McClellan After Malvern Hill

[wausaubob]

In fact Grant's movement from Cold Harbor to Charles City was almost exactly the same as McClellan's. Gaines Mill was fought in the same area as Cold Harbor was in 1864, and in 1864 the rebels used some of the same entrenchments that McClellan's men dug in '62. Grant's move to the James placed his army about a mile further east than McClellan's.

McClellan's strategy post the move to the James was identical to Grant's. He intended to cross the James and seize Petersburg. He sent Marcy off to Washington immediately after Malvern Hill to brief cabinet of his intent, and to bring back the pontoons for bridging the James. The government started getting involved in naval gazing. They would not approve the pontoons, and they ordered reinforcements already en route to McClellan to wait at Fort Monroe. Lincoln went in person down to the James and met McClellan, who explained his plans. He'd already explained them to Burnside, who was to lead the move over the James. Burnside's command would seize the right bank of the James opposite Harrison's (Coggin's Point), and cover the pontoon bridge being built whilst transports shuttled reinforcements over. They then make a run for Petersburg.

Lincoln came away from his visit unconvinced. He'd always disliked the army being in SE Va, and McClellan was going to take it further away from Washington. He signaled for Halleck to come take command, and Halleck killed the movement (which McClellan had begun even without the pontoons or Burnside, elements of 3rd and 5th Corps had seized Coggin's Point, and his cavalry had recce'd Petersburg). Halleck ordered the James abandoned, against McClellan's protests.

Two years later Halleck would write to Sherman about what a terrible mistake Grant had made in crossing the James. This time however he was powerless to stop it. I have zero doubt that had Grant had the same status as McClellan then Halleck would have ordered him back to Washington with his army in June '64.

Grant was implementing a version of McClellan's plan. McClellan and Grant were probably not the adversaries history portrays them to be. When Grant got elected, McClellan went to Europe. When McClellan wanted to get back into politics, Grant went on a world tour.
Grant's summer home was in New Jersey.
They never confronted each other in public. The essential difference between Grant and McClellan was that Grant absolutely never criticized Lincoln. It was like not swearing and it is a terrific demonstration of self discipline.
Oddly, I think they both died in 1885 within months of each other.
Sherman, Grant and Meade knew they were putting McClellan's plan in place.
In addition Grant tired of Halleck and essentially dropped him from his memory.
There is nothing wrong with McClellan's plans. He did not have the operational experience to make it click, but neither did anyone else fighting for the United States in 1862.

 

[Saphroneth]

There is nothing wrong with McClellan's plans. He did not have the operational experience to make it click, but neither did anyone else fighting for the United States in 1862.

What demonstrates that McClellan didn't have the operational experience? I mean, when Grant executed McClellan's plan he did so with a much greater preponderance of manpower - operational warfare becomes rather easier when one outnumbers the enemy 3:2 instead of being outnumbered oneself.

In addition Grant tired of Halleck and essentially dropped him from his memory.

Which is essentially saying Grant could do what McClellan could not - ignore Halleck.

 

[wausaubob]

What demonstrates that McClellan didn't have the operational experience? I mean, when Grant executed McClellan's plan he did so with a much greater preponderance of manpower - operational warfare becomes rather easier when one outnumbers the enemy 3:2 instead of being outnumbered oneself.


Which is essentially saying Grant could do what McClellan could not - ignore Halleck.

First, Halleck was a very skillful politician within the army and had good allies. He was skilled at taking credit for what other people accomplished.
General McClellan's army was bad at movement. All things having to do with combat readiness, logistics, intelligence, medical care, simply marching, had to be improved. In order to improve them people were going to have to be held accountable.
In order to defeat the Virginians on their own turf, it was going to take what McClellan built and a lot more.
But since Halleck got promoted for doing almost nothing, and Buell was maintained despite crawling to Pittsburgh Landing, and McClellan was not sustained for fighting, McClellan and Grant had much more in common than historians have written.

 

[Jamieva]

One significant difference between Grant and McClellan was the condition of the opposing army when they got to the James. Grant had beat down the ANV significantly. McClellan was facing an army that was at the peak of it's manpower.

 

[wausaubob]

One significant difference between Grant and McClellan was the condition of the opposing army when they got to the James. Grant had beat down the ANV significantly. McClellan was facing an army that was at the peak of it's manpower.

General McClellan did have the Confederates concentrated against him. What were Halleck and Buell doing? Halleck was playing it safe in Corinth and was not prepared when Farragut broke through at New Orleans. When Halleck did not move the war was prolonged a year.

 

[Saphroneth]

General McClellan's army was bad at movement. All things having to do with combat readiness, logistics, intelligence, medical care, simply marching, had to be improved. In order to improve them people were going to have to be held accountable.
In order to defeat the Virginians on their own turf, it was going to take what McClellan built and a lot more.

But that's the thing, it was under McClellan that the AotP achieved one of the great strategic moves of the war (the Loudoun Valley campaign) - it was McClellan who built the AotP into a force able to pull flying column supply.

One significant difference between Grant and McClellan was the condition of the opposing army when they got to the James. Grant had beat down the ANV significantly. McClellan was facing an army that was at the peak of it's manpower.

The casualty point is interesting, actually. 67th:

A casualty is a casualty - the destruction of Lee's army was a process that really started around Williamsburg, and accelerated throughout 1862 and into 1863 (Gettysburg). His casualties were roughly:

Peninsula campaign (McClellan): 29,298
2nd Bull Run campaign (Pope): 9,474
Maryland Campaign (McClellan): 14,488
Fredericksburg Campaign (Burnside): 5,377
Chancellorsville Campaign (Hooker): 18,938
Gettysburg Campaign (Meade): 25,723
Mine Run Campaign (Meade): 3,791
Overland Campaign (Grant): 31,763
Siege of Petersburg (Grant): 22,629
Appomattox Campaign (Grant): 19,636
-Surrendered: 27,805

Whilst Grant of course is the biggest inflicter of casualties (41% of battle casualties), McClellan comes second by a significant margin (24%, with Meade 3rd on 16%, Hooker on 10%, Pope on 5%, and Burnside on 3%). Compare his Peninsula Campaign with Grant's overland campaign - both inflicted about the same level of casualties and both ended with the Federal army on the James, but one was conducted with a lower force ratio (ca. 1.1 vs 2:1) and lost far fewer men (23,718 vs 55,942). One simply can't argue the Overland was better and keep a straight face. The difference is of course the will of Washington to sustain the offensive, and that lays squarely on Lincoln.

 

[Saphroneth]

When Halleck did not move the war was prolonged a year.

Halleck deserves a lot more blame than he gets for the reverses of the ACW - for example, it's often presented that McClellan ordered the retreat from the Peninsula, not Halleck...

 

[wausaubob]

We are getting away from the Peninsula campaign. The main point is that when Grant implemented his version of the Virginia campaign, under the political restraints imposed by Lincoln, he had McClellan's, as well as Pope's and Hooker's mistakes to inform him.
By April of 1865 Grant had completely changed the command structure of both the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James. That is evidence of how much more work McClellan had yet to do.

 

[Saphroneth]

By April of 1865 Grant had completely changed the command structure of both the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James. That is evidence of how much more work McClellan had yet to do.

I really don't think it is, unless something about McClellan's AotP contributed to his lack of success. Occam's Razor says the lack of success can be attributed to the force ratio.

The main point is that when Grant implemented his version of the Virginia campaign, under the political restraints imposed by Lincoln, he had McClellan's, as well as Pope's and Hooker's mistakes to inform him.

But Grant had less political restraints, a much better starting situation (the Overland would have been impossible in early 1862) and of course he suffered a lot more casualties to get to the same place.

 

[wausaubob]

Grant had more time constraints and his plan was vetoed by Halleck. Grant was not allowed to pick his commander on the James or like McClellan, he had to take what was given in the Shenandoah Valley.
I like the force ratio argument.
But over all, the reaction to Shiloh and the Seven Days was the same. Since the war was not going to be cheap and easy, someone has to be to blame. Since Wade, Julian, Ashley and Andrew Johnson were not going to accept any blame, Grant and McClellan were the fall guys and Halleck floated free.

 

[Saphroneth]

Grant had more time constraints and his plan was vetoed by Halleck.

I'm not sure how you conclude Grant had more time constraints? If McClellan had been given as long to take Richmond as Grant was (eleven months, from the start of May 1864 to the end of March 1865) he'd have still been there eleven months after arriving at Fort Monroe (i.e. Feb 1863) - by which time McClellan had been recalled, sacked, reinstated, won a victory, and sacked for the second and final time, and McClellan's replacement had overseen one of the great military defeats of US history (Fredericksburg) and himself been sacked.

Of course, many of McClellan's plans were vetoed by Lincoln, Halleck and/or Stanton. One of the interesting ones is the hash that was made of the Urbanna Plan...

 

[Saphroneth]

Should McClellan have ordered an attack, or was continuing the retreat to Harrison's Landing the right decision?

Retreating was absolutely the right decision - the army was pretty much out of supplies, the men hadn't eaten, and half of Lee's army was marching to cut off any access to resupply.
If McClellan had attacked north after Malvern Hill his army would have been destroyed.

ED: whoops, missed the thread date, thought this was a new one! Sorry!

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Retreating was absolutely the right decision - the army was pretty much out of supplies, the men hadn't eaten, and half of Lee's army was marching to cut off any access to resupply.
If McClellan had attacked north after Malvern Hill his army would have been destroyed.

ED: whoops, missed the thread date, thought this was a new one! Sorry!

No worries!

 

[Bruce Vail]

Burton is the best book out there.

Another good one is Harsh's Confederate Tide Rising if interested in Lee's PoV.

I've started Dowdey and I have Burton on order from the library.

 

[Lost Cause]

There are a whole bunch of books out there. I read Sears' To the Gates of Richmond and was hungry for more. I picked these three after soliciting recs here on CWT and elsewhere:

1) Clifford Dowdey "The Seven Days" -- suggested as a counterpoint to Sears because Dowdey writes from a Southern perspective

2) Gary Gallagher (Ed.) "The Richmond Campaign of 1862" -- a collection of nine essays (including one from Gallagher himself) from respected Civil War historians on different aspects of the campaign

3) Brian K. Burton "Extraordinary Circumstance" -- said to be an engaging account

I am happy to hear any criticisms of these books, or alternate suggestions, from CWT folk here.

I purchased Brian K. Burton's "Extraordinary Circumstance" approx. 15 years ago to follow certain individual troop movements during the campaign, which it did a good job, almost to a fault. Someone once accurately (IMO) critiqued the book, by comparing the heavy details to placing your nose on the screen of a large tv in order to understand a movie that is playing (or something similar).

 

[Bruce Vail]

But that's the thing, it was under McClellan that the AotP achieved one of the great strategic moves of the war (the Loudoun Valley campaign) - it was McClellan who built the AotP into a force able to pull flying column supply.


The casualty point is interesting, actually. 67th:

These are interesting numbers. What is the source?

"A casualty is a casualty - the destruction of Lee's army was a process that really started around Williamsburg, and accelerated throughout 1862 and into 1863 (Gettysburg). His casualties were roughly:

Peninsula campaign (McClellan): 29,298
2nd Bull Run campaign (Pope): 9,474
Maryland Campaign (McClellan): 14,488
Fredericksburg Campaign (Burnside): 5,377
Chancellorsville Campaign (Hooker): 18,938
Gettysburg Campaign (Meade): 25,723
Mine Run Campaign (Meade): 3,791
Overland Campaign (Grant): 31,763
Siege of Petersburg (Grant): 22,629
Appomattox Campaign (Grant): 19,636
-Surrendered: 27,805

Whilst Grant of course is the biggest inflicter of casualties (41% of battle casualties), McClellan comes second by a significant margin (24%, with Meade 3rd on 16%, Hooker on 10%, Pope on 5%, and Burnside on 3%). Compare his Peninsula Campaign with Grant's overland campaign - both inflicted about the same level of casualties and both ended with the Federal army on the James, but one was conducted with a lower force ratio (ca. 1.1 vs 2:1) and lost far fewer men (23,718 vs 55,942). One simply can't argue the Overland was better and keep a straight face. The difference is of course the will of Washington to sustain the offensive, and that lays squarely on Lincoln.

 

[Saphroneth]

These are interesting numbers. What is the source?

I'm not sure offhand, and I did get the numbers from @67th Tigers , but I'm fairly confident on the Peninsular numbers at least being from Harsh.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'm not sure offhand, and I did get the numbers from @67th Tigers , but I'm fairly confident on the Peninsular numbers at least being from Harsh.

I calculated them, from various sources, but mostly the OR and Livermore's Numbers and Losses.

I know I took the Overland and Petersburg siege casualties from Horn's works, which I found via Newton's "Lost for the Cause".

 

[Jimbo_Poke]

These are interesting numbers. What is the source?

"A casualty is a casualty - the destruction of Lee's army was a process that really started around Williamsburg, and accelerated throughout 1862 and into 1863 (Gettysburg). His casualties were roughly:

Peninsula campaign (McClellan): 29,298
2nd Bull Run campaign (Pope): 9,474
Maryland Campaign (McClellan): 14,488
Fredericksburg Campaign (Burnside): 5,377
Chancellorsville Campaign (Hooker): 18,938
Gettysburg Campaign (Meade): 25,723
Mine Run Campaign (Meade): 3,791
Overland Campaign (Grant): 31,763
Siege of Petersburg (Grant): 22,629
Appomattox Campaign (Grant): 19,636
-Surrendered: 27,805

Whilst Grant of course is the biggest inflicter of casualties (41% of battle casualties), McClellan comes second by a significant margin (24%, with Meade 3rd on 16%, Hooker on 10%, Pope on 5%, and Burnside on 3%). Compare his Peninsula Campaign with Grant's overland campaign - both inflicted about the same level of casualties and both ended with the Federal army on the James, but one was conducted with a lower force ratio (ca. 1.1 vs 2:1) and lost far fewer men (23,718 vs 55,942). One simply can't argue the Overland was better and keep a straight face. The difference is of course the will of Washington to sustain the offensive, and that lays squarely on Lincoln.

There are quite a few other differences. One being how Lee was fighting. Wilderness was a slugging match after that Lee's Army stayed in their works. I doubt Grant and Meade would have minded if Lee tried his assaults like he did at Seven Days, wasn't going to happen.

 

[67th Tigers]

There are quite a few other differences. One being how Lee was fighting. Wilderness was a slugging match after that Lee's Army stayed in their works. I doubt Grant and Meade would have minded if Lee tried his assaults like he did at Seven Days, wasn't going to happen.

He did. In the Wilderness Lee was maneuvering to try and turn Grant. He had hit Grant with two corps, and had his third trying to move round. The following actions of course do see Lee entrenching.