Most Overrated General?

well, next time, start at the end and work your way to the beginning! I had to do that study Eastern Roman History (Byzantine)
Oooo, Byzantine history.

Must . .. stay . . . on . . . topic.


Going back to Grant and his rating in general, one thing that comes to mind. To what extent do we value an officer's ability to stay on good terms with Washington (or Richmond)?

Grant and Lee stand head and shoulders above their peers there.
 
Oooo, Byzantine history.

Must . .. stay . . . on . . . topic.


Going back to Grant and his rating in general, one thing that comes to mind. To what extent do we value an officer's ability to stay on good terms with Washington (or Richmond)?

Grant and Lee stand head and shoulders above their peers there.

Yes. Lee knew how to play Davis. And Grant knew enough to get the hell out of D.C. and let Halleck take the heat.
 
No, it's not, and this will all come to a screeching halt at this moment, if anyone wants to walk away unscathed. Otherwise, stand in line. I've had a long, long day and I have a splitting headache and a throbbing knee. I will take Ole's axe and start whacking if everyone chooses to continue behaving in this juvenile manner. I don't like name calling. Before I was a teacher I didn't like name calling. Get over it, people.

I do appreciate those of you who have attempted to operate in a civil manner--very much.

Posted in Capacity as Moderator

Sometimes my attempts at 'light-hearted' are light-headed instead. :redface: My sincere apologies to all.
 
this may sound a bit hard, but I think that Grant's best ability is what we just discussed, mainly that he could see the finish line better than any other general on either side, and worked his way back to the start. Vicksburg comes to mind
 
Yes. Lee knew how to play Davis. And Grant knew enough to get the hell out of D.C. and let Halleck take the heat.


Not just let Halleck take the heat, but respond to what Lincoln wanted and was worried about. Grant may not have liked all of Lincoln's ideas or preferences any more than most of his peers, but he seems to have accepted that - for example - Sigel and Butler were politically important and that "politically important" was like mud - cursing at it wouldn't make it go away.
 
Not just let Halleck take the heat, but respond to what Lincoln wanted and was worried about. Grant may not have liked all of Lincoln's ideas or preferences any more than most of his peers, but he seems to have accepted that - for example - Sigel and Butler were politically important and that "politically important" was like mud - cursing at it wouldn't make it go away.

I always try to underplay my favorite ACW guy, Halleck, so as not to start a new tangent. Grant was lucky to have had a Halleck in D.C. to show him the political side of the war. Imagine if Grant had to stay in the Capitol. He'd have ended up like Halleck, I think.
 
I always try to underplay my favorite ACW guy, Halleck, so as not to start a new tangent. Grant was lucky to have had a Halleck in D.C. to show him the political side of the war. Imagine if Grant had to stay in the Capitol. He'd have ended up like Halleck, I think.
There is definitely something important about knowing personalities and situations: how to improve them, coddle and pet them, keep them from going to hell and to manipulate them when necessary to get jobs accomplished.
 
I always try to underplay my favorite ACW guy, Halleck, so as not to start a new tangent. Grant was lucky to have had a Halleck in D.C. to show him the political side of the war. Imagine if Grant had to stay in the Capitol. He'd have ended up like Halleck, I think.

Halleck's example went to waste, I'm afraid. Grant's presidency showed what would happen to him in Washington. His BFF Sherman knew that but Grant, having that necessary ego all good generals have, could not resist the temptation. However, Lincoln was wise enough to know Grant was way better out of Washington than in it!
 
Halleck's example went to waste, I'm afraid. Grant's presidency showed what would happen to him in Washington. His BFF Sherman knew that but Grant, having that necessary ego all good generals have, could not resist the temptation. However, Lincoln was wise enough to know Grant was way better out of Washington than in it!

Grant the politician had horrible people around him and was easily the most naïve President we've ever had. I wonder if his reputation as President doesn't have a lot to do with the way authors have tried to raise him above what he was in the ACW?

Sherman had a lot of issues with President Grant.
 
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I always try to underplay my favorite ACW guy, Halleck, so as not to start a new tangent. Grant was lucky to have had a Halleck in D.C. to show him the political side of the war. Imagine if Grant had to stay in the Capitol. He'd have ended up like Halleck, I think.

Could be, though I think Grant would have had different issues - Halleck had some real strengths, but he doesn't really seem to have been the kind of, um, assertive general in chief to make things happen because he willed it so.

Good bureaucrat - and I don't mean that as a backhanded compliment, it's a very significant skill - but not always effectively forceful.

Grant seems like he might lean the other way.
 
Could be, though I think Grant would have had different issues - Halleck had some real strengths, but he doesn't really seem to have been the kind of, um, assertive general in chief to make things happen because he willed it so.

Good bureaucrat - and I don't mean that as a backhanded compliment, it's a very significant skill - but not always effectively forceful.

Grant seems like he might lean the other way.

Maybe. But being a good desk jockey Grant wasn't. And once the war was over, so too, to some degree, was Grant.
 
Grant the politician had horrible people around him and was easily the most naïve President we've ever had. I wonder if his reputation as President doesn't have a lot to do with the way authors have tried to raise him above what he was in the ACW?

Sherman had a lot of issues with President Grant.

Yes, indeed Sherman and President Grant had problems. Sherman was very hurt by it, too. I think Grant was as well, although he seemed to be the one doing most of the parting. Sherman...well, he was Sherman! Half of Grant's problem was long entrenched corruption that had not been dealt with - Lincoln had plans for that but he did not live. The other half was his opportunistic and greedy family as well as hangers-on Grant did not recognize as such.
 
I always try to underplay my favorite ACW guy, Halleck, so as not to start a new tangent. Grant was lucky to have had a Halleck in D.C. to show him the political side of the war. Imagine if Grant had to stay in the Capitol. He'd have ended up like Halleck, I think.
Like a good assistant coach: able to deflect the negative, let through the positive, be a good go between from player to coach, owner and coach and vice versa for both, and be honest or say things in a way that are either honest or get the point across to the head coach without damaging his/her fragile psyche.
 
Maybe. But being a good desk jockey Grant wasn't. And once the war was over, so too, to some degree, was Grant.

Exactly. Halleck was cut out for that, Grant was not.

I think it speaks well of Halleck that he accepted this about himself, on that note. Not every general ill suited for combat takes well to desk duty, but Halleck seems to have liked that environment.
 
I guess, and I'm sure its me, my question about Grant is why did Lincoln allow him so much more time in 1864 then he did McClellan in 1862?

Results. Despite the losses, despite Cold Harbor, the result of April - July 1864 was better than the result of April - July 1862.

Also Halleck. McClellan's position in July 1862 went against Halleck's strategic concepts. He had to be called back. Wasnt the same in 1864.


And why did Lincoln not make Grant leave enough troops to watch D.C., etc. as he did Mac?
Depends on that tricky word in bold. McClellan decided to move most of the army by water in a way that would uncover DC to Johnson's army near Culpeper, north of the Rapidan. Grant intended to move in away that engaged with Lee's army, already south of the Rapidan, and Grant still left 30,000 PFD in the Department of Washington during May 1864. So seems Lincoln did make Grant leave enough troops to watch DC.
 
Depends on that tricky word in bold. McClellan decided to move most of the army by water in a way that would uncover DC to Johnson's army near Culpeper, north of the Rapidan. Grant intended to move in away that engaged with Lee's army, already south of the Rapidan, and Grant still left 30,000 PFD in the Department of Washington during May 1864. So seems Lincoln did make Grant leave enough troops to watch DC.

Where is that figure from?

Trying to collect the figures for the major campaigns of the AotP and compare them, as the number varied from time to time and it would be interesting to see how the forces in the field compare to those left in Washington at various dates.
 
Results. Despite the losses, despite Cold Harbor, the result of April - July 1864 was better than the result of April - July 1862.

Also Halleck. McClellan's position in July 1862 went against Halleck's strategic concepts. He had to be called back. Wasnt the same in 1864.



Depends on that tricky word in bold. McClellan decided to move most of the army by water in a way that would uncover DC to Johnson's army near Culpeper, north of the Rapidan. Grant intended to move in away that engaged with Lee's army, already south of the Rapidan, and Grant still left 30,000 PFD in the Department of Washington during May 1864. So seems Lincoln did make Grant leave enough troops to watch DC.

Lincoln did make Grant leave enough troops to be sure of DC but it was a different city than Mac looked after. By the time of Grant, it was the most heavily fortified city on earth.
 
Where is that figure from?

Trying to collect the figures for the major campaigns of the AotP and compare them, as the number varied from time to time and it would be interesting to see how the forces in the field compare to those left in Washington at various dates.


http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...on,+Department+of&view=image&seq=591&size=100


Also see June number (slightly smaller):

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...on,+Department+of&view=image&seq=721&size=100
 

Thank you. Here are the figures I've uncovered to date for comparison:

Fredericksburg Campaign (December 10 1862)
Department of Washington (including Defenses Upper Potomac): 52,200
Army of the Potomac: 149,503 officers and men present for duty (111,852 in the three Grand Divisions at Fredericksburg)

From
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0031;didno=waro0031;view=image;seq=1137

Chancellorsville Campaign (April 30)
Department of Washington: 34,925 officers and men present for duty
Army of the Potomac: 138,378 officers and men present for duty

From:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=morning report;rgn=full text;idno=waro0040;didno=waro0040;view=image;seq=0323
and
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0040;didno=waro0040;view=image;seq=0322

Gettysburg Campaign (June 30 1863)
Department of Washington: 21,467 officers and men present for duty
Army of the Potomac: 103,302 officers and men present for duty.

From
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0045&node=waro0045:4&view=image&seq=442&size=100
and
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0043&node=waro0043:3&view=image&seq=171&size=150
and
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0045;node=waro0045:4;view=image;seq=446;size=100;page=root


I am not aware at this time of the number of officers and men present for duty as of June 20 (1862) in the defenses of Washington nor those of September 10 or 20 (1862), and thus am reluctant to compare them to the figures McClellan had in the field in his campaigns.

But Wadsworth reports having only 19,022 officers and men present for duty as of April 2nd: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0015;didno=waro0015;view=image;seq=0240http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0015;didno=waro0015;view=image;seq=0240

And McClellan reports 180,362 officers and men present for duty, including 22,683 under Banks and the divisions of King and Blenker (none of which would serve on the Peninsula) on March 31: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0055
 
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Guess we're not talking about Grant, the President, so I will expect this to be gone in the morning.

As a general, Grant could select those subordinates he could trust. As a President, he was given subordinates (favors and all that political mesh) which still exists. And Grant typically trusted them. It was his thing. He didn't know how to distrust.

We'd remember him better if he'd have never been president
 

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