As a disclosure, I am far from an expert on the Peninsula Campaign. I have read some general works, such as Sears's books (where his biases against McClellan are clear). I have also read Rafuse's book about McClellan, which I enjoyed very much. So I approach this question with genuine curiosity.
I am aware that the veracity of the Kearny quote is questioned (perhaps from one of your earlier posts,
@67th Tigers ) and also that similar comments attributed to Porter are also questioned. But I have to believe, whatever the veracity of those quotes, that there were some within the army who questioned the decision to continue to retreat.
Porter's communique to McClellan was highly qualified.
Two years ago I posted this:
This is what Sears wrote:
"However serious the day's results, and in common with Mechanicsville on June 26, General Lee lost the battle but won the larger contest. At 9: 30 that night Fitz John Porter signaled McClellan that "against immense odds, we have driven the enemy beyond the battle field and the firing ended at 8: 30." He went on to say that if he could be resupplied with food and ammunition, "we will hold our own and advance if you wish." Here was General Porter, the soul of military caution, proposing to follow up the Malvern Hill victory with a counteroffensive. The next morning he said to Baldy Smith that he had spent the night "urging McClellan to move forward on Richmond at daylight."
General McClellan, however, had long since made up his mind. His only thought was safe haven at Harrison's Landing. Without even waiting for Porter's verdict on the day's events, in contradiction to all of Porter's later arguments, he issued the order for the army to continue its retreat."
Sears, Stephen W. (2014-11-11). To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (Kindle Locations 5924-5931). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.
Note how qualified Porter's supposed arguments are. They are contingent on being resupplied, and the whole point of the flank movement was that the army was out of supply and had to move to a new base (which it has not yet reached, because the Navy have nixed Haxall's for Harrison's).
In fact, Malvern Hill is a seductive trap. If you read Lee's Lieutenants then it's clear Lee's plan was to envelop Malvern and cut it off from Harrison's. When Huger's attacks (which Lee never ordered) occur Lee is with Stuart, Longstreet and AP Hill sending them off on a flank movement to come round and envelop the hill. It's in fact obvious just from looking at a map that Malvern Hill is a bad position.
Had the Army of the Potomac still been on Malvern Hill on 2nd July then likely Lee would have "bagged" it. He'd have Longstreet and AP Hill envelop the hill, cut it off from Harrison's and the men on the hill, without rations, water or bullets, would have to surrender.
</two years ago>
Now, in his most recent Sears writes:
"At 6: 10 p.m. Porter had reported to McClellan, "The enemy has renewed the contest vigorously— but I look for success again." By 9: 30 he declared victory: "After a hard fight for nearly four hours against immense odds, we have driven the enemy beyond the battle field. . . ." If reinforced, if the men were provisioned and their ammunition replenished, "we will hold our own and advance if you wish." His victorious men "can only regret the necessity which will compel a withdrawal." The general commanding, however, had already issued orders for the final leg of the retreat, to Harrison's Landing. Porter's report of a complete victory did not move him to reconsider. He explained to Lincoln: "I have not yielded an inch of ground unnecessarily but have retired to prevent the superior force of the Enemy from cutting me off— and to take a different base of operations." 52
McClellan's lieutenants were dismayed (or worse) by his order to continue the retreat. Darius Couch, who had smothered the assaults on Malvern Hill, recalled his "great surprise" at leaving a victorious field, and his bitterness at abandoning "many gallant men desperately wounded." For staff man William Biddle, "the idea of stealing away in the night from such a position, after such a victory, was simply galling." Israel Richardson observed that "if anything can try the patience and courage of troops," it was fighting all day every day, then falling back every night. Phil Kearny was livid. To fellow officers he declaimed, "I, Philip Kearny, an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this order to retreat. We ought, instead of retreating, to follow up the enemy and take Richmond. . . . I say to you all, such an order can only be prompted by cowardice or treason!"
In the early hours of July 2 Fitz John Porter and Baldy Smith found time for a conversation as their commands trudged toward Harrison's Landing. Porter described the decisiveness of the victory at Malvern Hill, and said he had spent the night trying to persuade McClellan to change his mind and move against Richmond at daylight. Knowing Porter to be McClellan's closest confidant, and knowing Porter's own native caution, Smith was fully persuaded just how ill judged was McClellan's decision. When he reached Harrison's Landing, he wrote his wife "saying I had arrived safely but that General McClellan was not the man to lead our armies to victory." 53
Sears, Stephen W.. Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac (pp. 271-272). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.
Again, we have slightly more of the quote (as we don't have the actual signals, which are in the LC McClellan papers and Sears did not extract fully), and it is still very qualified. Porter is stating that if resupplies and reinforcements arrive at Malvern immediately they can hold their position, and perhaps advance, and then states his regret at the necessity of withdrawing.
As to the conversation with Smith, I have Siciliano's thesis on Smith and it's highly revealing. Reading it one can conclude that Smith was in the middle of a serious nervous breakdown caused because he had hyperreactive insomnia. He had been unable to sleep since the Seven Days started and by the 30th June was quite psychotic (taking a cold bath during Glendale to try and stay awake), leading his division away from White Oak Swamp without orders and without telling anyone, and starting to march to Charles City.
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