Most Overrated General?

What did he do to find others errors? He cut app. 3000 deaths. How did he do that?

Reb, you are starting to ask the wrong questions, Gordon C. Rhea's claims of new documents were fine as a thread topic discussion as long Rhea supporters sang the praises of this "historian" outlier – we should know by now the folly of questioning any of them.
 
Hmm. Is it time to ask who the most overrated lawyer/journalist/novelist/chef turned historian is?

Pat Answer,

That could be a new thread topic -- I would advise posting this kind of thread in the "Movie & Book Review" Forum.

M. E. Wolf
POSTED IN THE CAPACITY OF MODERATOR
July 30, 2014 5:15 p.m.
 
May we please return to:

"Most Overrated General?" -- and why.....

Though it is a good exchange as far as how historians, writers, etc., affect/effect opinions, perceptions, etc., being a generalized topic -- personal opinions and how those opinions are reached are just as important.

M. E. Wolf
POSTED IN THE CAPACITY OF MODERATOR
July 30, 2014 5:24 p.m.
 
Grant and Sherman won. I see no reason for "yah buts."

The Union won.

If Grant and Sherman had been replaced by other reasonable generals then it's likely the Union would still win.

The idea that "Lincoln found a general" has little to commend it. The war was a long slow process, and Grant and Sherman made major contributions to it being won - but so did McClellan, Rosecrans, Buell, Meade, Thomas and many lower ranked officers and men.

In sporting terms (football, the rest of the world one), they may have scored the last goal, but it wouldn't have been a winning goal without all the goals scored by others, and saves made.
 
Right. Out of those, King is the only one he wanted to take the Peninsula but wasnt allowed.
Yeah. Some of those didn't come right away, but if we're talking about over the course of the campaign, the majority are part of the Seven Days campaign and some even make it to the Peninsula days.

Ok. Just seems to me that since you included "Defenses Upper Potomac" with those left behind why not include Slocum and Sigel? or Banks and Shields in spring of 62? Its just not clear to me why you are slicing things in the way you are.

"Defenses Upper Potomac" seems to relate to the issue of Washington's defenses (or at least "tied up as garrison"), but I'm not sure on Sigel and Slocum - their situation seems comparable to Banks in '62 in regards to "in the field, not necessarily with the main army".

I'm open to whatever interpretation is most fair and consistent if you think mine isn't there
Have to disagree with you here, even if Sickles remains in the spot he was placed, which actually was not where Meade wanted him anyhow, he should have been a little farther back than where he was camped the night before. Anyhow, V Corps was 1100 yards behind him as a reserve, Sickles would only have a mile long line to cover instead of the 2 miles he chose by moving up but he still would have needed the additional 11000 V corps troops. II Corps was originaly on the left but moved to the center as it could be sent either left or right, in which in this case they were sent to the left to help bail Sickles out. I am sure some of those troops would have still been sent to the left even if Sickles remains in place. The only thing I will say you are correct is the XII Corps wouldn't have had to go to the rescue. III Corps, V Corps, and half of II Corps would have given Sickles about 27,000 infantry, about 31-32k if all of II Corps shifts.

Had Sickles been in position as ordered, he would have had Caldwell's division (1st Division, 2nd Corps) on one flank and the other resting on LRT .

http://edtech2.boisestate.edu/dougwolfe/502/vtour/wheat.html The map admittedly does not show Sickles's intended position, but it does show the rest of the Union line.

Had Sickles not tried to have a salient without support on its flanks, there would not have been the need to send 2nd Corps to support Sickles because they would already be in a position to support, and 5th Corps would not have had to send four brigades to do what was supposed to be the responsibility of Sickles's corps.

Looking solely at the forces of his own corps, Sickles had about 9,900 infantry.

Hood and McLaws had around 13,735 infantry.

There is no reason Sickles needs to have such substantial reinforcements from Fifth Corps except spreading his forces too thinly in a position with its flanks exposed and disregarding important ground (which occupied four of eight Fifth Corps brigades).

Might it be necessary to reinforce LRT or any other specific point? Yes, defensive lines sometimes need back up. But not for the line on the whole.
 
In sporting terms (football, the rest of the world one), they may have scored the last goal, but it wouldn't have been a winning goal without all the goals scored by others, and saves made.

But they did more than simply score the last goal, and their goal/s (in 1864) were scored in a situation where a lesser player could have failed to make the goal or failed to make the saves or both.

"The Confederacy was doomed no matter what" might have worked in a world with unlimited time to play, but not here.
 
Though I think you should ask where were Sigel and Slocum at the time?

This is an older discussion, but I was just surfing around a little bit on here. So, Franz Sigel was obviously commanding the entire Reserve Grand Division (Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps'). Eleventh Corps coalesced in the vicinity of Stafford Court House and Dumfries on/by December 16th. Sigel actually established Headquarters at Stafford Court House on the 14th. Twelfth Corps had been moved from just South of Harpers Ferry (the London Heights area if remember correctly) to Fairfax Court House. They had arrived by the 16th, as well. I believe that the movements began on December 11th-12th, or so, if I remember correctly.

Burnside's meeting with Halleck at Aquila Landing occurred around 2:00 P.M. on December 17th, according to the record.

Sigel, however, it will be remembered, had to return to Washington for the McDowell inquiry and was accordingly back in Washington on December 19th.
 
Well, this ol' thread popped up in my feed. I'll need to kept myself restrained so I don't start a fight- It's Joe Johnston. So many people call him a brilliant strategist when he's outsmarted and outmaneuvered time and again. On two occasions his army was nearly encircled and destroyed by his opponent, and only Union overcaution saved his rear end.
And don't get me started on the people who believe he was practicing "Fabian tactics" and was intentionally falling back to defensive lines, and how that makes him a better general than Lee, when in reality his retreats only further undermined the Confederacy and the slave order they were trying to keep preserved.
 

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