Macon/Augusta/Savannah campaign

[33RDNCK]

IMO, Hood's Tennessee campaign was the final in the coffin of the Confederacy. If the Army of Tennessee (AoT) had stayed in Georgia, it might have been able to move to Macon and defend the line of the Ocmulgee. If Sherman had moved toward Augusta, the AoT could have moved to get between Sherman and Augusta. This thread is as much about Sherman's moves as it is about the AoT; what would Sherman have done if the (AoT) had remained in Georgia? He can't cut loose from his supply lines as he did in the March to the Sea; the AoT would likely fight a scorched-earth (ish) campaign, and perhaps more importantly, his ammunition carried by wagon would not allow for a full campaign. I'd like to hear thoughts on how Sherman might have reacted to the AoT moving to Macon or the Atlanta-Augusta corridor.

 

[Coonewah Creek]

I'd like to hear thoughts on how Sherman might have reacted to the AoT moving to Macon or the Atlanta-Augusta corridor.

One thing I'm pretty sure of about Sherman is that he would have taken care to ensure his logistics were in place to meet whatever contingency Hood might try to throw at him. As long as Forrest was tied down in Mississippi, he didn't really have to worry too much about cavalry raids doing much to his railroad supply line. Wheeler certainly wasn't up to it as he proved during the Atlanta Campaign. I would be interested to see where Hood was drawing his supplies in that situation. As he was moving east in front of Sherman, the AoT would be drawing on the same sources of supply as the ANV. I think Sherman would have seen to it that if necessary he could have diverted his direction of march and drawn upon another coastal supply base utilizing the Union Navy. In either case, I think Hood's supply situation would have been even more precarious than Sherman's. Sherman calculated his odds very carefully before cutting loose from his base of supply on his March to the Sea. He would have performed the same calculations and modified his plans had Hood maneuvered to oppose his movement instead of marching off to Nashville.

 

[DaveBrt]

Sherman's target was the Army of Tennessee. Once he had Atlanta, he would have aimed for Hood as long as he was in Georgia. As noted above, Hood's supply situation would have been bad -- his food needed to come from Montgomery and his war supplies from the east. Moving east, toward Augusta, would have required the fragile food and fodder supply line to Lee to support Hood, too -- Lee barely survived with Hood headed into Alabama and Tennessee -- don't see how he could make it if his line had to feed Hood, too.

 

[33RDNCK]

Strength returns show that there were about 21000 more confederates on duty in the Carolinas and Virginia on 12/31/1864 than there were on 09/30/1864. I will buy that their subsistence was not optimal, but I am not buying that you could not subsist the Army of Tennessee infantry from these sources and the remaining part of Georgia (which was the bulk of the agricultural region) throughout the fall harvest season. If Hood withdraws to Macon, He still has rail lines to both SC and AL. In order the cut that rail link to Alabama, Sherman will need to move to either Columbus or Opelika in Alabama. Even if Hood loses that, he still has a rail link to south GA running through Savannah. The returns of Sherman's forces at Atlanta show a total of around 73000 in early September. He eventually took 60000 on the March, and sent back the remainder, along with every garrison along the rail line back to Nashville, to help cobble together Thomas's force. The march to the sea would not have been possible with an Army in his front.

 

[DaveBrt]

Strength returns show that there were about 21000 more confederates on duty in the Carolinas and Virginia on 12/31/1864 than there were on 09/30/1864. I will buy that their subsistence was not optimal, but I am not buying that you could not subsist the Army of Tennessee infantry from these sources and the remaining part of Georgia (which was the bulk of the agricultural region) throughout the fall harvest season. If Hood withdraws to Macon, He still has rail lines to both SC and AL. In order the cut that rail link to Alabama, Sherman will need to move to either Columbus or Opelika in Alabama. Even if Hood loses that, he still has a rail link to south GA running through Savannah. The returns of Sherman's forces at Atlanta show a total of around 73000 in early September. He eventually took 60000 on the March, and sent back the remainder, along with every garrison along the rail line back to Nashville, to help cobble together Thomas's force. The march to the sea would not have been possible with an Army in his front.

Sherman had seen how effective a war against the railroads was in forcing the AOT to move out of the way. Moving the war toward either Augusta or Macon would have caused the AOT to use one road for its supply and would open the other to Sherman's tender attention.

Sherman had one objective as agreed with Grant earlier in the year -- pressure the AOT so that it could not send relief to Lee. As long as the AOT was in Georgia, Sherman would go after it. But having seen the effect of the war on railroads, he would not have ignored the value of destroying the two cross-Georgia lines, which provided Lee his food. Hood tried to entice Sherman away from those vital railroads by heading into northern Alabama and Tennessee -- Sherman did not bite and went after the roads supporting Lee. Any move by the AOT to stay in central Georgia would have had the result of those two railroads being destroyed and Lee left without food.