records; from Pennsylvania, 24,050; from Ohio, 18,354. The daily hardships of war, deficiency in arms, forced marches sometimes made straggling a necessary for less vigorous men), thirst, suffocating heat, disease, delay in pay, solicitude for family, impatience at the monotony and futility of inactive service, and (though this was not the leading cause) panic on the eve of battle—these were some of the conditioning factors that produced desertion. Many men absented themselves merely through unfamiliarity with military discipline or through the feeling that they should be "restrained by no other legal requirement than those of civil law governing a free people"; and such was a general attitude that desertion was often regarded "more as a refusal… to ratify a contract than as the commission of a grave crime."

The sense of war weariness, the lack of confidence in commanders, and the discouragement of defeat tended to lower morale of the Union army and to increase desertions. General Hooker estimated in 1863 that 85,000 officers and men had deserted from the Army of the Potomac, while it was stated in December of 1862 that no less than 180,000 of the soldiers listed on the Union muster roll were absent, with or without leave. Abuse of leave or furlough privilege was one of the chief means of desertion. Other methods were: slipping to the rear during a battle, inviting capture by the enemy (a method by which honorable service could be claimed), straggling, taking French leave when on picket duty, pretending to be engaged in repairing a telegraph line, et cetera. Some deserters went over to enemy not as captives but as soldiers; others lived in a wild state on the frontier; some turned outlaw or went to Canada; some boldly appeared at home; in some cases deserter gangs, as in western Pennsylvania, formed bandit groups.

To suppress desertion the extreme penalty of death was at times applied, especially after 1863; but this meant no more than the selection of a few men as public examples out of many thousands equally guilty. The commoner method was to make public appeals to deserters, promising pardon in case of voluntary return with dire threats to those who failed to return. That desertion did not prevent a man posing after the war as an honorable soldier is evident by a study of pension records. The laws required honorable discharge as a requisite for a pension; but in the case of those charged with desertion Congress passed numerous private and special acts "correcting" the military record.

Source: J.G. Randall, David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company) pp. 329-331

The Federal unionist war weariness is reflected in that th Federal desertion rate had jumped from the average of 4,647 a month in 1863 to an average of 7,333 a month in 1864.
See footnote on page 330 of J.G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction.

Confederate Desertion

Desertion in the South though less extensive than in the North was a factor of large significance; and a study of the causes that produced it goes far toward revealing the conditions which made the war intolerable to thousands among people and soldiers. As explained by Miss Ella Lonn, backwoodsmen and crackers were drawn into the army who had no sympathy with slavery and no interest in the issues of a struggle which they did not understand. The conscript net gathered in even Northerners and Mexicans, whose tendency to desert was natural enough. Many of the deserters were mere boys. Poor food and clothing lack of shoes and overcoats, and insufficient pay inevitably produced dissatisfaction. Sometimes the pay was fourteen months behind; Often a soldier on leave could not pay the transportation to return to his command. Unsanitary camp conditions had their debilitating effect. Soldiers kept in unwholesome inaction were more than commonly subject to homesickness and depression. Often the alternative was abandonment and neglect of wife and children or departure from the army – in other words, a choice between two kinds of desertion, a dilemma in facing conflicting loyalties. Not a few Southern soldiers found themselves in the situation of an Alabaman who deserted the army when his wife wrote him: "We haven't got nothing in the house to eat but a little bit of meal… I don't want you to stop fighting them Yankees… but try and get off and come home and fix us up some and then you can go back." Some Arkansas soldiers deserted when informed that Indians were on a scalping tour near their homes. Indignant at extortioners and profiteers, soldiers would become disgruntled at the "rich man's war and the poor man's fight." For such men desertion bore no stigma; and, in sum, it appears that this factor (which after all, was but a reflection of many other factors) 'contributed definitely to the Confederate defeats after 1862 and to the catastrophe of 1865."

J.G. Randall, David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 516-517

















Ibid. pp. 516-517
 
The Federal unionist war weariness is reflected in that th Federal desertion rate had jumped from the average of 4,647 a month in 1863 to an average of 7,333 a month in 1864.
See footnote on page 330 of J.G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction.
Is there a calculation on the percentage of deserters, both both sides, for the numbers of returnee's, that can be compared to the initial desertion numbers??
 
I'm sure that General Grant would be terribly humiliated to learn that there are people here who, from their years of training, and vast experienceView attachment 134491 in planning campaigns and leading triumphant armies, are "not impressed" with his generalship.
I would imagine you have never met a general they would be happy to hear what you have to say just so they could tell you how terribly wrong you are and why they are great generals. Most generals actually love what they do and given the right opportunity can go on forever discussing strategies causes outcomes it's in their blood.
 
You supplied one of the sources for those desertions yourself.

Union desertion

In view of the conditions which prevailed in the war department and in the Union army, it is not surprising that desertion was a common fault. Even so the actual extent of it, shown in official reports, comes as a distinct shock. Though the determination of the full number is a bit complicated, the total would have been over 200,000. From New York there were 44,913 deserters according to the records; from Pennsylvania, 24,050; from Ohio, 18,354. The daily hardships of war, deficiency in arms, forced marches sometimes made straggling a necessary for less vigorous men), thirst, suffocating heat, disease, delay in pay, solicitude for family, impatience at the monotony and futility of inactive service, and (though this was not the leading cause) panic on the eve of battle—these were some of the conditioning factors that produced desertion. Many men absented themselves merely through unfamiliarity with military discipline or through the feeling that they should be "restrained by no other legal requirement than those of civil law governing a free people"; and such was a general attitude that desertion was often regarded "more as a refusal… to ratify a contract than as the commission of a grave crime."

The sense of war weariness, the lack of confidence in commanders, and the discouragement of defeat tended to lower morale of the Union army and to increase desertions. General Hooker estimated in 1863 that 85,000 officers and men had deserted from the Army of the Potomac, while it was stated in December of 1862 that no less than 180,000 of the soldiers listed on the Union muster roll were absent, with or without leave. Abuse of leave or furlough privilege was one of the chief means of desertion. Other methods were: slipping to the rear during a battle, inviting capture by the enemy (a method by which honorable service could be claimed), straggling, taking French leave when on picket duty, pretending to be engaged in repairing a telegraph line, et cetera. Some deserters went over to enemy not as captives but as soldiers; others lived in a wild state on the frontier; some turned outlaw or went to Canada; some boldly appeared at home; in some cases deserter gangs, as in western Pennsylvania, formed bandit groups.

To suppress desertion the extreme penalty of death was at times applied, especially after 1863; but this meant no more than the selection of a few men as public examples out of many thousands equally guilty. The commoner method was to make public appeals to deserters, promising pardon in case of voluntary return with dire threats to those who failed to return. That desertion did not prevent a man posing after the war as an honorable soldier is evident by a study of pension records. The laws required honorable discharge as a requisite for a pension; but in the case of those charged with desertion Congress passed numerous private and special acts "correcting" the military record.

Source: J.G. Randall, David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company) pp. 329-331

The Federal unionist war weariness is reflected in that th Federal desertion rate had jumped from the average of 4,647 a month in 1863 to an average of 7,333 a month in 1864.
See footnote on page 330 of J.G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction.

Confederate Desertion

Desertion in the South though less extensive than in the North was a factor of large significance; and a study of the causes that produced it goes far toward revealing the conditions which made the war intolerable to thousands among people and soldiers. As explained by Miss Ella Lonn, backwoodsmen and crackers were drawn into the army who had no sympathy with slavery and no interest in the issues of a struggle which they did not understand. The conscript net gathered in even Northerners and Mexicans, whose tendency to desert was natural enough. Many of the deserters were mere boys. Poor food and clothing lack of shoes and overcoats, and insufficient pay inevitably produced dissatisfaction. Sometimes the pay was fourteen months behind; Often a soldier on leave could not pay the transportation to return to his command. Unsanitary camp conditions had their debilitating effect. Soldiers kept in unwholesome inaction were more than commonly subject to homesickness and depression. Often the alternative was abandonment and neglect of wife and children or departure from the army – in other words, a choice between two kinds of desertion, a dilemma in facing conflicting loyalties. Not a few Southern soldiers found themselves in the situation of an Alabaman who deserted the army when his wife wrote him: "We haven't got nothing in the house to eat but a little bit of meal… I don't want you to stop fighting them Yankees… but try and get off and come home and fix us up some and then you can go back." Some Arkansas soldiers deserted when informed that Indians were on a scalping tour near their homes. Indignant at extortioners and profiteers, soldiers would become disgruntled at the "rich man's war and the poor man's fight." For such men desertion bore no stigma; and, in sum, it appears that this factor (which after all, was but a reflection of many other factors) 'contributed definitely to the Confederate defeats after 1862 and to the catastrophe of 1865."

J.G. Randall, David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 516-517

















Ibid. pp. 516-517[/QUOTE]
All well and good but we should measure the qualitative desertion. That is did Union deserters join the Confederate Army or become Confederate guerrillas or free lance bandits. There is considerable evidence that I have posted that Confederate deserters did indeed join the Union Army and or become Unionist guerrillas or freelance bandits.
My previous threads " how serious was CSA desertion" "Union vs CSA guerrillas " has sources.
In my other thread" who has Unionist ancestors" Many posters on this forum had ancestors that originally fought for the Confederacy and then switched sides.
Leftyhunter
 
I would imagine you have never met a general they would be happy to hear what you have to say just so they could tell you how terribly wrong you are and why they are great generals. Most generals actually love what they do and given the right opportunity can go on forever discussing strategies causes outcomes it's in their blood.
Grant the braggart? I don't think so.
 
I would imagine you have never met a general they would be happy to hear what you have to say just so they could tell you how terribly wrong you are and why they are great generals. Most generals actually love what they do and given the right opportunity can go on forever discussing strategies causes outcomes it's in their blood.
I think my sarcasm failed to come through. I meant that I am very sure Gen. Grant wouldn't give a fig what 'impressed' these modern armchair know-it-alls. There's something ludicrous about the purpose of this thread.
I've edited in an explanation to my post.
 

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