Most Overrated General?

[NedBaldwin]

I am not aware at this time of the number of officers and men present for duty as of June 20 (1862) in the defenses of Washington nor those of September 10 or 20 (1862), and thus am reluctant to compare them to the figures McClellan had in the field in his campaigns.

Sept 10
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...hington,+Defenses&view=image&seq=266&size=100
Note that this includes the 5th Corps which had not yet departed to join the AotP.


Sept 20
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...hington,+Defenses&view=image&seq=339&size=100

 

[NedBaldwin]

And McClellan reports 180,362 officers and men present for duty, including 22,683 under Banks and the divisions of King and Blenker (none of which would serve on the Peninsula) on March 31: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0055

That table also includes the defense of Washington [Wadsworth+Viele = 20,179].

 

[NedBaldwin]

Fredericksburg Campaign (December 10 1862)
Department of Washington (including Defenses Upper Potomac): 52,200
Army of the Potomac: 149,503 officers and men present for duty (111,852 in the three Grand Divisions at Fredericksburg)

From
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0031;didno=waro0031;view=image;seq=1137

Though I think you should ask where were Sigel and Slocum at the time?

 

[Elennsar]

That table also includes the defense of Washington [Wadsworth+Viele = 20,179].

My bad. So that leaves 160,183 under McClellan (prior to subtractions for Banks and the other two divisions that never went to the Peninsula) not counting the Washington defenses.

But as none of those four divisions were left in Washington's defenses - Shields was either in the Shenandoah or the Department of the Rappahannock, Williams in the Shenandoah, King's in the Department of the Rappahannock, and Blenker sent to Fremont - they do not count as troops McClellan was forced to leave behind to defend Richmond, though they subtract from his available strength on the Peninsula.

Though I think you should ask where were Sigel and Slocum at the time?

Well, depending on how you want to count them, Burnside has either the larger figure or the one in () for just the Grand Divisions. I wrote that post to compare the numbers left behind at Washington to the numbers of the Army of the Potomac, rather than to analyze the deployment of the Army of the Potomac's forces in the field.


Edit: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0338 And this appears to be our official source for the 20th, looking through the volume you posted.

So that ought to shed some light on things.

 

[NedBaldwin]

My bad. So that leaves 160,183 under McClellan (prior to subtractions for Banks and the other two divisions that never went to the Peninsula) not counting the Washington defenses.

But as none of those four divisions were left in Washington's defenses - Shields was either in the Shenandoah or the Department of the Rappahannock, Williams in the Shenandoah, King's in the Department of the Rappahannock, and Blenker sent to Fremont - they do not count as troops McClellan was forced to leave behind to defend Richmond, though they subtract from his available strength on the Peninsula.

Right. Out of those, King is the only one he wanted to take the Peninsula but wasnt allowed.

Well, depending on how you want to count them, Burnside has either the larger figure or the one in () for just the Grand Divisions. I wrote that post to compare the numbers left behind at Washington to the numbers of the Army of the Potomac, rather than to analyze the deployment of the Army of the Potomac's forces in the field.

Ok. Just seems to me that since you included "Defenses Upper Potomac" with those left behind why not include Slocum and Sigel? or Banks and Shields in spring of 62? Its just not clear to me why you are slicing things in the way you are.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Ned Baldwin,
Sigel in 1864 was placed in the Shenandoah Valley, soon to come to grief at New Market. Some thing with Banks and Shields in 1862, when they were pitted against Stonewall Jackson during the Valley. Their commands were an autonomous department and not included in the Defenses of Upper Potomac. Slocum in early 1864 was on the West in Sherman's army.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Ned Baldwin,
Sigel in 1864 was placed in the Shenandoah Valley, soon to come to grief at New Market. Some thing with Banks and Shields in 1862, when they were pitted against Stonewall Jackson during the Valley. Their commands were an autonomous department and not included in the Defenses of Upper Potomac. Slocum in early 1864 was on the West in Sherman's army.
Civil War Scholar.

I know all those things.
My reference to Sigel and Slocum was in relation to the table Elennsar posted for the time of Fredericksburg (December 1862).


We are drifting from the topic of the thread. I was trying to help Elennsar with data on numbers and should create new thread if we are going to continue to discuss

 

[JPWalton]

As John Ford said, when you have to choose between fact and the legend, go with the legend

But stories like that tend to have a kernel of truth to them, especially in the Civil War.

Foote was asked to write his trilogy - it did take quite a while to get done, too. And, to be fair to him, he did try to be as accurate as he needed. That said...he couldn't resist a good yarn! The shoes at Gettysburg, for instance. Come now, does anyone really believe that's why Heth went down there? (He probably wouldn't have gone if he'd known Buford was hanging out there but...shoes? Naw!)

 

[Civil War Scholar]

JPWalton is right. In numerous Civil War tales, you cannot distinguish fact from fiction. And Heth had sent Pettigrew at Gettysburg to search for supplies, with a special mention of shoes. The claim still has enough credence.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[rbasin]

Exactly. Halleck was cut out for that, Grant was not.

I think it speaks well of Halleck that he accepted this about himself, on that note. Not every general ill suited for combat takes well to desk duty, but Halleck seems to have liked that environment.

I don't think he liked it, given some of his letters to Sherman, but I think he accepted his fate, and did the best he could.

 

[rbasin]

Thank you. Here are the figures I've uncovered to date for comparison:

Fredericksburg Campaign (December 10 1862)
Department of Washington (including Defenses Upper Potomac): 52,200
Army of the Potomac: 149,503 officers and men present for duty (111,852 in the three Grand Divisions at Fredericksburg)

From
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0031;didno=waro0031;view=image;seq=1137

Chancellorsville Campaign (April 30)
Department of Washington: 34,925 officers and men present for duty
Army of the Potomac: 138,378 officers and men present for duty

From:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=morning report;rgn=full text;idno=waro0040;didno=waro0040;view=image;seq=0323
and
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0040;didno=waro0040;view=image;seq=0322

Gettysburg Campaign (June 30 1863)
Department of Washington: 21,467 officers and men present for duty
Army of the Potomac: 103,302 officers and men present for duty.

From
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0045&node=waro0045:4&view=image&seq=442&size=100
and
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0043&node=waro0043:3&view=image&seq=171&size=150
and
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0045;node=waro0045:4;view=image;seq=446;size=100;page=root


I am not aware at this time of the number of officers and men present for duty as of June 20 (1862) in the defenses of Washington nor those of September 10 or 20 (1862), and thus am reluctant to compare them to the figures McClellan had in the field in his campaigns.

But Wadsworth reports having only 19,022 officers and men present for duty as of April 2nd: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0015;didno=waro0015;view=image;seq=0240http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0015;didno=waro0015;view=image;seq=0240

And McClellan reports 180,362 officers and men present for duty, including 22,683 under Banks and the divisions of King and Blenker (none of which would serve on the Peninsula) on March 31: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0055

Thanks. This is cool. I know where the 1862 numbers are in the O.R., I think and will post later as I am going to be late for work if I sit here much longer.

 

[rbasin]

Results. Despite the losses, despite Cold Harbor, the result of April - July 1864 was better than the result of April - July 1862.

Also Halleck. McClellan's position in July 1862 went against Halleck's strategic concepts. He had to be called back. Wasnt the same in 1864.



Depends on that tricky word in bold. McClellan decided to move most of the army by water in a way that would uncover DC to Johnson's army near Culpeper, north of the Rapidan. Grant intended to move in away that engaged with Lee's army, already south of the Rapidan, and Grant still left 30,000 PFD in the Department of Washington during May 1864. So seems Lincoln did make Grant leave enough troops to watch DC.

Were those 30,000 still there or were they part of the new troops sent to Grant? Partially, I assume, because once Early arrived in Maryland, there seemed to be a lot of confusion about not having enough men.

 

[CSA Today]

And no foot on a particularly firm historical foundation.

Thanks, I may read Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26 - June 3, 1864 later, but I want to read In the Footsteps of Grant and Lee: The Wilderness Through Cold Harbor first since it covers the whole battle of Cold Harbor and not just through June 3rd. If Rhea is claiming Grant's casualties were far few on the third, when is he saying the majority of them occurred? I'm interesting in seeing how he deals with the overland campaign overall and if he is claiming that Grant's casualties were far fewer and Lee's casualties far more than generally claimed by mainline historians for that campaign.

 

[matthew mckeon]

First off---CSA Today. Kudos for using the library and interlibrary loan. People talk about buying books on this forum: the library has, for free, access to most of the material you're looking for.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Seems to me that "overrated" or "underrated" are terms so elastic that they are often used without being useful.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was an outstanding officer in the war. But he didn't "save" the Union Army on July 2, 1863. He performed very well, as did several Union commanders that day, which is why Longstreet's assault eventually failed. His popular fame lies with Killer Angels and Gettysburg. But that's hardly his fault. He is overrated--but not by historians, or even more serious students of the CW(like most of the folks on this forum). He's just well known.

He's like Paul Revere, a great guy, but not personally responsible for the minutemen winning the battle.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Overrated by whom? When?

Grant got plenty of kudos by the generation that fought the war, which carried him to the White House. His reputation among historians and in the popular culture fell for most of the 20th century. His reputation, as a general and president, have been considerably revived recently, at least among historians.

Like the fortunes of his life, Grant's reputation has gone up and down. When was he overrated? When was his underrated? And by whom.

 

[JohnnnyReb]

Civil War Scholar said: ↑
When I said "destroyed", I meant thrown back with very heavy losses or forced to surrender, at least some parts.
Click to expand...
We should all try to say what we mean. It was impossible to destroy a Civil War army.
You would be wrong here, as destroy can be defined as many things.
To render ineffective or useless; nullify; neutralize; invalidate.
To defeat completely.

Civil War Scholar said: ↑ Sickles was routed and his corps was badly mauled. But, he gained time for Meade to concentrate on Longstreet's attack and manage to repulse them.Click to expand...

No, he didn't. Meade had sufficient forces in place and also close enough to the action to repel the attack had Sickles remained in place. Had Sickles remained in place his corps would have remained intact, with anchored flanks. The II Corps and V Corps wouldn't have had to go to his rescue, and the XII Corps wouldn't have had to go to the rescue.

Have to disagree with you here, even if Sickles remains in the spot he was placed, which actually was not where Meade wanted him anyhow, he should have been a little farther back than where he was camped the night before. Anyhow, V Corps was 1100 yards behind him as a reserve, Sickles would only have a mile long line to cover instead of the 2 miles he chose by moving up but he still would have needed the additional 11000 V corps troops. II Corps was originaly on the left but moved to the center as it could be sent either left or right, in which in this case they were sent to the left to help bail Sickles out. I am sure some of those troops would have still been sent to the left even if Sickles remains in place. The only thing I will say you are correct is the XII Corps wouldn't have had to go to the rescue. III Corps, V Corps, and half of II Corps would have given Sickles about 27,000 infantry, about 31-32k if all of II Corps shifts.

 

[BillO]

Get back to us when you learn something about Cold Harbor.

Get back to us when you learn how to conduct yourself in public.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Were those 30,000 still there or were they part of the new troops sent to Grant? Partially, I assume, because once Early arrived in Maryland, there seemed to be a lot of confusion about not having enough men.

By July, the number was down to 23,000
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...on,+Department+of&view=image&seq=173&size=100

 

[wilber6150]

Thanks, I may read Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26 - June 3, 1864 later, but I want to read In the Footsteps of Grant and Lee: The Wilderness Through Cold Harbor first since it covers the whole battle of Cold Harbor and not just through June 3rd. If Rhea is claiming Grant's casualties were far few on the third, when is he saying the majority of them occurred? I'm interesting in seeing how he deals with the overland campaign overall and if he is claiming that Grant's casualties were far fewer and Lee's casualties far more than generally claimed by mainline historians for that campaign.

Have fun, you should enjoy them.. They are long but they read very well...