McClellan After Malvern Hill

[Saphroneth]

The problem was the execution of the plan, which was flawed not least of which was the result of McClellan's excessive caution, and inability to seize the initiative.

Can you give an example of McClellan displaying excessive caution, please?

McClellan was certainly hobbled by Lincoln's decision to withhold McDowell's corps to defend Washington but the AOTP nevertheless still maintained numerical superiority, although McClellan thought otherwise.

This is actually not correct. By the end of May the two armies were at parity, and by the end of June (when Jackson came down) McClellan was moderately outnumbered.

Attacking at parity is a very risky business anyway, of course, but what made it worse was the orders to keep the base fixed at White House Landing - this forced the AotP to be spread across a waterway.

 

[Bruce Vail]

What are those three books--I'd love to know because both my eldest son and I are seeking more knowledge on the 7 Days! Thank you!

There are a whole bunch of books out there. I read Sears' To the Gates of Richmond and was hungry for more. I picked these three after soliciting recs here on CWT and elsewhere:

1) Clifford Dowdey "The Seven Days" -- suggested as a counterpoint to Sears because Dowdey writes from a Southern perspective

2) Gary Gallagher (Ed.) "The Richmond Campaign of 1862" -- a collection of nine essays (including one from Gallagher himself) from respected Civil War historians on different aspects of the campaign

3) Brian K. Burton "Extraordinary Circumstance" -- said to be an engaging account

I am happy to hear any criticisms of these books, or alternate suggestions, from CWT folk here.

 

[Bruce Vail]

McClellan's plan to besiege Richmond was thrown off course by Lee's relentless assaults during the Seven Days. Although the AOTP technically prevailed in most of those encounters, McClellan by that time and certainly after Malvern Hill was measuring success solely on the basis of being able to move the army and its base from White House on the Pamunkey River to Harrison Landing on the James River. Once the idea of investing Richmond by siege was no longer in play, the thought that McClellan would consider more aggressive offensive action against Richmond was not realistic.

"...Although the AOTP technically prevailed in most of those encounters..."

This a subjective and highly debatable proposition, if you don't mind me saying so. It's true the Yankees killed more Rebels than vice versa in most of the Seven Days battles, but Lee had a large force that was on the attack. Lee's forceful tactics intimidated McClellan, and he cautiously withdrew. I would not characerize that as "prevailing."

 

[Saphroneth]

This a subjective and highly debatable proposition, if you don't mind me saying so. It's true the Yankees killed more Rebels than vice versa in most of the Seven Days battles, but Lee had a large force that was on the attack. Lee's forceful tactics intimidated McClellan, and he cautiously withdrew. I would not characerize that as "prevailing."

Lee had a superior force on the attack (his PFD numbers are about 15% higher than McClellan's) and McClellan's forces tended to hold the field on the day before retreating overnight. This suggests that the tactical battles were being won by the Union but that the strategic situation was troublesome for them.

McClellan's withdrawal was not due to being intimidated - it was the only thing he could do to preserve the army. In particular, the common suggestion McCelllan should have counterattacked after Gaines Mill would have led to McClellan's entire army being cut off and destroyed.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Now, for Washington as of 4th July, there are several possible scenarios.


1) McClellan was not outnumbered and he was not in danger, but retreated because he was spooked, and it is possible to successfully attack Richmond via the James.
In that case, he should have been replaced - the army is right there before Richmond, and if his army is large enough to be successful with a competent commander then it should be done straight away.
2) McClellan was outnumbered and in danger, but it is possible to successfully attack Richmond via the James.
In that case, McClellan should be reinforced.
3) McClellan was not outnumbered and he was not in danger, but retreated because he was spooked, and it is not possible to successfully attack Richmond via the James.
This is essentially a logical contradiction. If McClellan's army was not in danger mere miles from Richmond, then it is obviously possible to successfully attack Richmond via the James.
4) McClellan was outnumbered and in danger, and it is not possible to successfully attack Richmond via the James.
This requires there to be some strong positive reason it's not possible to attack Richmond via the James, such as the enemy army being too large. If true, it begs the question as to where the hell all the Rebels came from!



The true case is (2), and McClellan stuck to this scenario. It is consistent with his statements before the Seven Days (that he needed McDowell) and with the results of the battles, and also with the information we have afterwards.

Thank you for the reply. I agree that McClellan believed that the Administration was out to ruin him. That was a big part of the reason McClellan's campaign was ultimately unsuccessful -- McClellan didn't trust the Administration, and the Administration did not trust McClellan. I believe the fundamental mistrust between the two parties can be traced back to two events -- either Lincoln's meetings with McDowell & Franklin when he was sick, or the appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War.

It's no secret that Lincoln never cared for McClellan's plan of attack. In this point of view, Halleck & Lincoln were in complete agreement not only in 1862 but for the next two years.

I believe the Administration's point of view was #1 in your list of scenarios above. I believe at that point Lincoln was ready to relieve McClellan but lacked the political will (or strength) to do so. That's why he called Halleck to Washington, but Halleck chose not to relieve McClellan at that point.

It is interesting to suppose what might have resulted of Burnside's force had moved from Ft. Monroe to reinforce McClellan instead of going yo Aquia to reinforce Pope

 

[jackt62]

"...Although the AOTP technically prevailed in most of those encounters..."

This a subjective and highly debatable proposition, if you don't mind me saying so. It's true the Yankees killed more Rebels than vice versa in most of the Seven Days battles, but Lee had a large force that was on the attack. Lee's forceful tactics intimidated McClellan, and he cautiously withdrew. I would not characerize that as "prevailing."

It is sort of subjective but given that most of the encounters allowed the AOTP to continue its withdrawal to the James River I call that a technical victory. For sure, despite the ANV's problems with command and coordination from Beavers Dam Creek onward, Lee's forceful tactics intimidated McClellan, and ensured that the Seven Days were a strategic victory for Lee and the ANV, such that the threat to Richmond was alleviated and McClellan was ultimately forced to withdraw from the Peninsula.

 

[Saphroneth]

It's no secret that Lincoln never cared for McClellan's plan of attack. In this point of view, Halleck & Lincoln were in complete agreement not only in 1862 but for the next two years.

I believe the Administration's point of view was #1 in your list of scenarios above. I believe at that point Lincoln was ready to relieve McClellan but lacked the political will (or strength) to do so. That's why he called Halleck to Washington, but Halleck chose not to relieve McClellan at that point.

I think this is the critical point - the Administration disagreed with McClellan, but were unwilling to actually issue him orders to procede a certain way (which would be the thing to do with the courage of one's convictions - give the order and take the blame for the consequences). Instead they gave McClellan very half-hearted support in all sorts of ways, starting with the damage to the original Urbanna plan (they didn't like it but didn't want to actually tell McClellan to not do it, so they just asked for a vote of the division commanders. When that came down on the side of the Urbanna plan, they promoted the dissenting division commanders and then asked for a vote of the corps commanders!)

 

[Saphroneth]

For sure, despite the ANV's problems with command and coordination from Beavers Dam Creek onward, Lee's forceful tactics intimidated McClellan, and ensured that the Seven Days were a strategic victory for Lee and the ANV, such that the threat to Richmond was alleviated and McClellan was ultimately forced to withdraw from the Peninsula.

Again, this is not correct. McClellan was not intimidated (at least, not beyond what was rational) and McClellan was forced to withdraw from the peninsula not because of Lee's forceful tactics intimidating him but because he was ordered to retreat at a time he was ready to resume the offensive. (And, I might add, willing to resume the offensive despite having not recieved more than about 9 regiments in reinforcements since Gaines Mill.)
If anyone was intimidated, it was the Administration back at Washington - not McClellan.

 

[jackt62]

Can you give an example of McClellan displaying excessive caution, please?

The planning of the Peninsula Campaign was carried out in a slow, deliberate manner by McClellan to the frustration of Lincoln and the administration. Once the AOTP did arrive on the Peninsula, its movement towards Yorktown and preparation for a potential seige of that place was likewise carried out with extreme caution, thereby allowing confederate forces under John Magruder to withdraw towards Williamsburg.

This is actually not correct. By the end of May the two armies were at parity, and by the end of June (when Jackson came down) McClellan was moderately outnumbered.

As far as numbers are concerned, I'm just going by memory for which I understood the AOTP to field over 100,000 to the ANV's roughly 60,000 at the start of the campaign. I of course, would appreciate any specific numbers for individual engagements.

 

[jackt62]

Again, this is not correct. McClellan was not intimidated (at least, not beyond what was rational) and McClellan was forced to withdraw from the peninsula not because of Lee's forceful tactics intimidating him but because he was ordered to retreat at a time he was ready to resume the offensive. (And, I might add, willing to resume the offensive despite having not recieved more than about 9 regiments in reinforcements since Gaines Mill.)
If anyone was intimidated, it was the Administration back at Washington - not McClellan.

Without getting into the mind of McClellan, I doubt whether Grant, had he been in command instead of McClellan, would have hightailed the army back north.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Lee had a superior force on the attack (his PFD numbers are about 15% higher than McClellan's) and McClellan's forces tended to hold the field on the day before retreating overnight. This suggests that the tactical battles were being won by the Union but that the strategic situation was troublesome for them.

McClellan's withdrawal was not due to being intimidated - it was the only thing he could do to preserve the army. In particular, the common suggestion McCelllan should have counterattacked after Gaines Mill would have led to McClellan's entire army being cut off and destroyed.

It's only speculative, of course, but I'm guessing McClellan was intimidated, even if he would not admit it to himself or to others. We know he had inflated enemy troop strength in his own mind, and that he feared an infusion of additional reinforcements from the West. And he correctly understood that shifting base (retreating) was the safest alternative for his army. So he chose the safer, more conservative course of action. He was surprised that he wasn't praised for it.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I preface this by saying I've never visited the battlefields discussed, so I don't have the same "feel" for this that I do for other fields.

The Army of the Potomac's position on June 25 was not taken with defense in mind. It was a terrible defensive position and had only been taken up with the idea of offensive operations in mind. Two factors contributed to making this position virtually untenable. First, McDowell's advance from Fredricksburg was suspended. Then McClellan discovered that Jackson was moving toward his right flank. This was Lee's masterstroke as it left McClellan with only two options. First, defend his current supply base at West Point or, second, establish a new one on the James. Choosing the first option would also have relieved Richmond I believe as it would have required McClellan to move most of his army north of the Chickahominy. So, although I have always believed otherwise, I have come to conclude over time that McClellan's decision to withdraw or change his base to the James was a sound one.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Don't get me wrong, I don't think McClellan was cowardly or stupid or anything like that.

He just faced a superior enemy force -- Edwin Stanton!

 

[Saphroneth]

Without getting into the mind of McClellan, I doubt whether Grant, had he been in command instead of McClellan, would have hightailed the army back north.

You mean he would have disobeyed orders? McClellan was ordered to withdraw, and before he actually got the order he repeatedly protested it (because he had an inkling from the preparatory moves he'd been ordered to make).

It's only speculative, of course, but I'm guessing McClellan was intimidated, even if he would not admit it to himself or to others. We know he had inflated enemy troop strength in his own mind, and that he feared an infusion of additional reinforcements from the West. And he correctly understood that shifting base (retreating) was the safest alternative for his army. So he chose the safer, more conservative course of action. He was surprised that he wasn't praised for it.

McClellan's inflated enemy troop strength is not actually as much of an overestimate as it is sometimes presented - it was accurate in that he was indeed outnumbered, and the infusion of reinforcements from the west was because several divisions of troops from the west had vanished and nobody knew where they were. Assuming they'd be routed to where the Rebels were gathering their greatest strength is quite logical.


Of course, it's pretty clear from context that he was not totally intimidated of enemy troop strength because he was actually advancing on the first of the Seven Days - he was taking the positions for his bombardment of the Richmond forts. What McClellan was doing at the end of June was gambling that McDowell would arrive from the north instead of Jackson, and in this he was unlucky.

If he'd had the support from the administration he was promised (i.e. McDowell sent when he was promised McDowell would be sent, which was late May) then he would have been able to hold, would have taken the positions he needed overlooking the Richmond defences in late June, and would have been battering his way into Richmond itself over July.

 

[Saphroneth]

Looking at the overestimate at Richmond itself, there are four components to it.

1) McClellan's figures used Aggregate Present, which is a "high" number - this must be compared with the real Aggregate Present and with McClellan's own Aggregate Present.

2) Pinkerton's numbers had drifted up a little because he identified some regiments as being present which were not. This led to thirty-six "phantom" infantry regiments and one "phantom" cavalry regiment, but they were reported separately and as being more dubious. This results in an overestimate of about 25,000 AP.

3) Nobody had any idea where Beauregard's divisions had gone (except that they'd last been seen leaving Corinth and heading east), and they HAD intercepted information that Beauregard had been ordered to Richmond. The natural assumption was that this was with his army, but he was being ordered back to explain himself! This results in an overestimate of about 20,000 AP.

4) The assumption was that Jackson would come down from the Valley with another ~40 or so regiments of equivalent strength to those at Richmond; in fact, he was a little weaker than this, but the overestimate is minor. Perhaps 5,000 or 10,000 AP.

Of these, (2) was definitely recognized as dubious.

None of these are invalid given the information available at the time, and indeed McClellan's actions are appropriate for what he was actually facing so we have to assume his confidence in the fighting qualities of the Union soldier pretty much compensated for the overestimates.


Compare to the situation at Corinth in May, where there were rumors of as many as 200,000 Confederates there.

 

[Jamieva]

There are a whole bunch of books out there. I read Sears' To the Gates of Richmond and was hungry for more. I picked these three after soliciting recs here on CWT and elsewhere:

1) Clifford Dowdey "The Seven Days" -- suggested as a counterpoint to Sears because Dowdey writes from a Southern perspective

2) Gary Gallagher (Ed.) "The Richmond Campaign of 1862" -- a collection of nine essays (including one from Gallagher himself) from respected Civil War historians on different aspects of the campaign

3) Brian K. Burton "Extraordinary Circumstance" -- said to be an engaging account

I am happy to hear any criticisms of these books, or alternate suggestions, from CWT folk here.

Dowdey most definitely has a ANV/Lee bias.

 

[67th Tigers]

3) Brian K. Burton "Extraordinary Circumstance" -- said to be an engaging account

I am happy to hear any criticisms of these books, or alternate suggestions, from CWT folk here.

Burton is the best book out there.

Another good one is Harsh's Confederate Tide Rising if interested in Lee's PoV.

 

[67th Tigers]

Without getting into the mind of McClellan, I doubt whether Grant, had he been in command instead of McClellan, would have hightailed the army back north.

In fact Grant's movement from Cold Harbor to Charles City was almost exactly the same as McClellan's. Gaines Mill was fought in the same area as Cold Harbor was in 1864, and in 1864 the rebels used some of the same entrenchments that McClellan's men dug in '62. Grant's move to the James placed his army about a mile further east than McClellan's.

McClellan's strategy post the move to the James was identical to Grant's. He intended to cross the James and seize Petersburg. He sent Marcy off to Washington immediately after Malvern Hill to brief cabinet of his intent, and to bring back the pontoons for bridging the James. The government started getting involved in naval gazing. They would not approve the pontoons, and they ordered reinforcements already en route to McClellan to wait at Fort Monroe. Lincoln went in person down to the James and met McClellan, who explained his plans. He'd already explained them to Burnside, who was to lead the move over the James. Burnside's command would seize the right bank of the James opposite Harrison's (Coggin's Point), and cover the pontoon bridge being built whilst transports shuttled reinforcements over. They then make a run for Petersburg.

Lincoln came away from his visit unconvinced. He'd always disliked the army being in SE Va, and McClellan was going to take it further away from Washington. He signaled for Halleck to come take command, and Halleck killed the movement (which McClellan had begun even without the pontoons or Burnside, elements of 3rd and 5th Corps had seized Coggin's Point, and his cavalry had recce'd Petersburg). Halleck ordered the James abandoned, against McClellan's protests.

Two years later Halleck would write to Sherman about what a terrible mistake Grant had made in crossing the James. This time however he was powerless to stop it. I have zero doubt that had Grant had the same status as McClellan then Halleck would have ordered him back to Washington with his army in June '64.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Two years later Halleck would write to Sherman about what a terrible mistake Grant had made in crossing the James. This time however he was powerless to stop it. I have zero doubt that had Grant had the same status as McClellan then Halleck would have ordered him back to Washington with his army in June '64.

I agree. I think this is an important point. I believe Grant was a good general, but I also believe he was only able to beat Lee in the end because he was free of the constraints placed on McClellan and others by Halleck. How much these constraints were Halleck and how much were Lincoln -- or maybe they were in agreement -- is probably a good topic for another thread.

 

[jackt62]

You mean he would have disobeyed orders? McClellan was ordered to withdraw, and before he actually got the order he repeatedly protested it (because he had an inkling from the preparatory moves he'd been ordered to make).

No question that Grant had the confidence of Lincoln and the administration, in contrast to McClellan. So Grant was given much more leeway than McClellan was.