Most Overrated General?

[67th Tigers]

First, let me say that Grant deserves a lot of credit for winning the CW. I do agree with what you wrote about his memoirs. I don't think he would have been relieved in 1864 for almost any reason, due to the election that fall. Lincoln would not have been re-elected if Grant had failed to the point where he was relieved. Besides, Grant, whether he failed or not, was too valuable a commander to have been shelved, which he would have had to have been due to his rank.

I guess, and I'm sure its me, my question about Grant is why did Lincoln allow him so much more time in 1864 then he did McClellan in 1862? The Urbanna Plan wasn't a bad plan, I don't think (I know you know more of that than I do). And why did Lincoln not make Grant leave enough troops to watch D.C., etc. as he did Mac? Imagine if Hancock had to stay around D.C. for the start of the Overland Campaign.

I'm told by those more knowledgable than I that one of the reasons Meade reorganised into three Corps is to stop the detachment of any more troops. With five infantry corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th) it would have been tempting for Stanton to detach off another corps to defend Washington, but with three it would not be possible.

Washington was heavily stripped of defenders, to the point where Meigs is placed in command of all the clerks etc. organised as a provisional division of 3,194 (13th July - ref). Haskin is commanding the lines north of the Potomac with 3,729 PFD and De Russy commanding south of the Potomac with 5,666 PFD. (10th Jul state - ref). In the actual fortifications Grant left a bit less than McClellan, but I think the case may be overstated.

Remember, McClellan intended to leave 2nd Corps under Sumner at Manassas until it was clear Johnston had withdrawn, and that was McClellan's true forward defence.

Results. Despite the losses, despite Cold Harbor, the result of April - July 1864 was better than the result of April - July 1862.

Also Halleck. McClellan's position in July 1862 went against Halleck's strategic concepts. He had to be called back. Wasnt the same in 1864.

The results of the Peninsula and Overland campaigns to that point were at best similar. McClellan had reached the banks of the James inflicting 29,288 battle casualties on the Confederates (major battles only, excluding skirmishes), whereas Grant inflicted 33,600 getting to the same position. The difference is Grant took 55-65,000 casualties whereas McClellan took 23,942. In purely grinding down the enemy terms the Overland and Peninsula campaigns stand as equals, although in terms of casualties sustained for the result then clearly the balance is in favour of the Peninsula.

Your absolutely right about Halleck. Halleck prevented McClellan crossing the James, and had the same objection in 1864, but was impotent to stop Grant.

Depends on that tricky word in bold. McClellan decided to move most of the army by water in a way that would uncover DC to Johnson's army near Culpeper, north of the Rapidan. Grant intended to move in away that engaged with Lee's army, already south of the Rapidan, and Grant still left 30,000 PFD in the Department of Washington during May 1864. So seems Lincoln did make Grant leave enough troops to watch DC.

I generally agree on looking at the available figures.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Remember, McClellan intended to leave 2nd Corps under Sumner at Manassas until it was clear Johnston

I dont think that is true.

The results of the Peninsula and Overland campaigns to that point were at best similar.

I disagree.
By July, Grant was across the James conducting offensive operations against Petersburg.
By July McClellan was defensively camped at Harrison's landing.

 

[matthew mckeon]

At the risk of hijacking the discussion around the Overland Campaign, I'll return to the idea of "overrated."

Nathan Bedford Forrest was a talented commander, but I can't help but think his current fame is a cultural phenomenon instead of an assessment by historians. So I'll disagree with Foote about his place in the war. And evaluating Forrest as a general and his pre and post war activities has become something of a litmus test about the belief system of the evaluator. I don't mean to denigrate his achievements on the battlefield, just that he has been transformed into a symbol.

 

[67th Tigers]

I dont think that is true.

Yes it is.

The scheme of maneouver on the Peninsula was to land 3rd and 4th Corps at Fort Monroe and advance up the Peninsula to draw the defenders down. 1st Corps (which had the landing craft etc. attached) would land at Eltham's Landing and cut off the Peninsula forces.

In this scheme 2nd Corps was to remain at Manassas (and Banks' 5th Corps, as it then was, in the valley) until it was clear Johnston had retired, then it was to move by water, probably to reinforce 1st Corps.

I disagree.
By July, Grant was across the James conducting offensive operations against Petersburg.
By July McClellan was defensively camped at Harrison's landing.

Well, McClellan's intent was to do exactly what Grant did. He had sent Marcy to Washington to procure a pontoon bridge and transports for the crossing. After 10th July Lincoln and Stanton decided to stall McClellan by simply not sending the pontoons, transports or Burnside's Corps afloat at the mouth of the James, and then Halleck came east and veto'd the move with the Pennsylvania Reserves already holding the bridgehead on the NC side.

Hence we can only compare until they reached the James. We can't compare after this as McClellan's plans were far too bold for the timid Halleck, and he was not allowed to implement them.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Yes it is.

The scheme of maneouver on the Peninsula was to land 3rd and 4th Corps at Fort Monroe and advance up the Peninsula to draw the defenders down. 1st Corps (which had the landing craft etc. attached) would land at Eltham's Landing and cut off the Peninsula forces.

In this scheme 2nd Corps was to remain at Manassas (and Banks' 5th Corps, as it then was, in the valley) until it was clear Johnston had retired, then it was to move by water, probably to reinforce 1st Corps.

I still dont think so. But if it was as you say, why did he not follow this plan? Why was Sumner removed before it was clear Johnston had retired?

Hence we can only compare until they reached the James. We can't compare after this as McClellan's plans were far too bold for the timid Halleck, and he was not allowed to implement them.

I disagree. We can compare what they accomplished in the same amount of time since that was the query -- rbasin asked "why did Lincoln allow him so much more time". Within the same amount of time McClellan was allowed, Grant had accomplished more.

 

[diane]

At the risk of hijacking the discussion around the Overland Campaign, I'll return to the idea of "overrated."

Nathan Bedford Forrest was a talented commander, but I can't help but think his current fame is a cultural phenomenon instead of an assessment by historians. So I'll disagree with Foote about his place in the war. And evaluating Forrest as a general and his pre and post war activities has become something of a litmus test about the belief system of the evaluator. I don't mean to denigrate his achievements on the battlefield, just that he has been transformed into a symbol.

I don't think Forrest is over-rated as a military man but that he's become more important as a symbol is very accurate. Forrest themed articles are now outselling Lee themed articles! When one examines both men, you can indeed see an intriguing cultural shift happening.

 

[JPWalton]

You are wrong about from whence Chamberlain's fame comes. He had a prominent place in several of Ken Burns's episodes of The Civil War, and that was in 1987 I think? I also recall Bruce Catton singling him out for praise in his treatment of Little Round Top.

My own take on Chamberlain is this: a whole chain of worthy officers had to be there to put him in place. He didn't up and go to Little Round Top on his own. Warren and Vincent were behind that. Vincent was killed, but Warren was recognized for his gallantry and would likely be a very celebrated figure today if he had not run so afoul of Sheridan, thereby compromising his career.

As for Chamberlain himself, it's easy to see how another regiment under another leader might have been driven back or retreated on their own volition. It's sheer foolishness not to acknowledge that he was the right man in the right place at the right time, and that is how soldier's battles are won.

The most interesting thing about this enormous effort to downplay Chamberlain, in my opinion, is how it focuses so much energy on who did what when Chamberlain was just a lieutenant colonel. Isn't this a thread about "overrated generals?" Chamberlain's later career play little in his legend, so we can't exactly call him an overrated general.

Seems to me that "overrated" or "underrated" are terms so elastic that they are often used without being useful.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was an outstanding officer in the war. But he didn't "save" the Union Army on July 2, 1863. He performed very well, as did several Union commanders that day, which is why Longstreet's assault eventually failed. His popular fame lies with Killer Angels and Gettysburg. But that's hardly his fault. He is overrated--but not by historians, or even more serious students of the CW(like most of the folks on this forum). He's just well known.

He's like Paul Revere, a great guy, but not personally responsible for the minutemen winning the battle.

 

[Nathanb1]

You are wrong about from whence Chamberlain's fame comes. He had a prominent place in several of Ken Burns's episodes of The Civil War, and that was in 1987 I think? I also recall Bruce Catton singling him out for praise in his treatment of Little Round Top.

My own take on Chamberlain is this: a whole chain of worthy officers had to be there to put him in place. He didn't up and go to Little Round Top on his own. Warren and Vincent were behind that. Vincent was killed, but Warren was recognized for his gallantry and would likely be a very celebrated figure today if he had not run so afoul of Sheridan, thereby compromising his career.

As for Chamberlain himself, it's easy to see how another regiment under another leader might have been driven back or retreated on their own volition. It's sheer foolishness not to acknowledge that he was the right man in the right place at the right time, and that is how soldier's battles are won.

The most interesting thing about this enormous effort to downplay Chamberlain, in my opinion, is how it focuses so much energy on who did what when Chamberlain was just a lieutenant colonel. Isn't this a thread about "overrated generals?" Chamberlain's later career play little in his legend, so we can't exactly call him an overrated general.

I think a lot of the popular opinions on the war do indeed have their roots in The Civil War, followed by Killer Angels/Gettysburg. Both Chamberlain and Forrest come to mind, as well as enhancing the images of Grant, Lee, and Sherman. Pickett, too. Who besides history majors knew about anyone else before then? That was public perception, indeed. Good catch.

 

[Rebforever]

I can't really believe anyone is seriously questioning Gordon Rhea. He doesn't need any other colleagues to vouch for him, he got his information from careful study of the records. He's tackling the strange mythology that has come over this particular battle. It wasn't the first time Grant ordered a brutal and highly lethal assault - Spotsylvania comes to mind. Rhea's solid credentials are as long as your arm. Until I get a list that long, I'm inclined to accept the word of someone who does have it.

What did he do to find others errors? He cut app. 3000 deaths. How did he do that?

 

[Nathanb1]

What did he do to find others errors? He cut app. 3000 deaths. How did he do that?

Added correctly? Why are you so hung up on this? At that point in the war, who the heck knows? I mean, does the South get a do-over if they have fewer casualties? Do they get penalty kicks?

This really needs to go to another thread (fine--start one on Rhea) instead of this one. You're abysmally off topic.

Posted in Capacity as Moderator

 

[rbasin]

I'm told by those more knowledgable than I that one of the reasons Meade reorganised into three Corps is to stop the detachment of any more troops. With five infantry corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th) it would have been tempting for Stanton to detach off another corps to defend Washington, but with three it would not be possible.

Washington was heavily stripped of defenders, to the point where Meigs is placed in command of all the clerks etc. organised as a provisional division of 3,194 (13th July - ref). Haskin is commanding the lines north of the Potomac with 3,729 PFD and De Russy commanding south of the Potomac with 5,666 PFD. (10th Jul state - ref). In the actual fortifications Grant left a bit less than McClellan, but I think the case may be overstated.

Remember, McClellan intended to leave 2nd Corps under Sumner at Manassas until it was clear Johnston had withdrawn, and that was McClellan's true forward defence.



The results of the Peninsula and Overland campaigns to that point were at best similar. McClellan had reached the banks of the James inflicting 29,288 battle casualties on the Confederates (major battles only, excluding skirmishes), whereas Grant inflicted 33,600 getting to the same position. The difference is Grant took 55-65,000 casualties whereas McClellan took 23,942. In purely grinding down the enemy terms the Overland and Peninsula campaigns stand as equals, although in terms of casualties sustained for the result then clearly the balance is in favour of the Peninsula.

Your absolutely right about Halleck. Halleck prevented McClellan crossing the James, and had the same objection in 1864, but was impotent to stop Grant.



I generally agree on looking at the available figures.

Wasn't it McDowell's 1st Corps that was being held back?

And wasn't Halleck's objection to Mac's campaign based on McClellan's own figures that he claimed showed Lee vastly outnumbered him, and the only other troops available McDowell's and the other units that formed the Army of Virginia? And so, if Mac wasn't able or willing to attack, wasn't it best to get him back and combined under Pope? I don't know. I'm just writing what I've read through the O.R.

 

[diane]

What did he do to find others errors? He cut app. 3000 deaths. How did he do that?

I didn't get the impression he was interested in finding other people's errors but rather in finding the real number as close as possible. But, it's really a bit like saying potato or potahto - even with lower figures an appalling number of soldiers were killed in an appallingly short period of time.

 

[rbasin]

I didn't get the impression he was interested in finding other people's errors but rather in finding the real number as close as possible. But, it's really a bit like saying potato or potahto - even with lower figures an appalling number of soldiers were killed in an appallingly short period of time.

I've read in several books that reports from the various commanders were at best incomplete, often times misleading, so just that someone tried to figure it all out is pretty cool. A lot of late lonely nights, I'm sure

 

[Nathanb1]

Off of Rhea, please. Looks like a great thread topic, however.

 

[wilber6150]

Off of Rhea, please. Looks like a great thread topic, however.

Yes it does, maybe we could even get him to participate in it...

 

[suzenatale]

You are wrong about from whence Chamberlain's fame comes. He had a prominent place in several of Ken Burns's episodes of The Civil War, and that was in 1987 I think? I also recall Bruce Catton singling him out for praise in his treatment of Little Round Top.

My own take on Chamberlain is this: a whole chain of worthy officers had to be there to put him in place. He didn't up and go to Little Round Top on his own. Warren and Vincent were behind that. Vincent was killed, but Warren was recognized for his gallantry and would likely be a very celebrated figure today if he had not run so afoul of Sheridan, thereby compromising his career.

As for Chamberlain himself, it's easy to see how another regiment under another leader might have been driven back or retreated on their own volition. It's sheer foolishness not to acknowledge that he was the right man in the right place at the right time, and that is how soldier's battles are won.

The most interesting thing about this enormous effort to downplay Chamberlain, in my opinion, is how it focuses so much energy on who did what when Chamberlain was just a lieutenant colonel. Isn't this a thread about "overrated generals?" Chamberlain's later career play little in his legend, so we can't exactly call him an overrated general.

I don't think Ken Burns had much affect, when I think of Ken Burns I think Elisha Hunt Rhodes. Killer Angels was published in 1974 and won the Pulitzer the following year. "The 20th Maine" was published in 1957.

I think Chamberlain did his best to erase the mark left on Warren by giving numerous speeches on the matter, writing "the Passing of the Armies" and his testimony before the Warren court.

If Chamberlain left, lots more would have died, the fact that he didn't is worth celebrating.

I agree, and said so before, this thread is about overrated generals. I don't imagine people who go to Gettysburg because they saw the film by the same name even know that Chamberlain became a general or how that happened.

If this thread were about Colonels and were were still living in the 1990s I might have to concede.

I know who Chamberlain is because I had to read Killer Angels for class. I subsequently read biographies on several people mentioned in that book, one of which was Hancock. My reason personally for liking Chamberlain was because I discovered that he was a stutterer who practiced so hard to overcome his disability that he actually overcompensated and surpassed his piers in public speaking and went on to become a respected teacher, colonel et c.
I guess the best way to show you why I thought that was so great is to show you a poem I wrote the following year for class. The assignment was to write a poem in the style of a poem we studied in class and I chose this.

Susan E. Natale
Stout
American Studies II
29 October 1997

I, Too Am America​

I, too am America.



I am the quiet child.

They send me to the special room

When the smart ones learn,

But I'll rise,

I will not be held down,

I will grow.


And Tomorrow,

I'll be in the classroom

When the smart ones learn.

And nobody'll dare

Say to me,

"Go to the special room,"

Then.


Besides,

They'll see how intelligent I am

And be ashamed-


For I too, am America.​

 

[67th Tigers]

I still dont think so. But if it was as you say, why did he not follow this plan? Why was Sumner removed before it was clear Johnston had retired?

Because it was clear Johnston had retired.

Sumner advanced to Warrenton Junction on the 27th, and on the 28th Howard's brigade advanced against the Rappahannock bridge and the enemy (Ewell's division) blew it up. His scouts penetrated deep enough to determine that Johnston had retired behind the Rapidan. Hence Sumner pushed back Johnston enough that, given the rebel demolitions, any advance towards Washington was not possible.

On the 30th March Lincoln sticks his oar in and detaches Blenker's division, with orders for them to move to Harper's Ferry. The valley situation bears some examination.

In early March there are three divisions in the valley, Sedgwick's (ex-Stone's), Williams' (ex-Banks') and Shields'. They mounted an advance to Winchester co-ordinated with the move to Manassas by another wing of the army. With Jackson in flight down the valley Sedgwick is ordered to Washington (22nd) and Williams is sent to relieve Richardson's division at Manassas as the army moved out.

The detachment of Blenker might be partially due to Jackson attacking Shields at Kernstown. Despite the fact that this was a major Union victory it shook the oversensitive Lincoln

Here Lincoln sticks his oar in again and in a series of orders detaches 1st Corps, Mansfield's division and revokes McClellan's general in chief status.

Note that McClellan advanced up the Peninsula with only 5 divisions:

Hamilton and Porter of 3rd Corps
Sedgwick of 2nd Corps
Smith and Couch of 4th Corps

Richardson, Casey and Hooker were still near Washington. McClellan ordered Richardson to embark on the 2nd (which it did on the 4th), Hooker on the 4th (which it did on the 6th-9th) and Casey's division to embark when complete on 5th April (they did not arrive until ca. 18th, and then still had not been issued all their equipment). It was a phased movement.

Also on the 4th McClellan orders Franklin to embark and make an amphibious assault on Gloucester Point to enable the navy to get up the York with 1st Corps to land at Eltham's Landing. His orders and Lincoln's removal of 1st Corps cross each other.

It is pretty clear McClellan's movement to the Peninsula was phased, and responsive. The whole army didn't up sticks and move, but instead as the Confederates withdrew it freed up more and more divisions for the major offensive movement. It is not clear when Casey would have embarked, if at all. Being the newest and greenest division in the army McClellan was inclined to leave it at Washington, and didn't order it to embark (and then not immediately) until after 1st Corps was withdrawn.

I disagree. We can compare what they accomplished in the same amount of time since that was the query -- rbasin asked "why did Lincoln allow him so much more time". Within the same amount of time McClellan was allowed, Grant had accomplished more.

Had he? He'd certainly bled his army more, but it's not clear he did accomplish more.

 

[wilber6150]

Because it was clear Johnston had retired.

Sumner advanced to Warrenton Junction on the 27th, and on the 28th Howard's brigade advanced against the Rappahannock bridge and the enemy (Ewell's division) blew it up. His scouts penetrated deep enough to determine that Johnston had retired behind the Rapidan. Hence Sumner pushed back Johnston enough that, given the rebel demolitions, any advance towards Washington was not possible.

On the 30th March Lincoln sticks his oar in and detaches Blenker's division, with orders for them to move to Harper's Ferry. The valley situation bears some examination.

In early March there are three divisions in the valley, Sedgwick's (ex-Stone's), Williams' (ex-Banks') and Shields'. They mounted an advance to Winchester co-ordinated with the move to Manassas by another wing of the army. With Jackson in flight down the valley Sedgwick is ordered to Washington (22nd) and Williams is sent to relieve Richardson's division at Manassas as the army moved out.

The detachment of Blenker might be partially due to Jackson attacking Shields at Kernstown. Despite the fact that this was a major Union victory it shook the oversensitive Lincoln

Here Lincoln sticks his oar in again and in a series of orders detaches 1st Corps, Mansfield's division and revokes McClellan's general in chief status.

Note that McClellan advanced up the Peninsula with only 5 divisions:

Hamilton and Porter of 3rd Corps
Sedgwick of 2nd Corps
Smith and Couch of 4th Corps

Richardson, Casey and Hooker were still near Washington. McClellan ordered Richardson to embark on the 2nd (which it did on the 4th), Hooker on the 4th (which it did on the 6th-9th) and Casey's division to embark when complete on 5th April (they did not arrive until ca. 18th, and then still had not been issued all their equipment). It was a phased movement.

Also on the 4th McClellan orders Franklin to embark and make an amphibious assault on Gloucester Point to enable the navy to get up the York with 1st Corps to land at Eltham's Landing. His orders and Lincoln's removal of 1st Corps cross each other.

It is pretty clear McClellan's movement to the Peninsula was phased, and responsive. The whole army didn't up sticks and move, but instead as the Confederates withdrew it freed up more and more divisions for the major offensive movement. It is not clear when Casey would have embarked, if at all. Being the newest and greenest division in the army McClellan was inclined to leave it at Washington, and didn't order it to embark (and then not immediately) until after 1st Corps was withdrawn.



Had he? He'd certainly bled his army more, but it's not clear he did accomplish more.

In the broader scope of the war if you included the time up to the Overland campaign Grant certainly did accomplish more then McClellan...

 

[NedBaldwin]

Because it was clear Johnston had retired...

Ahh, we have a miscommunication. I was thinking of Johnston retiring from northern Virginia which he had not done at this time which was part of the reason Lincoln made McClellan leave a Corps behind.

detachment of Blenker might be partially due to Jackson attacking Shields at Kernstown. Despite the fact that this was a major Union victory it shook the oversensitive Lincoln

Detachment of Blenker was due to fremont wanting more men and would have happe ed regardless of Kernstown. I don't see evidence that Lincoln was shaken.

He'd certainly bled his army more, but it's not clear he did accomplish more.

Its clear to me that Grants position in july 1864 is better than McClellans in july 1862

 

[ole]

Grant and Sherman won. I see no reason for "yah buts."