Lincoln Lincoln studies war

[wausaubob]

Its an interesting question. Lincoln had to deal with a group of very impatient politicians, while the British advice was that the US was going to have to inflict some economic pain, and escalate the war into a war of emancipation. Most of that advice never made it into writing. But Foreign officer Lord Lyons and his consular officers throughout the south had Seward's ear from the beginning.

 

[wausaubob]

Clausewitz didn't invent the linkage of political strategy and military strategy. It's right there in Jomini, too. Clausewitz did formulate it in its clearest terms, but it wasn't necessary to read his work in order to be exposed to that idea.

Its probably a reflection of the fact that Napoleon changed the scale of war, by creating national mobilization. The ideas that created were being discussed generally in Europe and later it was discovered the wife of von Clausewitz had preserved his exposition of the main questions. Lincoln would not have heard of von Clausewitz directly, but people like Lieber and Carl Schurz would have been talking in those terms and that did have an influence.
Lincoln was not aware that an army could sustain itself with local resources for short periods, but Grant became aware that if the number of days off the rail line were carefully computed, it could work.
Lincoln probably was most heavily influenced by British ideas in how to use naval power.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

My recollection is that Lincoln and McClellan were discussing concentration in time. But even in 1864, the first attempt at simultaneous movement produced mixed results at best. The second attempt resulted in the capture of the outer forts at Mobile Bay, the severing of the Weldon railroad, the partial demolition of the Confederate western army and the fall of Atlanta, and the application of overwhelming force in the Shenandoah Valley. A severe blockade, combined with concentration in time, was the correct strategy. But it required a massive mobilization beyond what the US thought it could do in 1862.

Actually, when McClellan was C-in-C, general activities were planned for the Spring of '62. And, things went ahead fairly well in the West. However, for whatever reason, Lincoln chose to supersede McClellan as to nuts and bolts. I do not think that was a smart move. Almost equally useful was making Halleck the head office boy at the War Department. I think these actions extended the war at least a year. I think Lincoln learned that wars could not be won at the telegraph office.

 

[wausaubob]

Actually, when McClellan was C-in-C, general activities were planned for the Spring of '62. And, things went ahead fairly well in the West. However, for whatever reason, Lincoln chose to supersede McClellan as to nuts and bolts. I do not think that was a smart move. Almost equally useful was making Halleck the head office boy at the War Department. I think these actions extended the war at least a year. I think Lincoln learned that wars could not be won at the telegraph office.

And two years later the lesson was applied. After 5 months, Lincoln and Fox met with Grant and Rawlins and from then on Lincoln was pushing Grant to take complete control. Halleck was pushed aside. Grant was in position to command Butler and he had his own man in the Shenandoah. McClellan could have accomplished much more if he had been commanding Buell and Grant directly.