Longstreet

[M E Wolf]

Posting as a member, with opinions on the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1-4, 1863, I've learned much from the reading of the many other commanders on the field that day, of both armies.

The enemy's position and view, regardless of sides, can add to the total view of us who are in the present. Frequently, I find myself thinking with the 20/20 hind-sight, to which is most unfair to those who fought on the battlegrounds in 1863.

Focusing on the major figures, has been a folly in my opinion, as each piece be it a minor or major person in the battle has a direct influence or a collateral one, on the outcome of the battle. Modern military tactics also have a nasty habit of creeping in when, the historical military tactics are best suited and understood first, along with the different levels of what 'honor' meant, 'reputation' meant and the standards of ethics, behavior and attitudes of the day were. It is extremely different from today's measures of which is most unfair to hold those in battles past up to.

Frequently, I have pulled from my own personal knowledge and experiences with horses, riding and driving them, training them and using them in traffic as well as on re-enactment fields, I have a better feeling of the experiences of Cavalry and a Trooper's experience than most, who have never been around a horse, let alone been on one or driven a single, a team/pair, a four-in-hand. So too, this adds to my own personal understanding of the authentic reports. Belonging to a para-military organization enhanced my understanding of orders, chain of command and obedience. I too understand what happens when a well planned 'action' falls apart due to the opposition's actions don't marry up to the plan of action. What bothers me, as a student/reader is having 'authors' write on a topic, such as Cavalry and never have had experiences around a horse or engaged in even a mock battle in a re-enactment, claiming expertise` nonetheless, and or any examples of such in any field or position, in relationship to the publications, etc.

I do hope that all of the lengthy reports on Gettysburg, published in the Official Records of the Rebellion also known as the O. R.s, will be read fully and it is an investment of time to do so.

To understand the entire picture, one cannot selectively look at one spot and be a fair judge of the whole work...be it art, be it a battle or life.

Just some thoughts, observations and opinions.

M. E. Wolf

 

[GABoy]

Man, klongstreet,, did you open a can o' worms! Thanks for the thread as it provoked some interesting reading in here.

 

[klongstreet]

Here is my two cents :

I believe the death of Longstreets children took him out of the game . Its safe to assume he was not himself during the campaign . Observers called him " a humbug " or " sullen " , " bitter ", " obstinate and irritated " . I believe his emotional and mental state interfered with his ability to deal effectively with Gen Lee . His 'will ' to carry out the attacks was drained .

Its well documented that he disagreed with Lee's offensive plan . Longstreet was too drained to convince Lee his plan would end in disaster . Longstreet should have done a better job in informing Lee about the true state of affairs ...the faulty intelligence , lack of artillery ammo , the disposition of the Union line etc etc . Longstreet could have called off the attack(s) .

Instead of diligently coordinating the July 3rd offensive he allowed 1/3 of Lee's Army to remain relatively idle . I believe Longstreet KNEW the charge would fail and tried to save what troops he could . There was no communication/coordination with AP Hill's Corp . How could a commander let that happen? I don't believe Longstreet utilized all the strength available . He did not commit 100% .

If he knew failure was the outcome why didn't he simply refuse to carry out Lee's orders and resign on the spot ? Instead he turned in a half assed effort and backed down to Gen Lee . Was his sense of duty to Lee more important than the lives of his men ? He didn't want to sacrifice his career and be labled a coward .

If Lee had replaced Longstreet...and still failed...Longstreet would have been in the " I told you so " position and history would have a totally different take on his performance . Instead he gave a half assed effort which ultimatley reflected poorly upon his record .

The question is did Longstreet purposely undermine Lee's orders ? Was his lack of coordination/communication indicative of his belief that failure would be the ultimate result ? OR was it a shortcoming of his command/leadership/administrative skills ?

I can't believe the Death of his children caused Longstreet any more grief than the many thousands of wives, mothers, sisters and kin already suffering loss, he witness death on a daily bases. " Sullen, Gloomy" yes but not so grief stricken as to sabotage " Lee's plan of attack". I also can't believe that he would refuse a direct order, I would turn your question around and ask
Where was Lee? during his great assault on the 3rd, Why did Lee insist on the attack, yet dismiss out of hand " the move to the right" which was argued for two days.
I have to agree that the attack on the 3rd was not coordinated and with so many views on as to why, " the fog of war springs to mind"
After Gettysburg, Longstreet continued to support Lee and Lee supported Longstreet, neither deserve the attacks made on their character or professionalism. IMO
Thanks for your opinion

 

[JEB]

I'm just searching for reasons why they did what they did .

 

[BillO]

The thing that I appreciate about Longstreet is that he seemed to recognize that the prevailing methods for fighting battles were outdated. To simply throw as many bodies as possible at an enemy and expect a positive outcome could no longer win the day. The problem he had was in convincing others, including Lee, that those methods had to change, and is why he knew "Pickett's Charge" would fail. General Hood also seemed to be of the same mind as Longstreet, at least as far as action on the second day of Gettysburg. Colonel Chamberlain (of Little Round Top fame) and Greene (up on Culp's Hill) would have probably loved to serve under Longstreet. And I dare say that if Grant had Longstreet, the war would have probably been over in 1863.

To say that Longstreet "knew" Pickets charge was doomed is simply wrong. He "knew" about the same time Picket did and not before. There were several people at the 0830 meeting between Lee and Longstreet and the only source I know of that talks about Longstreet objecting was his memoirs which were written long after. They are an interesting read but are useless as far as history goes. Much like Gordon's memoirs.

 

[klongstreet]

I agree. Longstreet as well as Hood on the 2nd knew to turn the right, know matter what I read. both argued it, but Lee was set upon the attacking on the center, For my 2 cents worth " Picket" followed orders as did Longstreet, what happened next was as Lee stated " it's all my fault"
However, anyone can't say both sides gave there all and as an Englishman just learning, I can see by my own history that that things go wrong. The AOP fought for their lives and won, we can argue about " interior lines...exterior lines) until we are blue ( or grey) in the face
I want to read more and learn more from the great knowledge that inspires me from this site, and I will be over next year.

 

[JEB]

Wasn't Longstreet completely stunned by Lee's decision to attack July 3rd ?

I thought Longstreet was busy making arrangements for a flanking movement when Lee showed up told him to prepare to attack the Union center .(?) Given that Longstreet had met with Lee that evening it seems that Longstreet believed he had the latitude to plan accordingly . Then Lee shows up and scuttles the plan . Nobody that witnessed this 8:30 meeting ever wrote about it other than Longstreet .

Granted Longstreet's memoirs must be considered " afterthoughts " ; however his offical report reflects at least some level of negativity towards the plan .

Consider Longstreet's " note " to AP Alexander . In short Alexander is to advise Pickett ( if ) and when he is to step off once the artillery has driven off the enemy . Longstreet tells Alexander , " I shall rely a great deal on your judgement ."

Whats up with that ?

My opinion : Longstreet had talked to Lee until he was blue in the face . This note was an last ditch effort to get Alexander to convince Lee that the attack would fail . Of course Alexander didn't take the bait .

AP Alexander does write of his dealings with Longstreet prior to the attack .But this all took place AFTER the 8:30 meeting .

Alexander says Longstreet rode out to his advance position and was told that the ammunition was spent and that Pendleton had moved the trains back and expropriated some of the guns sent by the III Corps . Alexander says Longstreet told him to " Go and halt Pickett right where he is and replenish your ammunition ." According to Alexander he told Longstreet it would take take too long( at least two hours ) and their only chance was to strike while " the iron is hot " .

Alexander quotes Longstreet " I don't want to make this attack ....I believe it will fail .....I do not see how it can succeed ...I would not make it even now , but that General Lee has ordered it and expects it ." Alexander believed with a little encouragement Longstreet may have called the attack off . But Alexander kept his mouth shut and Pickett's men marched .

The validity of the notion that " Longstreet knew Pickett's Charge would Fail " depends on how one judges Alexander's truthfulness . As far as memoirs go I thought AP Alexander is pretty well respected .

 

[M E Wolf]

My personal opinions are that from the beginning, there were multiple errors peppered throughout the Battle of Gettysburg. From General Early's moving off the location that General J.E.B. Stuart was designated to rendezvous at and with to get additional orders from Lee, through Longstreet; the prolonged trip and being separated from Lee's Army and Early's moving off without orders, caused Stuart to add two hours of hard riding in search of Early to get what he needed from Early. Early could have left a small portion of his command to meet Stuart as to snip off the 2 hours of wandering. The hills really bounce sound and can be misleading. Having been at a rest stop not far from Gettysburg, a thunderstorm's sound was bouncing oddly and could have easily misdirected a response if artillery.

Another personal 'bugging me' thought, was Lee's putting Longstreet in charge of the third day's operations. Military protocol would have caused Pendleton to check first with Alexander, chief of artillery for Longstreet. Searching the O.R.s, Pendleton's omission of any orders to do so, gave me great discomfort, as rank wasn't in play here if Longstreet's Corps was in charge of carrying out Lee's plan, even Lee himself did not interfere with such--it would upset the original plans of the officer in charge. Moving Alexander's ammunition did as much to ruin the attack, as if Pendleton chopped off Alexander's hands. Longstreet's calculated measures, counter-measures was hinged on the timing of Alexander's shelling and softening the position.

I am of the belief that had Lee been feeling better, as it was believed that Lee was suffering from the 'trots' and A.P. Hill, to which had the most men detailed to Longstreet by Lee, their medical distractions and the additional distractions of having no support from President Davis, hoped for by Lee --unusual absence of Stuart, the march to threaten Washington from the north was coming undone. Early's Raid was also a failure due to the men getting so drunk and silly that, the timing was off, the alarm sounded and citizens, wounded, Government clerks, every able body man rallied with the Marines to the forts and held them off as 6th Corps responded.

Had Longstreet not have an independent spy/scout (Harrison); Lee's Army could have met a more fatal situation. I further consider Lee's disbelief and or disappointment Stuart letting him down. Stuart wasn't able to effectively give details of Meade's Army and how many Corps Meade had in easy range. From the Battle of Kelly Ford and all around that area, such as Fleetwood, a railroad depot used for beef stock transportation, was vital for both armies.

It has been said that when Lee's blood was high, like a horse--clamping the bit and going off on their own--stubborn and opinionated -- hadn't had the same consequences earlier in the war. Yet, by time of Gettysburg, the supplies were getting more difficult to obtain as well as able soldiers. Having won so many times, its easy to ride on that 'high' and become careless.

To Lee's credit, he took responsibility. However, I am of the belief the domino effect certainly played a larger factor than just Longstreet alone.

I am of the opinion that General Lee might not take criticism well, especially from those less superior in rank and time in rank. General Joe Johnston promoted Longstreet over Stonewall Jackson. Perhaps Johnston saw these men in a different light and a different superior and style of leadership, has such an important part to play in developing a overall commander. It is to be remembered Johnston's wounding caused Lee to come from Richmond and as Davis' adviser and engineer the early victories; Lee inherited Longstreet and Jackson. From Lee's point of view, I am of the opinion that he trusted his previous superior in the Old Army; General Johnston and his judgment of officers. I don't have the same faith in A. P. Hill as I would Jackson or Longstreet. Being sickly, it wasn't something to be dismissed and seemed to be sick when it was critical. The question remains beyond Pickett's famous reply about Gettysburg, that Yankees had something to do about it, should it remain very unfair to blame Longstreet for the overall loss of the Battle of Gettysburg, post Lee's death to whom took the blame and maintained the responsibility to his death? Certainly, Lee knew who and when let him down for those three days and becomes a what if topic, which has no business when it comes to historical facts written and recorded at the time of its happenings, when these officers had sights only on battle success and surviving. As with all of us, 20/20 hindsight is perfect yet, I feel that the "Lost Cause" banner waved by Early, who didn't stick it out with the Confederate Army, et.al., ran to Mexico and didn't surrender with head held high, who made it a mission to divert blame all to Longstreet, when the reports concerning Early's role in Gettysburg, has plenty of blame, in addition to Pendleton's tampering with Alexander's artillery trains which tampered fully with Longstreet's well planned attack. That lack of etiquette to consult the head of the artillery barrage, is just inexcusable, in my opinion. He too was on full attack mode along with Early--both doing so after Lee's death. So, its my opinion that these two didn't have the stones to attack Longstreet when Lee was alive--only after Lee's death. Everybody wrote memoirs` and they are to be considered private recollections and accounts from their eyes and recall. I cannot dismiss entirely anybody's memoirs` as they were actual participants in the bloody Civil War but, when read along with the Official Records of the Rebellion. I lean heavily on the O.R.s as they are the freshest memories of what happened there. Follow up reports, or Special Reports--are soon after the original report.

Admittedly, we (in a general sense) shall always have our favorites, as far as Generals, characters and battles go. I admit my own being the special interests of the Battle of Gettysburg after the First Battle of Bull Run/Manassas, as it touches my neighborhood historically.

Just my thoughts and opinions.

M. E. Wolf

 

[bankerpapaw]

General Longstreet went on with his life. He chose not to live in the past.

 

[War Horse]

If this quote is accurate, it doesn't appear General Lee blamed Longstreet for the defeat.

"You must remember me very kindly to Mrs. Longstreet and all your children. I have not had an opportunity yet to return the compliment she paid me. I had, while in Richmond, a great many inquiries after you, and learned that you intended commencing business in New Orleans. If you become as good a merchant as you were a soldier, I shall be content. No one will then excel you, and no one can wish you more success and more happiness than I. My interest and affection for you will never cease, and my prayers are always offered for your prosperity."
Robert E. Lee in a letter to James Longstreet,
January 19, 1866

 

[War Horse]

This is supposedly a quote from General Mead on I believe Longstreet's plan to move to the right on day three.

"Longstreet's advice was sound military sense; it was the step I most feared Lee would take."
--General George Meade on Longstreet's advice to General Lee at Gettysburg.

I read it on the internet

 

[Vicksburger]

Can anyone cite to an actual quote where Lee referred to Longstreet as his "War Horse"? I have always wondered if this was historically accurate, or just another myth that becomes a fact by repetition.

 

[War Horse]

To say that Longstreet "knew" Pickets charge was doomed is simply wrong. He "knew" about the same time Picket did and not before. There were several people at the 0830 meeting between Lee and Longstreet and the only source I know of that talks about Longstreet objecting was his memoirs which were written long after. They are an interesting read but are useless as far as history goes. Much like Gordon's memoirs.

Here is Pickett's account of receiving the orders to charge.

I would say both men knew the outcome before it began.

"Pickett, I am being crucified at the thought of the sacrifice of life which this attack will make. I have instructed Alexander to watch the effect of our fire upon the enemy, and when it begins to tell he must take the responsibility and give you the orders, for I can't."
While he was yet speaking a note was brought to me from Alexander. After reading it I handed it to him, asking if I should obey and go forward. He looked at me for a moment, then held out his hand. Presently, clasping his other hand over mine without speaking he bowed his head upon his breast. I shall never forget the look in his face nor the clasp of his hand when I said: - "Then, General, I shall lead my Division on." I had ridden only a few paces when I remembered your letter and (forgive me) thoughtlessly scribbled in a corner of the envelope, "If Old Peter's nod means death then good-by and God bless you, little one," turned back and asked the dear old chief if he would be good enough to mail it for me. As he took your letter from me, my darling, I saw tears glistening on his cheeks and beard. The stern old war-horse, God bless him, was weeping for his men and, I know, praying too that this cup might pass from them. I obeyed the silent assent of his bowed head, an assent given against his own convictions, - given in anguish and with reluctance."
Major General George Pickett, CSA, discussing General Longstreet's
nodded command to begin the charge on Cemetery Ridge
in a letter to his fiancée, July 4, 1863

 

[War Horse]

Can anyone cite to an actual quote where Lee referred to Longstreet as his "War Horse"? I have always wondered if this was historically accurate, or just another myth that becomes a fact by repetition.

Yes he did refer to him as his Old War Horse, I will try and find the actual source. Other writing He also referred to Jackson as his right arm and Longstreet as his left as well as Jackson as his hammer and Longstreet as his anvil.

 

[War Horse]

Can anyone cite to an actual quote where Lee referred to Longstreet as his "War Horse"? I have always wondered if this was historically accurate, or just another myth that becomes a fact by repetition.

Source Wikipedia
James Longstreet, one of Lee's most trusted generals, was referred to by Lee as his Old War Horse, because of his reliability. After the Civil War, many Southerners were angered by Longstreet's defection to the Republican Party and blamed him for their defeat in the Civil War. However, Lee supported reconciliation and was also actually pleased with how Longstreet had fought in the War. (Longstreet was one of his top subordinates.) This nickname was Lee's symbol of trust.

 

[War Horse]

Here are two quotes I find interesting.

"Bring me Longstreet's head on a platter and the war will be over."
--President Abraham Lincoln.

"To Kill Longstreet."
--President Lincoln on the morning of the Battle of the Wilderness when asked about the best thing that could happen to the Union that day.

 

[JPK Huson 1863]

I don't mean to get off thread too far, but have always wondered why Longstreet was so unpopular post war, having rubbed elbows with former enemies but other former Confederates don't seem to have suffered the same fate? I'm not being critical, it's an honest question. Mosby for instance, whose memory and deeds are legendary held post war positions out of what you would think would be a comfort zone- hasn't taken it in the neck like Longstreet. He didn't have an Early helpfully throwing him under the trolley, no close connections where it would have to be him or Lee, pick one for some massive failure-just have always wondered why one would be resented for post-war activites and not the other.

Plus why is the failure of Longstreet's attack- attacks- always something to do with him? Is every defeat the failure of the man in charge? Even beginners like me know it's a terrible risk, attacking an entrenched position like the Confederates faced July 3, much less across that much ground. If the attack failed why isn't it because the Union army held their position? Longstreet wasn't sending all those boys across all that space against a bunch of Sunday School teachers. It was the Union Army, who knew they were coming.

 

[War Horse]

I don't mean to get off thread too far, but have always wondered why Longstreet was so unpopular post war, having rubbed elbows with former enemies but other former Confederates don't seem to have suffered the same fate? I'm not being critical, it's an honest question. Mosby for instance, whose memory and deeds are legendary held post war positions out of what you would think would be a comfort zone- hasn't taken it in the neck like Longstreet. He didn't have an Early helpfully throwing him under the trolley, no close connections where it would have to be him or Lee, pick one for some massive failure-just have always wondered why one would be resented for post-war activites and not the other.

Here is a summerized answer to the question. I just ordered one of his biographys which I hope will provide greater detail to the reasons.

Despite the fact that he was highly respected by Robert E. Lee and one of the most noted commanders of the Confederate Army, General James Longstreet has been the subject of controversy since the U.S. Civil War. A highly respected soldier whose courage and thoughtfulness gained the respect of all under him, Longstreet fought in the Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas), Sharpesburg, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and on the lengthy Wilderness Campaign and commanded the Confederate First Corps from its creation in 1862 to Lee's surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in early April 1865. Although Longstreet's military record shows him to be a soldier as valiant as fellow Confederates Lee and Stonewall Jackson, his later criticism of Lee's maneuvers during the battle of Gettysburg was viewed as traitorous by southerners still loyal to Lee after the war. The blame for the heavy losses suffered at Gettysburg was placed squarely upon Longstreet's shoulders, and he was excluded from Confederate circles—even military reunions—through his death in 1904
Plus why is the failure of Longstreet's attack- attacks- always something to do with him? Is every defeat the failure of the man in charge? Even beginners like me know it's a terrible risk, attacking an entrenched position like the Confederates faced July 3, much less across that much ground. If the attack failed why isn't it because the Union army held their position? Longstreet wasn't sending all those boys across all that space against a bunch of Sunday School teachers. It was the Union Army, who knew they were coming.

 

[JEB]

Longstreet's public image was shaped by his actions AFTER the war and had few defenders .

To the defenders of " The Lost Cause " Longstreet was a traitor . He very publically criticized Lee after the war and the Lee Cult crucified him thereafter . That was his first mistake .

It is easy to characterize Longstreet as questionable when it comes to issues of loyalty ....especially to the Southern cause . His post-war relationship with Sickles had to have added fuel to his critics fire . Essentially Longstreet sided with Old Dan and together they sought to congratulate each other for winning the war for the Union and together attended Gettysburg reunions .

Unlike Sickles , Longstreet had problems defending himself in print . His attempts at addressing his critics only made things worse . He reminded his fellow Southerners that " We are a conquered people " and was immediately vilified and even received death threats !

Longstreet set himself up as a scapegoat .

 

[War Horse]

I don't mean to get off thread too far, but have always wondered why Longstreet was so unpopular post war, having rubbed elbows with former enemies but other former Confederates don't seem to have suffered the same fate? I'm not being critical, it's an honest question. Mosby for instance, whose memory and deeds are legendary held post war positions out of what you would think would be a comfort zone- hasn't taken it in the neck like Longstreet. He didn't have an Early helpfully throwing him under the trolley, no close connections where it would have to be him or Lee, pick one for some massive failure-just have always wondered why one would be resented for post-war activites and not the other.

Plus why is the failure of Longstreet's attack- attacks- always something to do with him? Is every defeat the failure of the man in charge? Even beginners like me know it's a terrible risk, attacking an entrenched position like the Confederates faced July 3, much less across that much ground. If the attack failed why isn't it because the Union army held their position? Longstreet wasn't sending all those boys across all that space against a bunch of Sunday School teachers. It was the Union Army, who knew they were coming.

His decisJPK Hudson, the attached link is the best explanation I have seen concerning the post bellum decline in reputation suffered by James Longstreet. Several factors play into to it. Joining the Republican party, very unpopular with the Southern States, After the end of the war Longstreet felt stongly that the best path to reconstruction was to reestablish the entire nation as one undivided Union which meant full cooperation from the southen states.(He believed in the republican plateform and would not be a democrat simply because it was the popular party)
His decsion to live in New Orleans, one of the most volitile cites of the post war era breaming with Southern discontent for the Union. This was no place for the outspoken Longstreet to enter the political arena especially on the unpopular platform.
His friendship with Ulysses S. Grant. This caused jealousy among among former Confederate officers feeling Longsteet had become Republican for his own financial gain. The truth is Longsteet suffered with extreme poverty for seven years after announcing his political affilliation.
The battle of Liberty Place. It's all here along with citations and historical referrences points.

It's really an excellent thesis and brings to the point that James Longstreet was a victim of his own pride, outspokenness and the convenient escape goat of the surrendered Confederacy who's pride and confidence desperately needed to believe in the lost cause theory.

http://www.loyno.edu/~history/journal/Canzona.htm